Michigan’s anti-lockout statute; MCL 600.2918; Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers; Principle that a month’s notice to quit is required to terminate a month-to-month tenancy; MCL 554.134(1); Feister v. Bosack; Defining “squatter”; Summary procedure for recovering possession of realty; MCL 600.5701 et seq.; MCL 600.5711(1) & (2); MCL 600.5714; Whether defendants had a good-faith belief that plaintiff had abandoned the property; MCL 600.2918(3); Motion for a temporary restraining order; Injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy; Jeffrey v. Clinton Twp.; An injunction as an equitable remedy (not an independent cause of action); Terlecki v. Stewart; MCR 3.310(B); Grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1); Boulton v. Fenton Twp.

Holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to plaintiff’s status at the time he and his belongings were removed from the property and thus, as to his claim for violation of the anti-lockout statute, the court reversed summary disposition for defendants and remanded. It also held that because his complaint alleged a legally cognizable claim under the statute, the trial court abused its discretion in not reaching the merits of his injunctive relief claim. He entered into a month-to-month tenancy with the prior property owner, who lost the property to a tax foreclosure. It was purchased by defendant-2486930 Ontario, which hired defendant-Great Lakes Property and Investment to manage it. Defendants sent a letter giving plaintiff 10 days to vacate. Great Lakes’ sole shareholder later went to plaintiff’s apartment and demanded that he vacate within three days. When he did not, defendants “removed plaintiff’s personal belongings from his unit.” After they left, he returned, “purchased and installed a new lock on his door, repaired the door,” and returned his belongings to his unit. “The next day, defendants returned and once again, removed” his possessions from the property. He sued, alleging among other things a violation of the anti-lockout statute, MCL 600.2918, and seeking injunctive relief for illegal lockout. Concluding that his complaint was dismissed under MCR 2.116(I)(1), the court held that the trial court erred because the complaint “on its face properly states a cause of action, and the trial court did not find otherwise.” Further, “the trial court explicitly or implicitly made findings as to several disputed factual issues that controlled whether and how the lock-out statute should be applied.” There was no indication that the month-to-month tenancy was terminated before the tax foreclosure, and nothing showed that defendants “acted to lawfully terminate plaintiff’s lease after” acquiring the property. Neither the 10-day notice nor the 3-day notice was sufficient “as a one month’s notice to quit is required to terminate a month-to month tenancy.” The trial court’s determination that “plaintiff was a squatter at the time of removal” was not supported by the pleadings, and a question of fact existed as to whether MCL 600.2918(3)(c) applied.