Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Res judicata; PT Today, Inc. v. Commissioner of Office of Fin. & Ins. Servs.; Principle that recoupment decreases a plaintiff’s recovery by reducing any judgment in its favor by any claim the defendant may have to damages arising out of the same contract or transaction; McCoig Materials, LLC v. Galui Constr., Inc.; Subject-matter jurisdiction
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendant based on res judicata. Plaintiff sued defendant in circuit court claiming it failed to properly repair plaintiff’s bulldozer, resulting in damages for loss of use. Defendant sued plaintiff in district court for unpaid invoices, and plaintiff counterclaimed. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s motion to consolidate the suits. It later granted summary disposition for defendant based on res judicata, noting the doctrine “fit[] this situation like a glove.” On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that its damages were not decided in the district court, and “could not have been, given the jurisdictional monetary limit applicable to district courts.” It noted that the “crux of plaintiff’s complaint in the circuit court, and the crux of the counterclaim in the district court, was defective workmanship.” The “district court largely rejected plaintiff’s argument about defective workmanship but decided to compensate plaintiff for $1,837 worth of repairs—thus ruling on the issue in question.” Further, it “had jurisdiction in that it could have granted recoupment for any amount due to plaintiff based on its counterclaim.” Moreover, it “could have granted damages for loss of months of use up to $25,000.” As such, the court declined to rule, “under the specific circumstances of this case, that res judicata cannot apply because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.” Affirmed.
Breach of contract action; Elements of a valid contract; Kamalnath v. Mercy Mem’l Hosp. Corp.; Principle that mere discussions & negotiation cannot be a substitute for the formal requirements of a contract; Principle that before a contract can be completed, there must be an offer & acceptance; Pakideh v. Franklin Commercial Mtg. Group, Inc.; “Offer” defined; Cheydleur v. Hills (ED MI); Principle that acceptance must be unambiguous & in strict conformance with the offer; Acceptance; Kloian v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC
The court held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition for defendant on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim because defendant never accepted plaintiff’s offer. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract, claiming defendant failed to follow through on its agreement to sell the property at issue to plaintiff. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, finding defendant never accepted plaintiff’s offer. On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court that “reasonable minds could not differ” that defendant’s response did not constitute an acceptance of plaintiff’s offer. “Clearly, the parties, while on the path to an agreement, were still working out the details of the agreement. And [defendant] clearly was not yet convinced that an agreement would be reached as it was going to continue with planning to demolish the building. The e-mail exchange reflect[ed] nothing more than discussions and negotiations.” Further, “[r]ather than being the equivalent of ‘we accept,’” two lines in the e-mail read “together lead to only one reasonable conclusion: that [defendant] was excited about the parties being close to a deal, that the discussions and negotiations were progressing, but recognizing that a deal might not be reached and they needed to continue preparing their alternative plan of demolition.” The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that summary disposition was premature because discovery had not yet been completed, noting plaintiff pointed to “no possible evidence that could be discovered that would establish a genuine issue of material fact that [defendant] had accepted plaintiff’s offer. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine what undiscovered evidence could be lurking out there that would prove acceptance.” Defendant’s “acceptance of the offer would have to have been in writing and that written acceptance would have to have been delivered to plaintiff.” Thus, “plaintiff would already possess any such evidence.” However, the most it had produced was the e-mail. The court failed “to see how any further discovery would yield any evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that [defendant] had accepted plaintiff’s offer.” Affirmed.
Sentencing; People v. Lockridge; Proportionality; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Milbourn
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ judgment (see e-Journal # 61692 in the 2/5/16 edition), the court reversed in part and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. In its judgment, the Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the trial court for proportionality review and for a hearing pursuant to Lockridge. The court now remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for plenary review of defendant’s claim that her sentence was disproportionate, applying the Milbourn standard. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Sentencing; Downward departure from the sentencing guidelines; Proportionality; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Milbourn; Reasonableness; People v. Lockridge
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ judgment (see e-Journal # 61491 in the 1/8/16 edition), the court reversed that judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. In its judgment, the Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the trial court for proportionality review and for a hearing pursuant to Lockridge. The court now remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for plenary review of the prosecution’s claim that defendant’s sentence was disproportionate, applying the Milbourn standard.
Sentencing; Upward departure; People v. Steanhouse; Reasonableness of a departure sentence; People v. Lockridge; People v. Milbourn
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ judgment (see e-Journal # 61285 in the 11/19/15 edition for the published opinion), the court reversed that judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. In its judgment, the Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the trial court for proportionality review and for a hearing pursuant to Lockridge. The court now remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for plenary review of defendant’s sentencing claims, including his claim that his sentence was disproportionate, applying the Milbourn standard.
Suppression of the victim’s identification of defendant; Whether a photographic identification procedure was so suggestive it violated due process; Perry v. New Hampshire; People v. Gray; Simmons v. United States; Stovall v. Denno; Reliability; Manson v. Brathwaite; Totality of the circumstances; People v. Kurylczyk; Neil v. Biggers; Whether there was a sufficient independent basis for the victim’s in-court identification; People v. Kachar
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ judgment (see e-Journal # 64142 in the 12/20/16 edition), the court agreed with the trial court’s assessment of the reliability of the victim’s identification based on the relevant totality of the circumstances. Thus, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing the charges against defendant. The court found that an officer’s presenting a single photo to the victim, “accompanied by the question ‘was this the guy who shot you?’ was highly suggestive.” Further, there was insufficient record evidence “to conclude that the trial court erred when, in determining whether the suggestive procedure was necessary under the circumstances, it found this case distinguishable from the mortal exigency” that existed in Stovall. The trial court “did not find that exigency required an expedited identification procedure or that a less suggestive identification procedure would have been too burdensome to conduct; and” the court’s review of the record showed “insufficient evidence from which to draw such conclusions.” The court noted that “reliability is the ultimate touchstone for admissibility of an identification.” While an “unnecessarily suggestive identification may be admitted if it is sufficiently” reliable, the trial court ruled that the identification here “was unreliable under the totality of circumstances.” The parties did not dispute the facts as to the identification – “the victim viewed the assailant’s partially obscured face for no more than seven seconds on a dark city street with no streetlights while a gun was pointed at him.” The description he gave the police “was generic and could have described many young men in the area” and his “description of the assailant changed between his first interview and his follow-up interview at the hospital.” Thus, the trial court concluded that the single photo identification “was sufficiently unreliable that it should be suppressed.” The court agreed with the trial court. It also held that the trial court “did not err in determining that the victim’s in-court identification lacked an independent basis sufficient to ‘purge the taint caused by the illegal’ identification procedure used here.”
Denial of counsel at a preliminary exam; Harmless error; People v. Carines; Whether the deprivation of counsel at a preliminary exam amounted to harmless error; Coleman v. Alabama; State v. Canaday (AZ); State v. Brown (CT); People v. Eddington; Ditch v. Grace (3d Cir.); Relevant elements of arson; MCL 750.73(1); MCL 750.74 & 750.74(1)(a); Principle that the presentation of sufficient evidence to convict at trial renders any erroneous bindover decision harmless; People v. Bennett; Limitations on a defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary exam; Adams v. Illinois; Thomas v. Kemp (11th Cir.); Sentencing; People v. Lockridge
On remand, the court held any error resulting from the denial of counsel at defendant’s preliminary exam was harmless, but remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether it would have imposed a materially different sentence. At the preliminary exam, the trial judge indicated that defendant had rejected each of his appointed lawyers. It then proceeded with the exam, but defendant would not participate and was removed from the courtroom for interrupting and using profane language. His stand-by counsel also left. The judge then heard testimony, found sufficient probable cause, and bound him over for trial. He was convicted of four counts of third-degree arson and one count of second-degree arson. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth habitual offender to 17 to 30 years for each conviction. In a prior appeal, the court vacated his convictions and remanded for a new trial, finding the denial of counsel at his preliminary exam was a structural error requiring automatic reversal. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded for application of the harmless error standard. On remand, the court indicated that it could not conclude that the error was harmless “simply because defense counsel conceded that no evidence from the preliminary exam[] was used at trial, and no rights or defenses were waived by defendant’s lack of participation in the preliminary exam[].” It noted that “to determine whether the denial of counsel at a preliminary exam[] amounts to harmless error, courts must consider the factors discussed in Coleman, as well as any other factors relevant to the particular case, including the lost opportunity to negotiate a plea deal, and any prejudice resulting from the failure to file pretrial motions.” As to the first Coleman factor, it noted than any argument that counsel could have objected to the bindover based on the condition or nature of the buildings would not have altered the bindover decision. “Given that defendant was convicted at trial on the basis of sufficient evidence, the possibility that counsel could have detected preclusive flaws in the prosecution’s probable-cause showing is moot.” As to the second factor, although he was unrepresented at the preliminary exam, “he was appointed new counsel at the next hearing, who it appears was given a transcript of” the preliminary exam, which could have been used for impeachment at trial. Further, his argument that identity testimony “would have been useful at trial for impeachment purposes, [wa]s purely speculative.” As to the third factor, he failed to “identify any evidence used at trial that counsel could have discovered by virtue of participation in the preliminary exam[].” His arguments as to the specific circumstances of his case also failed. However, he was entitled to a remand in light of Lockridge.
Jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter; People v. Gillis; People v. Mendoza; People v. Datema; People v. Mills; Malice; People v. Holtschlag; People v. Goecke; Jury instruction on accident; M Crim JI 7.3a & 7.2; People v. Hess; Effect of the jury’s finding that defendant was guilty of felony murder; People v. Hawthorne; Right to present a defense; People v. Yost; People v. Richardson; Sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant’s felony murder conviction; People v. Gayheart; Minimal circumstantial evidence proving state of mind; People v. Kanaan; Great weight of the evidence; People v. Musser; People v. Lemmon; People v. Bosca
The court held that defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter or accident, and was not denied his constitutional right to present a defense. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support his felony murder conviction, which was not against the great weight of the evidence. He was also convicted of felony-firearm, armed robbery, and felon in possession. As to his involuntary manslaughter instruction argument, “there was no evidence presented that could have led to a conclusion that defendant did not act with malice.” Witness-W and others testified that defendant put a gun to W’s ribs and demanded his money. Even if the testimony as to robbery should not have been considered, the court was “left with the unrefuted evidence that defendant took his gun and struck [W] on the head, causing a deep gash and a loss of consciousness.” He did not and could not argue “that this act was done without malice.” Thus, even disregarding the testimony of all but one witness, the court could not conclude “that there was any evidence that would support a finding of involuntary manslaughter. The axiom: ‘If the homicide was committed with malice, it is murder,’” guided its decision. When the shot was fired, killing victim-M, “defendant was using his loaded weapon to intentionally strike [W], suggesting that at a minimum, defendant acted with a willful and wonton disregard of the likelihood that his actions would cause death or great bodily harm.” Further, even if the act of striking W’s head “caused the gun to fire, such conduct is the negation of accident” – it is the definition of malice. As to his sufficiency argument, the evidence showed that he stuck a gun in W’s ribs and demanded that W turn over his money. M told him to leave W alone. Defendant then hit W over the head with his gun, splitting his head and causing him to lose consciousness. “Depending on whose testimony was to be believed,” he then shot M “either almost simultaneous to the attempted robbery or about 15 seconds after” hitting W with his gun. Either way, there was legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he shot M “because he interfered with his robbery” of W. Affirmed.
Michigan’s anti-lockout statute; MCL 600.2918; Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers; Principle that a month’s notice to quit is required to terminate a month-to-month tenancy; MCL 554.134(1); Feister v. Bosack; Defining “squatter”; Summary procedure for recovering possession of realty; MCL 600.5701 et seq.; MCL 600.5711(1) & (2); MCL 600.5714; Whether defendants had a good-faith belief that plaintiff had abandoned the property; MCL 600.2918(3); Motion for a temporary restraining order; Injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy; Jeffrey v. Clinton Twp.; An injunction as an equitable remedy (not an independent cause of action); Terlecki v. Stewart; MCR 3.310(B); Grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1); Boulton v. Fenton Twp.
Holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to plaintiff’s status at the time he and his belongings were removed from the property and thus, as to his claim for violation of the anti-lockout statute, the court reversed summary disposition for defendants and remanded. It also held that because his complaint alleged a legally cognizable claim under the statute, the trial court abused its discretion in not reaching the merits of his injunctive relief claim. He entered into a month-to-month tenancy with the prior property owner, who lost the property to a tax foreclosure. It was purchased by defendant-2486930 Ontario, which hired defendant-Great Lakes Property and Investment to manage it. Defendants sent a letter giving plaintiff 10 days to vacate. Great Lakes’ sole shareholder later went to plaintiff’s apartment and demanded that he vacate within three days. When he did not, defendants “removed plaintiff’s personal belongings from his unit.” After they left, he returned, “purchased and installed a new lock on his door, repaired the door,” and returned his belongings to his unit. “The next day, defendants returned and once again, removed” his possessions from the property. He sued, alleging among other things a violation of the anti-lockout statute, MCL 600.2918, and seeking injunctive relief for illegal lockout. Concluding that his complaint was dismissed under MCR 2.116(I)(1), the court held that the trial court erred because the complaint “on its face properly states a cause of action, and the trial court did not find otherwise.” Further, “the trial court explicitly or implicitly made findings as to several disputed factual issues that controlled whether and how the lock-out statute should be applied.” There was no indication that the month-to-month tenancy was terminated before the tax foreclosure, and nothing showed that defendants “acted to lawfully terminate plaintiff’s lease after” acquiring the property. Neither the 10-day notice nor the 3-day notice was sufficient “as a one month’s notice to quit is required to terminate a month-to month tenancy.” The trial court’s determination that “plaintiff was a squatter at the time of removal” was not supported by the pleadings, and a question of fact existed as to whether MCL 600.2918(3)(c) applied.
MCL 600.2945(h); Production defined; MCL 600.2945(i); Chapter 29 of the Revised Judicature Act; Negligence as a theory of liability in a product liability action rather than a separate claim; Heaton v. Benton Constr. Co.; Failure to warn; MCL 600.2948(2); A “material risk” defined; Greene v. AP Prods., Ltd.; Design defect; Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc.; Bouverette v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.; MCL 600.2946(2); MCL 600.2947(5) & (6)
Holding that the defendants were properly granted summary disposition on plaintiff’s failure to warn and design defect product liability claims related to a crossbow, the court affirmed. Plaintiff purchased the crossbow from the Jenkins-defendants (doing business as The Archery Spot). It was manufactured by defendant-Bowtech. When he took a practice shot in the back room of the store, a portion of his thumb was severed by the bowstring. On appeal, the court noted that his claims against the defendants were governed by Chapter 29 of the Revised Judicature Act. His action was a product liability action. “Although he may allege negligence as part of his product liability action, such an assertion serves as a theory of liability, rather than a separate claim.” The trial court relied on MCL 600.2948(2) in dismissing his failure to warn claims. The court concluded that it did not err in ruling that “defendants owed plaintiff no duty to warn. It is common knowledge that a crossbow is a weapon that uses a string to propel a bolt, or arrow, at high speeds. It follows, then, that one in a position similar to that of plaintiff should recognize that shooting a crossbow when fingers are placed in front of the string, could lead to injury.” Further, he failed to “explain why the Jenkins defendants would have a duty to warn him of the dangers of using the crossbow, or could be liable for allegedly preventing him from reading the manual or other warnings provided with [it], when under MCL 600.2948(2), Bowtech had no duty to warn of the material risks associated with using” it. As to his design defect claims, plaintiff did not “produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the crossbow’s design or allegedly safer alternative designs.” The printout he presented about a “GripGuard” and the manual for a prior type of crossbow manufactured by Bowtech only showed that “an alternative design may have existed.” He presented no evidence or expert testimony that such an alternative design would have actually prevented his injury “without impairing the usefulness or desirability of the crossbow, or that it would have been technically feasible at the time the crossbow he purchased was produced.”