Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Religious objections to an employer’s vaccine mandate during the COVID pandemic; Title VII disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, & retaliation claims; 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1); The “materially adverse” standard; Tepper v Potter; Muldrow v City of St. Louis; Whether one of the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing; Savel v MetroHealth Sys
Because the district court relied on now-abrogated precedent (Tepper) in granting summary judgment to defendant-employer (UT-Battelle) on plaintiff-Mr. Bilyeu’s Title VII disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims, the court vacated the judgment as to those claims and remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard (Muldrow). It also reversed summary judgment for UT-Battelle on his Title VII retaliation claim, concluding a reasonable juror could find that the interview process conducted as to the sincerity of his religious beliefs could dissuade a reasonable employee from requesting accommodation. It affirmed summary judgment as to plaintiff-Mrs. Bilyeu because she lacked Article III standing. Both plaintiffs were employed by UT-Battelle. They submitted religious accommodation requests as to the vaccine mandate. After Mrs. Bilyeu learned “that breastfeeding mothers like her could qualify for a medical accommodation[,]” she successfully requested one. As a result, she did not miss work or lose pay. Mr. Bilyeu “had to sit for a panel interview, during which UT-Battelle officials thoroughly examined him about his religious beliefs.” The court first held that Mrs. Bilyeu did not meet the requirements of Article III standing under the court’s precedent (Savel). As to Mr. Bilyeu’s claim for disparate treatment, the district court ruled that he failed to establish a “material adverse employment action.” It relied on Tepper “for the proposition that unpaid leave does not qualify because Mr. Bilyeu ‘is simply not being paid for time that he has not worked.’” But the Supreme Court subsequently overruled the materially adverse standard in Muldrow, where it “eliminated the ‘material’ requirement that lower courts had added to the prerequisite of an adverse employment action.” Muldrow also applied to the failure to accommodate claim here where Sixth Circuit precedent requiring an “independent harm” clashed with Muldrow. The court held “that, under Muldrow, a court cannot dismiss a Title VII complaint simply because the plaintiff’s only harm is having to choose between violating his religious beliefs and violating workplace policies.” The court agreed “with the district court that a plaintiff cannot bring a Title VII retaliation claim when he alleges only that he made an accommodation request and that the employer denied the request.” However, the court found that he showed a triable issue existed “over whether UT-Battelle retaliated against him by subjecting him to an interview process that demeaned Mr. Bilyeu for his religious beliefs.”
Breach of contract; Waiver; Bissell v LW Edison Co; Instructional error; M Civ JI 142.41; Damages; Van Buren Charter Twp v Visteon Corp; Unjust enrichment; Landstar Express Am, Inc v Nexteer Auto Corp; Motion for a new trial or remittitur based on an excessive verdict; Denial of request to amend a claim; Dismissal of claims based on a merger clause; Claim for breach of a promissory note; Judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); Asset purchase agreement (APA)
In these consolidated appeals, in Docket No. 370769, the court affirmed the final judgment for plaintiffs-purchasers in the 2019 case because the trial court properly denied defendants-sellers’ motion for JNOV and motion for a new trial or remittitur. It also found that the purchasers were not entitled to any relief in their cross-appeal. In Docket No. 368946, it affirmed the trial court’s order in the 2023 case granting purchasers (defendants in that case) summary disposition of plaintiff-Best Team’s claim for breach of a promissory note. The cases arose “from the sale of several restaurants and catering businesses, the contractual obligations and assignments, and the promissory note.” In Docket No. 370769, defendants (referred to as the sellers) contended the trial court erred in denying their request for JNOV, “claiming that purchasers’ breach-of-contract claim was waived and there was insufficient evidence that purchasers suffered damages.” The court held that there “was record evidence for the jury to conclude that there was no waiver of this claim by purchasers, despite [one plaintiff’s] knowledge that the consents had not been obtained at closing, and the representation guaranteeing the consents would be obtained survived the closing.” Sellers nonetheless argued “that M Civ JI 142.41 was improperly given because purchasers’ waiver of breach of § 7.7” of the APA did not require separate consideration. The court concluded that sellers failed “to establish instructional error requiring reversal based on the [trial] court giving M Civ JI 142.41 at trial where there was no abuse of discretion in [its] conclusion that the standard instruction should be submitted to the jury.” Thus, the trial court did not err in denying sellers JNOV on the basis of waiver. Sellers next argued that they were entitled to JNOV “of purchasers’ breach-of-contract claim because purchasers failed to show damages.” But the court found “there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that purchasers suffered damages, and that the damages were caused by sellers’ breach of the APA.” In addition, the trial court properly denied sellers JNOV “of purchasers’ unjust-enrichment claim against” defendant-Dickson. The court held that “the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Dickson was unjustly enriched from the payroll advance[.]”
Other acts evidence; People v Denson; Whether an error was harmless
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83360 in the 3/28/25 edition) and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. It held that while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting other acts evidence in the bench trial, it erred in determining the error was harmless. The court concluded that, based on the trial court’s error in admitting the “evidence, the prosecution ‘referred to the evidence throughout the trial’—including during its direct examination of the other-acts witness, its cross-examination of defendant, and its closing statement—'to paint defendant as a violent person.’” Further, the trial court “expressly relied on the inadmissible other-acts evidence in reaching its verdict. The repeated misuse of this evidence was not harmless because the trial court questioned the testimony of both the complainant and defendant, using the tainted evidence to help bolster the complainant’s credibility and discredit defendant’s.” Considering the nature of the error and “‘its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence,’” the court determined that its improper admission undermined the verdict’s reliability. Thus, a new trial was warranted. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented. Dissenting, Justice Zahra would deny leave to appeal, finding that it was “probable that the trial court would have come to the same determination without the other-acts evidence presented at trial. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the statutory standard in MCL 769.26 to conclude that it is not more probable than not that the evidence changed the outcome of the trial.”
Criminal contempt; MCL 600.1701; MCL 600.1711; “Immediate view & presence” requirement; Effect of the fact the hearing was conducted over Zoom; Due process; In re Scott; People v Mysliwiec; Plain error review; Sufficiency of the evidence; People v MacLean; DeGeorge v Warheit
Rejecting appellant’s due process and sufficiency of the evidence challenges, the court affirmed the trial court’s order holding him in criminal contempt. Appellant, an attorney, was representing a criminal defendant (Bennett) during a bond hearing conducted over Zoom. After the trial “court’s bond ruling, appellant apparently believed that the Zoom hearing had disconnected and used derogatory curse words apparently in reference to the judge. But, the judge heard” him, leading to the order on appeal. Concluding that appellant’s due process claims were not preserved for appellate review, the court held that he failed to establish “plain error affecting his substantial rights.” It determined that his “conduct during the [trial] court’s Zoom hearing satisfied the ‘immediate view and presence’ requirement of MCL 600.1711(1)’s plain language. The trial court conducted a hearing addressing Bennett’s emergency motion to reinstate the prior bond and allowed appellant and Bennett to attend over Zoom. Although appellant was able to establish that Bennett’s additional charges were not committed while he was released on bond, the trial court nonetheless denied the motion, concluding that its amendment to the bond terms did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The trial court then ordered all cases scheduled for resolution the following week. After the court clerk announced the date, the transcript reflects that appellant” made the statement giving rise to the contempt finding. “The contempt occurred ‘in the immediate view and presence of the court.’ . . . That is, it was before the eye, view, or ‘face’ of” the trial court. The court noted “the fact that the trial court conducted the hearing over Zoom instead of physically in the courtroom does not preclude a finding that misconduct or insolent behavior by an attorney constitutes contempt when it nonetheless occurs over video in the immediate view and presence of the court.” It found that appellant failed to show “plain error affecting his substantial rights arising from the trial court’s determination that his conduct constituted criminal contempt, the timing of that conclusion and the punishment, and the due process afforded him to prepare and present a defense.” It also held that, viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s factual findings, there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s criminal contempt.”
Successive motion for relief from judgment (MFRJ); Newly discovered evidence; People v Cress; Whether the evidence would make a different result probable on retrial; People v Johnson; Ineffective assistance of counsel
The court held that defendant did not satisfy the first three prongs of the Cress test, and even if he had, he failed to satisfy the fourth. Further, for the same reasons that his “evidence would not make a different result probable on retrial,” his ineffective assistance of counsel claim also failed. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying his successive MFRJ. He was convicted of CSC I, CSC II, kidnapping, and second-degree child abuse. This appeal centered “around his claim of new evidence.” He sought to provide his own expert testimony as to “the DNA evidence, which he contends would rebut the prosecution’s theory regarding” its significance. He also proposed “to provide testimony from several of his family members that” the victim (JN) had “a history of making up false allegations of sexual assault against other family members[.]” Other proposed testimony indicated “JN recanted the allegations when confronted and often passed them off as jokes. According to the testimony, all of defendant’s proffered witnesses regarding these allegations knew of them before trial and several of the witnesses attempted to bring them up with defendant’s trial counsel, who did not inquire at trial into any prior false allegations other than those involving a teacher.” Applying the Cress test, the court agreed with the trial court that nearly all the evidence he sought “to present on retrial was not newly discovered because it was known to defendant prior to trial, and much of it was communicated to [his] counsel at that time as well.” While his new DNA evidence might be newly discovered, it ran “into difficulties with Cress’s second prong, which requires that it not be cumulative of the evidence presented at trial.” In addition, he failed to show “that any of his offered evidence—newly discovered or otherwise—could not have been, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, discovered and produced at trial.” As to the fourth Cress prong, “to undo the jury’s prior determination of his guilt and secure a new trial, defendant must show that, based on the evidence that would be admitted at retrial, a different result would not merely be possible, but ‘probable.’” He did not do so. Much of the evidence was “either cumulative, speculative, or sourced solely from defendant and his supportive son and mother. And none of it directly contradicts JN’s unwavering account of the specific conduct at issue in this case and the evidence at trial, physical and otherwise, that corroborated or was consistent with it.”
Sentencing; Right to be sentenced based on accurate information & accurately scored guidelines; People v Francisco; Scoring of OV 1; Discharge of a weapon toward a human being (MCL 777.31(1)(a)); Scoring of OV 3; Victim was killed (MCL 777.333(2)(b)); Reasonableness; People v Posey; Restitution; MCL 769.1a(2); MCL 780.766(2); People v Bentley
The court held that the trial court did not err in its scoring of OVs 1 and 3, or by ordering restitution. Defendant was convicted of FIP and felony-firearm for shooting the victim in the back five times during an argument. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 5 to 25 years for the former and a consecutive 5-years for the latter. It also ordered defendant to pay restitution. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by scoring OV 1 at 25 points, noting he “admitted to police that he had the gun in his possession at the time he used the gun to kill” the victim. Indeed, “it would be difficult for one to shoot a gun without possessing it.” It also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by scoring OV 3 at 100 points, noting defendant “admitted to police officers that he shot” the victim with a gun in his possession. Also, because it found the trial court did not err in scoring OVs 1 and 3, the court rejected “defendant’s contention that the trial court imposed a sentence above the applicable sentencing guidelines.” Finally, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution. He claimed that because he was not convicted of murdering the victim, he could not be ordered to pay restitution for the victim’s funeral expenses. He was convicted of FIP. “While committing that offense, defendant shot and killed” the victim, whose “death was factually and proximately caused by defendant’s possession of a firearm, and there is a direct causal relationship between the conduct underlying the convicted offense and the amount of restitution awarded, being the funeral expenses for the victim.” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Failure to secure PTSD/insanity evidence; MCL 768.21a; People v Armstrong; Diminished-capacity defense; People v Carpenter; Failure to prevent a witness from violating a sequestration order; MRE 615; Jury instructions; Waiver of a challenge to a curative instruction on sequestration; People v Hershey; Sentencing; Proportionality of mandatory 25-year minimum as a fourth habitual offender; MCL 769.12(1)(a) & (6)(c); People v Burkett; Ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing; Failure to present mitigation evidence
The court held that: (1) defendant’s ineffective-assistance claims failed, (2) any challenge to the sequestration instruction was waived, and (3) the mandatory fourth-habitual 25-year minimum sentences were proportionate. In 2019, the then-50-year-old defendant entered the 66-year-old victim’s camper and assaulted him. He was convicted of first-degree home invasion and AWIGBH. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 25 to 40 years for both offenses. On appeal, the court rejected his trial-stage ineffectiveness claim premised on lack of PTSD expert evidence. It noted counsel sought competency and criminal-responsibility evaluations, but because neither supported legal insanity and both contained damaging material, counsel reasonably declined to call an expert. The court also noted that, under Carpenter, “‘the insanity defense as established by the Legislature is the sole standard for determining criminal responsibility,’” and while psychological traits can bear on self-defense, the jury’s finding of home invasion rendered any PTSD effect “irrelevant to his claim of self-defense[.]” As to sequestration, counsel should have kept a defense witness from the courtroom until called and thus “performed deficiently,” but there was no reasonable probability of a different result given the instruction allowing jurors to weigh the breach, corroborating physical evidence of a prolonged beating inside the camper, motive tied to defendant’s mother, and defendant’s false exculpatory statements. The challenge to the trial court’s curative instruction was waived because counsel expressly approved it. “Having agreed to the jury instruction, defense counsel waived any error.” As to sentencing, because both offenses are “serious crimes” and defendant had three listed priors, the statute required a 25-year minimum. Legislatively mandated terms are “‘presumptively proportional and presumptively valid,’” and although “‘the mandatory 25-year minimum sentence is long, it . . . reflects a rational legislative judgment’” to incapacitate repeat serious offenders. Defendant’s age, PTSD, and background did not present “unusual” circumstances to rebut that presumption, and counsel was not ineffective at sentencing where mitigation was presented and the statute controlled. Affirmed.