Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Federal illegality defense; Marijuana outputs contract; Controlled Substances Act (CSA); 21 USC § 841(a); § 846; Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment (RFA); Medical & recreational marijuana; Michigan marijuana licensing; MCL 333.27501; MCL 333.27903; MI Admin Code R 420.214; Judgment as a matter of law; Fed R Civ P 50; Federal public policy; Kaiser Steel Corp v Mullins; Kelly v Kosuga; Hemlock Semiconductor Operations LLC v SolarWorld Indus Sachsen GmbH; Jackson Purchase Rural Elec Coop Assn v Local Union 816; 2026 rescheduling
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff-grower (Hello Farms) could not enforce its marijuana-supply contract against defendants-buyers (GR Vending and CURA MI) because federal courts cannot enforce agreements requiring conduct prohibited by the CSA. Hello Farms sued after GR Vending stopped accepting deliveries under an outputs contract, and a jury awarded Hello Farms $31.8 million in lost profits. The district court rejected defendants’ federal-illegality defense and denied their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the court first held that the contract was not limited to medical marijuana because it required the product to pass “local and state recreational cannabis testing requirements,” GR Vending held both medical and recreational licenses, and Hello Farms identified no contract provision limiting the deal to the medical-marijuana market. The court next held that enforcing the lost-profits award would enforce unlawful conduct because “on the face of the contract, the parties promised to commit felonies.” Performance required Hello Farms to possess and distribute marijuana and GR Vending to possess it with intent to distribute or dispense it. The court rejected Hello Farms’s argument that a damages award would merely transfer money, reasoning that federal courts may not help a party realize “the fruits” of an illegal agreement and that the claim arose from GR Vending’s promise to buy an illegal drug. The court also held that the RFA did not save the contract even if viewed as limited to medical marijuana because it did not legalize or decriminalize marijuana and the conduct prohibited by the CSA “remains criminal.” Finally, it held that neither Jackson Purchase balancing nor the April 2026 rescheduling rule made the contract enforceable because agreements to commit serious crimes are plainly unenforceable, and later changes in law did not retroactively validate the 2020 agreement. Reversed.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); Administrative exhaustion; 42 USC § 1997e(a); MDOC grievance process; Step I grievance; Mail rejection; First Amendment free speech; Fourteenth Amendment due process; Action under § 1983; Summary judgment; Fed R Civ P 56(a); Failure to exhaust as affirmative defense; Jones v Bock; Morgan v Trierweiler; Surles v Andison; Genuine issue of material fact; Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc; Prisoner affidavit; Lamb v Kendrick; Sham affidavit doctrine; France v Lucas; Pro se filings
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that defendant-mailroom clerk (Payton) was not entitled to summary judgment on PLRA exhaustion because a genuine factual dispute existed over when plaintiff-prisoner (Tubbs) learned that his challenge to the mail rejection was unresolved. After MDOC rejected his Step I grievance as untimely, Tubbs sued under § 1983, alleging that Payton violated his First Amendment and due-process rights by withholding a book written by his sister. The district court granted summary judgment to Payton on failure to exhaust administrative remedies grounds. On appeal, the court held that the material fact was when Tubbs understood the final outcome of the administrative hearing process, because under MDOC policy he could file a Step I grievance only once the issue was unresolved. The court reasoned that Payton had the burden to prove nonexhaustion as an affirmative defense and “failed to carry her burden” because her evidence did not conclusively disprove Tubbs’s claim that he received the hearing report on May 9 and filed his grievance the same day. It also held that Tubbs’s sworn affidavit created a genuine dispute because it directly contradicted the inference that he received notice in April, and a prisoner’s affidavit may foreclose summary judgment “‘even if the record lacks corroborating evidence.’” The court rejected Payton’s sham-affidavit argument because Tubbs had not contradicted prior sworn testimony and had consistently claimed that he learned the final decision when he received the report. The court further concluded that the district court improperly faulted Tubbs for not pleading exhaustion because failure to exhaust “must be established by the defendants.” Reversed and remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v Washington; CSC I; MCL 750.520b(2)(b); CSC II; MCL 750.520c(2)(b); Assault with intent to commit sexual penetration; MCL 750.520g(1); Other-acts evidence; MRE 404(b); Other sex acts against minors; MCL 768.27a; Sexual assault propensity evidence; MCL 768.27b; MRE 403; Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; Delayed disclosure; Expert testimony; MRE 702; Within-guidelines sentence; Proportionality; People v Posey
The court held that defendant-Morris failed to show ineffective assistance as to the admission of other-acts and delayed-disclosure testimony, and failed to overcome the presumption that his within-guidelines CSC I sentence was proportionate. Defendant was convicted of CSC I, assault with intent to commit sexual penetration, and CSC II for sexually abusing the victim when she was five years old, and the trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender. On appeal, the court first held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony from another CSC victim because any objection would have been meritless. The court reasoned that the prior acts occurred “less than 10 years before the charged offenses,” involved sexual offenses against a minor, and were “plainly material” to intent, character, propensity, and whether the minor victim was telling the truth. The court next held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the detective’s delayed-disclosure testimony because it was proper lay opinion based on 23 years of law-enforcement experience, and the detective “did not opine directly on the victim’s veracity.” Finally, the court held that defendant’s 37-year minimum sentence for CSC I was presumptively proportionate because it was within the guidelines range, and he offered no substantive argument to rebut that presumption. Affirmed.
Grant of resentencing; Unconditional guilty plea; People v Likine; Waiver; People v Blount; MCR 6.310(C)(3) procedure; Plea bargain & sentencing agreement; People v Smith; Jail credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Bell
The court held that the successor judge erred by granting defendant-Reed resentencing based on waived prearrest-delay and jail-credit theories after he entered an unconditional guilty plea and was sentenced under the parties’ agreement. Reed pled guilty to CSC I under a plea agreement that included a 3-to-15-year sentence and any jail credit the trial court had discretion to award. The sentencing court awarded 172 days but concluded it lacked discretion to award more. A successor judge later found a constitutional violation based on prearrest delay and granted resentencing. On appeal, the court held that an “‘unconditional guilty plea that is knowing and intelligent waives claims of error on appeal,’” and if the trial court believed the plea “was ‘not knowing and voluntary,’” it had to follow MCR 6.310(C)(3) rather than grant resentencing on a waived constitutional issue. The court also held that resentencing improperly altered the plea bargain by imposing a different agreement on the prosecution without giving it an opportunity to withdraw. Finally, the court held that there was no jail-credit error because, under Bell, when credit is not mandated by MCL 769.11b, “the trial court does not have discretion to award any additional jail credit.” Reversed.
Sentencing; Resentencing; Mootness; Minimum sentence served; People v Rutherford; Offense variable (OV) 16; Departure sentence; Presentence investigation report (PSIR); Updated PSIR; MCL 771.14(1); MCR 6.425(A)(1); People v Odom; Harmless error; People v McAllister; Abandoned habitual-offender notice claim
The court held that defendant-Squires’s sentencing challenges to OV scoring and the departure sentence were moot, his updated-PSIR argument did not require resentencing, and his habitual-offender notice issue was abandoned. Defendant was resentenced as a third-offense habitual offender after initially being sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, and he later appealed the resentencing order. On appeal, the court first held that his OV 16 and departure-sentence claims were moot because he had been released on parole and had “already served his minimum sentence,” leaving the court unable to provide a remedy. The court addressed his updated-PSIR argument because collateral consequences could remain, but held that reversal was unwarranted because “‘it is not particularly important how the information gets before the trial court’” so long as it has “‘the relevant information available for sentencing.’” It reasoned that defendant’s allocution gave the trial court the positive updates that would have appeared in an updated PSIR. Finally, the court held that his habitual-offender notice claim was abandoned because he listed it but failed to advance argument or supporting authority. Affirmed.
Premises liability; Fall due to a driveway pothole; Actual or constructive notice; Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc; Kroll v Katz; Distinguishing Basehore v Short (Unpub), Thompson v Gibson (On Remand) (Unpub), & Mancill v Trio Inv Props, LLC (Unpub); Lack of evidence of deterioration or another characteristic revealing the pothole’s age; Consideration of the evidence in deciding a MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion
The court held that the trial court properly granted defendant summary disposition in this premises liability case arising from a fall due to a driveway pothole because defendant identified the lack of evidence on the notice element, and plaintiff did not present evidence that created a genuine factual dispute. She was on defendant’s premises (an automotive business) due to an issue with her work vehicle. She testified that she fell after “her foot landed in gravel inside a pothole, slid backward, struck the back of the hole, and caused her ankle to roll.” She described the hole as “approximately the size of her foot and three to four inches deep, with gravel inside and pavement around it.” On appeal, the court found that the trial court should not have relied on defendant’s owner’s “testimony that he regularly traversed the area without seeing a pothole to the extent that his testimony depended on his disputed identification of the fall location.” But it concluded that reversal was not required. Even under plaintiff’s version of the events, her evidence did “not establish when the condition arose or otherwise permit a reasonable inference that defendant had actual or constructive notice of it. Thus, the disputed testimony” about where she fell was not material to the basis for summary disposition. She did not offer any “evidence that defendant actually knew of the alleged pothole before she fell. No witness testified that the condition had previously been reported or observed, and the record” contained no pre-accident complaint, photo, or repair connected to it. Thus, plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to actual notice. The court found the same was true as to constructive notice. Accepting her testimony, the evidence showed “that a foot-sized, three-to-four-inch-deep, gravel-filled hole existed when she stepped backward from” a vehicle. Her testimony did not establish when it “formed, whether it had changed over time, or whether its appearance reflected prolonged deterioration. [She] did not identify a physical characteristic, such as weathering or deterioration, from which a fact-finder could reasonably determine” its age. Further, the presence of gravel did “not permit a different conclusion.” Affirmed.
Petition for the appointment of a conservator; MCL 700.5401(3)(a) & (b); In re Townsend Conservatorship; Clear & convincing evidence; Social Welfare Act definition of “vulnerable adult”; Credibility assessments; Waiver
Holding that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for appointment of a conservator for petitioner’s mother (MJP), the court affirmed. The probate court “did not improperly focus on MJP’s capacity, nor did it ignore the question of whether she was a vulnerable adult at risk of exploitation.” It denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. It determined that while there were concerns about “MJP’s decision-making being impaired by the ‘relationship dynamics between [MJP] and her sons,’ there was no ‘pervasive pattern of abuse that would cause [MJP] to make, regularly, decisions that are contrary to her interests because of those relationship dynamics[.]’” It found none of MCL 700.5401(3)(a)’s conditions were present and also, under “Townsend Conservatorship, there were ‘no grounds whatsoever in order to allow this proceeding to move forward.’” And under MCL 700.5401(3)(b), it concluded “the element was not ‘shown even on a preliminary basis.’” The probate court found that MJP had “‘plenty of property and assets left,’ including full ownership of real property and other assets.” Thus, it determined that she had “the resources ‘she needs in order to take care of herself and that she is managing them accurately.’” It noted “that a conservatorship case was not the forum to ‘force a person to expose all of his or her financial records’” and that it did not have to decide whether her “decisions were ‘responsible.’ Finally,” it found her credible. The court held that the probate court’s findings as to her “credibility were not clearly erroneous.” It also held that the probate court did not err in relying on the report and deposition of a mental health professional (Dr. L) who had evaluated MJP’s capacity. L “performed numerous tests on MJP, including cognitive functioning, which she passed.” He also interviewed her “and discussed her ability to manage her finances, finding MJP’s ‘financial decision-making abilities were intact.’” In addition, he “reviewed the affidavits attached to the petition. He concluded MJP ‘has tumultuous and at times dangerous relationships with her sons,’ but otherwise has ‘intact cognitive functioning.’”