Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Chapter 13 conversion to Chapter 7 under 11 USC § 1307(c): Motion under FedRCivP 60(b)(1); Jurisdiction; 28 USC §§ 158(a) & (d)(1); Scope of the notice of appeal to the district court; Whether the conversion order & the “MTD order” were “inextricably intertwined”; The merits of the motion to dismiss; Failure to move for dismissal before the case was converted; Whether “excusable neglect” was shown
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] Holding that it (and the district court) had jurisdiction over one of the bankruptcy court orders at issue, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of debtor-O’Hara’s Rule 60(b) motion. Once the case had been converted from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7, § 1307 did not apply, and he did not show that his failure to move for dismissal before the case was converted was due to excusable neglect. At a hearing on the Trustee’s motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court indicated that it wanted to convert the Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7. O’Hara moved to dismiss instead but not until after the bankruptcy court entered its conversion order (the May 8 Conversion Order). The bankruptcy court subsequently denied his motion in its May 9 MTD Order and his later Rule 60(b) motion in its August 7 Order. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the court first concluded that O’Hara appealed all three orders to the district court. But it held that the appeals of the May 8 and 9 Orders were untimely, so it only considered the August 7 Order. It determined that this order, denying the 60(b) motion, encompassed “both the May 8 Conversion Order and May 9 MTD Order.” It noted that it has “held that orders converting a bankruptcy case to Chapter 7 are final, appealable orders” and because the May 8 Order was an underlying order, the August 7 Order was also a final, appealable order. Turning to the merits of the Rule 60(b) motion, the court explained that § “‘1307 does not grant a debtor an absolute right to dismiss a case after the case has been converted.’” Thus, the bankruptcy court did not make “‘a substantive mistake of law’” because once the case was converted to Chapter 7, “O’Hara no longer had the right to” voluntarily dismiss under the section. And his excusable neglect argument failed where he “was on notice for months ahead of the May 8 hearing that the U.S. Trustee’s motion to dismiss could result in conversion, and O’Hara could have moved to dismiss voluntarily at any time.” He also could have done so “at the May 8 hearing, but chose not to.” The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying his Rule 60(b) motion.
Title VII; “Hostile work environment” claim; Whether plaintiff could hold defendant-employer liable; Whether defendant acted negligently in failing to prevent co-workers’ abuse; Vance v Ball State Univ; Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Retaliation claim; The honest-belief rule
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-employer (Pullman) of plaintiff-Hamm’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims, concluding (1) Pullman took reasonable actions calculated to end the harassment and (2) Hamm failed to offer sufficient evidence that his firing for refusing to accept any other job assignment was a “pretext for discrimination.” Hamm alleged that his fellow employees harassed him once they learned he was bisexual. He reported his abuse to a Pullman HR employee, who investigated the allegations, interviewed the employees, and required them to review the company’s antidiscrimination policy. She also allowed Hamm to transfer to a new worksite and to take medical leave for anxiety and panic attacks. While on leave, he rejected offers of alternative assignments, and Pullman terminated him. He sued under Title VII and Michigan’s ELCRA, alleging hostile work environment and retaliation claims. The district court granted Pullman summary judgment. On appeal, the court noted that under Vance, where “the harasser is a ‘co-worker,’ the employee must establish that the employer acted negligently in failing to prevent the abuse.” Hamm failed to show that the allegedly abusive Station superintendent “could take tangible employment actions against him.” Thus, he did not qualify as a supervisor whose actions automatically bound Pullman. The court further held that Hamm failed to show the necessary negligence by Pullman because it had taken actions that were “‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment.’” Applying the same framework to his ELCRA hostile work environment claim, the court found that it failed for the same reasons. As to his retaliation claims, the court held that Pullman offered “a neutral reason for terminating” Hamm’s employment and Pullman had an “honest belief” that he had declined several alternative job offers.
Equal protection claim under 42 USC § 1983; Standing; Whether plaintiff had third-party standing; Personal representative (PR)
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that plaintiff, PR of his decedent’s mother’s (Henry) estate, lacked standing to bring an equal-protection claim against defendants-Benzie County and sheriff’s deputies where the complaint failed to allege that Henry personally experienced discriminatory treatment. Henry was killed by her neighbor, S (who was subsequently found to be mentally ill), after two years and at least 10 reports to police of S’s “threatening behavior towards women and girls.” The PR sued under § 1983 and state law, alleging that defendants had a pattern of “providing inferior protective services in response to threats of violence against women as compared to men[,]’” violating the right to equal protection and resulting in Henry’s death. The district court dismissed the federal claims for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. It declined jurisdiction over the state claims. Only the federal equal-protection claims were at issue on appeal. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff lacked standing, noting that the claims were “not based on Henry’s own legal rights.” The complaint did “not allege that Henry ever made any report about [S] to the Sheriff’s Office. In fact, during the 2019 incident when” S tried to break into her home, Henry did not call the police because she “did not believe that the Sheriff’s Office would help based on her past experiences.” The only report “the Sheriff’s Office ever received regarding a ‘risk of imminent harm’ to Henry was the 911 call from her son” on the day of her “murder. Nowhere in the complaint is there an allegation that Defendants ignored, minimized, or failed to respond to that report.” The claims were not based on Henry’s “equal-protection rights, but rather on the alleged violation of those rights possessed by” two other females (L and TW). And the court found that the claims did not fall “within the ‘limited’ exception for third-party standing.” This requires that three elements be met, and the court held that plaintiff failed to satisfy this test. “Henry lacked any ‘close relationship’ to [L] or TW,” and there was no indication they “are hindered from vindicating their own equal-protection rights.” Affirmed.
42 USC § 1983 action alleging an excessive force claim; Determining whether deadly force was justified; Barnes v Felix; Whether a second shooting violated the Fourth Amendment; Bletz v Gribble; Lee v Russ; “Failure to intervene” claim; Municipal liability; Failure to train
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] In an order on petition for a rehearing en banc, the original panel reviewed the petition and concluded that the issues it raised were fully considered in the original submission and decision (see eJournal # 84667 in the 11/20/25 edition). The petition was denied. Judge Griffin would grant the petition for the reasons stated in his dissent to the court’s original opinion “and for those stated in his dissent appended to this order. The petition was then circulated to the full court. Less than a majority of the judges voted in favor of rehearing en banc.” In the original opinion, the court held that plaintiff successfully pled a claim that defendants-police officers violated her husband’s “clearly established rights when they fired a second, deadly round of shots at him as he lay on the ground.”
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to introduce certain evidence as evidence of consent; Failure to advance a meritless argument; Matters of trial strategy; Motion for a Ginther hearing
The court held that defendant did not “show that her trial counsel’s handling of the evidence” she argued should have been offered “fell ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” It also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for a Ginther hearing. Thus, it affirmed her identity theft and illegal sale or use of a financial transaction device convictions. The case “arose from allegations that she used the personal identifying information of her half-sister, the victim, to fraudulently obtain a credit card.” Defendant claimed her trial counsel was ineffective for declining “to introduce potentially exculpatory evidence of the victim’s prior charitable dealings with defendant—namely, that the victim had added defendant’s name as a beneficiary to a Vibe Credit Union account held in the victim’s name, and that the victim had executed a quitclaim deed adding defendant’s name to the victim’s house. According to defendant, this evidence would have supported her defense of consent.” But the court noted that this evidence did “not particularly rebut the victim’s testimony regarding the specific conduct at issue in this case[.]” In addition, evidence that she “was added as a beneficiary to the credit union account does not establish that defendant was given access to any money in that account. Nor does the fact that [she] was added to a quitclaim deed; defendant could not use that property as collateral or sell the property without the victim’s consent.” The court also noted that “there was already evidence presented at trial of prior favorable dealings between the victim and defendant[.]” It agreed with the trial court that “the allegedly exculpatory evidence may very well have done more harm than good[.]” And in light of “the—at best—very limited potential exculpatory value of the evidence at issue, defendant” failed to show that, had counsel presented it at trial, a different outcome was reasonably probable.
Whether an elected member of a County Board of Commissioners vacated his seat after being sent to federal prison; Appellate jurisdiction; Factors hindering appellate review; What issues could & could not properly be resolved at this time
Although the 9/12/25 “order appealed did not resolve all of the parties’ pending claims, and is thus not a ‘final’ order appealable as of right,” the court exercised its discretion to treat their “claims of appeal as granted applications for leave to appeal. However, because of the procedural stance of these cases—particularly the fact that both actions were neither captioned nor argued as actions seeking relief in the form of quo warranto—we are unable to give the parties what they all seem to desire: a definitive ruling as to who currently holds the disputed seat.” Instead, it vacated the trial court’s 9/12/25 order in these two these consolidated, election-related appeals, and remanded. The parties disputed whether defendant-Brant remained an elected member of plaintiff-Monroe County Board of Commissioners, to which he was elected in 11/24, or he “vacated that position when he was sent to federal prison in a sister state later that same month.” For jurisdictional purposes, the court treated the “claims of appeal as applications for leave to appeal and grant them both.” It found that its “ability to reach the substantive merits of the ultimate question posed here is significantly hindered at this juncture. At their roots, the parties’ claims in these actions—and their respective requests for injunctive and declaratory relief—almost all depend on the answer to one fundamental question: whether Brant’s seat was vacated as a result of his conviction and incarceration in another state or whether, instead, he remains a sitting county commissioner. For a variety of reasons, a definitive ruling on that issue is simply not possible at this time.” But it determined that “not all of the issues currently before this Court defy appellate review entirely. While we cannot now rule on the question at the heart of this dispute—i.e., whether Brant currently holds the disputed seat—because that question may only be resolved via a properly instituted action for quo warranto, there are a few discrete issues we can properly resolve at this time.” It concluded that first, “the trial court erred when it purported to rule on whether Brant still held the disputed seat because the parties did not bring a quo warranto action.” Second, it found that “the trial court was correct when it declined to grant Brant’s request for an injunction precluding the disputed special election.” He did not “seek a writ of mandamus, the proper remedy for” his claim, or “name the proper election officials as parties in” his complaint. Third, it held that the trial court erred in granting him “a declaratory judgment that his incarceration in another state did not act to vacate his seat because [it] did not address or decide potentially dispositive legal issues raised by the parties below.”
Uninsured motorist benefits; “Entitled”; Authority to drive on public roads; MCL 257.301(1); Valid driver’s license; Huggins v Bohman; Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange (CURE)
As to plaintiff’s uninsured motorist benefits claim against defendant-CURE, the court held that as in Huggins, plaintiff here “failed to proffer a factual scenario wherein plaintiff, absent a valid driver’s license, could have reasonably maintained a good-faith belief that he was entitled to operate” defendant-French’s vehicle. Thus, the trial court properly granted CURE summary disposition. Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving his girlfriend’s (French) vehicle, which was insured under a policy with CURE. “Plaintiff did not have a valid driver’s license and had never held a Michigan driver’s license. He also did not have a policy of automobile insurance in his name.” The issue presented by this appeal was whether plaintiff may recover uninsured motorist coverage benefits under French’s CURE policy where he was injured while driving her vehicle with her express permission even though he did not hold a valid driver’s license. The policy “stated in relevant part that uninsured motorist coverage was not provided for any insured who was ‘[u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that “insured” is entitled to do so.’” The court found that the “key word to understand relative to this provision is ‘entitled,’ which is not defined by the policy.” Here, it was “undisputed that even if plaintiff had French’s permission to use her vehicle, plaintiff did not have a valid driver’s license.” The court held that as a result, he “did not have the legal right to drive a vehicle in Michigan, and plaintiff therefore could not have held a reasonable belief that he was actually ‘entitled’ to use French’s vehicle.” Although he would have the court “assign great weight to the ‘permission’ granted him by French, while French could authorize plaintiff to use her vehicle relative to her personal ownership rights in the vehicle, she could not provide plaintiff with any authority to drive it on the public roads because that privilege is governed by statute, not by French.” Affirmed.
Standing; Aggrieved party to appeal as to a special land use application; Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v Saugatuck Twp; Tuscola Area Airport Auth v Michigan Aeronautics Comm’n; Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA)
The court concluded that the “circuit court erred by holding that plaintiffs were not an aggrieved party able to appeal” defendant-ZBA’s decision granting a nonparty applicant’s “special land use application. Plaintiffs claimed a legally protected pecuniary interest that would likely be affected by applicant’s car wash operating in close proximity to plaintiffs’ existing car wash.” The applicant filed a special land use application to develop a car wash, which was denied, appealed to the ZBA, and approved. “Applying the Saugatuck criteria to this case, plaintiffs were an aggrieved party of the ZBA’s decision, which granted applicant’s special land use application to operate a Mister Car Wash in close proximity to plaintiffs’ existing car wash, thereby allowing plaintiffs to appeal the decision in the circuit court. As to the first requirement, both parties agree that plaintiffs participated in the challenged proceedings by opposing the application during public comment and by submitting their objections to the ZBA in a written memorandum.” It found that “as to the second requirement, the circuit court erred by holding that plaintiffs failed to claim some legally protected pecuniary right that was likely to be affected by the ZBA’s decision.” The court concluded that read “together, Saugatuck and Tuscola establish that a party must claim, and provide some supporting evidence, that its legally protected pecuniary right is likely to be affected by a ZBA decision. Plaintiffs provided information establishing that they will likely suffer pecuniary loss if the ZBA’s decision is not reversed. Therefore, the circuit court erred in finding that plaintiffs were not an aggrieved party able to challenge the ZBA’s decision.” The court found that plaintiffs “adequately claimed a legally protected pecuniary interest that would likely be affected by the ZBA’s decision, and the circuit court erred by dismissing plaintiffs’ appeal.” Reversed and remanded.
Whether a new ordinance was published under the city charter’s requirements; MCL 117.3(k); Timeliness; Sufficiency of the meeting minutes to satisfy the publication requirement; Distinguishing People v Poyma; Whether the new ordinance was a zoning ordinance or a regulatory ordinance; Natural Aggregates Corp v Brighton Twp; Whether plaintiff had a vested property right in a prior nonconforming use; Retroactive application; The Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA)
The court held that the new ordinance at issue “was not void for lack of publication or enumeration.” Further, because it was a regulatory ordinance, not a zoning ordinance, plaintiff-AFJN’s arguments as to “possession of a vested property right in a prior nonconforming use and the retroactive application of the new ordinance” were meritless. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-City of Highland Park. The case arose from a marijuana facility licensing dispute. After its original ordinance in response to the MRTMA was declared void and unenforceable, Highland Park enacted the new ordinance, which took effect on 9/5/23. It was “undisputed that the city charter required publication of the new ordinance and that the actual text of the new ordinance itself was not published on Highland Park’s website until” 4/24. AFJN argued that the publication requirement was “not met because the text of the new ordinance itself was not published within seven days and the [8/21/23] meeting minutes were insufficient to satisfy the publication requirement under the city charter.” But the court noted that the “meeting minutes contain the same language as the new ordinance almost verbatim.” The court found that AFJN’s claim that “the new ordinance was not enumerated in the” meeting minutes was unpersuasive. Further, AFJN’s reliance on Poyma was misplaced because the facts were distinguishable given that “the summary of the new ordinance contained in the [8/21/23] meeting minutes complied with the city charter and state law when it was published on Highland Park’s website within seven days of enactment.” The court further held that the new ordinance was a regulatory ordinance, not a zoning ordinance. And “Michigan caselaw does not support that a property owner may possess a vested right in a prior nonconforming use regarding a regulatory ordinance.” Thus, AFJN could not “possess a vested property right in a prior nonconforming use to operate an adult use marijuana retail facility in Highland Park, and there was no unlawful retroactive application of the new ordinance.”
Children’s best interests; Effect of a relative placement; MCL 712A.19a(8)(a); In re Olive/Metts
Because the trial court failed to address the children’s (NDD and MOK) “placement with a relative and weigh it against termination,” the court vacated the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights and remanded. It noted that several “factors weighed in favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights. [She] had a history of domestic violence, including the incident underlying her criminal conviction.” In addition, her “parenting ability was concerning. [She] admitted that she abused cocaine and alcohol. And, according to NDD, respondent used to call him names and took him to Children’s Hospital when he did not need to go because she wanted him out of the house. [Her] treatment of NDD was probative of how she might treat MOK.” She was also “unable to personally care for her children because she is serving a minimum 15-year prison sentence” and while she placed MOK with a grandmother, “NDD was left without any proper care when grandmother refused to pick NDD up from the hospital after NDD was placed with her via the safety plan.” Also favoring termination was the fact that “stability and permanency would be beneficial for the children.” However, other factors weighed against termination, including “evidence that the children had a bond with respondent.” In addition, “the trial court failed to explicitly address the children’s relative placement. Evidence at the termination hearing established that MOK had been living with grandmother, a relative, since” 12/23, and NDD “was scheduled to be placed in grandmother’s care just days after the hearing.” The court noted that while “every attorney referenced the relative placement in their closing arguments, the trial court’s oral ruling and subsequent order failed to explicitly address it. The trial court’s omission, specifically the lack of any discussion whether termination was appropriate in light of the children’s placement with a relative, rendered the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest determination.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Stipulation; Due process; Respondent’s absence during the preliminary hearing; Jurisdictional plea & the release of parental rights; Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
The court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to his two adopted children, AM and CP. “In 2019, then 60-year-old respondent, who was a neighbor, adopted the children after their biological parents’ rights were involuntarily terminated.” In 9/24, he was sentenced to prison for possession of child sexually abusive material and using a computer to commit a crime. His earliest parole eligibility date is 3/7/26 but his maximum release date is 9/7/31. “As a result of his convictions, respondent will be required to register under the” SORA. He asserted “that his due process rights were violated when the trial court proceeded with the preliminary hearing in his absence.” He also contended “that because the court did not advise him of his appellate rights in open court, although it sent him written notice of them, ‘it is possible he would have made other decisions at the time for trial.’” But he failed to establish “that he was prejudiced by his unexplained absence during the recorded portion of the preliminary hearing.” Moreover, his claim “that he might have made other decisions at the time of trial had his appellate rights been read to him at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing is speculative.” While the trial court did not advise him “of his appellate rights during the preliminary hearing, it asked [his] attorney to do so and it noted on the record that respondent’s appellate rights were included in the order entered after the preliminary hearing.” The record also contained “an advice of rights form that was mailed to respondent, explaining his ability to appeal the children’s removal, which he could have discussed with his attorney at any time.” Respondent further asserted “that the trial court erred in accepting his plea and the release of parental rights because they were not made knowingly or voluntarily.” As to his plea, he recognized “that many of his rights were explained to him, but contends that he was not advised that he had 21 days to appeal until after the voluntary termination. Our review of the transcript reflects that the trial court fully complied with the requirements of the plea-taking rule.” The court noted that the trial court mailed him “information about his appellate rights after the preliminary hearing.” Regarding the voluntary termination of his parental rights, based on the record, the court concluded that he was “not entitled to relief.” Nothing in the record suggested that his “voluntary release of his parental rights was the result of misunderstanding, intimidation, coercion, deception, or haste. Rather, the record shows that respondent’s plea, stipulations, and release were tendered freely, deliberately, and with full understanding.”
Child’s best interests; In re MJC; Effect of relative placement; In re CJM; Criminal sexual conduct (CSC)
Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s (PDS) best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. It concluded the record made it clear that the trial court properly evaluated PDS’s “best interests based on all the available evidence, which included but was not limited to the CPS report.” It noted the trial court “expressly acknowledged that it was required to consider PDS’s individual needs and stated that” it considered her “‘as an individual child who is ten and a half years old on her own merits.’ [It] also expressly acknowledged that it was required to consider whether termination” was for adoption, and noted that was not the case as the DHHS did not seek to terminate the mother’s rights. Thus, it “found that this factor weighed against” terminating respondent’s parental rights, as did PDS’s relative placement. It additionally “duly considered respondent’s ability to provide a safe and permanent home for PDS as well as the parent-child bond between them, and had weighed all the evidence available to it when doing so.” As to the safety and permanency of his home, it “found that respondent had pleaded no contest to the repeated sexual abuse of” PDS’s half-sibling (DP) “while they lived together approximately one year prior and that, at the time of the hearing, he had multiple . . . (CSC) charges—two of which involved a victim under the age of 13 years old—pending against him. [It] found that although there were no allegations of sexual abuse of PDS by respondent at that time, PDS would nonetheless be ‘at an imminent and an immediate risk of harm’ in [his] care because she faced a significant risk of sexual abuse, particularly given that she was about the same age as DP when respondent first began sexually abusing her.” There was conflicting evidence as to the parent-child bond. The trial court found that, regardless of its strength, “that bond—along with the other factors weighing against termination—were vastly outweighed by the risk of harm to PDS’s safety and wellbeing that respondent posed.” Further, the record evidence about his “parenting abilities and history of domestic violence only further support [its] best-interests determination.”