Batson v Kentucky challenge; People v Knight; Batson’s third step; Purposeful discrimination; Reliance on a juror’s demeanor; People v Tennille; Snyder v Louisiana

Holding that the trial court clearly erred in overruling defendant’s Batson objection to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge to a juror (Juror 7), the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. It concluded the trial court clearly erred in finding that the prosecutor offered “a racially neutral explanation for his peremptory challenge” to Juror 7. Defendant contended the prosecution’s explanation for removing the juror “entirely relied on Juror 7’s demeanor.” The court agreed. The prosecutor stated that while the juror “‘answered questions and seemed to engage while he was up in the jury pool, throughout the process he has been disengaged and (inaudible) in the back and I got the same impression while he was up here that he was not enthused to be here and I think I am allowed to dismiss him for that purpose.’” The court noted that when “‘a prosecutor’s sole explanation for a strike resides in a juror’s appearance or behavior, the third step bears heightened significance. Explanations for peremptory challenges based solely on a juror’s demeanor are particularly susceptible to serving as pretexts for discrimination.’” The court concluded the evidence here tended “to disprove the prosecutor’s rationale. For example, the prosecutor acknowledged that Juror 7 was engaged while he was in the jury box, but argued that he was disengaged while waiting in the back of the room. But, Juror 7 acknowledged that he had heard all the questions that were asked before he was called to the jury box. Moreover, when he was presented with the prosecutor’s ongoing hypothetical regarding what direct or indirect information Juror 7 would need to be convinced that the prosecutor was an attorney, Juror 7 stated, ‘I knew you were going to ask that,’ and proceeded to say that he was convinced that the prosecutor was an attorney because of what the prosecutor had proved throughout the day. These answers directly contradicted the prosecutor’s statement that Juror 7 was disengaged before he entered the jury box.” In addition, the court found that, “the prosecutor’s failure to make a record regarding his concern with Juror 7’s inattention undermines the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s claim. . . . Taken together, the trial court failed to determine whether Juror 7’s demeanor could credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike, and the record evidence disproves the prosecutor’s rationale in this case.”