Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Sufficiency of the evidence; Larceny; MCL 750.316(1)(b); Armed robbery; MCL 750.52; MCL 750.530; Due process; Anonymous jury; People v Hanks; People v Williams; Evidentiary hearing to suppress custodial statements
The court held that “the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of the predicate offense of armed robbery to support defendant’s felony-murder conviction.” Also, it disagreed that “referring to jurors by number rather than by name violated his right to due process.” Finally, it found that “even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in its decision not to hold a full evidentiary hearing, the remedy, if defendant prevailed, would have been suppression of his post invocation statements.” Because none of his “statements were admitted,” any error “in failing to hold a Walker hearing was harmless.” He was charged with open murder and convicted of felony murder. “Given the open murder charge, the trial court instructed [the] jury to consider whether, when defendant ‘did the act that caused the [shooting victim’s] death . . ., [he] was committing or attempting to commit or helping someone else commit the crime of armed robbery.’” On appeal, he contended that, despite co-defendant-Williams “testimony that their plan was to rob KA of money at gunpoint, no larceny was committed because she screamed before there was any demand for money or property.” And as such “that the murder victim ‘was not killed during the uninterrupted chain of events surrounding the commission of the larceny.’” Although the underlying felony was armed robbery, not larceny, “the felony-murder statute prohibits not only murders committed during the commission of the predicate felony, but also during an attempt to commit the predicate felony.” Further, the phrase “‘in the course of committing a larceny’ includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the larceny. . . .” Thus, the larceny need not be completed. The court held that “the inn’s videotape footage, Williams’s testimony, and KA’s testimony establish[ed] defendant was armed and in the course of committing a larceny when he shot and killed KA’s boyfriend.” The court next rejected his claim that “referring to jurors by number rather than by name violated his right to due process, noting that “nothing in the record suggests defendant lacked meaningful biographical information about the jurors.” Rather, voir dire “was probing and that information about the jurors’ backgrounds was available.” As in Hanks, “[t]here [was] no indication that any of the jurors believed that there was any significance in the use of numbers instead of names.” Lastly, it rejected his contention that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing to suppress his custodial statements.” Although the “matter was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing, the trial court, which had reviewed the interview videotape in advance, rejected defendant’s contention that he had unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.” On appeal, the parties argued “about the trial court’s actions without recognizing that there was no testimony or evidence offered during defendant’s trial about his police interview.” The court noted that “even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in its decision not to hold a full evidentiary hearing, the remedy, if defendant prevailed, would have been suppression of his post invocation statements.” None of his “statements were admitted, and, therefore, any error in failing to hold a Walker hearing was harmless.” Affirmed.
Sentencing; Enhancement for obstruction of justice (USSG § 3C1.1); “Clear error” review; Whether defendant committed perjury at trial; United States v Dunnigan; United States v Boring; Claim that affirming the enhancement chills a defendant’s ability to defend themselves by testifying; Imposition of a supervised-release condition permitting searches of defendant’s electronic devices
The court held that the district court did not clearly err by applying § 3C1.1.’s obstruction of justice enhancement in sentencing defendant-Jackson for his drug-possession conviction based on his perjurious trial testimony. It also rejected his challenge to the imposition of “a supervised-release condition permitting searches of his electronic devices.” He was charged with possessing meth and fentanyl with the intent to distribute. At trial, he claimed that a law enforcement officer planted the drugs in his car and near him. But the jury did not believe him and convicted him. The district court sentenced him to 97 months in prison and a term of supervised release. On appeal, he first argued that the two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement should not have been applied. The district court applied the enhancement based on its finding that Jackson committed perjury during the trial, concluding his “testimony about the planted drugs was false, willful rather than the result of a mistake, and material to” the possession charge. Before considering the merits, the court first held that clear error governs review of perjury-based obstruction enhancements based on a defendant’s perjury at trial. “When a district court renders the factual findings required to establish perjury, we review those findings only for clear error and can ordinarily affirm application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. That framework” governed here. As to the merits, a district court must identify the particular portions of the testimony it finds was perjurious and must make findings as to each perjury element. The “perjury predicates are threefold: The defendant must have given (1) ‘false testimony’ that (2) was ‘willful’ and (3) ‘concern[ed] a material matter.’” The district court followed these procedures. “Given its well-supported trio of findings about Jackson’s perjury, the district court did not clearly err by imposing the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.” The court rejected his argument that “affirming the district court could chill defendants’ ability to defend themselves by testifying at trial[,]” noting it has been repeatedly rejected. As for his challenge to the supervised-release condition involving his electronic devices, he did not object to it at sentencing, and the district court “adequately explained why it imposed the challenged search condition: ‘[T]o ensure the safety of the probation office’ and ‘to ensure that the defendant does not re-engage in drug trafficking activities.’” Affirmed.
No-fault benefits; Insurer priority; MCL 500.3114(1); Domicile; Grange Ins Co of MI v Lawrence; Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co; Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP)
Holding that the trial court erred in determining the injured person’s (DR) domicile as a matter of law, the court reversed summary disposition for plaintiff-healthcare provider (VHS) and defendant-Farmers Insurance Exchange in this no-fault case. DR’s mother (and now conservator), F, purchased an auto insurance policy underwritten by defendant-USA Underwriters (USAU). DR (her adult son) later suffered catastrophic injuries when he was hit by a vehicle. Farmers, the insurance carrier the MACP assigned to DR’s claim, denied responsibility for paying benefits, arguing “that, at the time of the accident, DR resided with a relative who had an active no-fault” policy – F. VHS sued Farmers and later added USAU as a defendant. Both USAU and Farmers denied being the highest-priority insurer. The “trial court found, as a matter of law, that DR was domiciled at [F’s] home at the time of the accident.” In doing so, it “stated its belief that the facts surrounding DR’s domicile were not in dispute and briefly referenced a few of the Dairyland factors.” But the court determined that “a full application of the Workman-Dairyland factors to the present case demonstrates that there was conflicting evidence, material to the determination of DR’s domicile, that rendered summary disposition inappropriate.” As to the Workman factors, while there was “no dispute that DR lived on the same premises as [F] when he stayed at her house[,]” there was contradictory evidence about “whether DR had other places of lodging at the time of the accident.” The record also indicated that he “had an informal relationship with [F]. DR testified that he did not pay [F] any rent to stay at her house.” As to the Dairyland factors, the record indicated “DR only kept his possessions at [F’s] house before the accident, which favors a finding that” he was domiciled there. But the “application of the remaining Dairyland factors to the specific circumstances” here was less clear. Among other things, it was “unclear whether DR’s decision to receive his mail at [F’s] house truly indicated that” it was his domicile. And the record contained contradictory evidence about whether F “actually maintained a room in her home specifically for DR.” Given that F’s policy only applied if DR was “domiciled in her household at the time of the accident, the trial court” also erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the policy applied to his injuries. Remanded.
Auto negligence; Serious-impairment threshold; MCL 500.3135; McCormick v Carrier; Aggravation of preexisting condition; Fisher v Blankenship; Owner’s liability; Federal preemption; Graves Amendment & financial-responsibility savings clause; 49 USC § 30106; Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951; Constitutional avoidance; Armijo v Bronson Methodist Hosp
The court held that rental-car owner-liability claims were not shown to be categorically preempted on this record because the moving parties failed to establish Graves Amendment preemption and address Michigan’s financial-responsibility carve-out, and that plaintiff failed to create a triable question that the crash caused an objectively manifested aggravation of a preexisting condition meeting the “serious impairment” threshold. Plaintiff, who already had neck/back issues from a previous crash, alleged defendant-driver in this case struck him while driving a Hertz rental car. He sued the driver for negligence (claiming aggravation) and defendants-Hertz entities for owner’s liability. The trial court granted summary disposition for the driver, and also to the Hertz entities on federal preemption grounds under the Graves Amendment. On appeal, the court first addressed the driver claim and applied the statutory definition of “serious impairment of body function,” i.e., “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life,” concluding plaintiff identified no medical documentation linking an aggravation to this crash. His deposition was indistinct as to which accident caused what, and with no material dispute on the nature and extent of injury, the threshold question was one of law properly resolved for the driver. Turning to the Hertz entities, the court explained that as the movants they had to carry the initial burden on preemption, i.e., identify the controlling preemption theory, grapple with the Graves Amendment’s financial-responsibility savings clause, and supply the pertinent facts (e.g., the rental agreement, situs, residency, insurance/registration posture) before reaching any constitutional ruling. Their motion did none of that. Because courts avoid constitutional determinations where the case can be resolved on other grounds, the preemption ruling could not stand and the matter required further development on remand. Affirmed as to the driver, vacated as to the Hertz defendants, and remanded.
Jurisdiction; Mootness; Whether defendant’s appeal of a preliminary injunction was mooted by its waiver; Effect of intervening events that make preliminary injunctive relief lack “practical effect”; Resurrection Sch v Hertel; Whether an exception to mootness applied; “Capable of repetition, yet evading review”; Forfeiture of an argument the court had jurisdiction because of voluntary cessation; Whether the injunction should be vacated; National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA); Two-year junior college (JUCO)
The court dismissed defendant-NCAA’s appeal of the preliminary injunction granted to plaintiff-Pavia (a college athlete) in his action regarding his eligibility where a waiver the NCAA granted during the appeal process rendered the appeal moot. Pavia wanted to continue playing quarterback for Vanderbilt University but could not do so under the NCAA’s eligibility rules. He sued the NCAA, accusing it of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and he obtained a preliminary injunction that would allow him to play in the 2025 season. The NCAA appealed, but in the interim, it “issued a waiver allowing all players in Pavia’s position to play one more season in 2025.” The court held that due to the NCAA waiver, the appeal was moot and thus, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It noted that “cases or controversies remain justiciable only as long as we can grant ‘effectual relief’ to the parties. . . . To be ‘effectual,’ the complaining party’s requested relief must have some ‘practical effect’ on the litigants. . . . That remains true at every stage of a case—including, as relevant here, on appeal of a preliminary injunction. If intervening events make the preliminary injunctive relief lack ‘practical effect,’ the appeal is moot[.]” In this case, no matter the outcome of the “appeal, Pavia has already obtained the full relief he initially sought by requesting a preliminary injunction. And the NCAA’s requested relief of reversal will accomplish nothing, as Pavia will play with or without the preliminary injunction.” As the court could not “give either party any further ‘effectual relief,’” it lacked jurisdiction over this appeal. It rejected their arguments against mootness. Pavia claimed that its ruling would affect his underlying lawsuit. But the court explained that “[a]t the preliminary-relief stage, our ruling on the merits will not affect discovery below. It merely decides the status quo as his lawsuit proceeds.” Both parties cited the exception to mootness for an issue that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” But the court held that neither of the two requirements for this exception were met. The “NCAA’s application of the JUCO Rule to Pavia isn’t so short as to evade review[,]” and he will not “be subject to the same action again.” While the NCAA suggested that his ability to sue it again to play for another season might satisfy the exception, it did not. Finally, because “the NCAA caused mootness by issuing the waiver[,]” the court would not vacate the injunction.