Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Wrongful termination; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); MCL 37.2202(1)(a); Associational discrimination; Distinguishing Bryant v Automobile Data Processing, Inc & Graham v Ford; Rouch World, Inc v Department of Civil Rights; Retaliation; MCL 37.2701(a); “Protected activity”
The court held that plaintiff-former employee (Kuilema) “did not allege a legally sufficient claim for discrimination because of sex under ELCRA” but did sufficiently allege a retaliation claim to survive a summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Thus, it reversed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition of his associational discrimination claim under MCL 37.2202(1)(a) but affirmed the denial of the motion as to his retaliation claim under MCL 37.2701(a). Kuilema had been a social work professor at defendant-Calvin Univrsity. As to his associational discrimination claim, he alleged “he was terminated in violation of ELCRA based upon his decision to officiate a same-sex marriage.” The court noted there is no language in MCL 37.2202(1)(a) “prohibiting discrimination against an individual because of association with others persons based upon the sex of the other persons.” Despite this lack of express statutory language, Kuilema asserted “that caselaw supports such a claim.” The parties identified two cases – Bryant and Graham – addressing racial discrimination based on “the plaintiff’s association with a member of a different race.” The court found both were distinguishable. In both cases, the plaintiffs’ “claims were based upon members of one race associating with members of a different race. Therefore, in both cases, the race of the plaintiff was a key factor in the discrimination.” But here, Kuilema’s sex was “irrelevant to Calvin University’s decision to terminate his employment. The university’s decision to terminate his employment was based upon his decision to officiate a same-sex wedding. That decision would not have been different if Kuilema were a female instead of a male.” The court also found that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Rouch supported its “analysis of the associational discrimination claims [in] Bryant and Graham.” Based on the allegations in Kuilema’s “complaint, the discriminatory action would have occurred regardless of [his] sex. As a result, he cannot establish causation under § 202 because his sex had no bearing upon the allegedly discriminatory action.” However, as to his retaliation claim, “regardless of whether Kuilema will be able to prove that he engaged in a protected activity by opposing the allegedly racist film and the questioning of an employee regarding his own actions in officiating that employee’s wedding, he alleged that each element of a retaliatory discrimination claim occurred.”
Sufficiency of the evidence; Duress; People v Lemons; Principle that a threat of future injury is not sufficient to establish duress; People v Hubbard; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 3; Life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury; MCL 777.33(1)(c); Whether the victim incurred a “bodily injury requiring medical treatment”; MCL 777.33(1)(d); MCL 777.33(3); People v Rosa; Scoring of OV 7 (aggravated physical abuse); MCL 777.37(1)(a); People v Hardy; Scoring of OV 10 (vulnerable victim); “Predatory conduct”; MCL 777.40(1)(a) & (3)(a); People v Cannon; Judicial bias; The trial court’s examination of witnesses; People v McDonald; Voir dire; People v Tyburski; Prosecutorial misconduct; Ineffective assistance
Finding that defendant’s convictions were proper, but that the trial court erred in scoring OVs 3, 7, and 10, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. He was convicted of AWIGBH, assault of a prison employee, and prisoner in possession of a weapon, for attacking a corrections officer (W) with a padlock tied to a cord. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth habitual offender to concurrent terms of 12 to 30 years for AWIGBH and 6 to 20 for each of the other convictions. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the prosecution failed to rebut evidence that his crimes were excused by the defense of duress. “[D]efendant’s evidence, even if the jury found it credible, did not establish an imminent threat to his physical well-being. The threat of future injury is insufficient to establish duress.” In addition, “the prosecution presented evidence that defendant had failed to use the prison’s reporting system to report” the officer’s alleged threats. However, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court erroneously scored OVs 3, 7, and 10. As to OV 3, “no evidence was presented that the injury [W] received was life-threatening.” Further, defendant’s “conduct did not rise to the level of cruelty required to assess points for OV 7.” And as to OV 10, “there was no evidence that defendant stalked [W] or lay in wait for the ideal moment to strike.” The court next rejected his claim that the trial court displayed bias against him and in favor of the prosecution when it questioned witnesses during trial. The trial “court asked a few clarifying questions that were primarily about prison operations and addressed both parties in its discussions of an evidentiary matter while the jury was absent.” It also “instructed the jury that its questions should not be taken to reflect its opinion on the evidence.” The court additionally rejected his contention that the trial court erred in conducting voir dire, noting its “comments were relatively benign and, if anything, presented a balanced view of prison inmates as consisting of both good and bad people.” It further rejected his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, noting that, “[r]ead in context, the prosecution’s questions and comments [did] not rise to the level of reversible error.” It also found each of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel meritless.
Sentencing; Proportionality; Considerations in imposing a departure sentence; People v Dixon-Bey; Mitigating factors; People v Bailey; Effect of the score for PRV 7; Consideration of the number of people threatened by defendant’s messages; OV 9; People v Carrigan
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in exceeding the guidelines by 19 months in sentencing defendant-Murray, concluding that the “sentence was proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” He was convicted of attempted false report of terrorism, use of a computer to commit a crime, and possession of meth. He was sentenced to 30 months to 5 years for the attempt offense, 30 months to 10 years for one of the using a computer to commit a crime counts, 30 months to 7 years for a second count of that offense, and 2 to 10 years for meth possession. He first argued that “the trial court did not adequately consider mitigating factors, including his lack of criminal history, strong employment history, and letters of support indicating his good character. However,” the court noted that “the trial court expressly considered [his] mitigating factors, but did not find—and was not required to find—that they weighed in favor of a lesser sentence.” He next contended that it erred in “considering dismissed conduct when fashioning his sentence. The trial court considered the ‘disturbing’ child-sexually abusive material found in Murray’s apartment[.]” Because he “was not charged with or acquitted of possession of child-sexually abusive materials, such evidence amounted to uncharged conduct that the trial court had discretion to consider when fashioning a proportional sentence.” He also claimed that it “erred by using facts already considered by the” guidelines to justify the departure sentences, citing his PRV 7 score. But the trial “court was free to determine that the guidelines, as scored, were given inadequate weight and did not accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime.” It determined “that the guidelines did not consider, or insufficiently considered, the serious nature of Murray’s offenses. As [it] noted, [he] communicated ‘very sexually graphic, aggressive and violent statements of [his] intentions and strong desire to sexually assault children.’” Finally, the court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the number of students and teachers who were threatened, as a ‘factor[] not considered by the guidelines’ . . . .” Among other things, under “Carrigan, OV 9 could not account for the number of students and teachers at the elementary school who were threatened when Murray stated he would ‘shoot up’ an elementary school with an automatic rifle.”
Wrongful death action arising out of a workplace shooting; MCL 600.2922; The intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA); MCL 418.131; Gray v Morley; Principle that where the employer is a corporate entity, a particular employee must possess the requisite state of mind in order to prove an intentional tort; Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co; Whether an injury was certain to occur; Herman v Detroit; Effect of evidence of gun ownership by an employee on whether the employer knew the employee was dangerous; LaDuke v Ziebart Corp; Distinguishing Johnson v Detroit Edison Co; Leave to amend; MCR 2.116(I)(5); Distinguishing Global Prod v Mayser Polymer USA, Inc (Unpub)
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding plaintiff failed to state a claim under the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA, or by denying her request to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff sued defendant after the decedent was shot and killed by a co-worker (Waller) while working at defendants’ store. The trial court granted defendants’ renewed motion for summary disposition. The court previously affirmed but remanded to allow plaintiff an opportunity to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint. On remand, plaintiff added a variety of new allegations, but the trial court again granted summary disposition for defendants, essentially stating that “the facts pleaded by plaintiff, taken as true, were not sufficient state a claim under the WDCA’s intentional tort exception because she failed to allege facts showing that an injury was certain to occur.” In the present appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by finding she failed to state a claim under the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA. “While plaintiff’s first amended complaint does add allegations that Waller had access to a gun, those allegations do not suggest that” defendants knew she had access to a gun. And “evidence of gun ownership by an employee, standing alone, does not prove that the employer knew the employee was dangerous.” The allegations sounded in negligence and did “not satisfy the elements of the intentional tort exception to the WDCA.” And they did “not establish that defendants had no doubt that an injury was certain to occur, as required by Herman.” Rather, they were “allegations that defendants did not act reasonably. But the exclusive remedy for an injury caused by the negligence of an employer in Michigan is provided by the WDCA.” Further, unlike “Johnson, where management had no doubt that injuries were going to occur prior to the plaintiffs being burned, the allegations in the present case suggest that defendants’ manager was concerned about an altercation that might occur between decedent and Waller the day before the shooting at issue.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred by not allowing her to file a second amended complaint, finding: “(1) the trial court allowed plaintiff to file an amended complaint and (2) the evidence before the court shows that yet another amendment would not be justified in this matter.” Affirmed.
Quiet title action; Probate court jurisdiction; MCL 700.1303(1)(a); Circuit court jurisdiction; MCL 600.2932(1); MCR 3.411; Effect of a claim being titled as a “petition” as opposed to a “complaint”; MCR 5.101(C)(1); Whether a motion for a directed verdict should be treated as one for involuntary dismissal; Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Cnty Treasurer; The raise or waive rule; Walters v Nadell; Contract modification; “Mutuality”; Universal Leaseway Sys, Inc v Herrud & Co; Effect of delivery of a deed; Resh v Fox; Personal representative (PR)
The court held that the trial court did not err by quieting title to real property in favor of appellee (the decedent’s cousin) and against appellant-PR of the estate (the decedent’s sister). Appellee sought to quiet title to the property based on a “Lady Bird” deed executed by the decedent conveying a partial ownership interest in the property to her. She disputed a handwritten bill of sale purportedly created by the decedent and agreeing to sell the property to appellant, as well as a quitclaim deed. The trial court granted a directed verdict for appellee. On appeal, the court rejected appellant’s argument that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to hear appellee’s quiet-title action, noting that “although the circuit court also had jurisdiction to hear the quiet title action, . . . the probate court had concurrent jurisdiction to hear the matter under MCL 700.1303(1)(a).” Appellee’s failure “to cite the correct statutory provisions does not negate the probate court’s concurrent jurisdiction under” this statute. And because she “is not a fiduciary or a trustee . . . MCR 5.101(C)(1) does not mandate that she title her action a ‘civil action.’ Further, she is not a claimant filing an action after notice that her claim has been disallowed, so MCR 5.101(C)(2) does not apply.” Appellant also claimed that the trial court erred by granting appellee’s third motion for a “‘directed verdict,’” because “the proper motion would have been one for ‘involuntary dismissal.’” The court agreed “the motion should have been treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal.” But appellant never gave appellee or the trial “court a chance to respond to her procedural argument relating to the timing of” the motion. Further, while appellant “did not present her testimony as part of her case-in-chief, any such testimony would be cumulative to the testimony already offered. And, given her testimony in the eviction proceedings and during [appellee’s] case-in-chief, it [was] apparent that in order to prevail in the quiet title action and in her petition to enforce the sale, she would have had to offer additional testimony to contradict her already sworn testimony. There [was] no indication that she would have offered such contradictory testimony or that, if she had done so, the [trial] court would have believed her.” Finally, the court rejected appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by quieting title in favor of appellee because the evidence showed that the decedent had conveyed title to appellant via a quitclaim deed. It noted she “never satisfied the mortgage while the decedent was alive, so the precondition was not satisfied.” Affirmed.
Reunification efforts; In re Rippy; Aggravated circumstances; MCL 712A.19a(2)(c)
Holding that respondent-father failed to show that, under the circumstances, the failure to provide him with reunification services was a plain error affecting his substantial rights, the court affirmed the order terminating his parental rights. His only argument on appeal was that terminating his rights was improper because the DHHS “did not make reasonable efforts to reunify him with” the child involved in this case. “‘Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except those involving aggravated circumstances under MCL 712A.19a(2).’” The court noted that one such aggravating circumstance, MCL 712A.19a(2)(c), “exists if ‘[t]he parent has had rights to the child’s siblings involuntarily terminated and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to that termination of parental rights.’” In this case, the termination hearing testimony “reflected that respondent’s parental rights to three of [the child’s] siblings were involuntarily terminated as a result of his significant substance-abuse issues.” Further, between 2015 and when these proceedings took place in 2024, “respondent’s substance-abuse issues had not been rectified. Instead, the record reflects that he was on probation for a substance-abuse related offense, that his probation was revoked because of his continued drug use, and that he was in a court-ordered treatment program to treat his substance abuse at the time of the termination hearing.”