Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Who plaintiff-law firm had a contract with for the legal services rendered; Oral contract; Distinction between a corporation & its agents; Whether a defendant guaranteed the debt; Bandit Indus, Inc v Hobbs Int’l, Inc (After Remand); Advanced Strategies Group, Inc. (ASG)
The court held that the record showed that a company (nonparty-ASG) for which defendant-Christensen was formerly president and CEO was plaintiff-law firm’s client and there was “no evidence that Christensen personally engaged plaintiff for legal services.” There was also no evidence that he “assumed the debt owed by ASG.” Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. The case revolved “around who plaintiff had a contract with for the legal services rendered. There is no express written contract for legal services or engagement letter between the parties in the” record. Plaintiff asserted “that it had an oral contract with Christensen for legal services rendered on behalf of Christensen, but paid by ASG.” The trial court found that “there was no genuine issue of material fact whether a contract existed between plaintiff and Christensen because” plaintiff’s principal attorney “admitted the ‘vast majority’ of the legal services he rendered was on behalf of ASG. As noted by the trial court, even viewed in a light favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, such a statement acknowledges that plaintiff’s client was ASG and not Christensen.” The court added that even without this “admission, a genuine issue of material fact was not shown regarding plaintiff’s assertion that the parties entered into an oral contract for legal services.” The court noted the “legal distinction and corporate shield between a company and its officers and shareholders.” It was “undisputed that ASG became plaintiff’s client in the 1990s and engaged plaintiff for various matters until it dissolved in 2012. Given its corporate form, it is no surprise that the invoices would mention Christensen, who . . . would be responsible for acting on behalf of ASG and managing its debts.” The court concluded the record supported “only that a contractual relationship for legal services existed between plaintiff and ASG.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that Christensen guaranteed ASG’s debt. There was “no contract expressing Christensen’s intent to personally guarantee the legal services rendered on behalf of ASG.” Given the absence of “a course of dealing between the parties or other direct contractual relationship, plaintiff has not articulated why an open account or account stated would exist between” them.
Sufficiency of the evidence; AWIM; Intent to kill; Self-defense; Motion for mistrial; Detective’s testimony
The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of AWIM and to show “a lack of self-defense, given the evidence presented and the jury’s credibility” determinations, and “a lack of prejudice resulting from the detective’s testimony.” Also, he was “not entitled to a mistrial based on the detective’s testimony where the phone call was played for the jury and defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony.” He argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove his intent to kill. “The victim testified that defendant had threatened him and had appeared at the victim’s house with a ‘machine gun’ about a week before the shooting. Both the victim and the victim’s friend testified that defendant appeared and pointed a gun at the victim. The victim testified that defendant shot him, and the jury heard defendant admit to shooting the victim during his police interview. Defendant pointing a gun at the victim and pulling the trigger is evidence of intent to kill, irrespective of whether anyone died.” Although he questioned “this testimony and the credibility of witnesses, ‘it is the role of the jury, not this Court, to determine the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.’” The court held that “making credibility choices in support of the jury’s verdict and viewing in a light most favorable to the prosecution, defendant’s intent to kill could be reasonably inferred from the evidence.” As for his self-defense argument, witness “testimony and the bullet hole in the back of the victim’s sweater both indicated that the victim was shot in the back. By shooting the victim in the back, a jury could infer that defendant had no reasonable belief of imminent deadly force being used against him.” Further, the court noted that “the victim and the victim’s friend testified that defendant approached the victim with a gun drawn and pointed at the victim. From this, the jury could infer that defendant was the initial aggressor, and as an initial aggressor, defendant generally cannot claim self-defense.” The court found that the “prosecutor met the burden for disproving defendant’s self-defense claim.” Thus, the jury could have found that the elements for AWIM were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Affirmed.
Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27b; People v Watkins; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v Cameron; Sufficiency of the evidence; People v Harris; CSC I elements; MCL 750.520b(1)(b); People v Phillips; Third-degree child abuse elements; MCL 750.136b(5); People v Jarrell; Domestic violence elements; MCL 750.81(2); People v Cameron
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting domestic-violence other acts evidence under MCL 768.27b and that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s CSC I, third-degree child abuse, and domestic violence convictions. Defendant’s CSC and child abuse convictions involved his 15-year-old stepson, and his domestic violence conviction involved his wife. There was evidence that he beat the stepson with a shoehorn and “jabbed” it into the anal area through clothing and later assaulted his spouse by grabbing her neck and punching her face. On appeal, the court held MCL 768.27b permits “evidence of the defendant’s commission of other acts of domestic violence” for any relevant purpose subject to MRE 403, and it concluded the prior acts were probative of propensity, provided context for the relationships, and helped explain delayed disclosure. Applying the Watkins factors, it found similarity and temporal proximity supported admission and the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly where courts should weigh the propensity inference in favor of probative value in this setting. The court also held the evidence was sufficient for CSC I because the object entered between the victim’s “butt cheeks,” and “entry into the anal canal is not required,” the victim was 15, and defendant was a household member. It affirmed the child abuse conviction based on testimony that defendant knowingly caused physical harm to a child under his authority by repeatedly striking him with the shoehorn. It affirmed the domestic violence conviction based on testimony and officer-observed marks corroborating that defendant assaulted and battered his spouse. Affirmed.
Motion to suppress confession; “Freely & voluntarily made”
Concluding that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress and he was not entitled to a new trial, the court affirmed. He was convicted of felony murder, felony-firearm, first-degree arson, and unlawful imprisonment. Defendant claimed that he was “entitled to a new trial because the trial court should have suppressed his involuntary confession made to police.” The court found that the record belied his “claim that his confession was involuntary. During the Walker hearing, one of the detectives who interviewed defendant testified defendant was read his Miranda rights and signed a document confirming that he understood these rights. Defendant stated that he had his GED, was able to read and write, and denied being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, claiming that he had been sober for two months. The detective, who was trained to recognize signs of intoxication, did not observe any noticeable signs of intoxication or drug use, nor any signs of cognitive impairments, disabilities, or withdrawal. The detective also believed defendant provided thoughtful and logical responses to questions, was coherent, and did not appear confused. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that defendant’s confession was freely and voluntarily made.” Defendant claimed “that, despite his denial of being under the influence, the detectives had reason to know he was. But the detective denied any such knowledge, and we defer to the trial court’s determination regarding the credibility of his testimony.”
Joinder of assault & murder cases; MCR 6.120; Whether evidence of the murder was admissible in the assault case & vice versa; MRE 404(b)(1); Relevance; Plan or scheme; Identity; Evidence of defendant’s robbery of a gun store; MRE 403; Admission of defendant’s other acts of domestic violence against his girlfriend in the assault case; MCL 768.27b(1)
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) joining defendant’s assault and murder charges, (2) admitting evidence of his “other acts from the murder case in the assault case, and vice versa[,]” and (3) not excluding evidence connecting him to a gun store robbery under MRE 403. But it did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of his other acts of domestic violence in his assault case involving his girlfriend. Thus, in this interlocutory appeal the court reversed the trial court’s order as to joinder, the admission of other acts evidence of each case in the other case, and the admission of evidence connecting him to the gun store robbery. It affirmed the order as to the admission of evidence of other acts of domestic violence in the assault case. The trial court found that the “cases were related by a series of connected acts as part of a ‘little crime spree.’” But the court concluded that while there was some evidence connecting “these cases—defendant used the same pistol in [his] girlfriend’s presence on the same day—these circumstances do not comprise a series of connected acts sufficient for joinder. [His] anger may be an underlying cause in both cases, but [it] was aimed at two different subjects during the crimes: his girlfriend in the assault case and an alleged shooter of his mother’s house in the murder case.” The prosecution argued “that defendant’s ‘fits of anger’ connect these cases, but such connection is tenuous, especially where hours lapsed between the assault and murder and his anger was aimed at two different people. Because there is no logical relationship between” the crimes, they were “not a series of connected acts within the meaning of MCR 6.120(B)(1)(b).” In addition, they were “not the same conduct or transaction and do not constitute part of a single scheme or plan. Defendant did not assault his girlfriend to secure her cooperation in the murder. [He] did not discover the broken window, which resulted in his anger at an alleged shooter of his mother’s house, until after the assault occurred.” As to the other acts of domestic violence evidence, they “were highly probative because they involved similar acts of violence to the same victim throughout defendant’s relationship with his girlfriend” and they fell “squarely within the Legislature’s purpose for enacting MCL 768.27b[.]” The court also could not find “any substantial risk of unfair prejudice.”
Consent judgment of divorce (CJOD); Custody; Effect of parties’ agreement; Koron v Melendy; Harvey v Harvey; Parenting time; Proper cause or a change of circumstances (COC); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Friend of the Court (FOC)
Noting that “parties may not stipulate to conditions that are required for a trial court’s determination regarding a child’s best interests,” the court affirmed the denial of defendant-father’s motion. The parties’ CJOD stated that a change in his “residence would be considered a [COC] and ‘proper cause’ to revisit parenting time.” When he “moved to modify the parenting time after changing residences, a” FOC referee found that it was “properly construed as a request to change custody” and recommended that it be denied. The trial court denied his “objections to the referee’s recommendation.” He argued that it “erred in its determination that parties cannot stipulate to which events constitute a” COC. He relied on Koron, which “held that ‘the court is not precluded from accepting the parties’ agreement and including it in the orders of the court,’ and ‘in cases where the parties are in agreement regarding custody and visitation and present the court with such an agreement, the trial court need not expressly articulate each of the best interest factors.’” But his argument was misplaced “because while parties are encouraged to work with each other to settle custody and parenting-time issues, they cannot through stipulation or agreement deprive the trial court of its statutorily-mandated duty to determine the best interests of a child.” Further, defendant ignored that “Koron also held that, ‘[i]mplicit in the trial court’s acceptance of the parties’ custody and visitation arrangement is the court’s determination that the arrangement struck by the parties is in the child’s best interest.’” The court found that “consistent with Koron, the trial court may include the parties’ agreement in a custody or visitation order after making findings that such agreement is consistent with the best interests of the child or children at issue.” Defendant also argued “that the trial court erred because the CJOD was signed by a judge, and therefore, defendant’s change of residence was already considered by a trial court to be a [COC] or proper cause.” In support, he relied on Harvey. He ignored that Harvey “went on to hold that ‘the deference due [to] parties’ negotiated agreements does not diminish the court’s obligation to examine the best interest factors and make the child’s best interests paramount.’” The court held that while “a trial court accepted the stipulation of the parties in the CJOD, that stipulation did not relieve the trial court of its obligation to determine whether the conditions precedent to a change in custody were present and satisfied the best-interests of the children three years later.” In light of the applicable cases, the court held “that the trial court did not err in declining to follow the provision of the CJOD that considered defendant’s change in residence to be a [COC] or proper cause necessary to revisit the custody of the children.” The court also disagreed with his “argument that the trial court’s finding that he failed to establish proper cause or a [COC] was against the great weight of the evidence.”
Marital property division; Sparks v Sparks; Fraudulent conveyance; Third-party joinder; Cassidy v Cassidy; Valuation findings; Olson v Olson; Separate property; Inheritance; Cunningham v Cunningham; Spousal support; MCL 552.23(1); Magee v Magee; Attorney fees; MCL 552.13(1); MCR 3.206(D)(2); Loutts v Loutts
The court held that the trial court did not err in rejecting plaintiff’s fraud-based challenges to the land-contract transfers, but it vacated the property division and remanded because the trial court failed to make required findings on the amount remaining from defendant’s inheritance from his mother. It also vacated the denial of spousal support and attorney fees as intertwined with the property distribution. The parties divorced after a volatile marriage involving a jointly operated salon and real estate transactions near the filing date, including conveyance of the marital home under a land contract to satisfy a claimed debt and sale of a separate property under a land contract. On appeal, the court affirmed the findings that the marital home and other property were not fraudulently transferred where promissory notes supported the debt, the notary testified plaintiff signed the quitclaim deed without duress, and the realtor testified the title company approved the transaction, and the panel deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations. It also upheld valuation of the salon at $54,000 based on the stipulated expert business evaluation. But it concluded the judgment was defective because, despite ordering plaintiff receive one-half of whatever remained of the mother’s $550,000 funds and safe-deposit-box cash, the trial court never determined “how much, if any, remained at the time of trial” and did not make findings about the locked-box contents, requiring remand for “more specific factual findings” and vacatur of the entire property award to permit an equitable redistribution. Because “the alimony award goes hand in glove with the property distribution,” the court vacated the spousal-support ruling and directed the trial court to make specific findings under the spousal-support factors on remand. It likewise vacated the attorney-fee ruling so the trial court could revisit fees after resolving property and support and make findings tied to the parties’ financial circumstances and equities. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
“Public record”; MCL 15.232(i); Amberg v Dearborn; Official function; Kestenbaum v Michigan State Univ; Contracting out; FOIA avoidance; Distinguishing MacKenzie v Wales Twp; Bearing on decision-making; Hopkins v Duncan Twp; Outside counsel invoices; Indirect payment by insurer; Detroit News, Inc v Detroit
The court held that outside counsel’s billing invoices sent only to defendant-County’s insurer were not “public records” under FOIA because the County never “prepared, owned, used, possessed, or retained” them “in the performance of an official function.” A law firm representing litigants against the sheriff sought the sheriff’s defense counsel invoices under FOIA. The County denied the request because the invoices were never sent to or held by the County, were sent to its insurer, and were paid by the insurer. On appeal, the court applied MCL 15.232(i), which defines a public record as a writing “prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body in the performance of an official function[.]” It reiterated that “actual possession of the record is not dispositive,” but also that documents are not public records merely because a public body possessed them. It assumed without deciding that hiring and compensating counsel can be an official function under MCL 49.71 and MCL 49.73, but held that did not make these invoices public records because the County “never directly used the invoices, did not provide any of the data used to create the invoices, and did not have access to any of the data contained in the invoices.” Nothing in the compensation statutes required the County to review them. Distinguishing MacKenzie, it emphasized the County could perform the function of compensating counsel by leaving payment details to its insurer and “had no need for the invoices to carry out that function.” Distinguishing Detroit News, it noted the invoices did not reflect actions of public officials or employees where the outside law firm’s attorneys were not public officials, and the County only “indirectly compensated” counsel through the insurer. Because the invoices could not “possibly have affected the County’s decision-making” and shed no light on “official actions,” the court affirmed summary disposition.
Effect of an assignment of the right to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for Reg’l Transp; Rescission or revocation of the assignments; Motion to reinstate claim for benefits
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that the Supreme Court’s decision in C-Spine Orthopedics, particularly its resolution of the companion Wallace case, was “directly on point and controlling.” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order denying plaintiff-insured’s (Aja) motion to reinstate his claim for PIP benefits, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with C-Spine. As in the Wallace case, Aja “was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. After the accident, [he] assigned some of his rights to pursue PIP benefits to two medical providers.” A year after the accident, he sued to collect PIP benefits. But, as with the plaintiff in “Wallace, at the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff was not the real party in interest because he had assigned away his rights. Yet, if [he] could show that he cured his real party in interest defect, his lawsuit could survive.” He and the two medical providers subsequently “allegedly entered into agreements whereby they agreed to revoke and rescind the assignments so as to be in the same position as if the assignments had never been made. Similar to the Wallace case, defendant filed a partial motion for summary disposition arguing, in relevant part, that plaintiff was not the real party in interest and had no standing to pursue his claims because he had already assigned his claims to his medical providers. In response, plaintiff relied on the revocation/rescission agreements. Although the documents on their face purport to be a rescission, the trial court treated [them] as revocations and then found that the revocations were not valid because of the questionable signatures. Given the understanding of the legal issues before it, the trial court did not engage in a rescission analysis.” The court noted that “the Supreme Court in C-Spine Orthopedics emphasized that because rescission in a remedy that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, ‘the trial court ought to consider this issue in the first instance.’” The court stated that on “remand, the trial court should ‘balance the equities and determine whether equitable rescission is warranted under the facts of this case’ and whether the real party in interest defect that existed at the filing of the complaint can be cured.”
Negligence action arising from a garage-door incident; “Threshold injury” under MCL 500.3135; Applicability of the statute
The court concluded that because “plaintiffs failed to respond to defendants’ motion for summary disposition with documentary evidence supporting [plaintiff-]Tammy’s claim that [defendant-]Kindlund caused her left shoulder injury when he dropped a garage door on her shoulder, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” It also held that because “the statutory language plainly limits MCL 500.3135 to injuries caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, the trial court properly determined that it” did not apply here. Tammy argued “that she sustained an injury to her left shoulder when Kindlund dropped a garage door on her shoulder while attempting to repair the garage door. Although plaintiffs’ complaint does not reference an incident involving a garage door, we note that an injury caused by a dropped garage door could, possibly, support a negligence claim. The trial court properly determined, however, that Tammy failed to provide any documentary evidence supporting her claim.” In responding to defendants’ summary disposition motion, “plaintiffs cited and attached text messages between Kindlund and Tammy. In the text messages, Tammy asserted that she did not feel well on the day Kindlund attempted to fix the garage door, she needed to go to the hospital, and she was diagnosed with a left rotator-cuff injury. Tammy did not mention a garage door, let alone indicate that Kindlund dropped a garage door on her, nor did she suggest that [he] caused her rotator-cuff injury.” Plaintiffs also attached medical records of Tammy’s 3/23 “MRI of both of her shoulders, indicating that rotator-cuff disorder was suspected regarding both shoulders. The records also stated ‘unspecified chronicity’ regarding Tammy’s left shoulder injury rather than indicating that [her] pain began when a garage door was dropped on her. During oral argument on defendants’ motion, the trial court asked plaintiffs whether they had medical records indicating that Tammy’s left shoulder injury was causally connected to Kindlund dropping a garage door on her shoulder, but plaintiffs were unable to identify any such evidence.” Tammy next argued “that the ‘serious impairment of body function’ standard set forth MCL 500.3135” applied as to her injuries, relying on the preamble of the Insurance Code. While the preamble may generally aid in understanding a provision, “if a provision is unambiguous, the language of the preamble does not control its meaning. MCL 500.3135(1) provides that ‘[a] person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.’” Affirmed.