An “employer” under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); MCL 15.361; Whether defendant-county was an “employer” of plaintiff-former assistant prosecuting attorney (APA); Reliance on the economic-reality test; Wrongful termination in violation of public policy; Suchodolski v Michigan Consol Gas Co; Claim of retaliation for attempting to prevent or remedy a violation of law; Public policy that criminal prosecutions comport with the law; False imprisonment; Length of confinement; Burden to prove lawful authority; Assault & battery; Level of connection between an object & the complainant

The court held that defendant-county fit “the definition of an ‘employer’ under the statutory language in the WPA” as to plaintiff-former APA, “and the Court of Appeals erred by using the economic-reality test to determine whether” it was an employer. Further, “a plaintiff can state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy where they allege that they were terminated based on their actions to prevent or remedy a violation of the law.” Finally, it found that plaintiff established genuine issues of material fact as to her claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery. Thus, it reversed Parts III(A), III(B), and III(D) of the Court of Appeals’ judgment on remand, vacated Part IV, and remanded the case to the trial court. This was the second time the case was before the court. Plaintiff’s claims arose from her handling of a CSC prosecution “and the alleged actions defendants took against [her] in response to her handling of that case.” Defendant-Boyd was the chief APA. The court first addressed whether the county was plaintiff’s employer such that it was susceptible to her WPA claims. It noted that the “the Legislature defined ‘employee’ and ‘employer’ as used in the WPA” in MCL 15.361, and it found that “the WPA’s plain text establishes that Saginaw County was [plaintiff’s] employer, such that it is subject to suit.” The court next considered her public policy claim. It held that “a plaintiff claiming retaliation for attempting to prevent or remedy a violation of law” has to satisfy “three criteria to survive summary disposition. A plaintiff must make a prima facie showing (1) that the law was or would have been violated, (2) that they reasonably and in good faith believed they were remedying or preventing a violation of law, and (3) that their actions regarding the alleged violation were the basis for an adverse employment action.” Given that “the trial court and the parties did not have the benefit of” this test, the court remanded “to the trial court to consider in the first instance the question of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact under MCR 2.116(C)(10)” as to plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. Finally, the court held that her intentional tort claims survived summary disposition. The length of time she “was detained is immaterial to liability for false imprisonment and Boyd lacked lawful authority to detain” her. As to her assault and battery claim, while merely “touching a door that another is touching could not support a claim for battery[,] . . . [plaintiff’s] allegations, if true, bring the door into the realm of objects held in the victim’s sole physical possession.”

Concurring, Justice Welch joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to provide an explanation for her vote as to Part III(B), concerning the wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim.

Dissenting, Justice Zahra agreed “with the majority opinion’s interpretation of the term ‘employer’ under the WPA” but dissented from its “decision to sustain plaintiff’s public-policy claim and intentional-tort claims.”