Sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder when the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime; Miller v. Alabama; People v. Hyatt; People v. Skinner; Claim that the life without parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the trial court erred in applying the Miller factors; MCL 769.25; Credibility determinations; People v. Kanaan; Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR)

In an order, the court granted the state’s motion for reconsideration and vacated its prior opinion (see e-Journal # 61980 in the 3/8/16 edition). In a new opinion, it held that, pursuant to Hyatt, a judge must make the factual findings mandated by Miller. Thus, the trial court’s findings did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Further, the trial court did not clearly err in its findings on the Miller factors and thus, did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to life without parole. He was convicted of first-degree murder for an offense he committed when he was a juvenile. In its prior opinion, the court vacated his life without parole sentence and remanded for resentencing before a jury pursuant to Skinner. However, in Hyatt, the court “convened a conflict panel and rejected the analysis and holding of Skinner.” Hyatt held that when the prosecution “seeks to enhance a juvenile’s default term-of-years’ sentence to life without the possibility of parole, a juvenile defendant does not have the right to have a jury make the factual findings necessary to elevate his or her sentence.” Thus, his claim that the Sixth Amendment was violated when the trial court made factual findings that increased his sentence failed. So did his claim that the Eighth Amendment was violated by the trial court’s alleged errors in applying the Miller factors. It conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing. It considered the PSIR, letters it received, defendant’s prison record, and evidence from the jury trial. While defendant argued that a juvenile should not receive a life without parole sentence, Miller “did not preclude sentencing a juvenile to life without parole.” The court held that the trial court “did not clearly err in finding that defendant’s age did not weigh in favor of parole.” It considered his age as only one of several factors, as well as his “maturity, mental acuity, and intelligence” level. It also did not err as to its finding that his allegation of physical abuse by his father was not credible. He stated in the PSIR “that his parents did not physically abuse him and that he had a good relationship” with them. Given that nothing in the record indicated that he was pressured by peers to commit the crime, the trial court did not err in its finding as to peer pressure. Affirmed.