Sentencing; Sentencing a minor to life imprisonment without parole; MCL 769.25a; Montgomery v. Louisiana; Miller v. Alabama; People v. Garay; The difference between adults & minors as to sentencing; Roper v. Simmons; Graham v. Florida; State v. Null (IA); Whether Miller applies to the sentencing of a minor for first-degree murder when the prosecution does not seek a sentence of life without parole; Sentencing objectives; People v. Snow; Consideration of a defendant’s conduct since his or her original sentencing; People v. Triplett; Whether defendant was entitled to resentencing on his armed robbery & kidnapping convictions; MCL 771.14(2)(e)(ii)

Holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by considering and balancing the Snow factors when resentencing defendant, the court found that he was entitled to resentencing on his conviction of first-degree felony murder. Thus, it vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing on that conviction. However, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of his request for resentencing on his armed robbery and kidnapping convictions. In 1994, defendant, who was a minor, aided and abetted an acquaintance (L) who killed a woman who offered them a ride and stole her car. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, to be served concurrently with sentences of life imprisonment for the armed robbery and kidnapping convictions. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery, finding that Miller applied retroactively, he was resentenced in 2016 to a term of 40 to 60 years. On appeal, the court first held that there is “no constitutional mandate requiring the trial court to specifically make findings as to the Miller factors except in the context of a decision whether or not to impose life without parole.” However, in sentencing a minor convicted of first-degree murder, “when the sentence of life-without-parole is not at issue, the court should be guided by a balancing of the Snow objectives and in that context is required to take into account the attributes of youth such as those described in Miller.” It then found that the trial court did not do this. Instead, it “concluded that defendant should receive the maximum sentence the court could impose because it was [his] idea to leave town that set the events in motion, and that he participated in a carjacking with [L], whom he knew was armed, and who had expressed the intent to kill the victim.” It also did not discuss whether he “remained a threat to the safety of society, whether he was capable of reform, or whether sentencing [him] to 40 years, rather than a lesser minimum term, would be likely to have a significantly different deterrent effect.” And because he “has been incarcerated for over 20 years, there was information available to evaluate defendant’s rehabilitation, and not merely his potential for rehabilitation.” Finally, the court noted that although there was merit to his claim that the trial court erred by refusing to resentence him on his armed robbery and kidnapping convictions, “[n]either the remand order nor the referenced statutes provide for resentencing on his other convictions and so the trial court properly concluded that it had no authority to resentence on those grounds.”