Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Search & seizure; Traffic stop; Investigatory stop; People v Mazzie; Separation of powers; Const 1963, art 3, § 2; MCL 257.227; MCL 500.3101a; Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)
Holding that defendant’s traffic stop was valid, the court affirmed his convictions. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver meth, CCW, resisting or obstructing a police officer, and felony-firearm after a traffic stop and inventory search revealed drugs, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and a knife. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. While his appeal was pending, he moved for a new trial, which the trial court also denied. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the officer (D) did not have a valid basis for his traffic stop. “Regardless of the parties’ arguments as to whether the defective tailpipe served an adequate basis for the stop, the prosecution correctly explain[ed] on appeal that the tailpipe only served to pique” D’s interest. It “was actually the lack of insurance for the truck that led to the traffic stop.” And an “officer may rely on LEIN information that a vehicle is uninsured as a proper basis to stop a vehicle. Thus, the traffic stop was valid.” The court also rejected his claim that the Secretary of State violated the separation of powers by providing the electronic insurance information to law enforcement through LEIN. “Separation-of-powers issues arise when one branch of government impermissibly encroaches on the authority of another branch.” There was no evidence here “that the Secretary of State ever encroached on the Legislature’s authority. Indeed, defendant’s unsupported separation-of-powers claim seems to be merely an alternative argument seeking evidence suppression—an argument that we previously rejected when we held that suppression of evidence is not the correct remedy in response to an alleged violation of” MCL 257.227 or MCL 500.3101a.
Motions to suppress preliminary breath test (PBT) results; Probable cause; “Reasonable cause”; MCL 257.625a(2); People v Olson (Unpub); Search warrant for a vehicle’s event data recorder (EDR); Good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
Although the court agreed “that ‘reasonable cause’ in this situation equates to probable cause, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress the PBT results because the officers had probable cause.” Also, as to the EDR from his vehicle, the trial court did not err by holding “that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply.” Defendant was charged with OWI causing death. As to his motions to suppress his PBT results, he argued “the officers did not have ‘reasonable cause’ to administer the PBT.” He contended that “reasonable cause” under MCL 257.625a(2) “equates to probable cause, and that, because the officers did not have probable cause, suppression of the PBT results was required.” The prosecution equated the term to “reasonable suspicion.” The court agreed with defendant’s position. It expressly adopted “Olson’s analysis concluding that ‘reasonable cause’ under MCL 257.625a equates to probable cause.” However, it found that “the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the police had reasonable cause to administer the PBT in this case.” Defendant also argued “that the search warrant for the EDR in his vehicle lacked sufficient probable cause and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule” did not apply. The court held that even if it accepted his “argument that the affidavit was insufficient, the evidence obtained from the EDR would still be admissible at trial.” It found that “the facts were sufficient to suspect that a crime had taken place and the EDR could aid officers in making that determination.” It noted that “at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress the EDR evidence, the trial court admitted that the affidavit ‘could have been better[,]’ but nonetheless found that it was supported by probable cause because there was ‘some field sobriety information provided at the point in which [the officer’s] affidavit was done and I’m assuming they had the PBT results at the time that this affidavit was done, and could have included that.’ The officer did not indicate that defendant was intoxicated in the affidavit, but he had personal knowledge of this fact on which he could rely when executing the search warrant. Thus, he would not have viewed his affidavit as so lacking in indicia of probable cause that his belief in the existence of probable cause was rendered unreasonable.” Affirmed.
Motion to withdraw a plea; Whether the plea was knowing & voluntary; Effect of an affidavit; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to advise defendant of the correct guidelines range; Failure to object to OV scoring; Scoring of OVs 10 & 19; MCL 777.40(1)(b); “Exploit” (MCL 777.40(3)(b)); A “domestic relationship”; MCL 777.49(b); Presumption information in a PSIR is accurate; Right to a speedy trial; People v Williams
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, rejecting his claims that the “plea was not knowing or voluntary and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the correct” guidelines range. Further, the trial court did not err in scoring 10 points for OV 10 and 15 points for OV 19, and his related ineffective assistance claims also failed. Finally, his “right to a speedy trial was not violated.” He was convicted of assault by strangulation and aggravated assault pursuant to a nolo contendere plea. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 108 to 240 months for the former and 365 days for the latter. The victim was his half-sister. He entered the plea on the second day of his trial. He contended “his plea was not knowing or voluntary because he entered [it] in reliance of the sentencing guidelines that his attorney calculated before trial.” He asserted that “he would not have entered his plea if he knew a higher guidelines range applied to his offenses.” But at no time during his “plea proceedings did the trial court or the parties mention a proposed guidelines range upon which” he could rely. He relied on his affidavit in contending on appeal “that he believed he would be sentenced under a lower guideline range . . . .” However, his affidavit conflicted “with his plea proceeding during which he stated under oath that no one had promised him anything other than what was discussed at the hearing thus far and no one had discussed any sentencing agreement. He also agreed to enter his plea after the trial court informed him that the maximum punishment for his assault-by-strangulation conviction was life imprisonment, and that the maximum punishment for his aggravated-assault conviction was one year in jail. ‘[W]hen a plea is entered in accordance with the applicable court rules, a trial court is barred from considering testimony or affidavits inconsistent with statements made during the plea hearing.’” As a result, his affidavit was “insufficient to establish that his plea was not knowing or voluntary or that he reasonably relied upon his attorney’s representation that he would be sentenced within a specific guideline range.” His speedy-trial claim failed because while prejudice was presumed given that the delay was over 18 months, the other factors were “either neutral or weigh against” finding a violation. Affirmed.
Parenting time; The law-of-the-case doctrine; Motion to suspend parenting time; MCL 722.27a(3); Limiting evidentiary hearing testimony; MRE 611; Proposed photo evidence; Makeup parenting time; MCL 552.642; Motion to modify child support; Order that a party undergo a psychological evaluation; MCL 722.27(1)(d)-(e); MCR 2.311(A); “Good cause”; Court-appointed experts; MRE 706; Contempt; Violation of a court order’s caregiver-notice & healthcare-notice provisions; Bond requirement; MCR 2.109(A); Frivolous-filing sanctions; MCR 1.109(E); MCL 600.2591; The seven-day procedure; MCR 2.602(B)(3); Attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D); Distinguishing Diez v Davey
In consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court violated the law-of-the-case doctrine related to parenting time (PT). But it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-mother’s motion to suspend plaintiff-father’s PT or commit reversible error in awarding him 38 days of makeup PT. It also did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying defendant’s motion to modify child support, (2) ordering plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation, (3) finding him in contempt, or (4) “requiring the parties to post a $1,500 bond as a condition precedent to filing any additional motions or pleadings in the case.” The court rejected challenges to the trial court’s imposition of some frivolous-filing sanctions and denial of others. Finally, it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for attorney fees “under MCR 3.206(D) based on an inability to bear the” litigation expense. The court noted that the case “has a complex trial and appellate history.” In this decision, among other things it agreed with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in its 1/26/24 and 2/2/24 orders by requiring the parties’ child (ASK) “to travel one week per month from Florida to Michigan for parenting time with plaintiff.” The court vacated the parenting-time provisions of those trial court opinions and orders based on the law-of-the-case doctrine, noting that it “previously decided on three separate occasions that an order requiring ASK to bear the burden of travel is an abuse of discretion.” It found that the exception to the doctrine that “applies when the facts of the case have materially changed” did not apply here. It “remanded for further consideration of a parenting-time schedule that would not impose frequent travel burdens on the child.” As to sanctions, among other things it rejected plaintiff’s claim the trial court erred in finding that he “filed sanctionable objections to defendant’s seven-day order following” an emergency hearing. The trial court found that his objections were frivolous because (1) they did not comply with MCR 2.602(B)(3)(b) and (c)’s requirements; (2) they did not “state the inaccuracy or omission in the proposed order with specificity;” (3) they did not “raise the issue of the burden that defendant was to carry at the show-cause hearing; and (4) [he] failed to provide an alternative order for the [trial] court to consider.” The court agreed “with the trial court’s findings.” Vacated in part (as to the parenting-time schedule) and affirmed in all other respects. The court retained jurisdiction and issued an order as to the remand proceedings.
Right of first refusal; LaRose Mkt, Inc v Sylvan Ctr, Inc
The court concluded that the trial court erred when it held that plaintiffs’ right of first refusal was not triggered by defendant-Summit’s sale of the 50-acre parcel to defendant-Dreamers and Doers. Defendant-Jarred owned Dreamers and Doers in equal part with his brother, Stephen, and friend, defendant-Kyle Sischo. “The trial court reasoned the transfer was not a ‘sale’ under LaRose because there was no bona fide, arm’s length sale, and that, while" two non-parties, Stephen and Kyle, joined in the project, "Dreamers and Doers . . . can hardly be described as ‘strangers’ to the other parties to the contract[.]” The court held that the “trial court misinterpreted the rule in LaRose. LaRose does not require a ‘sale’ to be a bona fide, arm’s length sale, only that it be ‘for value[.]’” There was “no dispute that Summit sold the property to Dreamers and Doers for $419,000. Unlike the $0 transfer from [defendants-Jarred and Sara] Spers to Summit, this transfer was certainly ‘for value[.]’” Also, there was “no dispute that ‘a significant interest in the subject property’ was transferred to another entity which ‘thereby gain[ed] substantial control over the . . . property.’” The court noted that Jarred, through Summit, owned 100% of the 50-acre plot, while Dreamers and Doers owned nothing. After the transfer, Jarred’s control of the property decreased from 100% to 33%, while Stephen and Kyle’s shares, together, increased from 0% to 67%. Thus, the only question that remained was whether the transfer was to “a stranger to the [purchase agreement.]” The trial court seemed “to have interpreted the term ‘stranger’ in the context of the buyer’s relationship to the parties themselves.” This, however, was “not the relevant inquiry. The buyer must be a stranger to the contract containing the right of first refusal, not the parties involved. The purchase agreement was between plaintiffs and the Spers. Neither Stephen, Kyle, or Dreamers and Doers as an entity were parties to this contract. Hence, the ‘significant interest’ in question— 67% control of the property—was, in fact, transferred to ‘stranger[s] to the [purchase agreement.]’ Because all four prongs are satisfied, Summit’s sale of the parcel to Dreamers and Doers triggered plaintiffs’ right of first refusal, and the trial court erred by holding otherwise.” Reversed and remanded.
Children’s best interests; In re White; Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in all her children’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. Throughout the case, she “struggled to comply with her treatment plan; she participated in about half of her required drug screenings, tested positive for illicit substances” at least seven times, did not “maintain adequate housing, and had inconsistent employment. [She] was also inconsistent with parenting time and struggled to appropriately parent her children during the visits she attended.” Three of them (RC, SA, and LA) “reported having regular nightmares about [her] and would often act out before visits because they did not want to participate in parenting time.” Due to her abuse, they “continued to exhibit extreme distress while in their foster care placements. They would scream and cry if their bedroom doors were closed or their caregivers” tried to bathe them. RC was diagnosed with PTSD. Only one child, MG, showed any kind of bond with respondent. The others “were bonded with their caregivers in their respective placements, and their placements were willing to adopt them and able to properly provide for them.” The court found these facts supported the trial court’s conclusion “that termination was in the children’s best interests. The trial court considered RC, SA, and LA as a group, finding they were similarly situated even though they were placed with different relatives.” It acknowledged that the “relative placements weighed against termination, but reasoned that [the] mother’s abuse, inability to parent her children, and failure to comply with her treatment plan or consistently attend parenting time clearly weighed in favor of termination.” It conducted a separate “analysis for MG because she was older and placed with her biological father. It acknowledged that MG could not be adopted because she was placed with her father, but, even with this placement, [it] was unconvinced that a custody or parenting-time arrangement . . . could adequately provide stability and safety for MG.” The record supported its findings as to all the children.