Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Horseracing Integrity & Safety Act (HISA); The “non-delegation” doctrine; Expansion of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) power to “abrogate, add to, & modify” the rules governing the horseracing industry; 15 USC § 3053(e); Whether the 2022 HISA amendment made the controversy “moot”; Delegations to private entities; FCC v Consumers’ Research; Standing to challenge the requirement that state authorities cooperate & share information with the Horseracing Authority or federal agencies; § 3060(b); Whether § 3052(f) violates the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering guarantee
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the court considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Consumers’ Research and other recent decisions and rejected plaintiff-Oklahoma’s facial challenge to the HISA. It held that the HISA, as amended, gives the FTC, not defendant-Horseracing Authority, “the final say over the Act’s key rulemaking and enforcement provisions.” Congress enacted the HISA “to establish a nationwide framework for regulating thoroughbred horseracing. That led to several non-delegation and anti-commandeering challenges to the validity of the Act throughout the country. The lead challenge—the facial non-delegation challenge—focused on the reality that the Act replaced several state regulatory authorities with a private corporation, the Horseracing Authority, which became the Act’s primary rulemaker and which was not subordinate to the relevant public agency,” the FTC. But the HISA was later amended to give the FCC the power “to create rules that ‘abrogate, add to, and modify the rules of the Authority.’” The court first held that the HISA’s amendments did not moot this case where “the revised statute continues to place a material burden on the plaintiff that arises from the same theory of unconstitutionality” stated in the complaint and where the “amendment does not affect other features of the challenge.” The court considered the principles of non-delegation as it applies to delegations to private entities. In Consumers’ Research, the Supreme Court held that a program does not impermissibly delegate government authority to a private entity where the government agency retains “final ‘decision-making authority.’” The court concluded here that, under § 3053(e), the FTC has “ultimate discretion over the content of the rules that govern the horseracing industry and the Horseracing Authority’s implementation of those rules.” It also has final authority over enforcement actions. Through “independent review, the FTC may reverse any sanction by the Authority.” The court next held that Oklahoma and the other plaintiffs-states lacked standing to challenge § 3060(b), “which requires state authorities to ‘cooperate and share information’ with the Horseracing Authority or federal agencies.” This statute “does not contain a penalty or enforcement mechanism. And Oklahoma does not point to any actual or threatened enforcement actions. An unenforceable statutory duty does not give rise to Article III standing.” Finally, although “3052(f)’s threat of preemption” gave Oklahoma standing to challenge it, “the provision does not commandeer the States.” Affirmed.
Disability discrimination; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Failure to accommodate; Whether plaintiff’s proposed accommodation was “objectively reasonable”; Failure to engage in the interactive-process
In this ADA action for failure to accommodate, the court held that plaintiff-Bowles’s requested accommodation was unreasonable as a matter of law because “versatility and mobility were essential functions of the position.” Further, her interactive-process claim depended upon a viable reasonable-accommodation claim. Thus, it affirmed summary judgment for defendant-employer (Chicken Salad Chick). Bowles worked for defendant as a cashier/service-team member. Because she suffered from arthritis in her knees, she requested that she be allowed to sit for five minutes after every ten minutes of standing. Defendant refused, and she sued under the ADA for failure to accommodate and for refusing to engage in the ADA’s interactive-accommodation process. On appeal, the court concluded that all Chicken Salad Chick team members “operate in a ‘fast-paced environment’ where effective multitasking and ‘well-paced mobility’ for the ‘duration of the workday’ are required skills.” Considering her claim for failure to accommodate, it explained that she had to show that “her proposed accommodation—being able to sit for five minutes after every ten minutes of standing—is objectively reasonable, accounting for the essential requirements of the cashier/service-team member role at Chicken Salad Chick.” The court concluded the “record on this front—including the ‘employer’s words, policies, and practices’—is overwhelming and undisputed.” It rejected her assertions that she was only hired to work at the register. As to her assertion that a reasonable jury could find “that an accommodation that permitted her to sit ‘intermittingly’ would have allowed her to still perform the job’s essential functions,” it determined that “a bare request simply to sit whenever needed is so nebulous that it amounts to no accommodation request at all.” The court held that meeting this accommodation request “would alter essential functions of the cashier/service-team member position . . . .” As to the failure to engage in the interactive-process claim, this is only an independent violation of the ADA if a “‘plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing that [s]he proposed a reasonable accommodation.’” As Bowles “presented a facially unreasonable request to Chicken Salad Chick,” this claim necessarily failed.
42 USC § 1983 action by a pretrial detainee for deliberate indifference; A “constitutional harm”; Whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that plaintiff was at “a substantial risk of harm from being placed in a cell” with two violent inmates; Westmoreland v Butler Cnty; Whether the action was “intentional”; Brawner v Scott Cnty; Causation; Whether plaintiff adequately alleged a claim under Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Barren County Detention Center (BCDC)
The court reversed summary judgment for defendants-County and County Jailer in this § 1983 case for deliberate indifference to pretrial detainee Poynter’s safety. It held that he “was not required to establish that a specific individual violated his rights” and that he raised a genuine issue of fact whether his assailants’ classification and presence in the general prison population “were intentional, not accidental.” He was placed in the County Jail for failure to pay child support. He was moved into a general-population cell where he was attacked by two cell occupants within two minutes. He suffered severe head trauma and is permanently impaired. He sued under § 1983 alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety where his two attackers were known to have previously beaten other inmates 11 times but were kept in the general-population cells. On appeal, the court first concluded the district court erred by ruling “that it was required to determine whether an individual BCDC staff member committed a constitutional violation” before a municipal defendant could be held liable under § 1983. “That is incorrect—we have held that a municipality can be liable for a constitutional violation ‘even in the absence of a showing of a constitutional violation by any one individual.’” He was only required to show that “he suffered a constitutional harm.” Applying the four-part Westmoreland test, the court held that Poynter offered sufficient evidence that his constitutional rights were violated. Considering the “intentional” requirement, it held that under Brawner, he was only required to show that “the unconstitutional action that harmed him was intentional (not accidental), recklessly placed him at a substantial risk of harm, and caused his injuries.” The court concluded that Poynter raised genuine fact issues whether the assailants’ classification was intentional, and whether the “BCDC recklessly disregarded the high risk of harm to Poynter from placing him in a cell” with two inmates with a history of violence and “did not take reasonable action to abate the risk.” As to causation, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that, if the assailants “had been classified properly and not placed in general population, Poynter would not have been hurt.” The court next found as to the Monell claim that Poynter offered “evidence that would allow a trier of fact to find that there was a clear and persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct.” Remanded.
Breach of contract; Interpretation of the term “Existing Agreement” in a 2020 Order Form termination provision; “Or”; Last-antecedent rule; Declaratory judgment; Leave to amend the complaint
The court concluded that (1) “no breach of the parties’ contract occurred,” (2) the trial court did not err in declining to grant plaintiff-CA a declaratory judgment, and (3) “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying CA’s request for leave to amend the complaint.” CA initially contended “that the definition of ‘Existing Agreement’ in the 2020 Order Form termination provision indicates that [defendant-]GM was required to either terminate all of the agreements between the parties, or none of them.” The court held that this interpretation was incorrect. “The use of the disjunctive ‘or’ between the listed documents in the 2020 Order Form that” made up the “Existing Agreement” created alternatives and allowed “for termination of one or more of the listed items. According to the plain language of the contract, GM could therefore elect to terminate the 2020 Order Form alone, without also terminating the underlying 2015 License Agreement. Further, the collective label ‘Existing Agreement’ does not transform ‘or’ into ‘and.’ As the trial court properly explained, ‘Existing Agreement’ is a collective shorthand whose contents depend on which agreements GM selects to terminate. CA’s contrary reading would render ‘or’ meaningless and conflict with the portion of the provision stating that ‘neither party shall have further obligations under the terminated portions of the this [sic] Agreement[.]’ Additionally, the ‘terminated portions’ phrase further indicates that the termination provision allows for selective termination.” CA also argued “that the parties’ deletion of the phrase ‘in whole or in part,’ which appears only in Section 5.3 of the 2015 License Agreement, means that [they] intended to prevent GM from engaging in selective termination of specific orders.” But the court found it clear from reading the clause in context “that the omission of the phrase ‘in whole or in part’ only prevents GM from selectively terminating items within a single instrument (i.e., terminating only part of the Order Form), not the ability to choose which instruments to terminate from the disjunctive list that makes up the parties ‘Existing Agreement.’” The court concluded that “under the last-antecedent rule, the clause ‘together with each and all Purchase Orders’ only modifies the preceding phrase, ‘this Order Form[.]’” The court saw “no contrary intention in the text of the contract. Accordingly, the 2020 Order Form requires only that GM terminate all purchase orders issued under the Order Form if it also elects to terminate the Order Form itself.” The court also disagreed “with CA’s contention that the termination provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations.” Thus, it held that “GM effectively terminated the 2020 Order Form and all associated purchase orders before the final-year prepayment date. The notice of termination that GM sent to CA on [9/1/22], identified and terminated the Order Form and ‘any purchase orders associated with the Order Form,’ as required by the 2020 termination provision. Without an amount due, failure to pay cannot constitute breach.”
Prearrest delay; People v Woolfolk; People v Cain; Relevance of admitted testimony; MRE 401; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Prosecutorial misconduct; Law enforcement failure to investigate; Distinguishing People v Jordan; Elicitation of “feelings & anxieties” testimony; Denigration of defense counsel; Curative instruction; “Vouching”; Denial of an addict-informer instruction (M Crim JI 5.7); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Cumulative error; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 4-6 & 19; MCL 777.36(1)(a) & (2)(a); Premeditation; People v Plummer; MCL 777.34(1)(a); MCL 777.35(1)(a); MCL 777.49(c); Harmless error; Proportionality
The court held that defendant did not show “actual and substantial prejudice from the nine-month delay in his arrest nor was counsel ineffective for failing to move to dismiss on that basis.” As to his evidentiary error claims, it rejected his relevance challenges. While some other acts evidence was erroneously admitted, the error was not outcome-determinative. And although the “prosecutor erred by denigrating defense counsel in closing remarks,” reversal was not warranted. The court rejected his other prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. His law enforcement failure to investigate claim lacked merit, and the trial court did not err in declining to give an addict-informer instruction. Finally, his OV scoring challenges failed except as to OV 4, and that error did not require resentencing. Thus, the court affirmed his AWIM, discharge of a weapon in or at a building, and FIP convictions, and his within-guidelines sentence of 30 to 60 years for AWIM, to be served concurrently with 5 to 10 years for the weapon discharge and 3 to 5 years for FIP. As to the prearrest delay, the court noted that even if it considered his affidavit, his “statements are speculative and nonspecific, as he merely supposes that witnesses would have been identifiable.” In addition, his “allegation that he would have been able to find alibi witnesses but for the delay in arrest is undermined by his testimony at trial that he spent time with numerous witnesses on the night of the incident, including his fiancée, family, and friends. In other words, defendant managed to identify potential alibi witnesses despite the delay in his arrest.” And because he failed to show “actual and substantial prejudice, counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a futile motion to dismiss” based on the prearrest delay. As to his evidentiary error claims, the court found that the trial court erred in admitting certain “jail call evidence to impeach defendant’s prior statement” because the “call and elicited testimony did not undermine those statements.” Rather, the testimony went toward showing that he “acted in conformity with his character in that he had previously had dealings with snitches.” But the court determined the error was not outcome-determinative “given that the evidence strongly supported defendant’s guilt, the testimony was relatively brief, and was not explicitly referenced in closing[.]”
Sufficiency of the evidence; Felonious assault; MCL 750.82(1); Reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery
Holding that there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant’s guilt of felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt, the court affirmed. He claimed that “he and the victim were always at a distance from one another during the incident in question and the victim admitted that he never saw defendant point the gun at him.” Given these facts, he maintained, “a rational jury could not have found that there was an attempt to commit a battery or a reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” The court saw “no merit in these arguments.” It noted that “the victim testified at trial that, during their dispute, defendant moved in the victim’s direction, threatened to shoot the victim, and moved his hand toward the gun that was visible at his hip—all of which caused the victim to retreat inside the house in fear that defendant was about to shoot him. The jury clearly credited the victim’s version of events, and [the court saw] no basis to disrupt that assessment.” Defendant offered “no legal authority in support of the notion that, under these facts, a rational jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s threatening words and actions intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” There was “nothing to indicate that, due to the distance between defendant and the victim or any other circumstance, defendant could not have possibly shot the victim—and in any event, ‘[f]or the apprehension-type assault, . . . a lack of actual ability to inflict the threatened harm is largely irrelevant and unnecessary, as long as the victim reasonably apprehends an imminent battery. Thus, the inquiry turns on what the victim perceived, and whether the apprehension of imminent injury was reasonable.’” Defendant failed to explain—and the court failed “to see—how the jury could not rationally conclude, based on the relevant legal standards and the evidence presented, that defendant placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.”
Divorce; Spousal support; Expenses & financial needs
Discerning no error by the trial court, the court affirmed the trial court’s award and amount of spousal support. At the core of the arguments, defendant-ex-husband’s claims were “seemingly premised on his belief that the trial court’s award of spousal support was inequitable and resulted from abuses of discretion by the trial court.” He claimed that the “support was inequitable in part because he was punished for his sexual orientation.” Specifically, he contended “the trial court improperly found him at fault on the basis of his sexual orientation.” However, the record belied his assertions. The court discerned “no error from the trial court’s findings, much less an encroachment of any of defendant’s civil liberties. Rather, the clear and unrebutted testimony was that defendant’s sexual orientation caused the dissolution of the marriage.” Defendant also contended “that the trial court erred by not adequately determining his income.” The court found the trial court’s findings as to his income were “thoroughly substantiated by the record.” Defendant argued “that the trial court erred in its determination of plaintiff’s income; however, this argument lacks support from the record.” He next argued “that the trial court erred in its discretion by failing to impute additional income to plaintiff, which defendant asserts should be $60,000 annually.” The court found that although “working 40 hours weekly could yield additional income, plaintiff has not been offered a position with that many weekly hours by her employer. From this record we discern no error by the trial court in establishing plaintiff’s income at $40,000 annually.” Defendant next argued “that the trial court erred by failing to identify each party’s expenses and financial needs postdivorce.” Again, the record demonstrated the contrary was true. Finally, as to his claim regarding his financial support of the parties’ adult daughter, the court held that there was “no such confusion as to why the trial court awarded spousal support.” The record also did “not support defendant will become impoverished by paying this award of spousal support.”
Child custody; Third-party custody presumption; MCL 722.25; Hunter v Hunter; Guardianship; Child’s best interests; Established custodial environment; Child’s preferences
The court held that clear and convincing evidence rebutted the parental presumption and supported awarding sole custody to third parties was in the child’s best interests. After the child’s father died following years of custody litigation, competing relatives sought guardianship and custody while the mother sought sole custody. The trial court terminated an existing guardianship and awarded sole legal and physical custody to the child’s aunt and uncle after extensive hearings. On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly applied the parental presumption and did not require the mother to prove fitness, explaining that third parties may prevail where all relevant factors, “taken together, clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the child’s best interests require placement with the third person.” The court further held that the trial court’s best-interest findings were supported by the record, including the child’s established custodial environment, lack of contact with the mother, and the child’s expressed preferences. Affirmed.
Highway exception to governmental immunity; Notice of intent (NOI) required under MCL 691.1404; Substantial compliance; Exact location & nature of the defect; McLean v Dearborn; Known witnesses
Holding that plaintiff’s NOI substantially complied with MCL 691.1404’s requirements, the court reversed summary disposition for defendant-City and remanded. Plaintiff was injured while riding his motorcycle on a city street. After his attorney timely served an NOI as required by statute, he sued defendant for negligence under the highway exception to governmental immunity. The trial court granted the City summary disposition on the basis the NOI failed to meet MCL 691.1404’s requirements. On appeal, the court concluded that, read as whole, the “NOI sufficiently describes the location and nature of the defect such that the City would have been able to find and repair it. Plaintiff described the location of the accident as ‘on the roadway and intersection of Field St and Henrie [sic] St.’ Although [his] description of the defect’s location could have been more precise, his NOI also included four close-up photographs of potholes—the alleged defects. These photographs provided exact representations of the defects allegedly at issue, and, like the photographs in McLean, one of them depicted a landmark—a sewer grate in the upper right-hand corner—that placed the pothole near one of two corners at Hendrie and Field.” The court further found that the NOI adequately identified witnesses known to plaintiff when it was drafted. The court noted there “is no language in the statute requiring that a plaintiff investigate any potential witnesses to the accident before serving a NOI. Plaintiff testified that his wife and son were called after the accident to take him home; they did not witness the accident themselves. As for the bystander who helped [him] at the scene, plaintiff stated he was not aware whether the bystander witnessed the accident. Thus, plaintiff was not required to identify the bystander in the NOI.”
Governmental employee immunity; MCL 691.1407; Ray v Swager; Proximate cause; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA)
The court held that a school principal was entitled to governmental immunity because her conduct was not the proximate cause of a student’s injuries resulting from a teacher’s assault. A special-needs student was injured when a teacher physically assaulted him during a classroom incident, and the student’s next friend sued the principal alleging gross negligence for assigning the teacher to the classroom. The trial court denied the principal’s motion for summary disposition, concluding discovery was needed. On appeal, the court held that even assuming negligent conduct, the principal was not the proximate cause of the injuries because “the teacher’s conduct—and not defendant’s—was the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injuries.” The court explained that proximate cause under the GTLA requires more than foreseeability and instead demands that the defendant’s conduct be “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause,” which was not met where the harm resulted from an intervening intentional assault. Reversed and remanded.
Assumption of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Children’s Protective Services (CPS)
Holding that record evidence supported the trial court’s finding that exercising jurisdiction over respondent-mother’s “children was warranted under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2),” the court affirmed the order assuming jurisdiction. Five children were involved in the case - SC, LC, JC, AS1, and AS2. As to her “medical neglect of AS2, testimony and medical reports established that respondent had not received any prenatal care until she was 29 weeks pregnant and that AS2” was born premature at 36 weeks with meth “and THC in her system. Multiple witnesses, including respondent, testified that she had missed at least three follow-up appointments for AS2 scheduled after her birth. The documentary and testimonial evidence also established that, during the weeks of these missed appointments, AS2 had lost nearly one pound, which was a concerning amount of weight for a newborn.” As to the finding of an “unsafe home environment and safe-sleep concerns related to AS2, respondent’s friend testified that, during her visit with respondent and AS2, respondent ‘was around’ but had ‘just sat [AS2] on the couch’ on top of a loose throw blanket.” In addition, a CPS investigator testified to observing “AS2 lying on loose blankets on the couch while respondent was ‘outside smoking a cigarette’ where ‘[i]t wouldn’t have been possible’ for her to see AS2.” As to her educational neglect of LC and SC, secretaries at their “schools testified that students were reported as truant if they missed more than 10 days in any given semester and that LC and SC had, respectively, missed 13 days and 25 days of school in the 2024 fall semester.” As to the issue of respondent’s drug use, the father of LC, AS2, JC, and AS1 “testified that, while visiting [her] home, he found some foil with a substance on it that he believed was” meth in the basement, “and the CPS investigator testified that respondent ‘would not allow access to’ the basement during a house visit.” There was also testimony AS1 appeared to have “a thrush infection in her mouth, for which respondent had not sought treatment[.]” Further, there was testimony that she “often relied on then-13-year-old SC to care for JC, who was nonverbal and required a specific diet and an at-home physical therapy routine due to his degenerative condition[.]” The court concluded the doctrine of anticipatory neglect also supported “the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over all the children.”
Children’s best interests; Guardianship
Holding that the trial court did not err by finding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children, the court affirmed. The preponderance of the evidence supported “the trial court’s determination that the children’s [KL and KD] need for stability and permanence outweighed the fact of relative placement. The evidence supported the determination that adoption best served [their] need for stability and permanence. Respondent had abandoned [them], failing to have contact with the children or support them financially, and assumed no responsibility for the children’s care or wellbeing, although he had the means to do so. The children had lived for much of their lives with their aunt, the aunt provided the children with stability and permanence, the aunt was eager to adopt the children, and the children were eager to be adopted by the aunt. Because the preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s best interest determination, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights.” Respondent also argued “that the trial court should have considered a guardianship for the children rather than terminating his parental rights.” The court found that in “this case, no such demonstration in support of guardianship was made. The trial court considered and rejected the possibility that the children be placed in a guardianship with their aunt, concluding that a guardianship was not the in the children’s best interests. The trial court reasoned that the children had spent a considerable amount of time in the care of their aunt, who provided the children with stability and permanence. The aunt and the children wanted adoption, and neither the aunt nor the children wanted a guardianship. Respondent had virtually no contact with the children for more than a year before the termination of his parental rights and made no effort to provide for [them] even after they were removed from the home of their mother, though respondent had the financial ability to do so.” The court found “no error in the trial court’s rejection of a guardianship in this case.”