Other acts evidence; The victim’s prior hospitalization; MRE 403; The People v Watkins factors; A child’s hearsay statement offered under the medical-treatment exception (MRE 803(4)); People v Meeboer; Prior corporal punishment; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to a witness’s testimony about another child’s bruises; Strategy of shifting blame; Withdrawal of a motion to exclude expert testimony under Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc; Convictions of first-degree felony murder & first-degree child abuse based on the same act

The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of prior instances in which defendant allegedly abused victim-IY and her siblings. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, the evidence supported his convictions of both first-degree felony murder and first-degree child abuse. He took “issue with several strands of evidence related to IY’s prior hospitalization.” IY’s mother and an ER nurse (H) “both testified about an incident” 11 months before IY’s death “when defendant called an ambulance because he found IY unresponsive when she was in his care.” Defendant argued “that this evidence was inadmissible to prove that IY’s prior medical emergency resulted from defendant’s prior abuse.” The court found that “the outcome of the 2016 CPS investigation is not definitive proof of defendant’s innocence.” He also argued “that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting [H’s] testimony that IY identified defendant as the perpetrator of the 2016 incident.” The court found that under the circumstances, there was “a close question regarding whether the trial court properly found that the statement was admissible under MRE 803(4). However, the trial court’s decision regarding a close evidentiary question generally does not constitute an abuse of discretion.” Further, it found that “even if the statement was erroneously admitted, defendant fails to establish a miscarriage of justice warranting reversal.” He additionally argued “that a mistrial was necessary to cure the impermissible inclusion of evidence regarding the 2016 hospitalization—particularly [H’s] testimony that she initiated procedures to submit a Form 3200 report of suspected abuse to CPS.” The court held that “the trial court correctly concluded that the parties’ stipulation did not extend to [H’s] statement and did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial.” Applying the factors from Watkins, defendant next argued “that the prior incidents of physical discipline described by [IY’s sibling] at trial were not similar to the charged offense.” The court found these arguments unconvincing. He did not show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. Affirmed.