Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Prosecutorial error; Vouching for credibility; Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC II; “Sexual contact”; Great weight of the evidence
The court concluded that defendant-Martinez’s claims of error involving the prosecutor’s arguments, the sufficiency of the evidence to support CSC II, and the great weight of the evidence, lacked merit. “The record demonstrated that the prosecutor did not vouch for the complainant, KFS’s, credibility or imply that she had special knowledge concerning KFS’s truthfulness. Rather, the prosecutor argued, on the basis of the evidence, that KFS was worthy of belief.” Such argument was proper. “Because the prosecutor’s arguments detailing why KFS was credible were not improper, no error occurred.” Also, the court concluded “that the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to support Martinez’s convictions.” The court noted that “KFS testified that Martinez began touching her inner thighs and buttocks when she was nine years old and in the fourth grade. She maintained that the incidents began in the Fall and occurred more than five times until they stopped in the Spring of the following year. She testified that, while Martinez touched her buttocks with his hands, he moved his hands in a ‘up and down’ motion, and she could feel his erection against her pelvic area because she was lying on top of him and facing him.” Thus, her testimony was sufficient. Martinez contended “that the prosecutor failed to present evidence corroborating KFS’s testimony.” The court held that “KFS’s testimony alone was sufficient to support Martinez’s convictions, and corroborating evidence was not required.” Martinez also argued “that the verdict contravenes the great weight of the evidence because KFS testified that several instances of sexual abuse occurred under circumstances that defy logic.” He also maintained “that her testimony was uncorroborated, inherently implausible, and impeached by her inconsistencies and motivation to lie.” The record belied Martinez’s claims. “Although some inconsistencies existed between KFS’s and her mother’s testimonies and between KFS’s testimony and her statements to the police, the evidence was generally consistent that Martinez engaged in sexual contact with KFS on several occasions beginning in the Fall of 2016 when she was nine years old and ending in the Spring of 2017. KFS testified that Martinez engaged in the same general conduct with her on at least five occasions. While Martinez maintained that KFS and her mother fabricated the allegations and that KFS was not worthy of belief, ‘the resolution of credibility questions is within the exclusive province of the jury,’ and her ‘testimony was not inherently implausible.’” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to elicit testimony about a victim’s prior inconsistent statements; People v Trakhtenberg; People v Douglas; Due process; Partial grant of a pretrial motion in limine to exclude other acts evidence; Objections to questions posed by defense counsel; Relevance; Lifetime registration & electronic monitoring (LEM) under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Kiczenski; Unreasonable searches & seizures; People v Hallak; Children’s Protective Services (CPS)
The court rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and found that the prosecution’s objections to questions posed by defense counsel were properly sustained on relevance grounds. It also rejected his claims that (1) his lifetime SORA registration and LEM violated “his right to be free from cruel or unusual punishment” and (2) the LEM violated “the constitutional prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.” He was convicted of CSC II. He asserted that “because this case was a credibility contest between the victim and defendant, defense counsel was ineffective for not impeaching the victim with her previous denial in 2015.” The court disagreed, concluding that, as “in Douglas, defense counsel’s strategy in this case to not directly confront the victim about her denial during the 2015 CPS investigation—to avoid opening the door to other-acts evidence that would harm defendant’s position—was reasonable despite the case being a credibility contest involving” CSC allegations. Defendant next argued “that the trial court’s pretrial order granting his motion in limine violated his right to due process because it precluded his defense counsel from impeaching the victim with her prior inconsistent statements regarding whether defendant sexually assaulted her.” The court determined that to the extent the trial court “sustained the prosecution’s objections to questions posed by defense counsel solely on the basis of the pretrial order, it was error. The order explicitly only applied to the prosecution and did not prevent defendant from presenting any evidence. However, the justification for the pretrial order was defendant’s argument that such evidence was irrelevant to the charges asserted against [him]. In other words, if the evidence would be irrelevant when presented by the prosecution, it would also be irrelevant if presented by the defense.” The court found that “while the trial court may have articulated that it was sustaining the prosecution’s objections on the basis of the pretrial order, it is clear that [its] underlying justification for those evidentiary decisions was on the basis of relevance.” Affirmed.
Enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); 18 USC § 924(e)(1); “Separate occasions” determination; Erlinger v United States; Wooden v United States; Harmless error analysis; Sentence exceeding the statutory maximum; Whether double jeopardy barred the government from seeking an ACCA enhancement based on defendant’s § 922(g)(1) offense for FIP
The court held that a jury, rather than the district court, should have determined whether defendant-Kimbrough had the three previous convictions necessary to support an enhancement under the ACCA. Further, the error was not harmless where there was “reasonable doubt about whether a rational jury, properly instructed under Wooden and Erlinger, would have found that Kimbrough committed the two 2016 burglaries in question on different occasions[.]” Further, resentencing was required because his sentence was impacted by the ACCA enhancement. In 2022, he pled guilty to four counts involving carjacking and firearms. The district court determined that Kimbrough had committed three prior violent felonies on different occasions and enhanced his sentence as an “armed career criminal” under the ACCA. In 2024, the Supreme Court issued Erlinger, which held “that error occurs when a judge, instead of a jury, makes the ‘occasions’ decision.” Thus, the court here had to determine whether the district court’s error was harmless. To show that it was, “the government must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt—through relevant and reliable information in the record—that, absent the error, any reasonable jury would have found that [Kimbrough] committed the prior offenses on different occasions.’” The court’s focus was on whether his “two 2016 aggravated burglaries took place on different occasions. Under Wooden, we must look at the timing, the proximity of location, and the character and relationship of these offenses.” It held that “[a] jury could reasonably find that the two burglaries in 2016 were part of a single ‘criminal event.’” They were committed within roughly 2.3 miles of each other. The “facts could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that [they] were committed by the same individuals, using the same modus operandi[.]” As to timing, even if they “were committed nine days apart, that would not necessarily establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they constituted ‘separate occasions.’” The error was not harmless. As to the impact on his sentence, the statutory maximum for Count Four (FIP) was 120 months but the district court sentenced him to 148 months on each count, to be served concurrently. If the ACCA enhancement had not been imposed, “the Guidelines range for this group of counts would have been 84–105 months.” Thus, the enhancement raised his sentence for FIP over the statutory maximum. Resentencing was also required because his sentence for Count One exceeded the 60-month statutory maximum. The court vacated his sentence on Counts One, Two, and Four, and remanded.
Permanent custody petition; Jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(6); Termination under § 19b(3)(f)(i) & (ii); “Parent”; MCR 3.903(A)(18); “Father”; MCR 3.903(A)(7); Principle that a putative father does not qualify as a father for the purpose of jurisdiction; In re Long; In re Knipp; Child’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Gonzales/Martinez; Relative placement
The court held that because the trial court improperly exercised jurisdiction over the child (CSA) as to respondent-father, it could not terminate his parental rights. However, the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over respondent-mother and did not err by terminating her parental rights to CSA. Petitioners-guardians filed a permanent custody petition seeking to adopt CSA and requested that the trial court assume jurisdiction and terminate respondents’ parental rights. The trial court granted the petition, finding respondents failed or neglected to support the child for two years or more before the filing of the petition. On appeal, respondents argued that a statutory ground for termination was not met. The court agreed as to the father. In light of the holdings in both Long and Knipp, it concluded “that because [he] only was the putative father when the" petition was filed, “and he did not establish his paternity to CSA until approximately two months afterwards, the trial court erred when it terminated his parental rights under [§ (f)] because it improperly exercised its jurisdiction over CSA with respect to [him] before his parentage was recognized legally.” As to the mother, the court noted she “was employed and capable of providing support for CSA while CSA was under petitioners’ care, yet she did not do so.” As such, the trial court did not err by finding § (f) was proven by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, as to CSA’s best interests, the court found that “because the trial court was not permitted to exercise jurisdiction over CSA with respect to [the] father, [it] was barred further from determining that it was in the best interests of CSA to terminate” the father’s parental rights. Conversely, the trial court did not “err when it determined that termination of [the] mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of CSA under MCL 712A.19b(5).” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Whether the Michigan Children’s Institute’s (MCI) decision to withhold consent for adoption was arbitrary & capricious
In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court properly determined that respondent-MCI’s “finding was not arbitrary and capricious, and denied the motion challenging the decision.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing petitioner’s petition to adopt. The case arose out of her “attempt to adopt her minor grandchildren, ASLM and JACM, after the parental rights of the children’s parents were terminated.” She challenged “the trial court’s denial of her motion, filed under MCL 710.45,” arguing that the MCI’s “decision to withhold consent for adoption was arbitrary and capricious.” The court noted that the “superintendent’s decision primarily focused on the second factor, the willingness and ability of a relative to ensure the physical and emotional well-being of the children on a permanent basis.” Petitioner did not show “that the superintendent’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.” The court found that petitioner appeared “to be conflating DHHS’s initial removal and placement of the children with the MCI superintendent’s consideration of her petition to adopt following” termination. The children were initially placed with relatives but later moved to a nonrelative foster home. The record did “not indicate the reason for the change. In any event, the children’s placement following removal was not at issue at the hearing in this case.” Further, nothing in the record suggested “the MCI superintendent’s decision concerning adoption was untimely, or that the superintendent improperly used negative information against the children’s relatives while disregarding negative information” as to the foster family. A “significant portion of petitioner’s argument concerns her claim that the foster home is unsuitable for the children.” But many of her claims were not substantiated by any record evidence. She also argued “that the children did not exhibit physical, mental, or behavioral issues before being placed in foster care.” The court noted that they “were young when they were removed from their mother—ASLM was six years old, and JACM was 1-1/2 years old.” It was reasonable that some of their “struggles were discovered as they grew and started attending school. And petitioner’s characterization of [their] significant special needs as being caused by their foster placement casts doubts on her ability to manage those needs if they were in her care and custody.” She also argued “that the superintendent considered improper information about [her] in the decision.” But the court agreed “with the trial court that any minor errors in the recitation of petitioner’s criminal history, CPS history, or martial status did not render the superintendent’s decision arbitrary and capricious.” Finally, petitioner did “not explain what additional discovery she should have received or how additional discovery would have altered the outcome of the hearing.”
Whether plaintiff was erroneously deprived of a bench trial; Claim for declaratory relief; Principle that a request for declaratory relief is not an independent cause of action; Interpretation of a deed restriction; Ambiguous contractual language as a question of fact for a jury; Motion for a new trial; Great weight of the evidence; Enforcing deed restrictions; Thiel v Goyings
The court held that the trial court did not (1) err in denying plaintiff-A2C2’s request for a bench trial or (2) abuse its discretion in denying A2C2’s motion for a new trial on the ground “that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.” Thus, the court affirmed the “judgment effectuating the jury verdict that A2C2 was prohibited from developing” lots (the Golf Lots) within a subdivision for residential use. A2C2 argued the trial court erred in depriving “it of a bench trial because its claim for declaratory relief was equitable in nature.” It sought a declaratory judgment that the lots “could be used for residential purposes under” a 1975 restriction agreement. But “a request for declaratory relief is not an independent cause of action.” Underlying the request here was interpretation of the 1975 Agreement, which was grounded in contract. Ambiguous “‘contractual language presents a question of fact to be decided by a jury.’” In a prior appeal, the court “concluded that the 1975 Agreement was ambiguous because of its internal inconsistencies.” Thus, the proper construction of the Agreement was “a question of fact to be decided by a jury.” Given that defendant-Association “timely demanded a trial by jury as permitted by MCR 2.508(B), the trial court did not err by denying A2C2’s request for a bench trial.” As to the great weight of the evidence argument, during trial the parties presented evidence including a prior agreement (the 1957 Agreement), “the 1975 Agreement, the Association’s annual meeting minutes prior to its adoption of the 1975 Agreement,” and testimony from two witnesses. The “1975 Agreement differed from the 1957 Agreement in that it omitted the provision affording owners of the lots within the Subdivision an option to purchase the Golf Lots and stating that if they failed to exercise their option, ‘said golf lots may be employed for residence purposes.’ Despite this distinction, the 1975 Agreement retained language that appeared to contemplate the residential development of the Golf Lots.” Because the extrinsic evidence presented by the witnesses’ testimony “conflicted with the portion of the 1975 Agreement that appeared to contemplate the residential development of the” lots, the evidence did not preponderate “‘so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow it to stand.’” Finally, the state’s “public policy favoring the free use of property does not itself render the jury verdict contrary to law.”
Declaratory action; Whether defendant was required to plead an affirmative defense; Nonconforming use; Edward C Levy Co v Marine City Zoning Bd of Appeals; Laches; Knight v Northpointe Bank; Equitable estoppel; Hughes v Almena Twp; Admissions; MCR 2.111
The court held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition for plaintiff-township on its claim seeking injunctive relief against defendant-resident. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to have defendant reduce the number of dogs she owned to comply with the applicable zoning ordinances. It claimed she was in violation of an ordinance “by impermissibly operating a ‘commercial kennel’ by virtue of housing, boarding, or caring for more than four dogs on the premises.” The trial court granted summary disposition for plaintiff, finding defendant failed to properly plead any affirmative defenses. On appeal, although the court agreed with defendant that she was not obligated to plead as an affirmative defense that her ownership of her dogs did not violate any current zoning ordinance, this did “not necessitate reversal.” Because her defense “did not include any acceptance of liability, it [was] not an affirmative defense, and it was not required to be pleaded as one.” However, she “admitted liability in her answer to plaintiff’s complaint, and summary disposition” for plaintiff was still warranted. The court next noted that, under “a nonconforming-use theory, a defendant admits noncompliance with a current zoning ordinance while maintaining that they nonetheless are entitled to prevail for some other reason. This meets the definition of an affirmative defense.” Here, however, “because defendant was required to plead this affirmative defense and failed to do so, the defense” was waived. In addition, if she “only became aware of the defense after discovery, [she] could have amended the responsive pleading to include that defense.” But she “made no effort to do so.” Further, she abandoned her contention that she was not required to plead laches as an affirmative defense, and even if she hadn’t, “it is well established that laches is an affirmative defense.” Moreover, “had defendant’s pleading raised the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel, and assuming . . . an offer or representation was made by someone on the Planning Commission, without pleading any facts demonstrating any ‘exceptional circumstances,’ defendant still would not be able to avail herself of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.” Finally, defendant’s failure to respond to pertinent allegations resulted “in the allegations being deemed admitted.” Where she “has raised no affirmative defenses and has effectively admitted to continuously violating the zoning ordinance, the trial court properly granted summary disposition” for plaintiff. Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(j); Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Atchley; A parent’s responsibility to participate & benefit from services; Accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); 42 USC § 12132; In re Hicks/Brown; Ineffective assistance of counsel in child protective proceedings; In re Williams; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Parent-child bond; In re Pederson
Holding that: (1) DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, (2) respondent-mother’s trial counsel was not ineffective, (3) § (j) was met, and (4) termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of her parental rights. Her rights were terminated on the basis of unsuitable housing and improper supervision. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification. “While mother failed to provide DHHS medical documentation confirming an alleged disability, DHHS nonetheless took steps to accommodate [her] as best it could.” In addition, there was “no indication that mother was cognitively impaired or had significant mental health concerns.” And the record showed that “DHHS provided services that comported with the recommendations in [her] psychological evaluation, which” showed it was responsive to her needs. In short, respondent “failed to uphold her ‘commensurate responsibility’ to engage in and benefit from the services offered by DHHS.” And contrary to her “arguments on appeal, there [was] no indication that she would have fared better if DHHS had offered other services or accommodations to assist her.” The court also rejected her claim that her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request ADA accommodations and by failing to ensure that DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification. Because there was no indication she provided medical documentation of her disability or need for accommodations to her trial counsel, she “failed to establish the factual predicate for her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” And her “trial counsel made a concerted effort to ensure that DHHS took steps to accommodate” her. The court next rejected her contention that a statutory ground for termination was not met, noting that, under § (j), there was “a reasonable likelihood that the children would experience harm if returned to” the home. The court also rejected her claim that termination was not in the children’s best interests. “To the extent that mother and the children were bonded, the bond was not healthy for the children.” In addition, they “required permanency and stability, and were reportedly thriving in foster care.” It was also “unclear how mother, who did not seek to understand the children’s needs, would provide appropriate” care, or how she would ensure they “attended school and medical appointments.” Safety and housing also remained concerns.