Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Child support arrearage; Statute of limitations (SOL) defense; MCL 600.5809(4); Waiver; Distinguishing Alpena Friend of the Court ex rel Paul v Durecki; Wayne Cnty Soc Servs Dir v Yates
The court held that the trial court erred in ruling defendant-father waived his statute of limitations defense to the child support arrearage owed to plaintiff-mother. He argued on appeal that it “erred in concluding that he was required to file an original action and, as a plaintiff, raise the” SOL as an affirmative defense, and in determining MCL 600.5809(4)’s 10-year statute of limitations did not apply. The court agreed. The trial court denied his motion for reconsideration of his motion to terminate income withholding “by concluding that, to avail himself of the 10-year period of limitations, [he] was required to file a complaint and then raise the affirmative defense of the” SOL. But MCL 600.5809(4) “contains no such requirement. The trial court read into the statute prerequisites that simply do not exist.” It also did not “identify the cause of action that defendant would file to obtain relief, and how as a plaintiff, he would raise an affirmative defense.” The court next considered case law addressing the applicable 10-year statute of limitations as to child support arrearages. In the trial court, the FOC relied on Durecki, which the court found factually distinguishable. Defendant’s obligation to pay child support ended on 7/11/10. The 10-year limitations period expired on 7/11/20. He made no payments during that period. In 12/23, “the FOC sent an income withholding order to [his] employer and was able to secure funds through that order. The FOC failed to present evidence that defendant voluntarily made payments between 2010 and 2024 or that he negotiated with plaintiff or the FOC or notified them of his employment and consented to the income withholding order.” Thus, there was no evidence that his actions between 7/11/20 and 1/24 “revived or extended the period.” The court also concluded that its decision in Yates did not support affirmance. It was “undisputed that defendant did not pay child support for more than 10 years . . . when suddenly an income withholding order addressed to [his] employer caused a child support payment to be made on” 1/2/24. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting his “motion to terminate the income withholding order and direct repayment of monies obtained under it.”
Divorce; Parenting time; Lieberman v Orr; MCL 722.23(b), (c), (f), (h), & (j); Distinguishing Bofysil v Bofysil; Child support; The Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF); Uniform Child Support Order (UCSO)
The court held that the trial court did not err in (1) awarding defendant-father less parenting time than plaintiff-mother during the school year or (2) calculating his income for purposes of child support. As to parenting time, he contended “the trial court erroneously ruled that the evidence favored plaintiff under” statutory best-interest Factors (b), (c), (h), and (j). He also asserted that this case was similar to Bofysil and that the trial court clearly erred in not following its reasoning. The court found Bofysil distinguishable, as “the evidence in this case did not show that defendant arranged his work schedule so that he could—and did—provide significant regular care for the children during the school year.” And unlike the stay-at-home parent there, “plaintiff worked full-time outside the home and provided income and benefits for the family. She also provided the overwhelming majority of the care for the children in the months and years preceding the divorce trial.” The court found that, in contrast to “the situation in Bofysil, defendant did not play an active role in the children’s daily routines during the school year even when he was not at work; however, plaintiff did so while also working full-time.” The court also disagreed with his claim that she “prevented him from participating in the daily care of the children.” It affirmed the trial court’s ruling that “Factors (b), (c), and (h) favored plaintiff because its findings of fact were not contrary to the great weight of the evidence or founded on clear legal error.” The court also rejected defendant’s arguments as to Factors (j) and (f). It held that the “trial court’s factual findings were supported by the record evidence and” he failed to show “that its determinations clearly preponderated in the opposite direction or that [it] made a clear legal error on a major issue.” As to child support, defendant did not show “that the trial court clearly erred when it determined the parties’ incomes or that the UCSO constituted an abuse of discretion[.]” Affirmed.
Order for involuntary mental health treatment; Mootness; An issue “publicly significant, likely to recur,” yet may evade judicial review; In re Tchakarova
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the Court of Appeals holding that this case was moot (see eJournal # 83763 in the 6/12/25 edition), and remanded to that court for plenary consideration. It noted that involuntary “mental health treatment orders under Michigan law are inherently limited in duration. Initial orders for involuntary mental health treatment that include combined hospitalization and outpatient treatment may not exceed 180 days.” Their brief duration “means that appellate review will frequently occur after the challenged order has expired by its own terms.” While an issue is moot, it is justiciable if it “is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review.” The court found that, like the 90-day order in Tchakarova, “the involuntary mental health order at issue in this case presents an issue of public significance and the limited duration of the 180-day order ‘all but guaranteed that no meaningful judicial review of the order could ever be conducted before the order expired.’” But the Court of Appeals dismissed respondent’s appeal of the 7/24 involuntary mental health treatment order as moot, determining that the order would “‘not, in a practical sense, evade appellate review, given respondent’s appeal of the probate court’s” 1/25 order. Yet it later also dismissed respondent’s appeal of the 1/25 order as moot. “This pattern of successive orders demonstrates precisely the capable of repetition, yet evading review circumstance that justifies an exception to mootness. The Court of Appeals holding would effectively immunize short-duration involuntary treatment orders from appellate scrutiny whenever a subsequent order is issued.” The court held that the mootness exception applied to the order at issue, and the “Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.”
Preliminary injunction in a misappropriation of trade secrets case; The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA); Requirement that a party cease work under a contract; Irreparable harm; Downstream effects; Forensic exam of electronic devices; Whether the order was narrowly tailored; Protection of confidential information
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in this misappropriation of trade secrets case by entering a preliminary injunction requiring that defendant-Kent Power cease working under a contract (¶ 4(e) of the order) and ordering an independent forensic exam of defendants’ electronic devices (¶¶ 4(b)-(d)). The court concluded that, as to ¶ 4(e), plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm, and that ¶¶ 4(b)-(d) were not narrowly tailored. Thus, it vacated the preliminary injunction order and remanded. Plaintiff-UEC is the parent and sole owner of United Electric, which previously employed defendant-Hatcher. After UEC terminated Hatcher, it conducted a forensic review of his company-owned devices and allegedly found communications between him and defendant-Kent (the owner of Kent Power), “in which Hatcher allegedly transmitted confidential pricing and rate materials.” UEC then filed this action, which included a federal misappropriation of trade secrets claim under the DTSA. Paragraph 4(e) of the preliminary injunction order required that defendants cease working under the contract with a nonparty client (LG&E) of United Electric, and ¶¶ 4(b)-(d) directed “independent forensic examiners to obtain ‘responsive items’ from” defendants’ electronic devices. On appeal, the court concluded as to ¶ 4(e) that nothing in the record showed “with any certainty that Kent Power poses a competitive threat to United Electric’s relationship with LG&E.” In addition, the record lacked “sufficient evidence suggesting that Kent Power poses a threat to United Electric’s distribution services or other services in Louisville.” To succeed on the irreparable harm prong, “some imminent, non-speculative harm” had to be shown. The court held that UEC did not show “any harm.” While the court has “permitted injunctive relief when misappropriation of trade secrets led to loss of goodwill and competitive disadvantage[,]” the court found the cases on which UEC relied were distinguishable. As to ¶¶ 4(b)-(d), the court held that “the district court failed to provide protections for the Defendants’ confidential, privileged, and private information, making its order overbroad.”
Special needs trust; Guardian removal; Temporary guardian; Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC); MCL 700.5312(2); MCL 700.5311; Due process; Notice & opportunity to be heard; Trust proceeding; Guardianship proceeding; Interested persons; MCR 5.102; MCR 5.107(A); MCL 700.1105(c); In re Rhea Brody Living Trust; Signed order in the case file requirement; MCR 2.602(D)
The court held that the probate court erred by suspending appellant as incapacitated BJ’s guardian and appointing a temporary guardian during a trust-case hearing on a special fiduciary’s petition for instruction. BJ suffered a traumatic brain injury, lived in a home modified for his needs, and had a special needs trust. Appellant, who was BJ’s guardian and primary caregiver, was suspended after the special fiduciary raised concerns in the trust case about caregiver payments, alleged food insecurity, and potential conflict between appellant’s caregiver and guardian roles. On appeal, the court held that the record did not support temporary suspension under MCL 700.5312(2) because the probate court “clearly erred when it determined that [appellant] was ‘not effectively performing the guardian’s duties’ and that BJ’s ‘welfare required immediate action.’” The court also held that reversal was required because the suspension and temporary-guardian appointment occurred in the trust case, not the guardianship case, and the order’s “actual import was on the guardianship case.” Because that procedure deprived interested persons in the guardianship case of proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court directed that “issues pertaining to BJ’s guardianship should be heard and addressed in the probate court guardianship case.” Reversed and remanded.
Termination of parental rights; Best interests; In re Moss; In re White; In re CJM; Substance abuse; Meth; Case service plan; Parent-child bond; Relative placement; In re Olive/Metts; In re Atchley; Fictive kin; MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(i); Guardianship
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. DHHS became involved after the child was born with meth in his system. Although the mother made progress while incarcerated and initially after release, she relapsed on meth, violated parole, and arrived intoxicated to several parenting-time sessions. On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly weighed her substance-abuse barrier because her “ongoing addiction issues affected her parenting abilities, undermined respondent’s compliance with the service plan, and weighed in favor of termination.” The court also rejected her bond argument, holding that the trial court did not err because testimony showed the child did not ask about or talk about her, and the record supported “a lack of a parent-child bond.” As to relative placement, the court recognized that the trial court was “required to expressly consider” that placement as weighing against termination, but held that the order as a whole showed the trial court “considered the relative placement as weighing against” termination and still found termination appropriate. Affirmed.