Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Disparate treatment based on race; MCL 37.2202; McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green; Prima facie case of discrimination; Similarly situated employees; Hecht v National Heritage Acads., Inc; Statistical evidence & pretext; Hazle v Ford Motor Co; Town v Michigan Bell Tel Co; Retaliation for engaging in a protected activity; MCL 37.2701; Garg v Macomb Cnty Cmty Mental Health Servs; Temporal proximity & causation; West v General Motors Corp; Rymal v Baergen
The court held that the trial court erred in denying summary disposition to defendant in plaintiff’s race discrimination and retaliation action under the ELCRA. Plaintiff sued her former employer after she was discharged from her line leader position at a cheeseball factory, alleging she was terminated because of her race and in retaliation for reporting a racist remark. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, finding factual disputes. On appeal, the court found plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination because there was no evidence that management acted with racial animus or treated similarly situated employees more favorably. Plaintiff cited derogatory remarks by coworkers, including one calling her “a lazy Black girl,” but the court noted those employees had no authority over her termination, which was made by her Black supervisor. The evidence showed she was retained after other layoffs and then discharged for chronic tardiness, arriving on time only 6 of 21 days. Defendant offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, such as shift elimination and persistent lateness, and plaintiff did not produce evidence that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination, as statistics alone without other proof of animus were insufficient. As to retaliation, although plaintiff’s testimony created a factual dispute about whether she engaged in protected activity by reporting the racist remark, she failed to establish causation. The court stressed that “[s]omething more than a temporal connection” is required to show retaliation, and the evidence showed her termination was based on tardiness, not protected activity. As such, summary disposition for defendant should have been granted on both claims. Reversed and remanded.
Prisoner action alleging First & Eighth Amendment violation claims; First Amendment retaliation; Thomas v Eby; Protected conduct; Adverse action; Bell v Johnson; Causation; Qualified immunity; Clearly established law; Thaddeus-X v Blatter; COVID-19 exposure Eighth Amendment claims; Standing; Injury in fact; Waiver (timeliness of defendants’ motion to dismiss); FedRCivP 12(a)(1); The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); 42 USC § 1997e(g); Order of defendants’ filings; Dismissal “at any time” for failure to state a claim; § 1997e(c)(1)
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] After rejecting plaintiff-prisoner’s (Hardrick) argument that defendants waived the right to dismissal because their motion to dismiss was untimely, the court held that “the district court erred in dismissing Hardrick’s First Amendment retaliation claim and granting” defendant-warden (Huss) qualified immunity. But his Eighth Amendment claims as to COVID-19 exposure could not proceed due to lack of standing. Hardrick asserted “an industrial-sized fan blew dangerously cold air and dust into his cell, causing him to cough up blood.” He alleged that Huss “refused to avert the fan because [he] had filed grievances against her[.]” He also alleged that “Huss and members of the prison’s medical staff endangered his health by erroneously designating him as having COVID-19 and placing him in housing with prisoners who had tested positive for” it. The district court dismissed the case. He first argued on appeal that defendants’ motion to dismiss was untimely, resulting in waiver of the right to dismissal. While he relied on Rule 12(a)(1), the PLRA altered the timeline so that 21-day clock did not apply here. As to his reliance on § 1997e(g), it “does not address the order of defendants’ filings. Hardrick’s argument also ignores a different provision of the PLRA” requiring dismissal of “a case ‘at any time’ if the complaint ‘fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Turning to the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that Hardrick’s three grievances over his living conditions did not constitute protected conduct. The prison’s rejection of his grievance about the fan did not deny “it First Amendment protection. The district court never found the grievance ‘frivolous,’ nor Hardrick’s use of the grievance process ‘abusive.’” In addition, the “protected activity did not need to be directed at Warden Huss; if a defendant retaliates based on protected activity aimed at other officials, it’s still retaliation based on conduct protected by the First Amendment.” Next, the court concluded that he “plausibly pled that Warden Huss took an adverse action against him by refusing to address the harm from the industrial-sized fan” and that he “sufficiently alleged causation.” It also found that the warden “violated clearly established law when she refused to resolve the harms caused by the industrial-sized fan.” The question was “whether a reasonable officer at the time would have known that they cannot refuse to help an inmate who is coughing up blood because he filed grievances against her. The answer is yes.” Reversed and remanded as to the First Amendment retaliation claim against the warden, affirmed as to all other claims.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Plea bargaining; Motion for relief from judgment; Changes to juvenile sentencing; Mandatory LWOP sentence; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Parks; People v Poole
The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. In 2012, when he was 18, he was convicted of felony-murder, AWIM, and felony-firearm for his role in an armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to mandatory LWOP for the felony-murder conviction, 285 to 600 months for each AWIM, and a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed. The Supreme Court denied leave. He ultimately accepted the prosecution’s offer to resentence him to 25 to 60 years for his felony-murder conviction in exchange for dismissal of his pending motion for relief from judgment. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he received ineffective assistance from the counsel that handled his initial resentencing negotiations. “[H]ad defendant refused the offer, he was by no means guaranteed the 25-year minimum sentence for his felony-murder conviction that his counsel had obtained through resentencing negotiations with the prosecution.” In addition, he did not show that counsel’s claimed failure to convey a statement purportedly made by trial counsel “rendered counsel’s overall advice regarding the” motion for relief from judgment and resentencing him deficient, “or that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different, more favorable outcome had counsel advised defendant of this information.” Finally, there was “nothing to indicate that, had [he] decided to decline the prosecution’s resentencing offer and instead forge ahead with his” motion for relief from judgment, “he would have ended up any better off.” Had he “rejected the offer and then failed to secure relief through his [motion], he would have still been entitled to resentencing under Parks but would have lost the benefit of the resentencing agreement,” which guaranteed him “the lowest possible minimum sentence he could receive for his felony-murder conviction and eliminated the mandatory, consecutive two-year sentence that he faced for the felony-firearm conviction.” As such, “to obtain a better outcome than what he received, defendant would have to both secure a new trial and then receive a more favorable outcome at trial (or via plea) than he did previously.” He did not argue, let alone show, that such an outcome was reasonably probable. Affirmed.
Identification; Motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the rental vehicle; Late endorsement of the prosecution’s witness; Prejudice; Other acts evidence of defendant’s attempt to influence or intimidate the jury; MRE 404(b); Unfair prejudice
The court held that: (1) there was sufficient evidence to identify defendant-Holt as the perpetrator of the subject offenses, (2) the trial court properly denied his “motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his rental vehicle[,]" and (3) it did not abuse its discretion by “allowing the late endorsement of the prosecution’s witness” or by “granting the prosecution’s motion to admit the” other acts evidence. He was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm. As to identification, the court found “the evidence was sufficient to establish Holt’s identity as the person responsible for the armed robbery and shooting of decedent.” While he contended “that the prosecution failed to present any direct eyewitness identification testimony or forensic evidence indicating [he] was responsible for the underlying incident,” circumstantial evidence is adequate to establish identity. The court also held that any discrepancies as to his “appearance, the vehicle associated with fleeing the scene of the shooting, or the car rental entity’s records were issues solely for the jury to address.” Ultimately, it found “there was a plethora of circumstantial evidence to enable the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Holt was the perpetrator of the subject offenses.” Holt next argued “that the evidence recovered from his rental car should be suppressed because it was the product of an unconstitutional search.” The record indicated Sergeant R “was lawfully near Holt’s rental vehicle, overseeing his apprehension, when [R] saw the firearm in plain view.” While Holt claimed the trial court “failed to consider whether law enforcement was legitimately present in the parking lot, which he claims was gated private property,” there was “no suggestion that the officers were required to bypass a gate or faced any obstacles in accessing the premises, despite the presence of numerous officers in the vicinity.” It further found that “Holt did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking lot considering it was a common area shared with other tenants, guests, and employees of the apartment complex, and the firearm was plainly visible through the front passenger window to any observer.” Moreover, in light of his “status a suspect in a firearm-related murder investigation, and the established connection between him and the rental vehicle, the presence of a firearm inside the car constituted incriminating evidence under the probable-cause standard.” And although he “was detained and unable to drive the rental vehicle, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement clearly permitted [R] to enter the vehicle.” Given that he “was suspected of killing a person with a firearm, the observation of a firearm inside the vehicle gives rise to probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of the offense. The firearm was additionally in plain view, and as previously explained, subject to a warrantless seizure.” Affirmed.
Evidence; Denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized during a canine search; Whether defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to present extrinsic evidence challenging a canine search; Whether Florida v Harris creates an exception to the “four corners” rule as it applied to warrant affidavits; Franks v Delaware; Whether the search was supported by probable cause
The court held that the district court properly denied defendant-McCarley-Connin’s motion for a hearing to present extrinsic evidence challenging a canine search under Harris because Harris only applies to “warrantless searches.” Challenges to an approved warrant affidavit require a preliminary showing under Franks. McCarley-Connin was charged with drug conspiracy after an investigation determined he was connected to two packages containing drugs sent through the mail. The drugs were discovered after a canine sniff search. He argued that under Harris, the evidence should be suppressed because the district court denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing with extrinsic evidence to challenge the reliability of the canine sniff, which supplied the “probable cause” for the search of the packages. He pled guilty, reserving his right to challenge the search. McCarley-Connin first challenged the hearing denial. The court agreed with the government that Harris does not extend to searches made under a warrant. A court considers the warrant’s affidavit to determine whether there is probable cause. Considering information outside the affidavit “would eviscerate the ‘essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment.’” A defendant may challenge the truthfulness of the affidavit with a Franks hearing, but “after a warrant affidavit has been reviewed and approved by a neutral and detached magistrate, a defendant is entitled to a hearing based on evidence outside the four corners of the affidavit only if he makes the preliminary showing under Franks.” In sum, “Harris and Franks govern different factual situations: Harris after a warrantless search, Franks after a warrant affidavit.” McCarley-Connin also argued that the affidavit did not support probable cause. However, the district court properly limited its review to the affidavit’s four corners, and because defendant failed to offer any other reason for its alleged insufficiency, the court affirmed probable cause to search both packages.
Child custody; Modification of a custody arrangement; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Proper cause or a change of circumstances; Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Whether joint legal custody is in a child’s best interests; The statutory best-interest factors; MCL 722.23; Whether the parties can cooperate & agree on co-parenting matters; MCL 722.26a(1); Bofysil v Bofysil; A referee’s duties; MCR 3.215(E)(1); Live evidence; MCR 3.215(F)(2); Due process
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying in part plaintiff-mother’s motion for reconsideration of its order maintaining joint legal custody and modifying defendant-father’s parenting time. The trial court adopted most of the referee’s recommendations and modified defendant’s parenting time, finding the evidence demonstrated that the child “struggled with transitions between parenting time due to the parties’ behavior, and the extended weekends during the summer would allow” the child “‘to relax and settle into the environment of [defendant]’s home before facing another parenting time exchange.’” It denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, finding her objections to select provisions of the recommendations did not obviate its duty to issue a parenting-time schedule in accordance with the child’s best interests. On appeal, the court rejected her challenge to the trial court’s denial of her request for sole legal custody, noting she conceded “that there was no change of circumstances that would support revisiting the parties’ custody arrangement, but” argued there was proper cause to do so, and that the trial erred by finding otherwise. “The record, however, clearly reflects that both the referee and the trial court found that there was proper cause and/or a change of circumstances to revisit the parties’ custody arrangement. And [it] did, in fact, revisit the parties’ custody arrangement—it simply concluded, after its analysis of the best-interest[] factors, that it was not in [the child’s] best interests to modify the arrangement from joint legal custody to plaintiff’s sole legal custody.” In addition, it was “readily apparent that the parties generally dislike each other and struggle to communicate effectively and appropriately, with defendant having directed some particularly inappropriate communications toward plaintiff in the past. But the record as a whole does not clearly indicate that, contrary to the [trial] court’s assessment, the parties are completely unable to cooperate and generally agree on major decisions regarding” the child’s welfare. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in its award of parenting time to defendant. “To start, the trial court did not err simply by opting not to follow the referee’s recommendation regarding parenting time.” Further, plaintiff never indicated any need or desire to present additional evidence. “And even in the time since the [trial] court issued its final decision, [she] has never substantiated or explained in any detail . . . what additional evidence she would have provided regarding parenting time that was not already presented at the evidentiary hearing before the referee.” The court also disagreed that she was denied her right to due process, noting she was “given full opportunity to object to the referee’s recommendation,” and she failed to explain how this right was violated. Affirmed.
Joinder; Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to join a defendant under FedRCivP 19’s “necessary, indispensable party” stricture; Whether the court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction because one federal party could only be sued in the Court of Claims; Whether the party was “necessary” for complete relief under 19(a)(1)(A) or (B); Whether the party was “indispensable”; Rule 19(b); School Dist. of City of Pontiac v Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Educ.; Glancy v Taubman Ctrs, Inc
The court reversed the district court’s ruling that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in this annuity case and remanded for the district court to analyze whether defendant-DHHS was a “necessary and indispensable” party to the case under Rule 19’s “joinder framework.” William Plott’s estate sued to recover his final annuity payment from defendant-Wilac Life Insurance, which was due two months after his death. Wilcac’s annuity contract was with the DHHS. When Wilac denied payment, the estate sued Wilac and the DHHS. The district court dismissed the case under Rule 19, ruling that the DHHS was a “necessary and indispensable party” and that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the DHHS could only be sued in the Court of Claims. The estate argued that the district court should have joined the DHHS under Rule 19. The court held that the district court failed to engage in the proper Rule 19 framework analysis and rejected any “bright-line rule that that all parties to a contract are necessary and indispensable to lawsuits involving the underlying contract.” These determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis, and without the correct analysis, the court was unable to determine whether the district court found that the DHHS “claims an interest in the litigation that will not be protected in [its] absence.” Neither could the court determine whether the Rule 19(b) factors supported the district court’s ruling that the HHS was “indispensable.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g) & (j); Authorization of the petition; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Discovery; Jury instruction on the definition of “neglect”; Reasonable reunification efforts; Reliance on domestic violence; Children’s best interests; Relative placement; Whether respondent’s home was preferable; Psychologist’s report
The court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights to her four children, MC1, NC, MC2, and WC, under §§ (g) and (j). Respondent first argued “that the trial court erred by authorizing the petition after the preliminary hearing because she did not pose a substantial risk of harm to the children’s mental well-being.” As to “MCL 712A.2(b)(1), the petition alleged—and testimony at the preliminary hearing supported—that the children were subject to a substantial risk of harm to their emotional well-being because none of the children felt safe living in respondent’s home and all of the children—but MC1 and WC in particular—struggled emotionally while in respondent’s care.” The CPS investigator testified that “the children reported during their forensic interviews that they did not feel safe living in respondent’s home.” WC disclosed “that respondent’s partner had sexually abused her multiple times, . . . frequently stood by her bedroom door and watched her, and that she was afraid to sleep with the door open because she was afraid that someone would come into her room at night.” MC1 indicated “she was constantly emotionally distraught while living with respondent, namely due to the sexual abuse and misconduct by respondent’s partner, and she engaged in self-harming behaviors as a result. And when investigators first investigated the sexual-abuse and misconduct allegations, they observed MC1 crying after respondent refused to let her leave the home.” NC and MC1 “reported that respondent regularly forced the children to do household chores for hours before they were permitted to eat dinner, that they frequently did chores until midnight despite a 5:30 a.m. wake-up time for school, and that they were typically left to feed themselves.” The court saw “no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s authorization of the petition on this basis.” As for MCL 712A.2(b)(2), it noted “there were allegations and evidence that the criminality and depravity of respondent and respondent’s partner, a ‘nonparent adult’ living with the children at respondent’s behest, left the children in an unsafe home environment where they were exposed to sexual misconduct and abuse, as well as domestic violence.” Thus, on this record, “there was probable cause that the allegations in the petition were true and could support the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2)” The trial court did not “err by finding as much,” and did not “abuse its discretion by authorizing the petition on this basis[.]”