42 USC § 1983 action alleging violation of plaintiff-prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; Requirement that plaintiff participate in a sex-offender program to obtain parole; Bridges v Michigan Parole Bd (Unpub 6th Cir order); Whether plaintiff established a “liberty” interest; Wilkinson v Austin; Sandin v Conner; Whether plaintiff was entitled to a hearing before prison officials could treat him as a sex offender

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff-prisoner failed to identify a cognizable “liberty ” interest in (1) avoiding the “sex offender” label, (2) “obtaining parole under Michigan’s discretionary system” or (3) avoiding a requirement that he “complete a sex-offender program as a condition of parole.” In 1986, plaintiff pled guilty to several crimes, including CSC III. Due to his later plea to second-degree murder, he remains in prison. He also pled guilty to AWIGBH for assaulting a female corrections officer with whom he claimed to be having a sexual relationship. Testing for his likelihood of committing another sex offense “suggested he posed a moderate to high risk of recidivism.” Thus, a prison official recommended that he complete the sex-offender program. He has twice been kicked out of the program and has since refused to participate. Because he would not participate, he was repeatedly denied parole. He then filed this action under § 1983, alleging defendants-prison officials denied him “due process by failing to give him a hearing before treating him as a sex offender and requiring him to participate in the sex-offender program to obtain parole.” The district court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the court first considered the liberty interests still available to a prisoner. It noted that to find a liberty interest created by a prison regulation, a court must first consider “the ‘nature’ of the condition of confinement that the regulation addresses.” Significantly, “if the regulation limits an administrator’s ability to impose the type of hardship that generally ‘falls within the expected perimeters’ of prison life, it will not create a liberty interest.” Here, plaintiff was not required to attend the program; his complaint only stated that it was recommended he do so. Without more, he did “not have a liberty interest in avoiding a mere official recommendation[.]” And attending the program qualified “as one of ‘the ordinary incidents of prison life’— not an ‘atypical’ hardship.” Further, it is well established that in Michigan, there is no liberty interest in parole. As for avoiding the sex offender classification, in an unpublished order, the court has held that a state “may require convicted sex offenders to participate in a sex-offender program as a condition of parole without providing any more process.” Finally, the Michigan statutory process giving prisoners a right to a hearing if they object to treatment did not apply to plaintiff’s “recommended sex-offender program.” He was not required to participate and “it applies only to prisoners that staff find mentally ill.” Affirmed.