Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Whether the trial court’s findings of fact were sufficient; MCR 2.517(A)(2); Triple E Produce Corp v Mastronardi Produce, Ltd; Damages in a contract action; Lawrence v Will Darrah & Assoc, Inc; Damages in a tort action; Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Servs, Inc; Causation; Kandil-Elsayed v F & O Oil, Inc; Unjust enrichment; Conversion; MCL 600.2919a; Badiee v Brighton Area Schs; Lost profits; Body Rustproofing, Inc v Michigan Bell Tel Co
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding plaintiff’s tort damages claim was speculative, but did err by failing to grant a judgment for plaintiff against defendant-Abdullah. The trial court entered a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendants in plaintiff’s action alleging a variety of claims surrounding a dispute over trucking business. The trial court found defendants, in their capacity as independent contractors, did not “steal” any preexisting business from plaintiff, but instead found new business. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in adopting defendants’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without weighing the evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses, and conducting its own independent analysis of the legal issues. Ultimately, the court found that the trial court correctly held that the damages claim was speculative, noting that under the facts of this case, it could not “find that the trial court erred when it determined that plaintiff had not met its burden to prove its damages with reasonable certainty.” Because plaintiff “may not proceed with claims arising out of tort where the alleged damages are speculative,” it likewise held “that the trial court did not err when it dismissed those claims.” However, regardless of whether there was mutuality of assent, Abdullah “was required to proceed in a workmanlike manner and he introduced no evidence at trial rebutting plaintiff’s evidence that he failed to notify the driver that the load needed to be refrigerated. Likewise, Abdullah introduced no evidence disputing plaintiff’s evidence that his mistake caused plaintiff damages in the amount of $28,138.78.” As such, plaintiff was “entitled to judgment against Abdullah in that amount.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Statute of limitations applicable to felony-firearm; Catchall six-year statute of limitations for criminal indictments; MCL 767.24(10); Plain-error review; Admission of a recorded prison conversation; Fifth Amendments right against self-incrimination; Coercion; Applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; Polygraph reference; Evidence of other acts of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b; MRE 403; Sentencing; Jail credit; MCL 769.11b; Judgment of sentence (JOS)
Noting that the statute of limitations applicable “to felony-firearm appears to be an issue of first impression,” the court held that felony-firearm is subject to the 6-year catchall limitations period in MCL 767.24(10). It also concluded “that, under the circumstances, the error of not dismissing that count because it was time-barred was plain.” But it held that defendant’s evidentiary and constitutional arguments lacked merit. Thus, it affirmed his second-degree-murder conviction but under plain-error review vacated his felony-firearm conviction. It remanded for the trial court to dismiss that conviction, provide him “with an opportunity to establish any jail credit to which he is entitled, and correct his” JOS. His convictions arose from the shooting death of T in 2010, but he was not charged in this case until 2021. The prosecution contended “that felony-firearm should not be subject to its own limitations period but should be subject to the same limitations period as the predicate felony.” The court rejected “this argument because, while charging an individual with felony-firearm depends on the existence of a predicate felony or attempted felony, felony-firearm is a crime distinct from the underlying felony or attempted felony.” It believed “that, because there is no statute specifying that any other limitations period applies, felony-firearm must be subject to the catchall limitations period of six years in MCL 767.24(10). And because defendant was not charged with” felony-firearm within that “period, the charge was time-barred” and should have been dismissed. The court found that the conclusion the “six-year statute of limitations in MCL 767.24(10) applies to defendant’s felony-firearm prosecution ‘is not subject to reasonable dispute,’ so the error of allowing that count to stand was plain.” Further, it was “obvious that defendant was prejudiced by this plain error.” As to whether he was entitled to jail credit, the prosecution conceded that he was not on parole when T “was murdered, so his parole status should not have precluded him from receiving any jail credit to which he was entitled.” The court rejected defendant’s challenge to the admission of a recorded conversation between his then-girlfriend-H (who has passed away) and defendant on the basis that it was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. While the police used H “to deceive defendant and ‘lull him into a false sense of security,’” the court held that “nothing about this deception or the circumstances surrounding defendant’s conversation with [H] compelled or coerced [him] to talk to her. It follows that Miranda warnings were not required, and [his] Fifth Amendments right against self-incrimination was not violated.” The court also held that, when he spoke to H, “he did not yet have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel as it relates to [T’s] murder, so that right could not have been violated.” His other evidentiary challenges also failed.
Sufficiency of the evidence; Aiding or abetting; AWIGBH & armed robbery; Double jeopardy; Inconsistent verdicts; People v McKewen; Prosecutorial error; Vouching for the victim’s credibility; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Sentencing; Proportionality; Effect of within-guidelines sentences
The court held that there was sufficient evidence for “the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant aided and abetted in the underlying crimes of AWIGBH and armed robbery.” Also, his AWIGBH and felonious assault convictions did not violate double jeopardy. As to his inconsistent verdicts claim, the “Supreme Court held in McKewen that a guilty verdict for felonious assault was not mutually exclusive to a guilty verdict for AWIGBH and upheld” that defendant’s convictions. He failed to show plain error as to his prosecutorial error claim and because no error occurred, his trial counsel was not “ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection.” Finally, his sentence was proportionate. He was convicted of AWIGBH, armed robbery, felonious assault, and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to 18 to 120 months for AWIGBH, 8 to 15 years for armed robbery, 1 to 4 years for felonious assault, and 2 years for each felony-firearm conviction. Defendant contended, among other things, “there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, demonstrating: (a) he was aware of [codefendant-]Dew’s plan to rob and shoot the victim, (b) he intended to assist Dew in robbing and shooting the victim, or (c) he assaulted the victim intending to do great bodily harm.” The court found his claim was not persuasive. “Defendant’s challenges, including what inferences could be drawn from the evidence, are related to the weight and credibility of the evidence, which were issues for the jury to resolve.” The court noted that the “jury was free to accept or reject the theory of either party in light of the evidence presented at trial, and we will not interfere with the jury’s role of determining issues of weight and credibility.” Further, it noted that it was “required to resolve all conflicts in the evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in favor of the prosecution[.]” It held that applying “these standards, there was sufficient evidence to” support defendant’s AWIGBH and armed robbery convictions on an aiding and abetting theory. Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence; Felonious assault; People v Starks; Ethnic intimidation; MCL 750.147b; People v Stevens; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 1; MCL 777.31(1)(c)
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Mangiapane’s convictions of felonious assault and ethnic intimidation, and that the trial court properly scored 15 points for OV 1 in sentencing him. As to the felonious assault conviction, the record showed that the victim (M) feared an immediate battery due to “gunshots coupled with his interaction with Mangiapane. [M] was walking on the sidewalk across the street from Mangiapane when a green laser beam flashed on his face. After [M] stated, ‘get that beam out of my face,’ Mangiapane directed [M] to continue walking and called him a racial slur. Shortly after their exchange, [M] heard gunshots and started walking faster. When asked why he did not start running, he replied, ‘I didn’t want him to start shooting more at me.’ The surveillance video corroborated [M’s] testimony. It showed that Mangiapane aimed a firearm with a green laser pointer at [M] as he walked down the street. The video depicted a glowing light moving around and focusing on [M]. While there was no evidence that Mangiapane shot directly at [M], the prosecutor presented evidence that Mangiapane fired the rifle and that [M] believed that Mangiapane fired the rifle at him. The police recovered a spent shell casing outside the building, which was fired from the rifle found inside the safe. Mangiapane fired the rifle immediately following his verbal exchange with [M], and [M] testified that he did not run after hearing gunshots because he did not want Mangiapane ‘to start shooting more’ at him.” Thus, the court concluded that “Mangiapane’s actions placed [M] in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” As to the ethnic intimidation conviction, the court noted that Mangiapane directed a racial slur at M and “told his girlfriend after his encounter with [M] that he had ‘to teach a n****r a lesson.’ Mangiapane’s words alone were strong evidence that he acted in the manner he did because of [M’s] race.” As to the scoring of OV 1, the surveillance video showed “the laser beam on [M’s] person and in his immediate vicinity. [M] also testified that a green beam was flashing in his face. It may be reasonably inferred from the evidence that the firearm was pointed at or toward [M] if the mounted laser beam was pointed in his direction.” Affirmed.
The No-Fault Act; Action for first-party personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Household services claims; False & material misrepresentations; “Fraudulent insurance act” (MCL 500.3173a(4)); Candler v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of MI; Bakeman v Citizens Ins Co of Midwest; Distinguishing Gary v Farmers Ins Exch; Misstatements in the litigation process; Williamson v AAA of MI; Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF); Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP)
The court held that “plaintiff committed a fraudulent insurance act” and as a result, “was ineligible for PIP benefits through the MACP.” The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant-Farm Bureau in this first-party action for PIP benefits. Plaintiff was injured while operating a motorized scooter that was struck by an automobile. He applied with the MAIPF for PIP benefits under the MACP. His claim was assigned to Farm Bureau. Plaintiff asserted the trial court erred because genuine issues of material fact existed whether he “made false and material misrepresentations in support of his household services claims . . . .” The court noted that the dispute here involved “the fourth Candler factor—whether plaintiff knew the statements contained false information.” It concluded that the evidence showed he “knew that the household services statements that he submitted for the months of” August through “December 2021 were not correct.” He knew that the person who was providing the services (KR) was providing them to plaintiff’s wife (VR), “not plaintiff, before the accident and that the services did not change after the accident. Plaintiff also knew that [KR] did not perform any window washing. And plaintiff knew that he was not entitled to make a claim for services for dates before the subject accident. No reasonable jury could conclude that [he] did not know that he was submitting false information material to his claim for no-fault benefits.” While he relied on Gary, that case was distinguishable. Unlike the plaintiff in Gary, there was “no evidence in this case that plaintiff suffered a cognitive impairment.” In addition, unlike “the household services statements in this case, the forms in Gary were not completed by the plaintiff. Further, there was no testimony from the service provider in Gary that the services were not actually provided. The errors in plaintiff’s forms were not, as he suggests, merely typographical. [His] multitudinous misrepresentations were substantive, which also distinguishes this case from Gary.” And in light of Williamson, the court rejected his “argument that misstatements made in the litigation process are not actionable.” Finally, it declined “plaintiff’s invitation to express disagreement with Bakeman’s analysis of the scienter requirement of MCL 500.3173a.” Affirmed.
Federal preemption; The Federal Aviation Administration & Authorization Act (FAAAA or the Act); 49 USC § 14501(c); Whether the FAAAA preempts state common law “negligent hiring” claims against freight brokers; The FAAAA’s safety exception; § 14501(c)(2)(A); City of Columbus v Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv, Inc; Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc v Pelkey; Whether common-law tort claims like plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim are part of a state’s “safety regulatory authority”; Whether negligent hiring claims are “with respect to motor vehicles”
In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court considered whether the FAAAA preempts negligent hiring claims against freight brokers under a state’s common law. It held that where such a claim “substantively concerns motor vehicles and motor vehicle safety,” it falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception and is not preempted. Plaintiff-Cox sued defendant-TQL, a freight broker, for negligence under Ohio law. He alleged that TQL negligently hired an “unsafe motor carrier,” resulting in his wife’s death in a vehicle accident. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that it was preempted by the FAAAA. On appeal, Cox conceded that § 14501(c)(1) prohibited his state-law claim but argued that the Act’s safety exception saved it from preemption. Agreeing that the claim fell within the scope of § 14501(c)(1), the court turned to the applicability of the safety exception, The exception provides that the FAAAA “‘shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles . . . .’” The court held that common-law tort claims like Cox’s negligent-hiring claim are part of a state’s “safety regulatory authority,” satisfying the first prong of § 14501(c)(2)(A). It then considered whether negligent hiring claims such as Cox’s are “with respect to motor vehicles.” This was the requirement in dispute here and is the source of a circuit court split. The court explained that in the present case, it was not necessary to decide “whether the safety exception requires a direct connection to motor vehicles” because even if this was required, Cox’s claim would not be preempted. On this point, the court diverged from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. And the court found that Cox's theory of liability – that TQL was liable for ignoring a motor vehicle operation record and placing a vehicle driven by an unsafe driver on the highway – “comports with the FAAAA’s recognition that motor vehicles are core to the services provided by brokers, as well as the basic reality that brokers are ultimately responsible for placing such motor vehicles on the road, even if those motor vehicles are driven and owned by a different entity.” The common law requirement Cox sought “to enforce would, in turn, directly regulate a broker’s sale, provision, and arrangement of motor vehicle transportation. Assuming that a direct link between Mr. Cox’s substantive claim and motor vehicles is indeed required, we conclude that such a link exists here.” The court held that Cox’s claim fell “within the ambit of the safety exception.” Reversed and remanded.
Wrongful-death action; Premises liability; Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc; Duty; Jeffrey-Moise v Williamsburg Towne Houses Coop, Inc; Possession & control; Derbabian v S & C Snowplowing, Inc; Distinguishing between premises liability & ordinary negligence; Laier v Kitchen; Notice
Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed summary disposition of plaintiff-PR’s claims in this wrongful death action. Plaintiff’s decedent died when he fell from the mezzanine level of a warehouse to the warehouse floor. On appeal, the court first rejected plaintiff’ argument that the trial court erred by finding defendant-Sammut was entitled to summary disposition of the premises-liability and individual-liability claims. “Plaintiff failed to establish that Sammut had possession and control of the premises, or that there was a genuine issue of material fact in that regard.” And plaintiff neglected “to cite any individual tortious acts by Sammut to warrant a different conclusion, particularly considering Sammut was uninvolved in the ownership, management, and operations of Sammut Properties or the subject premises.” The court next rejected plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred when it dismissed the negligence claims against Sammut and defendants-Khamo and King Custom. “Because plaintiff failed to plead sufficient allegations indicating ordinary negligence, the trial court did not err when it barred plaintiff from proceeding on that theory.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by finding there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Khamo and King Custom had notice of the dangerous condition. Plaintiff “failed to present any evidence of constructive notice, i.e., that the hazard was of such a character, or the hazard existed for a sufficient time, that a reasonable premises possessor would have discovered it.” Ultimately, because plaintiff did not “present sufficient evidence to establish a genuine factual dispute regarding actual or constructive notice, the trial court did not err by granting Khamo and King’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of absence of notice.” Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by dismissing King Custom as a party due to its purported lack of possession and control of the premises. It found that it was “evident that King Custom maintained neither possession nor control of the premises at the time of decedent’s fall.” And even “assuming that there was a genuine factual dispute regarding whether King Custom maintained possession and control of the subject premises, because [it] lacked notice of the alleged dangerous condition, summary disposition remained proper.” Affirmed.