Age & gender discrimination in employment claims; Whether defendant-employer treated plaintiff less favorably than a similarly situated male employee; Whether plaintiff met the “heightened standard” in a workforce reduction case; Pretext; Hostile work environment claim; Timeliness; Equal Pay Act (EPA) claim

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-employer (Clariant Plastics) on plaintiff-Hayes’s age discrimination and hostile work environment claims but held that she established genuine issues of material fact as to her gender-discrimination and unequal-pay claims. Hayes worked as a warehouse logistics clerk at Clariant for 25 years until she was fired. Clariant contended she was laid off as part of a workforce reduction. She sued for discrimination, violation of the EPA, and hostile work environment. The district court granted Clariant summary judgment on all claims. As to Hayes’s age discrimination claim, the court on appeal found that she was unable to show that she was “replaced by someone outside her protected class or treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside her protected class.” Turning to the gender discrimination claim, the central dispute was whether Clariant treated Hayes “less favorably than a similarly situated male employees.” The district court ruled that Hayes and the retained male employee (P) were not similarly situated “because ‘he had production experience, a forklift license, and supervisory skills.’” But it did not explain why these things “were relevant to the similarly situated analysis.” The court noted it was not necessary for Hayes to show an “‘exact correlation’” with the employee receiving favorable treatment; she only needed to show that they both were “‘similar in all of the relevant aspects.’” There was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the two were “similarly situated in all relevant aspects of their warehouse jobs.” Hayes also met the “heightened standard” in a workforce reduction case with her extensive experience and her superior employment record. She also may “show that she was singled out by presenting evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere.” Viewed in the light most favorable to her, the record “reveals a climate of pervasive sexual harassment.” As to the question of pretext, the court determined that “a reasonable juror could conclude that Clariant’s proffered reason lacked a basis in fact or did not actually motivate the company’s decision to fire Hayes.” The court added that “the district court also erred when it concluded that Hayes did not establish a prima facie case under the EPA.” A reasonable juror could find that she and P “performed equal work.” And her pay rate when she was discharged was over $5 less per hour than P’s pay rate. But the court held that her hostile work environment claim was time-barred. Lastly, it remanded for the district court to reconsider whether to assume supplemental jurisdiction over her state claims. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.