Child custody; Proper cause or a change of circumstances; Lieberman v Orr; Modification of an established custodial environment; Shade v Wright; The statutory best-interest factors; MCL 722.23; Kessler v Kessler; Whether there is a right to counsel in custody proceedings; Haller v Haller; Whether MCL 712A.17c(4)(a) applied; Comparing Jendrusik v Marine (Unpub); Joint legal custody; Pierron v Pierron

The court held that the trial court did not err by awarding defendant-father sole physical custody of the parties’ child, or by failing to appoint counsel for plaintiff-mother. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award defendant sole legal custody as well. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court should have awarded the parties joint physical custody, and should have appointed her counsel in the custody proceedings. It disagreed with her claim that the trial court erred as to several of the statutory best-interests factors, and thus, erred by awarding defendant sole physical custody. The fact that defendant “provided a stable household environment for [the child] and was otherwise an appropriate parent, whereas [plaintiff] was inconsistent in this regard, shows that the trial court did not err by finding [defendant] was favored with regard to factors (b), (c), (d), (e), and (h), each of which somehow concern the ability of the party to provide a stable household environment and act as an appropriate, caring parent for the child’s physical and mental needs.” It also did not err as to factor (f). And although it arguably erred as to factor (l), the error was harmless because the bulk of the factors weighed in defendant’s favor. The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel for her in the custody proceedings. “[T]he fact that the custody proceedings were subsequently used as a basis for dismissing the child-protective proceedings is irrelevant because that subsequent dismissal could not have affected the earlier custody proceedings themselves. Consistent with Jendrusik,” the court declined to decide whether plaintiff “had a statutory right to appointed counsel in the custody proceedings.” Finally, the court rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding him sole legal custody. “There is nothing logically or legally inconsistent with the trial court’s ultimate ruling that [defendant] would have sole physical custody, but that the parties also would be able to cooperate for the purposes of legal custody. To the extent that the cooperative relationship between the parties may have changed, [he] may file a new motion seeking modification of the current custody order.” Affirmed.