Admission of other acts evidence under MCL 768.27b; MRE 403; People v Watkins; Jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter; Waiver; Sentencing; Effect of a within-guidelines sentence; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Carp

Rejecting defendant-Purdle’s claim that other acts evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it under MCL 768.27b. Further, the involuntary manslaughter jury instruction he sought was not supported by the evidence, and his within-guidelines sentence did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. He was convicted of second-degree murder, CCW, FIP, and felony-firearm. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 680 to 960 months for murder, 60 to 180 months each for CCW and FIP, and a consecutive 2-year term for his felony-firearm convictions. The other acts evidence consisted of testimony from his ex-girlfriend, B, which “indicated that she was in a dating relationship with Purdle, that she got into an argument with him, and that in response to the argument he pulled out a gun.” He was also in a dating relationship with the victim, D. Days after the incident with B, defendant got into an argument with D “and pulled a gun. In light of the striking similarities between the two acts, and their closeness in time,” the court concluded that the fact he did not point a gun at B was “not so significant as to warrant exclusion of the” other acts evidence. While he contended the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it placed a gun in his hands days before D was shot, the court noted that evidence is not “unfairly prejudicial merely because it is damaging to the defendant’s case.” The other acts evidence of domestic violence here was “not marginally probative; instead, it is significantly probative both of the fact that Purdle had a gun just days before the shooting and that he had a propensity to use it to threaten women he was dating while he was in arguments with them.” As to his jury instruction claims, the court found that he waived the issue of the denial of his request for an accident instruction, and that the trial court did not err in denying his request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction. He failed to show “that any rational view of the evidence could support a conclusion that he had a gun and pointed it at [D’s] face and shot her, with something less than malice.” Affirmed.