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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Distinction between a money judgment & a judgment lien; Whether the trial court’s “Judgment Confirming Arbitrator’s Award” should be treated as a judgment renewable within 10 years pursuant to MCL 600.5809(3) or as a judgment lien that must be renewed within 5 years under MCL 600.2801 & 600.2809; “Judgment lien”; MCL 600.2801(c); “Noncontractual money obligation”; MCL 600.5809; The Construction Lien Act (CLA); Ronnisch Constr Group, Inc v Lofts on the Nine, LLC; , The Michigan Judgment Lien Act (MJLA); Thomas v Dutkavich
The court held that the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion to set aside a judgment renewal, characterizing its “judgment” as a lien, finding the judgment was “much more a lien than a ‘noncontractual money obligation.’” Over two decades ago, plaintiffs filed a construction lien on defendants’ property. The parties eventually entered into binding arbitration. The arbitrator significantly reduced the lien, and the trial court entered a “Judgment Confirming Arbitration Award.” Almost a decade later, it granted plaintiffs’ ex parte motion to renew the judgment. Defendants successfully moved to “set aside [the] improper judgment lien renewal.” On appeal, the court noted that the entry of the Judgment Confirming Arbitration Award not only “confirmed and incorporated the arbitrator’s award, but also stated clearly that ‘this Judgment may be recorded with the St. Clair County Register of Deeds.’ And, in fact, plaintiffs recorded the judgment in short order as ‘an encumbrance in favor of a judgment creditor against a judgment debtor’s interest in real property,’ just as MCL 600.2801(c) defines a ‘judgment lien.’” The court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that “a judgment lien can only arise after the entry of a judgment, especially in circumstances such as this where the judgment itself expressly contemplates the filing of that document as ‘an encumbrance in favor of a judgment creditor against a judgment debtor’s interest in real property.’” It also did not accept plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court’s ruling deprived them “of a remedy to protect their longstanding claim against” defendants. It noted the “MJLA allows for rerecording of a judgment lien ‘by recording with the register of deeds, not less than 120 days before the initial expiration date under [MCL 600.2809(1)], a second notice of judgment lien that has been certified by the clerk of the court that entered the judgment.’” Plaintiffs chose not to utilize “that rerecording opportunity, so the five-year expiration date of” the judgment lien came and went. Their “inaction cannot be laid at the feet of any court or opposing party. Simply put, plaintiffs chose to take no action for nearly ten years, and in the meantime they gave up the statutory right to protect their financial interest through the rerecording process set forth in the MJLA, MCL 600.2809(4).” Affirmed.
Fraud; Statute of frauds (SOF) (MCL 566.106); Cassidy v Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp; Promissory estoppel; State Bank of Standish v Curry; Distinguishing Featherston v Steinhoff & Carnes v Sheldon; Unjust enrichment/quantum meruit; Statutory conversion; MCL 600.2919a
In this case arising after the end of a romantic relationship, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s fraud claim related to a property based on Cassidy, which held that “an action for fraud cannot be used to overcome enforcement of the” SOF. But it found her promissory estoppel claim should be allowed to go forward, and declined to vacate the trial court’s ruling allowing her “to proceed with a claim for actual expenses associated with the” house given the absence of a cross-appeal. It affirmed summary disposition of her statutory conversion claim as to a securities account, finding her “control” theory was only conjecture. The court disagreed with plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in dismissing her fraud claims related to defendant’s alleged promise “to give her one-half of the Mackinac house in exchange for her labor in helping to construct it.” The court noted that “neither the parties nor the trial court addressed the threshold question of whether an action for fraud can be used to avoid the” SOF. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cassidy has long been recognized as standing “for the proposition that an allegation of fraud cannot be used to overcome enforcement of the” SOF in Michigan. The court noted that although “the trial court did not rely on Cassidy to dismiss the fraud claims, a trial court’s decision may be upheld if the correct result was reached for an alternative reason.” But the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred in dismissing her promissory estoppel claim, concluding that the allegations in her complaint and affidavit “set forth the ‘when’ of performance (when construction is completed) and the ‘how’ (conveyance of a one-half interest by means of executing a deed). The date of the conveyance is not specifically identified, but it need not be. The promise to convey is conditional (upon construction), with performance due when the condition occurs.” Further, it found that allowing the claim to go “forward would not be ‘resurrecting common law marriage’” given that she did not raise a contract implied in fact claim. But it determined that she was not entitled to relief as to the grant of partial summary disposition of her unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim (for her labor on the house). “Under Featherston, recovery under” this theory was inappropriate.
Breach of contract; Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5807(9); The common-law discovery rule; Trentadue v Buckler Lawn Sprinkler Co
The court held that the trial court should have granted defendant-Heritage Place’s motion for summary disposition on statute of limitation grounds under MCR 2.116(C)(7), and erred by holding the common-law discovery rule applied following the bench trial. Thus, in Docket No. 356948, the court reversed the trial court’s 12/11/20 order denying Heritage Place’s motion for summary disposition and vacated the 4/1/21 judgment. In Docket No. 358244, it vacated the trial court’s 5/14/21 order awarding plaintiff-Harriet Buck case evaluation sanctions and vacated the trial court’s 8/5/21 order denying Heritage Place’s motion for reconsideration. “Harriet acknowledged in the trial court that she did not bring her breach-of-contract claim within the statutory six-year period. Instead, she argued MCL 600.5855, the fraudulent concealment statute, applied to give her two years after she discovered the contract breach to bring suit.” In its motion for summary disposition, Heritage Place claimed that Harriet failed to plead “the acts or misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment,” and the court agreed. The “undisputed evidence established (1) agents of Heritage Place did not engage in affirmative acts or misrepresentation after July 2007, and (2) Harriet failed to exercise diligence to discover the breach-of-contract claim. Therefore, MCL 600.5855 did not toll the statute of limitations. Because there was no factual dispute the statute of limitations was expired on the breach-of-contract action under MCL 600.5807(9) when the complaint was filed, the trial court erred by failing to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).” The court further held that the “trial court also erred by failing to dismiss the breach-of-contract claim after the bench trial.” It concluded that “the evidence supported Harriet should have been aware of a potential claim in July 2007, and she failed to exercise diligence to discover the breach-of-contract claim. Additionally, application of the common-law discovery rule could not save Harriet’s breach-of-contract claim because it was abrogated” in Trentadue.
Parole; MCL 791.233(1)(a); MI Admin Code, R 791.7715(2); Requirement that a prisoner with a history of predatory or assaultive sexual offenses undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation before a release decision is made; In re Parole of Haeger; The parole guidelines factors for scoring; R 791.7716(3)(a)
Holding that the Parole Board abused its discretion in granting appellant parole and that the circuit court did not err in reversing the Board’s decision, the court affirmed the circuit court. Appellant was charged with three counts of CSC I against his children, and pled nolo contendere to a count involving one of his daughters. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He was previously denied parole five times. The Board granted it in 2019. The prosecution appealed. “The circuit court examined the entire record including [appellant’s] PSIR, the files pertaining to his previous attempts to obtain parole, the file pertaining to [his] current request for parole, and the public hearing transcript. [It] identified and articulated in its written opinion numerous substantial and compelling reasons why it concluded that the Parole Board abused its discretion” in granting him parole. The court concluded the record supported the circuit court’s decision. It found that the circuit court did not substitute its judgment for that of the Board but rather “determined an error committed during the process of evaluating [appellant’s] level of risk which undermined the weight that the statistical analysis should be given. That, coupled with [appellant’s] gross failure to demonstrate willingness to accept responsibility for and insight into his past criminal behavior supported the circuit court’s conclusion that [he] failed to establish his readiness for release and that he will not become a menace to society or to the public safety. The circuit court also appropriately concluded that [he] had no viable plan for parole because he lacked a support system outside prison, lacked housing, lacked marketable skills, and had no specific plans for employment.” The court held that it did not err by finding he could not show “readiness for release because the record establishes that he lacked specific plans and skills to enable him to integrate back into society.” In addition, the circuit court did not err in “stating that significant concerns exist where sexual offender treatment will be left to the discretion of a parole officer.” Based on the record, “the circuit court appropriately concluded that reasonable assurance, after consideration of all of the facts and circumstances, did not exist that [appellant] will not become a menace to society or to the public safety as required under MCL 791.233(1)(a).”
Legal custody; Medical care; Change in circumstances (CIC); Parenting time conditions
The court reversed that portion of the trial court’s order granting plaintiff-mother sole legal custody over all medical decisions related to the child (RJF), and affirmed the trial court’s conditions for defendant-father’s exercise of parenting time. RJF “suffers from a number of serious and potentially life-threatening medical issues[.]” Defendant argued that the trial court erred by finding a CIC “warranting reopening the custody decision and by apportioning legal custody when it granted plaintiff sole legal custody over matters pertaining to RJF’s medical care.” The court determined that “the factual underpinnings of the trial court’s conclusions were against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court’s analysis of plaintiff’s request for modification of legal custody should not have proceeded to a determination of the established custodial environment and a best-interest analysis. Moreover, even if plaintiff had met her burden to establish a proper cause or a [CIC], the [trial] court committed clear legal error by apportioning legal custody and ordering that plaintiff had sole decision-making authority over issues concerning the entirety of RJF’s medical care.” Thus, the court reversed that “portion of the trial court’s order granting plaintiff sole legal custody on all issues related to RJF’s medical care.” Defendant next asserted that “the trial court erred by imposing certain conditions on his exercise of parenting time.” The court concluded that given “the unique nature of RJF’s severe medical condition, and considering that the order does not require anyone to be vaccinated and does not allow plaintiff to deny the now-vaccinated defendant parenting time, . . . the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning its ruling for the protection of RJF under the circumstances.”
The Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) “judgment bar”; Whether the FTCA bar preluded plaintiff’s claim under Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed Bureau of Narcotics; Whether Harris v United States has been overruled by subsequent Supreme Court cases (Simmons v Himmelreich; Will v Hallock; Brownback v King)
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that Harris (in which the court held that the FTCA judgment bar applies to other claims brought in the same action, including claims brought under Bivens) has not been overruled by later Supreme Court precedent. Thus, it affirmed the district court’s order dismissing plaintiff-King’s remaining claims. After the FBI mistakenly arrested King, who was acquitted of all charges, he filed suit, asserting a Bivens claim and a § 1983 claim against the agents who arrested him, defendants-Allen and Brownback, based on Fourth Amendment violations. He also brought an FTCA claim against the United States. The district court dismissed all the claims on the merits without addressing the FTCA judgment bar, which provides that a judgment on a FTCA claim completely bars any of a plaintiff’s other claims that are based on the same subject matter, brought against the government employee whose actions precipitated the claim. On appeal, the court had held that his Bivens claim was not precluded by the bar “‘because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over” his FTCA claim, so that claim was not resolved on the merits and the judgment bar was not triggered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order dismissing the FTCA claim “‘went to the merits of the claim and thus could trigger the judgment bar[,] . . . where, as here, pleading a claim and pleading jurisdiction entirely overlap, a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits that triggers the judgment bar.’” In a footnote, the Supreme Court discussed how the court should proceed on remand. It noted that “King had argued ‘that the judgment bar does not apply to a dismissal of claims raised in the same lawsuit.’” It declined to address the issue, leaving it to the Sixth Circuit to consider “whether the FTCA judgment bar applies to claims in the same lawsuit, which would require the dismissal of King’s remaining Bivens claim.” On remand, the court concluded that none of the three Supreme Court cases King cited overruled Harris. Because it concluded that Harris has not been overruled, it was compelled to affirm the district court’s dismissal of King’s remaining claims.
Best interests of the child; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors
Holding that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. He did not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in finding statutory grounds for termination existed. The trial court found that despite respondent being offered “very extensive services,” he failed to complete or benefit from them enough to have the child placed with him, or to cooperate or communicate with the DHHS during the case, and remained “no closer to reunifying with his child than at the start of the case.” In addition, it found he was “incapable of providing this child with a caring, stable environment.” On appeal, respondent claimed termination did not serve the child’s best interests because he had sufficient parenting ability, his rights to the child’s siblings were not terminated, the child would not be easily adopted, and the parent-child bond declined only because of the suspension of his parenting time. The court disagreed. First, the trial court appropriately found that the child “would require consistent, stable care in a calm environment,” and her “emotional stability would be greatly disturbed with the ‘drama, instability, insecurity that [respondent] could create if he still retained his parental rights.’” Further, while the trial court “originally suspended parenting time, respondent’s own actions and inactions prevented parenting time from being reinstated. The trial court cannot be blamed for the diminishment of his bond with” the child. Finally, despite his “demonstrated ability to care for his older, average-needs children, he continued to lack the skills to parent” the child and provide for her special needs. The trial court “considered and weighed the applicable best-interest factors and none of these factors tended to favor respondent.”