Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Action alleging that a prosecutor committed fraud on the court in the context of criminal proceedings by lying as to whether an immunity agreement was in place; MCR 2.612(C)(3); Heck v. Humphrey; Daoud v. DeLeau; Recovery of money damages under 42 USC § 1983
Holding that the pro se plaintiff (previously a criminal defendant in a case in which defendant here was the assigned prosecutor) failed to allege a valid cause of action, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition. Plaintiff was convicted of several crimes in 2005. In a prior appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to inquire into an eyewitness's understanding of whether an immunity agreement protected the witness from prosecution for parole violations stemming from prior felony convictions. Plaintiff filed several more appeals in both state and federal court, all of which were denied. He eventually filed this action, alleging defendant committed fraud on the court in the context of the criminal proceedings by lying as to whether an immunity agreement was in place. He also sought an order setting aside his criminal convictions. The trial court granted defendant summary disposition, concluding that plaintiff “could not bring an independent cause of action under MCR 2.612(C)(3),” that res judicata barred his suit, that defendant “was shielded by prosecutorial immunity, and that the suit was precluded pursuant to” Heck. The court concluded that plaintiff “cannot employ MCR 2.612 in a separate action against [defendant] individually in his ongoing effort to alter his criminal convictions.” He did not present the court “with any relevant authorities that support the proposition that a defendant can obtain relief from a criminal conviction or have it set aside in an action against the prosecuting attorney that is separate and independent from the criminal proceedings or from the avenues of relief available under the laws of criminal procedure.” Further, to the extent his “complaint could be construed as seeking money damages or constituting an action under” § 1983, it failed under Heck.
Governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); MCL 691.1407(1); Odom v. Wayne Cnty.; Whether the court had jurisdiction to review the trial court’s denial of summary disposition on plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v) (defining final judgment & final order); MCR 7.203(A)(1); Principle that governmental immunity under the GTLA does not protect a governmental agency from claims that it by custom or policy violated the state or federal constitution; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.; Mack v. City of Detroit; Jones v. Powell; Effect of the existence of factual issues; Waait & Sons Elec. Co. v. Dehko; 42 USC § 1983
The court held that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff’s gross negligence and respondeat superior liability claims against defendant-Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA). It concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s denial of summary disposition as to his federal constitutional claims in this appeal of right. Thus, it reversed in part and remanded. Although plaintiff believed he had paid delinquent taxes on his property, a tax foreclosure occurred and title was transferred to the DLBA. DLBA’s contractor later “removed all of plaintiff’s belongings from the home and demolished” the house. He asserted claims against the DLBA for “unlawful eviction, conversion, violation of procedural due process and unconstitutional search and seizure under the Michigan Constitution, violation of due process and unlawful search and seizure under” the U.S. Constitution and § 1983, gross negligence, and respondeat superior liability for the other defendants’ actions. As to the last two claims, the DLBA was engaged in a governmental function and plaintiff failed to “plead an exception to governmental immunity that applied to DLBA; moreover, none of the exceptions found in the GTLA applicable to governmental entities encompass” gross negligence or respondeat superior liability for alleged agents’ gross negligence. Thus, the DLBA, a governmental entity, was immune under the GTLA from suit based on gross negligence and respondeat superior liability for its alleged agents’ acts. As to the DLBA’s claim that the trial court erred in denying it summary disposition on plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims, governmental “immunity under the GTLA does not protect a governmental agency from claims that it, by custom or policy, violated the state or federal constitution.” The DLBA asked the court to exercise its discretion to consider this issue as on leave granted. However, it declined “to do so in light of factual issues, such as whether DLBA’s agents acted under an official custom or policy, that are best resolved in a final judgment or order of the trial court before” the court considers them on appeal.
Sentencing; Whether each separate shot constituted a separate “act” for purposes of OV 12 (contemporaneous felony acts); MCL 777.42; MCL 777.42(2)(a)(i); People v. Light; Sentencing offense defined; People v. McGraw; Effect of the prosecution’s reliance on all three shots as evidence of defendant’s intent for purposes of the assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH) offense; Whether resentencing was required; People v. Francisco; Judgment of sentence (JOS)
Given that the prosecution relied on all three gunshots to establish an element of the sentencing offense (AWIGBH), the court held that 10 points were erroneously scored for OV 12 on the basis that each separate pull of the trigger constituted a separate “act.” Further, because correcting this score changed defendant’s guidelines, resentencing was required. He fired three shots through the door of a residence he knew was occupied. He was sentenced to 5 to 10 years for his AWIGBH conviction, and lesser sentences for other crimes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling as to OV 12 “that ‘[e]ach time defendant pulled the trigger was a separate act, and only one [act] was needed to convict him. Thus, the other two acts of pulling the trigger would be contemporaneous felonious criminal act[s] . . . .’” Under Light, determining whether a defendant “engaged in multiple ‘acts’ for purposes of OV 12 does not depend on whether he or she could have been charged with other offenses for the same conduct. What matters, instead, is whether the ‘sentencing offense’ can be separated from other distinct ‘acts.’” The court defined sentencing offense in McGraw “as ‘the crime of which the defendant has been convicted and for which he or she is being sentenced.’” AWIGBH was the sentencing offense here. It was clear the prosecution relied on all three shots “as evidence of defendant’s intent to commit murder or inflict great bodily harm,” and thus, a finding that two were not part of the sentencing offense was not supported by the record. As a result, “it was inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to distinguish two gunshots from the conduct constituting the ‘sentencing offense.’” The court noted that it limited its holding to the facts of the case. It was not suggesting “that there can be no circumstances under which multiple gunshots may constitute separate ‘acts’ that are distinguishable from the ‘sentencing offense.’” But as all of the shots were used to establish the intent element of the sentencing offense here, they could not “then be used to establish separate ‘acts’ that occurred within 24 hours of the ‘sentencing offense’ under MCL 777.42(2)(a)(i).” The court reversed the Court of Appeals’ opinion to the extent it upheld the scoring of OV 12, vacated the JOS, and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
Sentencing; Whether defendant was entitled to resentencing without the habitual offender enhancement because the prosecution failed to comply with the notice filing requirements of the habitual offender statute (MCL 769.13(1) & (2)); People v. Head; Due process; People v. Walker; Harmless-error review; People v. Carines; MCR 2.613(A); MCL 769.26
The court held that while the prosecution failed to file a proof of service of the habitual offender notice, defendant was not entitled to resentencing because that error was harmless. He was convicted of felonious assault. He alleged that because the prosecution failed to comply with the notice filing requirements of the habitual offender statute (MCL 769.13(1) and (2)), he was entitled to resentencing without the habitual offender enhancement. The court disagreed. It held that this case was analogous to Head and Walker. The prosecution did not dispute “that it did not file a proof of service of the notice of its intent to enhance defendant’s sentence with the clerk of court, in violation of MCL 769.13(2). However, the felony complaint and the felony information both included the fourth-offense habitual offender charge, and defendant” did not allege that he did not receive those documents. Although he waived his arraignment, at his preliminary exam the prosecution asked the trial court to bind him over as a fourth-offense habitual offender. At the plea hearing, he pled “no contest to the habitual offender charge and stipulated to the factual basis for that charge. Further, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that the PSIR needed to be corrected because ‘it just [said] assault with a dangerous weapon, felonious assault. It should also [have said] the hab-4, and be a maximum penalty of 15 years.’ Defense counsel responded, ‘I agree, Your Honor.’ Notably, defendant has not challenged the substantive basis for his fourth-offense habitual offender status in the trial court or on appeal.” Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant’s conviction of forgery of a document involving real property; MCL 750.248b(1); People v. James; People v. Johnson-El; People v. Grable; The Certification of Abandoned Property for Accelerated Forfeiture Act (the Accelerated Forfeiture Act) (MCL 211.961 et seq.); Abandoned property; MCL 211.962; MCL 211.964; MCL 211.964(1); Local unit of government defined; MCL 211.962(f); MCL 211.963; Late endorsement of the prosecution’s witnesses; People v. Burwick; People v. Everett; MCL 767.40a; People v. Duenaz; Good cause; People v. Callon; People v. Herndon; Whether the addition of the witnesses made defendant alter his trial strategy; People v. Rode; Judgment of sentence (JOS)
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of forgery of a document involving real property. Also, it was not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution’s late endorsement of four witnesses. Thus, it affirmed his convictions, but remanded for the ministerial purpose of correcting a clerical error in his JOS. His convictions arose from a “scheme in which he persuaded individuals to pay him sums of money to pay delinquent property taxes on homes in Detroit, in exchange for which defendant promised to assist them in securing title to the homes, even though he did not have any property interest in the parcels.” He was also convicted of obtaining money of $1,000 or more but less than $20,000 by false pretenses and encumbering real property without lawful cause. He contended that witness-E’s affidavit was a document expressing an interest in real property, and thus, “the prosecution did not establish that he was guilty of forgery of a document involving real property.” The court disagreed. The underlying purpose of the E affidavit “was to notify other holders of interests in the Monte Vista property that the person signing the affidavit, [E], has a legal interest in” the property. The foundation of her “purported interest in the property, as set forth in the affidavit that defendant drafted, was the reliance on MCL 211.962, cited in the affidavit, and an accompanying statute that is not expressly identified in the affidavit, MCL 211.963.” The record showed that the property was “vacant, and there was also some indication in the record that the property had delinquent property taxes at one point during the relevant time period.” However, both witnesses-F and G denied that their client received prior notice from E or defendant, aside from the recording of the E affidavit, as to E’s alleged “legal interest in the property. More importantly, the entire foundation of [E’s] purported legal interest in” the property as set forth in the “affidavit, to the extent that the affidavit reflected that a quiet-title action would be pursued on that basis, was that the property constituted ‘abandoned property’ as set forth in MCL 211.962. However, as the relevant statutes make clear, only a local unit of government, after meeting strict statutory requirements, may certify a property as abandoned.” Thus, the entire basis for the E affidavit claiming a legal interest in the “property was false, fraudulent, and not supported by Michigan law.” The evidence supported the jury’s finding that it was a false instrument. This case was similar to Johnson-El. Affirmed.
Habeas corpus; 28 USC § 2254; The law-of-the-case doctrine & its applicability to a codefendant’s habeas corpus petition; Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.; Arizona v. California; Burley v. Gagacki; Pennsylvania v. Finley; Messenger v. Anderson; United States v. Lawrence (5th Cir.); Patterson v. Haskins; Rosales-Garcia v. Holland; Due process implications; Montana v. United States; Taylor v. Sturgell
In this habeas action, the court held that the district court erred by denying petitioner-Edmonds habeas relief based on the law-of-the-case because the doctrine does not apply across separate habeas actions “brought independently by petitioners who were codefendants in the underlying criminal proceedings.” Edmonds brought his habeas petition after his codefendant’s petition was denied. He raised four of the same alleged errors in his petition. The district court dismissed them based on the law of the case because they overlapped with his codefendant’s and the issues had been considered and rejected in that case. The court reversed, noting that “[t]he defining feature of the law-of-the-case doctrine is that it applies only within the same case.” A post-conviction habeas action is a separate civil case, not a subsequent step in the underlying criminal proceedings. Thus, it followed that separate habeas actions filed “by petitioners who were codefendants in the underlying criminal proceedings are separate also—from the criminal proceedings and from each other.” The court concluded that extending the doctrine here would “unmoor” it from its core purposes. Additionally, applying the doctrine across separate habeas “cases would deprive the second petitioner of the opportunity to present his own arguments and would therefore implicate due process concerns.” Edmonds’s four claims at issue must be addressed on the merits. Reversed and remanded.
Divorce; Child support; Imputing income to a parent; The Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF); 2017 MCSF 2.01(G)(1); Stallworth v. Stallworth; 2017 MCSF 2.01(G)(2)(a)-(k); Determining the income of self-employed individuals & business owners; 2017 MCSF 2.01(E)(1)(c); 2017 MCSF 2.01(D); 2017 MCSF 2.01(E)(4)(b) & (d); Deference to the trial court’s credibility findings; MCR 2.613(C); Woodington v. Shokoohi; Custody & parenting time; Motion for reconsideration; Yoost v. Caspari; MCR 2.119(F)(3); Admission of a videotape; Harmless error; MCR 2.613(A)
The court held that the trial court did not err in imputing income to defendant-father for child support purposes, that its decision to deny his motion for reconsideration did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, and that any error in admitting a videotape was harmless. Thus, it affirmed the divorce judgment, which granted plaintiff-mother physical custody of their children, “granted the parties joint legal custody, and ordered defendant to pay $1,445 a month in child support on the basis of an imputed annual income of $66,000.” The court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found that defendant was a farm manager.” It also rejected his claim “that the trial court did not consider his disabilities. The trial court specifically considered defendant’s testimony about his back and hand conditions that he gave at the aborted trial, but found that they did not prevent him from functioning in his capacity on the farm.” Further, it concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that he “had the ability to earn $66,000 a year.” He was an executive of his family’s farm “who had control over the form and manner of his compensation. He specifically testified that he refused monetary compensation from the farm. Defendant had extensive in-kind income.” While he stated that he had not drawn a paycheck for years, “he testified that he received housing, food, and clothing for the children as a benefit for the labor he provided on the farm. His parents paid” his electric and gas bills. The gas in his car was “paid for by a business credit card or his mother’s personal credit card. He had a business credit card in his name. Defendant also effectively reduced his compensation as a result of the complaint for divorce.” Given that he “received extensive alternative compensation for his work on the farm, and the average wage for a farm manager is $65,000 to $75,000,” the court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake” in finding that he was able to earn $66,000 a year.
Premises liability; Applicability of the open & obvious doctrine to a tenant’s claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a); Royce v. Chatwell Club Apts.; Whether the parking lot was fit for its intended purpose; Intended use of a parking lot; Allison v. AEW Capital Mgmt. LLP; Effect of the fact plaintiff fell in a handicapped access area of the lot; Principle that walking in a parking lot is secondary to the lot’s primary use; Hadden v. McDermitt Apts.; Upholding a trial court’s ruling where it reached the right result for the wrong reason; Gleason v. Michigan Dep’t of Transp.
While the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting defendant-landlord summary disposition of plaintiff-tenant’s statutory claim based on the open and obvious doctrine, it affirmed because the parking lot at issue was fit for its intended purpose. Plaintiff contended that “defendant breached its duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because the handicapped access area of the parking lot” where she fell was not fit for its intended purpose, which she asserted was for walking. However, the Supreme Court concluded in Allison that “the intended use for a parking lot is for parking vehicles.” Plaintiff claimed that the handicapped access area “could not have the primary purpose of parking because vehicles are not allowed to park” there. The court found that her argument made “a distinction without a difference.” Her argument focused “too much on where vehicles are or are not allowed to park in relation to the intended purpose of a parking lot.” A parking lot’s intended purpose “is to park vehicles, while ‘[w]alking in a parking lot is secondary to’” its primary use. Although vehicles may not be permitted “to park in the handicapped access area, the primary purpose of a parking lot, parking vehicles, reflects the purpose of a parking lot as a whole, and does not account for where vehicles are or are not allowed to park.” The undisputed material facts showed that plaintiff slipped and fell in the lot as she was trying to access her vehicle. She asserted that “the handicapped access area was unfit for its intended purpose because ice and snow covered” it. Her daughter testified that there were about 1 to 2 inches of snow in the “lot and that there was ice where the sidewalk met the parking lot. However, plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence that the 1 to 2 inches of snow and patch of ice prevented the tenants from parking their vehicles or having reasonable access to their vehicles.” There was evidence that at least one vehicle used the lot around the time she fell. “Importantly, MCL 554.139(1)(a) does not require that a parking lot be maintained ‘in an ideal condition or in the most accessible condition possible, but merely requires the lessor to maintain it in a condition that renders it fit for use as a parking lot.’”
Order removing the personal representative (PR) of the estate; The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC) (MCL 700.1101 et seq.); In re Kramek Estate; MCL 700.3611; A PR as a fiduciary; MCL 700.3703(1); MCL 700.3611(2)(a) & (c)(iii)
Holding that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in removing appellant-Curtis as the PR of her father’s estate, the court affirmed the order removing her as PR and appointing a successor PR. Appellee-Haas (who the court referred to by her first name, Nancy), also the decedent’s daughter, petitioned to have Curtis removed as PR. The court concluded that there was evidence to support the probate court’s determination that Curtis had tried “to get Nancy to agree to distributing the estate in a manner other than the method prescribed by the decedent in his will. After Nancy refused, Curtis retained legal counsel and incurred significant expenses for the estate in the form of bills for legal services” and PR fees, despite the fact “the estate involved a simple will and relatively few, easily identifiable assets, creditors, and heirs. As her retained counsel continued to pursue Curtis’s legal issues, Curtis did not question the amount of legal expenses that the estate was incurring.” As the probate court found, this “management of the estate lead to the estate incurring high expenses that were disproportionate to the estate’s limited assets. The evidence further suggested that Curtis’s manner of administering the estate, which was not cost-efficient, would significantly impact Nancy’s distribution under circumstances where the will had provided for Curtis to receive a distribution that was substantially lower than Nancy’s.” The court noted that a PR is a fiduciary, “who is ‘under a duty to settle and distribute the decedent’s estate in accordance with the terms of a probated and effective will and [EPIC], and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.’” The evidence did not show that Curtis tried “to settle and distribute the estate expeditiously and efficiently.” Under the circumstances, it appeared that she “was mismanaging the estate and that removing her as [PR] was in the estate’s best interests.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i), & (j); In re Trejo Minors; In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors; In re JK; Abandoned claim; Berger v. Berger; Child’s best interests; Special accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USC § 12101 et seq.); In re Terry; In re Hicks; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Newman; In re Fried
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondents-parents’ parental rights to the child where the statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence and it was in the child’s best interests. The court first noted that respondent-mother’s failure to address § (i) precluded any relief as to her argument that a statutory ground was not established. In any event, the court held that the evidence supported each of the challenged grounds. As to § (c)(i), the child was removed from her care at birth because he was exposed to marijuana in utero, and because the mother “failed to rectify her parental deficiencies in the prior proceeding, which led to the termination of her parental rights to two other children.” During this case, she “failed to resolve her substance abuse issue or benefit from services. She failed to comply with drug screening until she was required to submit drug screens at parenting time visits.” She also failed to complete individual therapy or continue with mental health treatment. The evidence clearly established that she failed to rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication. Further, considering that she failed to satisfy her treatment plan requirements in her prior case, and her lack of progress here, “there was no reasonable likelihood that she would be able to rectify the conditions within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age.” As to respondent-father, the child could not be placed with him after birth because he did not have adequate housing. He reported having two jobs, but failed to document his earnings. He “had a history of substance abuse, and during the proceedings he never resolved these deficiencies. He failed to participate in substance abuse treatment, did not attend parenting classes, and failed to consistently visit the child.” Although he argued “that he worked conscientiously toward reunification before his efforts were derailed by his injuries and recovery from an automobile accident, he was terminated for noncooperation with parenting classes before the accident.” The father “also refused drug screens before they became a requirement for visitation, and then tested positive for cocaine and THC. He never established housing or made progress toward doing so.” This evidence supported the trial court’s finding that he “failed to rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication and was not reasonably likely to rectify them within a reasonable time, justifying termination under” § (c)(i). Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g), (h), & (j); In re Trejo Minors; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re VanDalen; MCL 712A.19b(1); MCR 3.977(I)(1); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Moss Minors; MCR 3.911(E); MCL 712A.2(b); MCR 3.911(E)(1)-(4)
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s rights to the child (J) where § (j) was established by clear and convincing evidence. Also, it held that the requirements of MCR 3.977(E) were met and reunification efforts were not required. There was evidence that the father had a long history of substance abuse, he exposed J to illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia, and he cared for J while he was under the influence of narcotics. Moreover, he “refused to acknowledge and seek treatment for his substance abuse during the time that CPS investigated him before mother died of an overdose.” On this record, the court “was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that” J would be harmed if he was returned to his care. Affirmed.