Denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized under search warrants for social media account data; Admission of co-conspirator statements; FRE 801(d)(2)(A) & (E); FRE 804(b)(3); Limitations on the cross-examination of the victim; Sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of aiding & abetting a kidnapping; Discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of the sentence & the written judgment as to supervised release special conditions

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that (1) the district court properly denied defendant-Blake’s motions to suppress evidence and limited cross-examination of the victim, (2) group chat messages were properly admitted as co-conspirator statements, and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support his aiding and abetting kidnapping conviction. But it remanded for the district court to resolve the discrepancy between its written judgment and its oral pronouncement at sentencing as to his supervised release conditions. Blake first claimed that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized under search warrants for social media account data. However, the district court ruled that Blake lacked standing and he did not challenge this basis for its denial of his motion to suppress. Not doing so meant that his suppression challenge failed. The court next held that the co-conspirator statements from the group chat were admissible under FRE 804(b)(3) where there was “no question as to the messages’ occurrence or accuracy, making them ‘trustworthy” for the purpose of this hearsay exception.” Also, from a reasonable person’s perspective, they were against the co-conspirators’ penal interests because they implicated them in the victim’s kidnapping and beating. The court further held that the district “court did not err by allowing limited cross-examination” of the victim about the existence of her pending state charges “but prohibiting additional questions about their details or impact on [her] relocation agreement.” It also held that there was record evidence supporting that “Blake affirmatively acted to facilitate the kidnapping.” Lastly, Blake challenged the imposition of special conditions of supervised release. During the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence, it “did not incorporate the special conditions in the presentence report by reference, as it did for the standard conditions.” Applying de novo review, the court found that “the district court’s written judgment imposes greater restrictions than those announced at sentencing.” Thus, his “constitutional right to be present at sentencing” required remand.