Divorce; Distribution of liabilities; Scope of remand; Law Offices of Jeffrey Sherbow, PC v Fieger & Fieger, PC; The law-of-the-case doctrine; Rott v Rott; The “rule of mandate”; Stacy v Colvin (9th Cir); Equitable division of marital property; Butler v Simmons-Butler; Meatte v Meatte; Sparks v Sparks; Distinguishing McNamara v Horner; Consideration of fault; Berger v Berger

The court held that: (1) the trial court did not exceed the scope of its authority on second remand when it applied the 90-10 split to the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ Colorado home seized by the IRS, (2) it complied with the court’s instructions and its findings of fact did not leave the court “with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made,” and (3) the court was “not left with a firm conviction that the application of the 90-10 split to the amount seized by the IRS after the sale of the Colorado home was inequitable.” This postjudgment divorce matter stemmed from disputes over the parties’ financial obligations, including the distribution of liability for their tax debt. The court rejected defendant-ex-husband’s argument that the trial court exceeded its authority after second remand by applying the 90-10 split of the parties’ tax debt to the portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Colorado home. “The trial court determined that the sale of the Colorado home occurred ‘before the termination of Defendant’s spousal support obligation to Plaintiff,’ which terminated on” 6/30/23. His “90% share was $562,328.63 and plaintiff’s 10% share was $62,480.96. The trial court awarded defendant various credits, totaling $97,819.07. [It] ordered defendant to continue making $7,500 monthly payments to plaintiff, consistent with the order of” 12/13/23, until further court order or issuance of a stay. “The issue was left open by this Court, and the trial court did not err by deciding [it] on second remand.” Further, while “the parties, the trial court, and this Court knew about the tax liens on the Colorado home, this Court was not aware of the sale of [that] home when it remanded the case on either occasion. The trial court was presented with this information after second remand by this Court and was able to decide the matter. [Its] actions complied with this Court’s remand instructions.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court’s application of the 90-10 split to the home resulted in an inequitable property settlement. The trial court’s findings of fact did not leave the court “with a definite and firm conviction a mistake was made.” Further, its “dispositional ruling on second remand was fair, and this Court is not left with a firm conviction that the reapportionment of the tax debt liability or resulting property division was inequitable.” It also found that “the facts in Meatte differ from those in this case and do not justify another remand or the relief requested by defendant.” Moreover, unlike in McNamara, “the trial court on second remand finally addressed all the appropriate Sparks factors and did not err in reapportioning the parties’ tax debt to a 90-10 split. Consequently, the overall property division was not inequitable.”