Right to present a defense; Not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) defense; MCL 768.20a(1); Legal insanity; MCL 768.21a(1); People v Carpenter; Guilty but mentally ill (GBMI); MCL 768.36(1); Whether an NGRI or GBMI instruction was warranted by the evidence; MCL 768.29a(2); Expert testimony; MRE 702; Waiver; Right to a jury trial; “Criminally responsible”; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Waiver of right to testify; Comparing People v Boyd; Distinguishing Rock v Arkansas; Competency to stand trial; MCL 330.2022(1); MCR 6.125(B); Bona fide doubt as to competency; People v Kammeraad; Distinguishing People v Harris

The court held that the trial court did not err by prohibiting the admission of evidence about defendant’s mental health treatment or precluding him from raising a NGRI defense, and defense counsel was not ineffective. He was convicted of multiple counts of CSC III for incest with his adult daughter. On appeal, the court first found that the trial court’s “finding regarding culpability essentially functioned as a finding that defendant was competent to stand trial and that the NGRI defense could not be raised at trial, which did not deny [his] right to a trial by jury or otherwise violate [his] presumption of innocence.” Further, even assuming he “did not waive the NGRI defense, the evidence did not warrant an NGRI instruction.” In view of the trial “court’s discussion of the issue . . . and considering the lack of evidence supporting defendant’s position . . . the trial court did not deprive defendant of his right to present an NGRI defense.” Defendant did “not offer any expert testimony to support his position and appear[ed] to rely solely on his own proposed testimony, as well as the evidence relating to his guardianship and civil-commitment proceeding.” This testimony “was not sufficient to support his NGRI defense.” Further, remand was unnecessary because: (1) the record was “sufficiently developed to allow for appellate review of the trial court’s rulings, and defendant’s testimony was insufficient to support his NGRI defense,” and (2) the documentation and testimony he proposed “to present to the trial court [did] not support his NGRI defense.” In addition, the trial “court did not err in precluding the admission of evidence relating to defendant’s mental health, treatment, hospitalization, or the guardianship.” Further, his “trial counsel adequately investigated the [NGRI] issue by requesting an independent examination, and was not deficient for failing to pursue an insanity defense after defendant’s own independent expert concluded, only a month before trial, that defendant was competent and could be found criminally responsible.” The court also held that the trial court’s ruling precluding his testimony about his mental health history did not deprive him of his right to testify at trial, or render his waiver of this right involuntary. Finally, the trial court did not err by finding defendant’s competency had been thoroughly explored before trial. Affirmed.