Ineffective assistance of counsel; Plea bargaining; Motion for relief from judgment; Changes to juvenile sentencing; Mandatory LWOP sentence; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Parks; People v Poole

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. In 2012, when he was 18, he was convicted of felony-murder, AWIM, and felony-firearm for his role in an armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to mandatory LWOP for the felony-murder conviction, 285 to 600 months for each AWIM, and a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed. The Supreme Court denied leave. He ultimately accepted the prosecution’s offer to resentence him to 25 to 60 years for his felony-murder conviction in exchange for dismissal of his pending motion for relief from judgment. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he received ineffective assistance from the counsel that handled his initial resentencing negotiations. “[H]ad defendant refused the offer, he was by no means guaranteed the 25-year minimum sentence for his felony-murder conviction that his counsel had obtained through resentencing negotiations with the prosecution.” In addition, he did not show that counsel’s claimed failure to convey a statement purportedly made by trial counsel “rendered counsel’s overall advice regarding the” motion for relief from judgment and resentencing him deficient, “or that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different, more favorable outcome had counsel advised defendant of this information.” Finally, there was “nothing to indicate that, had [he] decided to decline the prosecution’s resentencing offer and instead forge ahead with his” motion for relief from judgment, “he would have ended up any better off.” Had he “rejected the offer and then failed to secure relief through his [motion], he would have still been entitled to resentencing under Parks but would have lost the benefit of the resentencing agreement,” which guaranteed him “the lowest possible minimum sentence he could receive for his felony-murder conviction and eliminated the mandatory, consecutive two-year sentence that he faced for the felony-firearm conviction.” As such, “to obtain a better outcome than what he received, defendant would have to both secure a new trial and then receive a more favorable outcome at trial (or via plea) than he did previously.” He did not argue, let alone show, that such an outcome was reasonably probable. Affirmed.