Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Retaliation action under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); MCL 37.2701(a); Meyer v Center Line; Burlington N & Santa Fe Ry Co v White; Causation; Barrett v Kirtland Cmty Coll; Res judicata; Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit; Whether an action was decided on the merits; Privity; Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley; “Employer” under the ELCRA; MCL 37.2201(a); The “transactional test”; Garrett v Washington; Collateral estoppel; Mecosta Cnty Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co; Consolidation; MCR 2.505(A)
Holding that plaintiff-employee identified no error requiring reversal, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition for defendants-employers. Plaintiff sued defendants for retaliation under Title VII, alleging she engaged in protected activity by complaining about defendant-company’s unfair treatment of Black employees and by lodging a complaint of racial discrimination against a fellow employee at a meeting. She also alleged retaliation in violation of the ELCRA, asserting “that she engaged in protected activity by filing” a prior case, “that defendants knew about that lawsuit, and [they] subjected her to an adverse employment action by dissolving her position, demoting her, and refusing to transfer her to a purchase mortgage team.” On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by ruling in favor of defendants because summary disposition was premature, its analysis as to her transfer to a new role was flawed, and it exhibited favoritism toward defendants by accepting their statements as evidence. First, “plaintiff was reassigned to a new role because of departmental restructuring.” And she failed to show “her decision to choose the position in the refinance team was a demotion.” In addition, defendants’ “refusal to transfer her from the refinance team to a purchase mortgage team is not an adverse employment action because plaintiff is not entitled to her preferred role.” She also did not “show a causal nexus between her protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action.” Second, summary disposition would have also been proper because of the prior final judgment in the first lawsuit. That lawsuit was decided on the merits, there was privity among defendants, and “the matter in the second lawsuit was or could have been resolved in the first lawsuit because they arose from the same operative facts.” Moreover, the “specific factual issue of whether defendants retaliated against her by transferring her to the refinance team was barred by collateral estoppel.” Third, the trial court “did not issue inconsistent rulings by dismissing the second lawsuit” instead of consolidating them.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v Trakhtenberg; Failure to present mitigation evidence at sentencing
The court held that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing due to a failure to present mitigation evidence. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of her boyfriend (WM) and sentenced to 20 to 40 years. As to her claim defense counsel (E) did not fully investigate mitigation evidence, the Ginther hearing testimony showed that E and a social worker (M) “conducted many interviews of defendant, her family members, and the victim’s family members, to compile information for a mitigation report. Through these interviews, [E] was aware of defendant’s personal history, as well as defendant’s and [WM’s] substance abuse.” The court found it clear that E “conducted a thorough investigation into defendant’s personal history. While he did not request police reports concerning defendant, [E] was aware of defendant’s tumultuous home life through his and [M’s] investigation. It cannot be said that defense counsel conducted a ‘less than complete investigation.’” Defendant also asserted that E should have presented WM’s “medical records to the trial court, which detailed his decades-long history of addiction and mental illness. After discussing the matter with [M] and defendant, [E] elected not to file a mitigation report detailing [WM’s] medical history because he did not want the sentencing hearing to delve into a critique of the victim’s life. [E] believed this may aggravate the trial court and result in a lengthier sentence.” The court concluded that E “made a complete investigation and made an objectively reasonable, strategic choice based on his professional judgment not to present this evidence. Thus, defense counsel’s choice did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The court also rejected defendant’s argument that she was prejudiced by E’s decision not to present mitigation evidence at sentencing, finding that there was not a reasonable probability she “would have received a lesser sentence.” Affirmed.
Expert testimony; Insanity defense; Intoxication or withdrawal from substance use; Great weight of the evidence; Testimony on malingering; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to correct improper testimony; Evidence of defendant’s drug & alcohol use; MRE 404
The court found no merit to defendant’s challenges to (1) the testimony of Dr. A (who completed a criminal responsibility evaluation for him), (2) testimony of malingering as to his symptoms of mental illness, and (3) alleged character evidence. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. He first challenged Dr. A’s “opinion that his apparent delusions and psychotic behavior at the time of the offenses stemmed from voluntary intoxication with various substances. Dr. [A] also suggested that defendant feigned mental illness after the offenses[.]” His argument amounted “to a disagreement over the strength and weight of the evidence regarding legal insanity.” Evidence indicated “that nitrous oxide was knowingly abused by defendant.” In assessing his “voluntary intoxication levels, Dr. [A] relied on defendant’s intoxication—stemming from either nitrous oxide, marijuana, or both—as a basis to conclude that [he] was not legally insane.” The court concluded that “it was not legally erroneous for Dr. [A] to rely on her finding that defendant was intoxicated—whether by nitrous oxide or marijuana or a combination of both—to support her finding that [he] was not legally insane at the time of the offenses because his psychotic symptoms were the result of voluntary intoxication.” The court noted that mere disagreements as to “the interpretation of conflicting evidence do not establish that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.” Next, defendant argued that Dr. A “improperly provided instructions to the jury on the law related to the insanity defense.” To the extent he complained about instances where Dr. A “referred to statutory definitions of insanity and mental illness, defendant” did not show any error. To the extent he complained “about the prosecution eliciting explanations and definitions of the statutory terms, defendant is correct that plain error occurred.” But the court held that he failed to establish prejudice. Beyond “merely asserting that the trial court’s instructions to the jury did not correct Dr. [A’s] alleged misstatements of law, defendant does not explain how the trial court’s jury instructions did not accurately reflect the law or were otherwise somehow erroneous.” Next, he argued “that the expert witnesses should not have been permitted to testify that he was lying or malingering regarding his symptoms of mental illness.” He contended “that such testimony amounts to improper expert testimony regarding defendant’s credibility similar to evidence of a polygraph test.” But the court found that he did not show “that there was any error in permitting the experts to discuss which of [his] descriptions of symptoms may or may not have been accurate as part of their respective discussions whether he met the definition of legal insanity.” Affirmed.
Prosecutorial vouching; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the prosecution’s statements during closing argument; Jury instructions & verdict form; Mandatory minimum sentence; Proportionality; Cruel & unusual punishments; Separation of powers
The court held that “the prosecution did not commit error when making references to [victim] SH’s courage.” Also, the trial court did not plainly err as to the jury instructions or verdict form. Further, because defendant was convicted of CSC I “pursuant to MCL 750.520b(2)(b), his 25-year mandatory minimum sentence did not constitute a departure from the guidelines,” and was presumptively proportional. Additionally, he failed to establish prejudicial plain error on the grounds that this sentence violated the United States or Michigan Constitutions. Finally, he failed “to establish prejudicial plain error on the grounds that MCL 750.520b(2)(b)’s 25-year mandatory minimum sentence violates the separation-of-powers doctrine under the Michigan Constitution.” He was convicted of CSC I and II, and accosting a child for immoral purposes. He was sentenced to 25 to 40 years for each of the CSC I convictions, 10 to 15 years for the CSC II conviction, and 2 to 4 years for the accosting conviction. The case arose out of his “sexual abuse of SH when she was between the ages of four and eight years old.” Defendant argued, among other things, “that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of SH during closing arguments, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s statements.” During closing arguments, “the prosecution emphasized that SH was courageous for disclosing defendant’s sexual abuse and standing up for herself. Contrary to defendant’s characterization of the prosecution arguing that ‘SH was a courageous truth[-]telling witness,’ none of the prosecution’s statements referenced SH’s credibility or suggested that the prosecution had special knowledge concerning SH’s truthfulness.” Thus, the prosecution’s references to her “courage did not amount to improper vouching.” The court concluded that even if the “references could be characterized as bolstering SH’s credibility, the prosecution is permitted to do so by arguing from the evidence and reasonable inferences from it.” The court found that the “prosecution’s statements that SH was courageous can be reasonably inferred from evidence that SH initially did not disclose the abuse because she was afraid of getting in trouble, but realized that defendant’s behavior was inappropriate after growing older. This eventually led SH to disclose the abuse to her grandmother when she felt the time was right.” Further, the court found that “any purported impermissible vouching was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the lawyers’ commentary and arguments were not evidence, and that it was the responsibility of the jury to ‘decide which witnesses [it] believe[s] and how important [it] think[s] their testimony is.’” Affirmed.
Child support; Retroactive modification; MCL 552.603(2); Michigan Child Support Formula 2.01(E)(4)(d); Friend of the Court (FOC); Uniform Child Support Order (UCSO)
Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to retroactively modify support beyond 2/22, the court affirmed the order adopting the FOC’s child support recommendation retroactive to that point. The parties divorced in 2010. Defendant-ex-wife moved to modify child support in 2/22. The FOC recommended a modification for the parties’ younger child effective the date of that motion. She argued the modification should be retroactive to 7/14 under MCL 552.603(2). The court disagreed. The trial court determined that the 12/9/14 UCSO and a 4/15 “order resolved the child support issue raised in defendant’s” 7/14 motion. She asserted that the 12/14 order was temporary and her 7/14 modification request was pending at the relevant time. The court found “no merit in this argument. MCR 3.207(C)(4) requires that ‘[a] temporary order must state its effective date and whether its provisions may be modified retroactively by a subsequent order.’ The 2014 UCSO was clearly labeled as a modification, not a temporary order. It also did not state that its provisions could be modified retroactively; rather, it stated that the support modification was effective” 8/29/14. Defendant “did not object to the 2014 UCSO. [She] also did not seek relief from the order” based on a mistake under MCR 2.612(C)(2). In addition, the 4/15 “order made it clear that there was not a pending motion because it invited defendant ‘to file a motion for modification of child support if discovery or other change of circumstances justifies’ it.” She did not object to this order. While “defense counsel orally requested an evidentiary hearing in [1/19], the trial court denied the request absent a motion. At that time, [it] noted that discovery had continued for five years without the filing of a substantive motion. Despite [its] nudging, defendant waited three more years before finally moving to modify child support and requesting an evidentiary hearing.” The court held that given “these facts, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that plaintiff could have reasonably believed that there was not a petition for modification of child support before the [trial] court until defendant moved for modification in” 2/22. Further, because “there was no evidence to support that plaintiff misrepresented his income, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to apply MCL 552.603b to retroactively modify support beyond” that date.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a), (g), (j), & (k); The trial court’s findings of fact & conclusions of law; MCR 3.977(I)(1); In re Pawloski; Effect of exposing the children to harm; In re Plump; Children’s best interests
Holding that the trial court failed to make findings of fact supporting a statutory ground to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights, the court vacated in part as to him, and remanded. In addition, holding that § (j) was met as to respondent-mother, and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of her parental rights. Respondents’ parental rights were terminated on the basis of the “mother’s continued relationship with an abusive partner despite multiple incidents involving domestic violence resulted in her oldest child sustaining life-threatening injuries.” On appeal, the court first addressed the termination of the father’s parental rights. “Because the trial court failed to make any findings of fact supporting its determination that the evidence satisfied a statutory basis for termination, we vacate in part the trial court’s . . . order following the adjudication and statutory-grounds hearing with respect to [him] only and remand for the trial court to make findings of fact in support of at least one statutory basis for terminating” his parental rights. “Having vacated its statutory-grounds determination with respect to the father, we likewise vacate in part the” order terminating his parental rights only. As to the mother, it found that while the record did not support termination of her parental rights under §§ (a), (g), and (k), it did support termination under § (j). The court noted that her tolerance of abuse by one of the children’s father’s “over a period of years exposed her children to harm, which ultimately nearly killed her oldest child.” And the record supported the trial court’s determination that she “failed to demonstrate that she recognizes the danger to which she subjected her children or that she is capable of protecting them from persons with whom she associates.” As to the children’s best interests, the court found that while she has a “strong bond with her children and visits with them went well, [they] indicated that they did not want to return home to her.” In addition, she “has begun experiencing blackouts, seizures, and auditory and visual hallucinations during which she hears voices and sees shadowy figures. The trial court expressed concern regarding whether [she] is able to care for her own needs, much less her needs in addition to those of her children.”