Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Prior consistent out-of-court statements; Waiver; Whether challenged statements were hearsay; Applicability of MRE 801(d)(1)(B); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a futile objection; Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27a; Separation-of-powers doctrine; People v Watkins; Whether evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403
The court held that testimony defendant challenged was not hearsay and that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a futile hearsay objection. His separation-of-powers challenge to MCL 768.27a was rejected by the Michigan Supreme Court in Watkins, and the court found that the evidence at issue was properly not excluded under MRE 403. Thus, it affirmed his CSC I, II, and III convictions. He argued that the trial court erred in “allowing the prosecution to introduce prior consistent statements made by” the victim (JM), “improperly bolstering JM’s trial testimony. He asserted those statements consisted of JM’s testimony in the family court about the letter recanting his allegations and what he told ‘investigators.’” The court noted as to the family court testimony, “defense counsel’s affirmative approval of the testimony waived any objection to it on appeal.” Further, the testimony on redirect examination that defendant referenced was “not hearsay. The prosecutor did not elicit an out-of-court assertion made by JM on how, when, and where he had been sexually assaulted in order to prove that he had been sexually assaulted in a given manner, at a particular age, and in a specific location. JM was asked to affirm what he did not say, that is, that he never failed to omit from his accounts that he had been sexually penetrated, orally or anally, and that defendant had him masturbate him. Defendant opened the door to this rehabilitative testimony through his cross-examination, much of which was directed at discrediting JM by pointing out inconsistencies in his accounts of the sexual abuse, including regarding what he had told others about the number of times the particular acts occurred, where and when the sexual contact and sexual penetration first happened, and whether defendant had ejaculated.” MRE 801(d)(1)(B) did not apply and defendant “failed to establish error, plain or otherwise.” As to MRE 403, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of evidence about sexual abuse in another state. That disclosure “came long after the abuse started, but those two events do not evidence a lack of temporal proximity. Rather, the evidence chronicles a steady history of sexual abuse and a gradual progression of the range of abuse committed by defendant.” The court noted that other “events did occur over the years of abuse, including the family moving multiple times during a nearly 10-year time frame, but those events do not constitute intervening acts.”
Sufficiency of the evidence for an aggravated domestic violence conviction; MCL 750.81a(2); Serious or aggravated injury; People v Brown; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v Washington; Prejudice; Failure to use an expert or to request one for trial at public expense; Distinguishing People v Ackley; Failure to call certain witnesses; Closing argument/alleged concession of defendant’s guilt; Florida v Nixon; McCoy v Louisiana; Failure to obtain defendant’s cell phone; Failure to raise self-defense & request a self-defense instruction
Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s aggravated domestic violence conviction and rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed. He was acquitted of other charges. On appeal, he asserted there was insufficient evidence to establish the necessary element that the victim (DS) “suffered a serious or aggravated injury[.]” In Brown, the court “held that ‘serious or aggravated injury’ for purposes of MCL 750.81a is defined as a ‘substantial bodily (physical) injury or injury that necessitated immediate medical treatment or caused disfigurement, impairment of health or impairment of any bodily part.’” Here, the record showed that “there was sufficient, credible testimony that defendant picked DS up by her neck and threw her into a sliding glass door and that they were married at the time of the incident. A rational trier of fact could have reasonably found that [he] committed an assault against his spouse.” The court noted that he did “not appear to contest that those two elements were satisfied[.]” As to the serious or aggravated injury element, “there was trial testimony that as a result of the physical assault by the sliding glass door, DS suffered extensive swelling and bruising to her left jaw and the left side of her face, prolonged bruising and swelling on her neck, a split lip, bleeding gums, and a deviated septum. She also testified that her throat was ‘scratchy’” for months. Further, the jury was “shown pictures of these injuries. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that DS suffered a serious or aggravated injury as a result of the assault by defendant.” As to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, his “primary postconviction focus has been to second-guess a myriad of decisions by his trial counsel and relitigate his trial with a modified strategy that defendant believes would have resulted in acquittal on all charges.” The court found no merit in any of his claims. Among other things (1) he did not show “a reasonable likelihood that but for the lack of his proposed expert testimony, the result of [his] trial would have been different” and (2) trial counsel’s closing argument “did not constitute an explicit expression that the jury should find defendant guilty of the aggravated domestic assault charge.” Rather, the argument focused “on contesting the more serious” charges, of which he was acquitted.
Sentencing; Whether defendant knowingly & voluntarily waived his right to a revocation hearing for his supervised-release violation; Fed R Crim P 32.1(b)(2); Whether defendant’s sentence was “procedurally unreasonable”; Whether the district court erred when applying the 18 USC § 3553(a) & § 3583(e) sentencing factors & whether this led to a procedurally unreasonable sentence
The court held that the district court erred when applying the § 3553(a) sentencing factors by not specifically applying them to both defendant’s FIP conviction and his supervised-release offense, leading to a procedurally unreasonable sentence. He pled guilty to FIP, admitted this violated a condition of his supervised release, and was sentenced to 96 months in prison with a consecutive 24-month term on the violation for supervised release. Reviewing his three claims of error, the court rejected his argument that he was denied his right to a revocation hearing for the supervised-release violation because he never knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a hearing. The court held that he received all the information and opportunity to respond that he was entitled to under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(E). Thus, the district court did not clearly err by accepting that his admission of responsibility to the substantive offense and his decision to admit responsibility and forego a hearing was knowing and voluntary. The court also rejected his claim that the district court’s 96-month sentence for FIP was procedurally unreasonable. However as to his supervised-release sentence, it agreed that the district court erred when applying the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, leading to a procedurally unreasonable sentence. With a supervised-release violation, § 3583(e) requires a court to consider a subset of the § 3553(a) factors. The court noted the district court’s discussion of the relevant factors, but explained its significant error of not explicitly distinguishing between which factors, if any, applied to the supervised-release violation, or whether the factors applied to both offenses. This error required resentencing on the supervised-release violation “considering only the permissible factors set forth in § 3583(e).” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Right to vote; Residency requirements; Const 1963, art 2, § 1; MCL 168.759a(3); Whether individuals who do not presently live in Michigan can vote in Michigan elections; Injunctive & declaratory relief under MCR 2.605; Laches; Nykoriak v Napoleon; Rebuttable presumption of laches as to an election-related civil action filed less than 28 days before the affected election; MCL 691.1031; Laches as an affirmative defense; Prejudice; Home-Owners Ins Co v Perkins; Dicta
The court held that the Court of Claims correctly applied laches to bar plaintiffs’ expedited lawsuit. Plaintiffs challenged the right of individuals who do not presently live in Michigan to vote in Michigan elections. “The Court of Claims opined that ‘it is hard to imagine a more prejudicial situation’ than that arising out of plaintiffs’ complaint, filed less than a month in advance of the 2024 election.” It found that “all ‘requested relief is barred by the doctrine of laches.’” Despite this finding, because the issue was likely to recur, it considered plaintiffs’ challenge on the merits, and granted summary disposition for defendants. On appeal, the court found that “the Court of Claims’ ruling on laches was correct as a matter of law. Simply stated, plaintiffs are the masters of their complaint, and they did not expressly allege a claim or expressly request relief outside of the November 2024 election.” Based on “the language in their own pleading, plaintiffs sought a complete and final resolution of their complaint on an expedited basis, with relief directed at the” 11/5/24 general election. Their desire for relief applicable to the 11/24 “election did not require such a highly targeted and fully expedited approach; plaintiffs could have filed a complaint on a regular track and separately requested preliminary injunctive relief as to the [11/24] election. They did not. By the time [they] attempted to tack on additional requests for relief, they had already received what they asked for—an expedited hearing on their bid for final judgment and relief in advance of the” 11/24 election. “As for the Court of Claims’ analysis of the merits of plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional and statutory claims,” the court agreed “with the sentiments provided by both parties at oral argument . . . any such discussion on the merits was dicta.” It also agreed “with defendants, as they stated in their brief and again at oral argument, that ‘to the extent Plaintiffs argue the Court of Claims somehow barred them from raising their constitutional claim in the future, they misapprehend the court’s ruling.’ The instant lawsuit was properly dismissed on the basis of laches; any further discussion of plaintiffs’ claims was unnecessary to that disposition below and is unnecessary to our affirmance of it here. The adjudication of the merits of any such claims can await another day and another lawsuit.” Affirmed.
Retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); MCL 15.362; Debano-Griffin v Lake Cnty; “Direct evidence”; Causal connection; Whether an employer offered a legitimate reason for terminating an employee; Pretext; Retaliation under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); MCL 37.2701(a); White v Department of Transp; Disparate treatment; Municipal liability under 42 USC § 1983; Johnson v Vanderkooi; Municipal custom; Office of Inspector General (OIG)
The court held that the trial court erred by granting defendants-city and supervisors summary disposition of plaintiff-former employee’s WPA claim, but did not err by granting them summary disposition of her ELCRA and municipal liability claims. Plaintiff sued defendants alleging she was terminated without just cause as a result of her OIG complaint. She asserted claims of retaliation under the WPA and the ELCRA, and municipal liability under § 1983. The trial court concluded there was inadequate evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that plaintiff’s OIG complaint was causally connected to her disciplinary action and termination. It also found there was no evidence that the defendants who were involved in making the adverse employment decision were aware that she had filed the OIG complaint. On appeal, the court first found that the trial court erred by granting defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s WPA claim. She “presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a reasonable fact-finder to find a causal connection between her protected activity, i.e., her OIG complaint, and her subsequent” termination, and “infer that the legitimate business reasons provided by defendants for [her] termination were pretextual.” However, the court found summary disposition for defendants was proper as to her other claims. “Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff’s OIG complaint was not a protected activity, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ELCRA . . . .” As to municipal liability, her “assertion that the city ‘failed to investigate the complaint filed by [plaintiff] with the OIG,’ does not rise to the level of showing a permanent and well-settled practice of failing to conduct OIG investigations.” And the evidence did “not establish a causal link between the denial of plaintiff’s OIG complaint and her termination.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
“Associational standing”; Whether the lawsuit was “germane” to a plaintiff’s purpose; Venue for suits against federal-government defendants; 28 USC § 1391(e)(1)(C); U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS); The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
The court held that plaintiffs-Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, and Michigan Chamber of Commerce did not meet the “germaneness requirement” for associational standing in this case challenging the constitutionality of the Drug Price Negotiation Program. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for lack of proper venue. Plaintiffs sued the HHS, the CMS, and the agencies’ heads over the ability to negotiate prices for drugs manufactured to sell to Medicare and Medicaid under the Program. They claimed the Program is unconstitutional. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Due Process Clause, the Excessive Fines Clause, and the First Amendment. The district court ruled that none of the regional chamber plaintiffs could “satisfy the test for associational standing” and dismissed the case based on improper venue. On appeal, the court first reviewed the district court’s ruling that the interests at stake were not germane to the purpose of the regional chambers. It noted that the “Dayton Chamber itself acknowledges that its primary purpose is to advocate for a business-friendly environment in the Dayton region.” While plaintiffs claimed “a broader purpose of safeguarding the principles of free enterprise and advocating for a business-friendly legislative and regulatory environment, the interests that they aim to protect are greatly attenuated from the regional interests of the Dayton Chamber.” It noted that in cases “where a challenge to associational standing has failed, the ‘germaneness’ (i.e., the relationship between the subject of the lawsuit and the purpose of the plaintiff association) has been much more direct.” In contrast, in cases where challenges “to association standing have been successful, ‘germaneness’ has been found too remote.” The court found this case was closer to the latter cases. There was “little reason to believe that the Dayton Chamber has any particular knowledge or experience in the subject matter of the lawsuit.” It explained that an “essential link” was missing here. “The subject matter of the litigation—the constitutionality of a federal program applicable only to pharmaceutical manufacturers—is simply not germane to the Dayton Chamber’s purpose of promoting regional business.” As to venue, given that the Dayton Chamber and the Ohio Chamber lacked standing to sue, venue in Ohio was improper. And because plaintiffs “did not identify an appropriate venue outside of Ohio that the case could be transferred to” if those chambers lacked standing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. Affirmed.