Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) & Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA); Disability discrimination; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework; Notice of a disability; Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination; Pretext; Failure to accommodate; Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA); Interference theory; Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); 29 USC § 1140; Age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act & Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Race & sex discrimination under Title VII & ELCRA
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Holding that plaintiff-Hrdlicka’s post-termination diagnoses of serious health conditions did not create a genuine dispute of material fact that would justify denying defendant-GM summary judgment, the court affirmed. As to her ADA and PWDCRA claims, it held that she “failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under either the ADA or the PWDCRA because her purported disability was unknown to either herself or [GM] until well after her employment was terminated.” The parties agreed that she “was never diagnosed with any medical condition until after her termination. In fact, she never even sought medical help for any symptoms or conditions from which she was suffering while employed.” She contended that GM was nevertheless on notice. But the court noted that she “made only a single, unsubstantiated statement that she was depressed without any corroborating medical evidence and without ever having sought medical help, and she consistently presented the issue as a workplace conflict, not a disability. Although a diagnosis is not necessary for an ADA claim to succeed,” the court concluded that “Hrdlicka failed to present any of the ‘[r]elevant information’ that [it] has found pertinent to determining if an employer was placed on notice of a disability.” The mention of depression by itself “is insufficient to constitute a ‘severe symptom’ . . . .” The court added that even if she “were deemed to have made out a prima facie case, [GM] presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her.” The court determined that “chronic tardiness and repeated absences, coupled with Hrdlicka’s immediate failure to abide by her Attendance Letter, were clearly legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate her.” As to pretext, she failed to rebut GM’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.” Further, she did not “establish a failure-to-accommodate claim because she did not identify a reasonable accommodation.” Also, her FMLA interference claim failed “under the fourth prong because she did not provide adequate notice of her intention to take FMLA leave.” In addition, the only decision she claimed “was a violation of ERISA was [GM’s] denial of her open-door appeal.” However, GM “clearly had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying” that appeal and she did not show that it “was pretextual or that interference with her rights was nonetheless a motivating factor.” Finally, her age, race, and sex discrimination claims were “woefully insufficient and require little analysis to dispose of each.”
Exclusion of the victim’s prior acts of violence against defendant; MRE 404(a)(4); MRE 608; MRE 404(b)(1); Proper purpose; People v Galloway; Police officers’ testimony; People v Heft; Opinion testimony; MRE 701; People v Allen; Constitutional right to present a defense; Cumulative effect of errors
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim’s (defendant’s then-husband) “prior acts of violence against defendant” and also that she was not entitled to appellate relief based on police witnesses’ testimony. Further, it concluded the record contradicted her claim the trial court’s evidentiary rulings denied her the right to present a defense, and her cumulative error claim failed in the absence of any error. Thus, the court affirmed her assault and battery, felonious assault, and domestic violence convictions. Admission “of character evidence to prove an individual acted in conformity with that trait on a specific occasion is prohibited, unless a listed exception applies.” The only potentially applicable exception here “was subsection (4), which allows evidence of a witness’s character pursuant to MRE 607, MRE 608, MRE 609.” After considering MRE 404(a)(4), the trial court determined “the specific instances of conduct were inadmissible because they did not concern the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the victim as mandated by MRE 608(b). It is clear from the record and on appeal that defendant sought admission of the evidence to prove that the victim had a propensity for violence, and he was acting in accordance with that trait on the day of the assault. Such a purpose is expressly prohibited by MRE 404(a).” As to MRE 404(b)(1), she did not “show that the victim’s alleged prior acts of violence were offered for a proper purpose.” She next challenged the admission of police witnesses’ testimony she contended impermissibly expressed an opinion as to her guilt. The court found that a “fair reading of the record indicates that neither officer testified about defendant’s guilt; rather, the officers were explaining opinions and conclusions based on their personal perceptions of the victim’s injuries, the interviews, and the other collected evidence during the investigation.” As to her right to present a defense, it was clear that she “was able to present her self-defense claim. Defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine the victim, the victim’s friend, and the responding officers. Defendant’s entire written statement addressing the assault, in which she asserted self-defense, was admitted as evidence, and the jury was instructed on self-defense.” Thus, the jury was given the opportunity to consider her self-defense claim.
Motion for a mistrial; People v Barker; Prosecutorial misconduct; Closing remarks explaining the role of circumstantial evidence; Mischaracterization of the evidence; Questioning of defendant & closing argument addressing defendant’s former girlfriend; MRE 404(a); Plain error; Sentencing; Scoring of 10 points for OVs 14 & 19
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, and he was not entitled to relief on his claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by assessing 10 points each for OVs 14 and 19. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver meth, conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver meth, and maintaining a drug house. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to serve 20 to 50 years for possession with intent to deliver and conspiracy, and 46 months to 15 years for maintaining a drug house. Defendant contended the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial in light of prejudicial testimony from a police witness, S. The court found that there appeared “to be no dispute from defendant that the prosecution did not intentionally elicit the responses from [S], there was no request for a curative instruction, and the record clearly demonstrates that most of the volunteered remarks were unresponsive. In the first challenge to improper testimony, the prosecution merely asked [S] if defendant had previously stayed at the Timberline Lodge.” S replied, “I was involved with [the hotel manager] on prior occasions at which he had advised me that [defendant] had been there on a previous time and stayed there, and he explained to me that he believed that he was selling controlled substances from there.” The court held that the “initial portion was admissible and responsive, but the latter portion was not and was properly excluded by the trial court. Whether defendant had sold controlled substances from the Timberline Lodge was unresponsive to the prosecution’s question about whether” he previously stayed there. In the next challenged testimony, the prosecution asked S “if there were unique characteristics about” the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger that allowed it to be located in a store parking lot. Part of S’s answer included that he had been told defendant had a pulled a gun on someone. Because S’s “testimony involved unresponsive replies that were immediately stricken by the trial court and there was no indication that the prosecution encouraged the responses, defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial because the responses did not deprive him of a fair trial.” Lastly, S's testimony about “filed-down keys” did not warrant a mistrial under the circumstances. Affirmed.
Action seeking PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act; Entitlement to benefits through the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility; MCL 500.3173a; Fraudulent insurance act; MCL 500.3173a(2); Candler v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of MI; Materiality; Bahri v IDS Prop Cas Ins Co; Eligibility; MCL 500.3107(1)(a); Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP)
The court held that the trial court properly found there was “no genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s commission of a fraudulent insurance act and that plaintiff was ineligible for benefits under MCL 500.3173a(2).” Plaintiff was walking when he was hit and injured by a vehicle that was never identified. The MACP assigned his PIP claim to defendant, which denied it on the basis that he made materially false statements in his application regarding his medical history, including his involvement in several accidents prior to the accident at issue, his preexisting conditions, and the severity of his injuries. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, rejecting plaintiff’s “defense of somebody helped him fill out the application, the plaintiff would be responsible. He signed it.” It also found that there was no genuine issue of fact that he “made a false statement in his affidavit in response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition when he stated that the person depicted in the photographs and videos submitted by defendant was his twin brother.” On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by making credibility determinations as to the photos and videos defendant submitted, and by improperly weighing the statements he made in his affidavit when deciding defendant’s summary disposition motion. It held that the trial court “properly found that there was no genuine issue that plaintiff committed a fraudulent insurance act under MCL 500.3173a(2) when he knowingly made false statements in his application for benefits with respect to his medical history and preexisting conditions and that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits.” A review of plaintiff’s “extensive omissions leaves no question that [he] was dishonest in his application for no-fault benefits. A reasonable juror could not conclude [he] was unaware that he was submitting false information.” And the false statements were material to his claim. Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Failure to accomplish any meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication; In re Williams; Best interests of the children; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re White; Relative placement; In re Mason
The court held that § (c)(i) was met and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. The court rejected his argument that the DHHS failed to prove a statutory ground for termination. It found that “182 or more days had elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order” as to respondent, and that he “failed to rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication despite being provided with services that were aimed at facilitating reunification.” The court noted he “lacked commitment throughout the proceedings, was unable to demonstrate and maintain sobriety, and refused to communicate with DHHS throughout the entire case.” In addition, at the time of termination, “the children had been out of [his] care for nearly a year.” Further, multiple DHHS workers testified that “a variety of accommodations were offered to respondent to overcome any transportation or scheduling issues he may have had, but [he] remained noncommunicative and uninvolved.” Given his history, “the caseworker did not believe that respondent would participate in services if given additional time.” The court also rejected his claim that termination was not in the children’s best interests. Given his “issues with substance abuse and domestic violence, his incarceration, the children’s young ages and need for permanency, the fact that they were doing well in their foster placements, and the likelihood of adoption,” the trial court did not err by finding that it was in their best interests to terminate his rights.