PIP benefits action; Admissibility of evidence; Relevance; MRE 401; Penalty interest; MCL 500.3142(2); Williams v AAA MI; Good faith & reasonableness; Davis v Citizens Ins Co of Am; Morales v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Hearsay; Party-opponent admission; Evidence of impeachment under MRE 613; People v Lundy; Jury instructions; Supplemental instructions; Bouverette v Westinghouse Elec Corp; Exacerbation of a preexisting injury; Plaintiff’s burden of proof; Mootness

The court held that defendant-insurer’s evidentiary and jury instruction challenges were meritless. It also found moot defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s striking of its experts’ deposition testimony. The trial court entered an order, after a jury verdict, awarding plaintiff PIP benefits for treatment of injuries defendant’s insured (nonparty-B) sustained in a rear-end collision. It also awarded penalty interest. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s evidentiary challenges as meritless, concluding the trial court did not err by finding: (1) defendant’s claims representative’s testimony was irrelevant even as to the issue of penalty interest; (2) a letter written by B’s counsel before the accident occurred was not admissible as a party-opponent admission; and (3) documents related to B’s Social Security Disability Insurance were inadmissible and irrelevant. The court also rejected defendant’s challenges to two of the trial court’s rulings pertaining to jury instructions. First, “the trial court did not err by declining to provide defendant’s requested jury instruction.” And even if “there was any error, defendant has failed to show how any ‘error resulted in such unfair prejudice to the complaining party that the failure to vacate the jury verdict would be inconsistent with substantial justice.’” Second, because plaintiff’s “requested instruction, as given, properly instructed the jury regarding the applicable law and because the standard instruction does not fully address the situation of an aggravation of a preexisting injury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by providing the special instruction.” Finally, the court rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court erred when it struck the deposition testimony of its three experts. Defendant failed “to explain, assuming any error occurred, how the requested relief of a new trial” was warranted. “The trial court struck the experts’ deposition testimony and allowed defendant to either (1) proceed to trial without the experts, or (2) retake the testimony. Defendant opted for the second option, and the experts testified in person at trial. Importantly, the trial court did not limit how the experts could testify in this subsequent proceeding.” As such, the issue was moot as “the requested remedy of a new trial would accomplish nothing that did not occur already. The experts would simply testify again, either via de bene esse depositions or live at trial.” Affirmed.