Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to introduce certain evidence as evidence of consent; Failure to advance a meritless argument; Matters of trial strategy; Motion for a Ginther hearing

The court held that defendant did not “show that her trial counsel’s handling of the evidence” she argued should have been offered “fell ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” It also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for a Ginther hearing. Thus, it affirmed her identity theft and illegal sale or use of a financial transaction device convictions. The case “arose from allegations that she used the personal identifying information of her half-sister, the victim, to fraudulently obtain a credit card.” Defendant claimed her trial counsel was ineffective for declining “to introduce potentially exculpatory evidence of the victim’s prior charitable dealings with defendant—namely, that the victim had added defendant’s name as a beneficiary to a Vibe Credit Union account held in the victim’s name, and that the victim had executed a quitclaim deed adding defendant’s name to the victim’s house. According to defendant, this evidence would have supported her defense of consent.” But the court noted that this evidence did “not particularly rebut the victim’s testimony regarding the specific conduct at issue in this case[.]” In addition, evidence that she “was added as a beneficiary to the credit union account does not establish that defendant was given access to any money in that account. Nor does the fact that [she] was added to a quitclaim deed; defendant could not use that property as collateral or sell the property without the victim’s consent.” The court also noted that “there was already evidence presented at trial of prior favorable dealings between the victim and defendant[.]” It agreed with the trial court that “the allegedly exculpatory evidence may very well have done more harm than good[.]” And in light of “the—at best—very limited potential exculpatory value of the evidence at issue, defendant” failed to show that, had counsel presented it at trial, a different outcome was reasonably probable.