Successive motion for relief from judgment; The trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction when it entered a judgment of sentence (JOS); People v Washington; People v Scott; MCR 7.315(C) Entry & effective date of Supreme Court orders & judgments; MCR 7.315(C) & (D); Effect of the filing of a motion for reconsideration; MCR 7.311(G); Double jeopardy claim; MCR 6.502(G)(2); MCR 6.508(D)

The court held that (1) the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction when it entered a JOS convicting defendant of second-degree murder and (2) the double jeopardy claim portion of his successive motion for relief from judgment was procedurally barred. He was convicted of first-degree murder in 1992. On 9/13/95, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court entered an order vacating that “conviction and remanding the case to the trial court; it directed the prosecution to choose either to retry defendant for first-degree murder or to allow the entry of a conviction of second-degree murder.” On 10/4/95, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. On 11/17/95, the trial court entered an order vacating the first-degree murder conviction and a JOS convicting defendant of second-degree murder. The Supreme Court denied his motion for reconsideration 12 days later. In this appeal from the denial of his fourth motion for relief from judgment, the court concluded “the Supreme Court’s 1995 order was not an order or judgment issued pursuant to an opinion under MCR 7.315(C) (then MCR 7.317(C)), but instead was ‘[a]n order or judgment, other those by opinion under subrule (C),’ issued under MCR 7.315(D) (then MCR 7.317(D)).” The order was “in the Michigan Reporter under the ‘Actions on Applications’ section, is labeled as an order (not as an opinion), makes no reference to any related opinion, and does not itself fit the requirements for a Supreme Court opinion found in our court rules, either in 1995” or now. His “case was never placed on the calendar or heard by the Supreme Court; rather, [his] application was disposed of via order absent the issuance of any opinion. There simply is no evidence in the record from which to conclude that the 1995 remand order was ‘an order or judgment pursuant to an opinion’ under MCR 7.315(C) which, unless otherwise ordered, would not have become effective until either the time for filing a motion for rehearing had elapsed or a timely-filed motion for rehearing had been disposed of by the Court.” Under MCR 7.315(D), the order “became effective the day it was entered, [9/13/95], and subject-matter jurisdiction was re-invested in the trial court on that day.” His motion for reconsideration “did not stay that investiture.” The court also held that his double jeopardy claim did not fall within MCR 6.502(G)(2)’s exceptions. Affirmed.