Sufficiency of the evidence; Felonious assault; MCL 750.82(1); Reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery

Holding that there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant’s guilt of felonious assault beyond a reasonable doubt, the court affirmed. He claimed that “he and the victim were always at a distance from one another during the incident in question and the victim admitted that he never saw defendant point the gun at him.” Given these facts, he maintained, “a rational jury could not have found that there was an attempt to commit a battery or a reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” The court saw “no merit in these arguments.” It noted that “the victim testified at trial that, during their dispute, defendant moved in the victim’s direction, threatened to shoot the victim, and moved his hand toward the gun that was visible at his hip—all of which caused the victim to retreat inside the house in fear that defendant was about to shoot him. The jury clearly credited the victim’s version of events, and [the court saw] no basis to disrupt that assessment.” Defendant offered “no legal authority in support of the notion that, under these facts, a rational jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s threatening words and actions intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” There was “nothing to indicate that, due to the distance between defendant and the victim or any other circumstance, defendant could not have possibly shot the victim—and in any event, ‘[f]or the apprehension-type assault, . . . a lack of actual ability to inflict the threatened harm is largely irrelevant and unnecessary, as long as the victim reasonably apprehends an imminent battery. Thus, the inquiry turns on what the victim perceived, and whether the apprehension of imminent injury was reasonable.’” Defendant failed to explain—and the court failed “to see—how the jury could not rationally conclude, based on the relevant legal standards and the evidence presented, that defendant placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.”