Consent judgment of divorce (CJOD); Custody; Effect of parties’ agreement; Koron v Melendy; Harvey v Harvey; Parenting time; Proper cause or a change of circumstances (COC); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Friend of the Court (FOC)

Noting that “parties may not stipulate to conditions that are required for a trial court’s determination regarding a child’s best interests,” the court affirmed the denial of defendant-father’s motion. The parties’ CJOD stated that a change in his “residence would be considered a [COC] and ‘proper cause’ to revisit parenting time.” When he “moved to modify the parenting time after changing residences, a” FOC referee found that it was “properly construed as a request to change custody” and recommended that it be denied. The trial court denied his “objections to the referee’s recommendation.” He argued that it “erred in its determination that parties cannot stipulate to which events constitute a” COC. He relied on Koron, which “held that ‘the court is not precluded from accepting the parties’ agreement and including it in the orders of the court,’ and ‘in cases where the parties are in agreement regarding custody and visitation and present the court with such an agreement, the trial court need not expressly articulate each of the best interest factors.’” But his argument was misplaced “because while parties are encouraged to work with each other to settle custody and parenting-time issues, they cannot through stipulation or agreement deprive the trial court of its statutorily-mandated duty to determine the best interests of a child.” Further, defendant ignored that “Koron also held that, ‘[i]mplicit in the trial court’s acceptance of the parties’ custody and visitation arrangement is the court’s determination that the arrangement struck by the parties is in the child’s best interest.’” The court found that “consistent with Koron, the trial court may include the parties’ agreement in a custody or visitation order after making findings that such agreement is consistent with the best interests of the child or children at issue.” Defendant also argued “that the trial court erred because the CJOD was signed by a judge, and therefore, defendant’s change of residence was already considered by a trial court to be a [COC] or proper cause.” In support, he relied on Harvey. He ignored that Harvey “went on to hold that ‘the deference due [to] parties’ negotiated agreements does not diminish the court’s obligation to examine the best interest factors and make the child’s best interests paramount.’” The court held that while “a trial court accepted the stipulation of the parties in the CJOD, that stipulation did not relieve the trial court of its obligation to determine whether the conditions precedent to a change in custody were present and satisfied the best-interests of the children three years later.” In light of the applicable cases, the court held “that the trial court did not err in declining to follow the provision of the CJOD that considered defendant’s change in residence to be a [COC] or proper cause necessary to revisit the custody of the children.” The court also disagreed with his “argument that the trial court’s finding that he failed to establish proper cause or a [COC] was against the great weight of the evidence.”