Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; Effect of a within-guidelines sentence; People v Anderson; Vindictiveness; Effect of resentencing by a different judge; People v Mazzie; Claim the sentence violated the indeterminate sentencing rule in People v Moore; People v Merriweather; People v Kelly; People v Lemons; Scoring of OVs 3, 6, & 19; MCL 777.33(1)(c); People v Houston; MCL 777.36(1)(b) & (2)(a); MCL 777.49(c); Fleeing from police; Propriety of the trial court resentencing defendant rather than only conducting a United States v Crosby hearing; Waiver

The court rejected defendant’s reasonableness challenge to his within-guidelines sentence and his claim of vindictive sentencing, noting that a different judge resentenced him and that he did not point to any indication of vindictiveness. As to his claim that his sentence violated the indeterminate sentencing rule in Moore, the court found that Moore has been overruled. It also upheld the scoring of 25 points for OVs 3 and 6, and 10 points for OV 19. Finally, it found that he waived his argument that the trial court should have only conducted a Crosby hearing rather than resentencing him. He was convicted of second-degree murder, AWIM, and domestic violence (third offense). He was originally sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent prison terms of 70 to 150 years for murder, 40 to 80 years for AWIM, and 3 to 15 years for domestic violence. On remand, he was resentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 80 to 150 years for murder and the same sentences as originally imposed for the other two crimes. As to his argument that his 80-year minimum sentence for murder was disproportionate, the court noted that it was within his guidelines range for that conviction. Thus, the “sentence need not be reviewed for reasonableness.” Rather, it had to be affirmed absent an error in guidelines scoring or reliance on inaccurate information, neither of which was asserted here. As to his vindictiveness argument, he acknowledged there was no presumption of this given that he was resentenced by a different judge. The court also found the record belied “any retaliatory motivation. The resentencing judge clearly had different ‘perceptions, experience, and judgment’ than the original sentencing judge, which is precisely what the judge elucidated when explaining” his reasons for sentencing defendant. He “had thoroughly reviewed the circumstances of the case, including both the original and updated presentence reports, defendant’s prior record, [his] current circumstances, sentencing memorandums and letters submitted to the court, and ‘issues such as protection of society, punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence.’” He described the case as among “‘the most horrific’” he had dealt with. He “stated: ‘It is my best judgment that the appropriate and proportionate . . . sentence in this case is a greater sentence than that imposed by [the original sentencing judge].’”