Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; Search incident to arrest; Probable cause to arrest; People v Champion; Driving while license suspended or revoked (DWLS) arrest authority; MCL 764.15(1)(a); “Quickly on the heels” doctrine; People v Nguyen; Facial challenge to the FIP statute; MCL 750.224f; People v Hughes; Facial challenge to the CCW statute; MCL 750.227; People v Langston
The court held that the handgun and drugs were admissible because the search was valid as incident to arrest where probable cause existed to arrest defendant for DWLS. It also held that MCL 750.224f and MCL 750.227 are not facially unconstitutional. During a traffic stop, the officer learned defendant was driving with a revoked license. After arresting the passenger on an outstanding warrant and finding drugs on her, the officer searched defendant and found “eleven individually packaged corner ties” of suspected crack cocaine and a “loaded handgun” in his underwear. Defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression, arguing the detention was improperly extended and the search lacked probable cause or consent. The court upheld denial of suppression because defendant conceded probable cause existed to arrest him for DWLS, and under MCL 764.15(1)(a) the officer could arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence. It reiterated that a search incident to arrest “‘may occur whenever there is probable cause to arrest,’” and that “‘a search conducted immediately before an arrest may be justified’” if probable cause existed beforehand. It also applied the rule that a search is valid when the arrest follows “quickly on the heels” of the search. Thus, the search was lawful “regardless if drugs were found on” the passenger. As to the unpreserved constitutional challenge, the court rejected defendant’s claim that the FIP and CCW statutes are facially unconstitutional. It relied on binding Court of Appeals precedent rejecting the same attacks, including that felon dispossession laws remain “‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’” and that Michigan’s “shall-issue” concealed carry licensing scheme does not violate the Second Amendment. Affirmed.
Prosecutorial misconduct; Closing arguments; Comment on a witness’s lack of motive to lie; People v Thomas; Shifting the burden of proof; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Sentencing; Due process; People v Cobbs; Lack of an explanation for a departure from the statutory mandatory minimum; People v Sherrill
The court held that the record did not support defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claim and that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection to the prosecutor’s challenged statements. It also rejected defendant’s claim “that he was denied due process because he relied on the trial court’s statement that it would ‘certainly’ sentence him to the mandatory” 25-year minimum and it instead later sentenced him to a 30-year minimum. But it held that the trial court violated the principle of proportionality by failing to explain its departure. Thus, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC I convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. He argued that during closing argument, the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to the defense by focusing on the victim’s (BM) lack of motive to lie. The court disagreed. “BM testified that defendant assaulted her in 2007. There was no other evidence available at [the] 2023 trial aside from witness testimony. Thus, this case rested entirely on the credibility of the witnesses. ‘[A] prosecutor may comment on his own witnesses’ credibility during closing argument, especially when there is conflicting evidence and the question of the defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury believes.’” The court also noted “that defense counsel sought to impeach BM’s credibility on cross-examination in an attempt to prove to the jury that she was being untruthful about her allegations against defendant.” The prosecutor did not commit misconduct, so defense counsel had no reason to object to the closing argument statements. As to defendant’s purported reliance on the trial court’s pretrial hearing statement about sentencing, the Cobbs framework did not apply here, where “defendant explicitly rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial.” But the trial court failed to give “any explanation for why the legislatively-mandated 25-year term was insufficient. [Its] reasoning addressed only why the guidelines range of 108 to 180 months was inadequate, stating that the guidelines did not adequately account for the psychological harm to BM. However, this explanation provides no basis for concluding that the statutory minimum of 25 years was similarly deficient.”
Denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized under search warrants for social media account data; Admission of co-conspirator statements; FRE 801(d)(2)(A) & (E); FRE 804(b)(3); Limitations on the cross-examination of the victim; Sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of aiding & abetting a kidnapping; Discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of the sentence & the written judgment as to supervised release special conditions
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that (1) the district court properly denied defendant-Blake’s motions to suppress evidence and limited cross-examination of the victim, (2) group chat messages were properly admitted as co-conspirator statements, and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support his aiding and abetting kidnapping conviction. But it remanded for the district court to resolve the discrepancy between its written judgment and its oral pronouncement at sentencing as to his supervised release conditions. Blake first claimed that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized under search warrants for social media account data. However, the district court ruled that Blake lacked standing and he did not challenge this basis for its denial of his motion to suppress. Not doing so meant that his suppression challenge failed. The court next held that the co-conspirator statements from the group chat were admissible under FRE 804(b)(3) where there was “no question as to the messages’ occurrence or accuracy, making them ‘trustworthy” for the purpose of this hearsay exception.” Also, from a reasonable person’s perspective, they were against the co-conspirators’ penal interests because they implicated them in the victim’s kidnapping and beating. The court further held that the district “court did not err by allowing limited cross-examination” of the victim about the existence of her pending state charges “but prohibiting additional questions about their details or impact on [her] relocation agreement.” It also held that there was record evidence supporting that “Blake affirmatively acted to facilitate the kidnapping.” Lastly, Blake challenged the imposition of special conditions of supervised release. During the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence, it “did not incorporate the special conditions in the presentence report by reference, as it did for the standard conditions.” Applying de novo review, the court found that “the district court’s written judgment imposes greater restrictions than those announced at sentencing.” Thus, his “constitutional right to be present at sentencing” required remand.
Order for involuntary mental-health treatment; Mootness
Holding that respondent’s appeal of the probate court’s order for his involuntary mental-health treatment was moot, the court dismissed the appeal. The case arose from “a series of orders for respondent to undergo involuntary mental-health treatment for schizophrenia.” The court noted that both the 1/25 order at issue and a subsequent 6/25 order had expired. He did not point to any “collateral legal consequences that might warrant judicial review of the” 1/25 order. Even if the court were “to address the merits of his appeal, respondent would still be subject to collateral legal consequences arising from the [6/25] order, which he elected not to appeal.” He also did “not point to any issues in this matter that are of public significance and likely to recur while escaping judicial review. Under the circumstances, the appeal presents only abstract questions of law without any practical legal effect on an existing controversy.” There was no relief that the court could grant in the matter.
First-party no-fault action; Real party in interest; MCR 2.201(B)(1); Assignment of rights; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Contract enforceability presumption; Coates v Bastian Bros, Inc; Traditional contract defenses; Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Provider claim against patient; One-year-back rule; MCL 500.3145; Auto-Owners Ins Co v Compass Healthcare, PLC
The court held (1) that plaintiff was not the real party in interest after assigning the right to pursue no-fault benefits for the charges at issue to nonparty-Northland Radiology, (2) that defendant-insurer could invoke the real-party-in-interest rule even though it was not a party to the assignments, and (3) that plaintiff identified no traditional contract defense to avoid enforcement of the unambiguous assignment forms. Thus, dismissal was proper. Plaintiff received treatment at Northland Radiology from 3/29/22 through 6/22/23 and “every time he attended treatment” he executed an assignment of rights to Northland. After he added a first-party no-fault claim to his existing suit, defendant moved for summary disposition arguing Northland was “the real party in interest.” Plaintiff responded with an affidavit from a Northland representative asserting Northland “never viewed the alleged assignments as valid and enforceable” and did not attempt to enforce them. The trial court ruled the assignments were “valid and enforceable” and the affidavit was not a proper revocation. It barred Northland-related charges older than one year and the case later ended by stipulation. On appeal, plaintiff argued defendant could not enforce the assignments as a nonparty to them. The court rejected that framing, explaining defendant was not challenging validity but asserting the assignments’ effect under MCR 2.201(B)(1), which requires suit by the real party in interest. Relying on C-Spine, the court emphasized that “a plaintiff who assigns a claim cannot then bring suit to collect on that claim as that plaintiff is no longer the real party in interest.” In addition, “failure to bring suit in the name of the real party in interest is a ground for dismissal.” Plaintiff did not contend rescission or revocation occurred, and the court applied the rule that courts “‘presume the legality, validity, and enforceability of contracts,’” enforcing unambiguous assignments “as written” in the absence of “traditional contract defenses.” Plaintiff offered none. The court also rejected the policy claim that enforcement would expose him to collections, noting under Compass Healthcare any provider claim would still be a no-fault claim subject to the one-year-back rule, so any recovery against plaintiff would have expired by 6/22/24. Because the assignments controlled who could sue, defendant had standing to raise the real-party-in-interest defect. Affirmed.
Quiet title; Acquiescence; Statutory 15-year period; Tacking; Privity; Adverse possession
The court rejected the claims that defendants “could establish entitlement to the property through the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession, and that” they should have been granted summary disposition instead of plaintiff. The dispute concerned “the ownership of a strip of land between the parties’ respective properties.” The court noted that all “three parcels were originally owned by” nonparties-W and M. Acquiescence requires “evidence that parties treated a particular boundary line as the property line” and it has to “be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” Defendants relied “on the actions of their predecessors in order to establish acquiescence for the applicable statutory 15-year period.” The court’s “review of both documents indicate that there are no material contradictions between” M’s son’s (L) “statements in the affidavit and his statements in the telephone transcript. Assuming arguendo that the telephone transcript constitutes substantively admissible evidence under MCR 2.116(C)(10), it does not create a genuine factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary disposition when compared to the sworn affidavit testimony presented by plaintiff. Both documents consistently reflect that [L] maintained and used the land between the properties for family reasons, with no intention to claim ownership or alter boundaries, and with an understanding and respect for the legal property lines. The affidavit provides a more general overview, while the transcript adds detail about [L’s] actions and motivations. Minor differences in detail, such as whether [L] had [M’s] explicit permission to mow the lawn, do not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [L] acquiesced to a new boundary line between the properties.” Defendants’ argument to the contrary lacked merit. They also could not “establish entitlement to the property through adverse possession.” Defendants purchased their property in 11/13, “providing only 10 years of possession before this litigation commenced in 2023. This falls short of the required 15-year statutory period required for a claim of adverse possession.” To remedy the “deficiency, defendants must successfully ‘tack’ [L’s] prior use onto their own possession period” and they could not “establish the required privity with [L]. [His] affidavit does not indicate that he had any interaction or conversation with defendants prior to closing. Indeed, the record contains no evidence that there was any communication between defendants and [L] regarding boundaries. The warranty deed from [L] to defendants likewise contains no reference to any land other than the 1.01-acre parcel as originally surveyed. Without either inclusion of the disputed property in the deed or parol references at the time of conveyance, no privity exists to support tacking.” Affirmed.
Child’s best interests
Concluding that the trial court’s best-interest determination was not clearly erroneous, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child, NLB, the youngest of nine. Respondent argued the record supported that her “situation was improving by the best-interest hearings, and the [trial] court should have ruled that NLB was similarly situated to her older siblings.” The court noted that respondent “had a long history of cocaine abuse and continued to abuse the drug up until the time of the termination hearings. Meanwhile, NLB has been in foster care for most of her life, starting when she was a young infant. While there was evidence to support that respondent-mother had a bond with NLB, the bond appeared stronger on respondent-mother’s end than NLB’s end. In fact, visitations had not occurred for a significant duration, and NLB was nervous to be around respondent-mother when visits first resumed in [10/24]. It took a while for her to warm back up to” respondent. The court concluded that the “trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was in NLB’s best interests considering NLB’s strong bond with her foster family; NLB’s need for permanency, stability, and finality; [her] lack of ability to provide a home for NLB; and the advantages of the foster home over” her home.