Sixth Amendment right to counsel; Allowing appointed counsel to withdraw without appointing substitute counsel; People v Anderson; MCR 6.005(D); Giving up the right to counsel by defendant’s conduct; People v Kammeraad; Ineffective assistance of counsel due to lack of preparation time; United States v Cronic; Admission of preliminary exam testimony; MRE 804(b)(1); Unavailability; MRE 804(a)(5); Due diligence; Right of confrontation; Motion to suppress evidence obtained from a cell phone; People v Hughes; The particularity requirement; Sufficiency of the evidence for an obstruction of justice conviction; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 10 & 12; MCL 777.40(1)(b); MCL 777.42(1)(a); A contemporaneous felonious criminal act; Effect of a within guidelines sentence

The court held that while the trial court should have again “advised defendant of the charges against him, the sentencing consequences he faced, and the” risks of self-representation before permitting appointed counsel to withdraw, this was not outcome-determinative in light of his conduct. His Cronic argument also failed. Further, the trial court did not err in admitting preliminary exam testimony, and there was no Confrontation Clause violation. Also, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone, there was sufficient evidence for his obstruction of justice conviction, and there was no error in the scoring of OVs 10 and 12. Finally, he failed to overcome the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was proportionate. Thus, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences for producing child sexually abusive activity, distributing or promoting child sexually abusive activity, possession of child sexually abusive material, using a computer to commit a crime, and obstruction of justice. While the record indicated “the trial court failed to comply with the substance of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D)[,]” reversal was not warranted. Defendant’s “actions delayed the case for over two years, in part by repeatedly terminating the services of his retained and appointed counsel.” The court found that he made his attorney’s “work impossible. He refused to communicate with his retained counsel, and his lack of communication continued with his appointed counsel. He threatened his retained counsel’s professional license, while he accused his appointed attorney of lying and colluding with the prosecutor’s office. During the less than two months that defendant represented himself with advisory counsel, two hearings” were conducted, and he failed to “reach out to advisory counsel for any advice or counsel during this time.” The court further held that when he told victim-AM to drop the charges in a separate case, and “not to answer any questions about why she was dropping the charges, defendant attempted to ‘willfully hamper, obstruct or interfere with a criminal investigation.’”