Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Enforceability of a consent judgment of separate maintenance in a later divorce; MCL 552.7(1); MCL 552.101(3); MCR 3.211(B); Andrusz v Andrusz; Overruling Engemann v Engemann; Nonmodifiable spousal support by waiver; Staple v Staple; Contract interpretation of consent judgment provisions for life insurance beneficiary & attorney fee shifting; Hein v Hein; Practical impossibility & agreed modification of real property terms; Holmes v Holmes
The court held that the trial court erred by refusing to enforce the parties’ consent judgment of separate maintenance as a binding contract, except as to the marital-real-property provisions. Thus, it reversed in part and remanded. The parties married in 1982 and, in 2014, resolved a separate-maintenance action by a detailed consent judgment. It split property, required sale of the marital home with equal division of net proceeds and an equalization payment to defendant-ex-wife (Doris) at closing, preserved life-insurance beneficiary designations, awarded Doris 38% of plaintiff-ex-husband’s (Karl) pension as spousal support on a “final, binding and non-modifiable” basis (subject only to a health-insurance carveout), and provided fee-shifting if Doris had to enforce the agreement. Years later Karl filed for divorce. The trial court altered spousal support, reconfigured property and insurance terms, and denied Doris’s request for enforcement sanctions. On appeal, the court first rejected the view that a later divorce frees a court to revisit a prior separate-maintenance settlement, holding that consent judgments are contracts governed by their plain terms and that courts are “bound by property settlements reached through negotiations and agreement” absent limited exceptions. The court overruled Engemann’s determination that “the trial court in a divorce action may modify a previous settlement to which the parties voluntarily agreed to resolve an action for separate maintenance” and found “the trial court erred by determining that it was not bound by the consent judgment.” The court also held that the spousal-support waiver clause must be enforced as the consent judgment expressly made support “final, binding and non-modifiable,” and under Staple such waivers are valid. As such, “the trial court erred by declining to enforce the spousal support provision to which the parties agreed.” As to life insurance and fees, the panel enforced the consent judgment language continuing each party’s beneficiary rights and the fee-shifting term, directing that “the trial court shall determine the amount of attorney fees and court costs that Doris reasonably incurred in said actions.” Finally, the court agreed with the trial court’s treatment of the real property because Doris herself agreed at the divorce hearing to take the marital home in lieu of the equalization check and to deed her interest in another parcel to Karl, and because, after 11 years of non-sale and intervening deterioration, “enforcing the marital-home provisions in the consent judgment would be impracticable, if not impossible.”
Batson v Kentucky challenge; People v Knight; Batson’s third step; Purposeful discrimination; Reliance on a juror’s demeanor; People v Tennille; Snyder v Louisiana
Holding that the trial court clearly erred in overruling defendant’s Batson objection to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge to a juror (Juror 7), the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. It concluded the trial court clearly erred in finding that the prosecutor offered “a racially neutral explanation for his peremptory challenge” to Juror 7. Defendant contended the prosecution’s explanation for removing the juror “entirely relied on Juror 7’s demeanor.” The court agreed. The prosecutor stated that while the juror “‘answered questions and seemed to engage while he was up in the jury pool, throughout the process he has been disengaged and (inaudible) in the back and I got the same impression while he was up here that he was not enthused to be here and I think I am allowed to dismiss him for that purpose.’” The court noted that when “‘a prosecutor’s sole explanation for a strike resides in a juror’s appearance or behavior, the third step bears heightened significance. Explanations for peremptory challenges based solely on a juror’s demeanor are particularly susceptible to serving as pretexts for discrimination.’” The court concluded the evidence here tended “to disprove the prosecutor’s rationale. For example, the prosecutor acknowledged that Juror 7 was engaged while he was in the jury box, but argued that he was disengaged while waiting in the back of the room. But, Juror 7 acknowledged that he had heard all the questions that were asked before he was called to the jury box. Moreover, when he was presented with the prosecutor’s ongoing hypothetical regarding what direct or indirect information Juror 7 would need to be convinced that the prosecutor was an attorney, Juror 7 stated, ‘I knew you were going to ask that,’ and proceeded to say that he was convinced that the prosecutor was an attorney because of what the prosecutor had proved throughout the day. These answers directly contradicted the prosecutor’s statement that Juror 7 was disengaged before he entered the jury box.” In addition, the court found that, “the prosecutor’s failure to make a record regarding his concern with Juror 7’s inattention undermines the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s claim. . . . Taken together, the trial court failed to determine whether Juror 7’s demeanor could credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike, and the record evidence disproves the prosecutor’s rationale in this case.”
Post-divorce judgment enforcement of a drag-along business-interest proceeds provision; Consent judgment construed as a contract; Meaning of “net” & “actual receipt” in the payout clause; Limits on modifying property settlements in consent judgments; Andrusz v Andrusz; Relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1); Rose v Rose; Domestic-relations arbitration award; Domestic Relations Arbitration Act (DRAA); MCR 3.602; Cipriano v Cipriano; Judicial estoppel; Szyszlo v Akowitz
The court held that the divorce judgment’s drag-along provision unambiguously entitled plaintiff-ex-wife to 50% of the “net” proceeds defendant-ex-husband actually received from the sale of the marital business (Envision) and that “net” allowed only deductions for taxes and costs. Thus, it reversed the denial of an additional payout sought by plaintiff and remanded. The parties’ 2020 consent judgment (incorporating an arbitration award) awarded plaintiff 50% of any net proceeds defendant actually received from any sale of marital business interests. Envision sold its assets in 2021. The sale proceeds were received in two distributions. For the second distribution, “all Envision members with an equal membership interest to defendant received the same disbursement amount except him—his share, alone, was subject to a $517,000 transfer from himself to” a business partner, “which defendant claimed reflected amounts defendant owed Envision for his excess compensation.” He calculated plaintiff’s share using only the $129,624.11 “disbursement he received after the $517,000 deduction.” The trial court treated the diversion as a proper reduction and denied plaintiff’s motion for more. On appeal, the court first held that the judgment and incorporated arbitration award were to be enforced as written. Read together, the term “net” was used “only in relation to the deduction of taxes and costs[,]” not undisclosed personal liabilities. The court concluded that interpreting the term “to include an undisclosed debt in defendant’s sole name would thus conflict with—and circumvent—the divorce judgment’s other-debts and full-disclosure provisions.” The court next construed “actual receipt” to mean proceeds in fact conferred or accepted. Envision allocated $540,233.72 to defendant, he owed tax on that amount, and he affirmatively redirected $517,000, so he “actually received” the full allocation for divorce judgment purposes. The trial court effectively and impermissibly modified the parties’ property settlement. Because the judgment incorporated a domestic-relations arbitration award limiting deductions to taxes and costs, the trial court also lacked authority to alter that result absent a proper motion under the DRAA/MCR 3.602. And judicial estoppel did not apply. Plaintiff consistently sought 50% of proceeds “‘net of taxes and costs.’”
Action for alleged damage caused to trust property; Motion to dismiss; Motion in limine to exclude evidence of monetary damages; Timeliness of the motions
As to plaintiff-Trust’s arguments about defendants-Walkers’ motion to dismiss, the court held that the Trust was not entitled to relief based on the trial court’s failure to strictly follow MCR 2.116 where any error was harmless. But it agreed that “the trial court erred when it granted the motion to dismiss because the evidence presented failed to establish that the Trust transferred the Property to” a nonparty (N). The court also held that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of monetary damages. Thus, it vacated the trial court’s judgment granting the Walkers’ motion to dismiss and motion in limine. and remanded. The case arose from alleged damage caused to the Trust’s property “after defendants altered the grading of their own adjacent properties.” As to the timeliness of the Walkers’ motion to dismiss, while there was no dispute they “filed their motion after the deadline set forth in the [5/21] pretrial order, the Trust’s reliance on the deadlines in that order would require us to read that order in isolation, without the context of the procedural and factual history of this case. Once the case was dismissed by stipulation of the parties, absent an order to the contrary from the trial court upon reinstatement of the case, the [5/21] pretrial order implicitly no longer controlled.” Supporting this conclusion was “that the case was reinstated almost a year after the original trial date upon which the [5/21] pretrial order was based, and the new trial date was almost two years after the trial date contemplated by the deadlines in the order.” Further, although the court agreed “that the hearing on the motion took place before the applicable time periods set forth in MCR 2.116 had elapsed, under the specific facts of this case, the Trust is not entitled to relief on this basis.” The court noted that it “responded to the motion to dismiss, did not ask for additional time, and” failed to raise “any substantive claims of prejudice[.]” Turning to the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting the Walkers’ motion to dismiss, the court concluded a genuine issue of material fact existed as to “the ownership of the Property, and, regardless, the record contained insufficient evidence to conclude, as a matter of law, that the Trust would not have remained a real party in interest to any claim in the complaint had a transfer occurred.” As to the motion in limine, which “was based on the language of a stipulated order removing the case from case evaluation under MCR 2.403,” the court read that “order as declining to submit any part of the action to case evaluation on the basis that the primary relief sought is not monetary, but we do not interpret it as going so far as to establish that the only relief sought is equitable such that, going forward, the Trust would be wholly foreclosed from pursuing any monetary relief.”
Quiet title & adverse possession action concerning a vacant lot; Withdrawal of counsel; MCR 2.117(C)(2); In re Withdrawal of Attorney; “Good cause”; MRPC 1.16(b)(6); Ambrose v Detroit Edison Co; Setting aside default; MCR 2.603; Good cause or a meritorious defense; Shawl v Spence Bros; Quiet title; Prima facie title; MCL 211.78l(1); Adverse possession; MCL 600.5801(4); Kipka v Fountain; Temporary restraining orders (TROs); MCR 3.310(B)(1); Mootness
Holding that plaintiff failed to establish title to the vacant lot and could not meet the requirements for adverse possession, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on withdrawal of counsel, default, summary disposition, and TROs. Plaintiff brought a quiet-title and adverse-possession action concerning a vacant Detroit lot adjacent to her house, claiming that her mother’s quitclaim deed and later use of the property gave her ownership rights. The trial court allowed her attorney to withdraw, set aside defaults against defendants, granted summary disposition to defendant-Brazier (titleholder of the vacant lot) and defendant Hall (titleholder of the house lot), and granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s requests for TROs. On appeal, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing withdrawal because plaintiff’s own statements showed “there was a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship and that she had rendered counsel’s continued representation unreasonably difficult.” It further upheld the order setting aside Brazier’s default, explaining that while process issues existed she “ultimately filed an answer, and nothing in the record indicates she knowingly or intentionally filed an untimely answer.” As to quiet title, the court held plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing, emphasizing that under MCL 211.78l(1) “fee simple title to the property vests in the foreclosing governmental unit” once foreclosure is complete, and thus plaintiff’s equitable interest under the land contract was extinguished. Her adverse possession claim also failed because “considering the many years that the governmental entities owned the vacant lot after the 2005 foreclosure, and that Brazier acquired title only in 2021, plaintiff cannot establish the requisite 15-year period.” Finally, the TRO issue was deemed moot, since Brazier prevailed on title.
Governmental immunity; Motor vehicle exception; Gross negligence; Liability; Comparative fault; MCL 500.3135(2)(b); People v Pace; Motorist’s obligation toward pedestrians; Huggins v Scripter; Braxton v Gazdecki
The court held that under the undisputed facts, no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant-Green (bus driver) was more at fault than plaintiff (pedestrian), “as MCL 500.3135(2)(b) requires for plaintiff’s claim to succeed.” Thus, the trial court erred in denying summary disposition, and the court reversed and remanded. The “dispositive evidence is not contested testimony or disputed inferences—it is a multi-angle video that both sides agree is a complete account of the accident. The footage incontrovertibly shows plaintiff opening his driver-side door directly into traffic, causing it to collide with the municipal defendant’s bus, which was traveling in its lane at the moment of impact.” Plaintiff contended that his claims against defendant-City fell within the motor vehicle exception. As to Green, plaintiff invoked MCL 691.1407(2). Under Pace, “the mere fact of an accident is not, in and of itself, proof of actionable negligence; a plaintiff must still identify actually negligent conduct to recover in tort.” The court concluded “that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff was less negligent than defendants in light of the indisputable video evidence. Plaintiff stood on the side of a busy, five-lane highway in Detroit. Seconds earlier, he had scrambled across the roadway, giving Green every reason to think he was aware of oncoming traffic. He then positioned himself tight against his vehicle in the parallel parking space, behaving like someone who was aware of the traffic conditions. Yet he inexplicably opened his car door into traffic.” The court found that in “this, plaintiff acted similarly to the five-year-old decedent in Braxton, who 'darted from the curb, ran across the street with his head down,' and was struck by an automobile.” The court concluded that in “similar fashion, while Green had a general responsibility to operate the bus in a reasonably safe fashion in light of plaintiff’s presence, he was not obliged to anticipate that plaintiff would suddenly swing his car door into traffic—especially when plaintiff’s prior conduct indicated an awareness of traffic conditions. Despite this video record, plaintiff attempts to recast the accident as defendants’ fault.” However, the court found that “the ‘other proofs’ defendants submitted—most notably, the multi-angle video recording—demonstrate that no reasonable factfinder could conclude plaintiff was less negligent than defendants. As in Huggins, plaintiff’s own conduct so plainly exceeded any arguable negligence by defendants that the case cannot proceed to a jury under MCL 500.3135(2)(b). Because the video evidence leaves no room for reasonable dispute, the trial court was required to grant summary disposition at least as to plaintiff’s counts I and II.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Atchley; Children’s best interests; In re Sanborn; Parent-Agency Treatment Plan (PATP)
Holding that (1) termination was warranted under § (c)(i), (2) the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, and (3) termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. The conditions leading to the adjudication “were (a) domestic violence, (b) an unfit home, (c) neglect, (d) improper supervision, and (e) respondent’s untreated mental health. Of importance during the proceedings, respondent never obtained suitable housing. [She] was unable to make ‘small down payment[s]’ or show ‘proof of income.’ She also never verified her employment status or income from any of her jobs and admitted she never secured her own housing despite referrals.” In addition, she “lacked the ability to properly parent her children because of unaddressed mental-health concerns and inability to supervise [them]. Despite receiving parenting classes, supportive visitation, a psychological evaluation, and therapy, respondent did not benefit from the services and instead was ‘often combative.’ True, she attended her parenting time sessions, but case workers had a ‘plethora of concerns in regards to the safety of the children.’” Further, the record did not indicate that she “could rectify the issues in a reasonable amount of time considering the children’s ages. When the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights,” the children were 15, 7, 5, and 2 years old. Three of them had been out of her care since 12/20, and one was never in her care. The record did “not show respondent was able to rectify her ability to take proper care of the children in a reasonable amount of time.” As to reunification efforts, the record supported the trial court’s finding that the DHHS “made the necessary referrals to help respondent address the barriers to reunification with her children and that additional time to comply with her PATP was not necessary.” The court was not “persuaded that she was entitled to additional housing assistance and was not referred for more specialized parenting classes despite being willing to participate—the trial court appropriately concluded those would not have benefitted her because she demonstrated little to no benefit from the services already offered over several years.” As to the children’s best interests, they were “doing well in their respective placements and would be at risk of harm if returned to” her care.