Quiet title action; Probate court jurisdiction; MCL 700.1303(1)(a); Circuit court jurisdiction; MCL 600.2932(1); MCR 3.411; Effect of a claim being titled as a “petition” as opposed to a “complaint”; MCR 5.101(C)(1); Whether a motion for a directed verdict should be treated as one for involuntary dismissal; Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Cnty Treasurer; The raise or waive rule; Walters v Nadell; Contract modification; “Mutuality”; Universal Leaseway Sys, Inc v Herrud & Co; Effect of delivery of a deed; Resh v Fox; Personal representative (PR)

The court held that the trial court did not err by quieting title to real property in favor of appellee (the decedent’s cousin) and against appellant-PR of the estate (the decedent’s sister). Appellee sought to quiet title to the property based on a “Lady Bird” deed executed by the decedent conveying a partial ownership interest in the property to her. She disputed a handwritten bill of sale purportedly created by the decedent and agreeing to sell the property to appellant, as well as a quitclaim deed. The trial court granted a directed verdict for appellee. On appeal, the court rejected appellant’s argument that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to hear appellee’s quiet-title action, noting that “although the circuit court also had jurisdiction to hear the quiet title action, . . . the probate court had concurrent jurisdiction to hear the matter under MCL 700.1303(1)(a).” Appellee’s failure “to cite the correct statutory provisions does not negate the probate court’s concurrent jurisdiction under” this statute. And because she “is not a fiduciary or a trustee . . . MCR 5.101(C)(1) does not mandate that she title her action a ‘civil action.’ Further, she is not a claimant filing an action after notice that her claim has been disallowed, so MCR 5.101(C)(2) does not apply.” Appellant also claimed that the trial court erred by granting appellee’s third motion for a “‘directed verdict,’” because “the proper motion would have been one for ‘involuntary dismissal.’” The court agreed “the motion should have been treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal.” But appellant never gave appellee or the trial “court a chance to respond to her procedural argument relating to the timing of” the motion. Further, while appellant “did not present her testimony as part of her case-in-chief, any such testimony would be cumulative to the testimony already offered. And, given her testimony in the eviction proceedings and during [appellee’s] case-in-chief, it [was] apparent that in order to prevail in the quiet title action and in her petition to enforce the sale, she would have had to offer additional testimony to contradict her already sworn testimony. There [was] no indication that she would have offered such contradictory testimony or that, if she had done so, the [trial] court would have believed her.” Finally, the court rejected appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by quieting title in favor of appellee because the evidence showed that the decedent had conveyed title to appellant via a quitclaim deed. It noted she “never satisfied the mortgage while the decedent was alive, so the precondition was not satisfied.” Affirmed.