Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Disability discrimination in employment claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Whether “night blindness” is a legally cognizable disability under the ADA as amended by the ADA Amendments Act; 42 USC § 12102(1)(A); “Major life activity” (§ 12102(2)(A)); Wade v General Motors Corp (Unpub 6th Cir); Retaliation; Failure to accommodate; Judgment as a matter of law; FedRCivP 50
Noting that it had not “yet issued a binding opinion addressing whether night blindness qualifies as a disability under the ADA[,]” the court held that “driving is inherently dependent on the ability to see, and seeing is a major life activity that the ADA expressly recognizes.” Thus, it affirmed the jury’s verdict for plaintiff-Edwards, concluding she supported her ADA disability discrimination claim that defendant-former employer (Shelby County, Tennessee) discriminated against her based on her night blindness. On appeal, the County argued that “the jury erred in finding Edwards disabled because (1) night blindness is not a legally cognizable disability under the ADA, (2) driving (particularly night driving) is not a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA, and (3) Edwards’s ability to drive at night demonstrates that she is not substantially limited in any major life activity.” It cited the court’s decision in Wade, where it held that night blindness was not an ADA-covered disability. But Wade was decided before the 2008 ADA Amendments Act, which “substantially broadened the definition of disability and explicitly rejected the narrower approach of cases like Wade.” Under the amended standard, “an impairment need not ‘significantly or severely restrict’ a major life activity to qualify as substantially limiting.” As to whether driving is a major life activity, night driving was a requirement of plaintiff’s job. The court found that the proper focus was “on whether Edwards’s impairment substantially limits her ability to see.” It concluded that she offered sufficient evidence that “her night blindness qualified as a disability.” The court made clear that “night blindness is not a disability per se. There may be a case where a mild difficulty seeing at night does not substantially limit any major life activity.” Instead, it held “that the jury was not unreasonable in finding, based on the evidence presented at trial, that Edwards’s night blindness constituted a disability insofar as it substantially limited her ability to see.” As to her admission that she does sometime drive at night when she has no alternative, the jury was entitled to weigh her credibility. “[I]ndividuals who can technically perform an activity, but with difficulty, pain, or risk, may still be substantially limited.” The court also upheld the verdict for Edwards on her retaliation claim, concluding the County did not meet “its burden of showing that no reasonable jury could have found that Edwards engaged in protected activity and was retaliated against for doing so.” Finally, it upheld the verdict for failure to accommodate her asthma. There was “sufficient support for the conclusion that Edwards’s asthma imposes substantial limitations that entitle her to ADA protection.”
Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree premeditated murder; MCL 750.316(1)(a); Self-defense; Waiver of right to counsel; People v Anderson; MCR 6.005(D) & (E); Judicial misconduct; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)
Holding that there were no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed. Defendant-Ball was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to life without the possibility of parole. It found “that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ball was not acting in self-defense[.]” At the start, “the prosecution presented documentary evidence and witness testimony disputing Ball’s claim that [victim-A] violently assaulted him with a pistol in” 11/21. And the surveillance footage allowed “for a reasonable inference that Ball’s sudden, vicious assault of [A] was unprovoked.” That inference was “corroborated by witness testimony describing [A] as happy, smiling, and dancing.” It was “also corroborated by witness testimony describing Ball striking [A] repeatedly with a knife while [A] was unable to fight back and was holding on to Ball in order to keep himself upright. Ball’s testimony that he was scared is contradicted by people who knew him, testifying that he did not seem scared, he seemed ‘locked in’ and ‘focused.’ And, rather than rely upon Ball’s testimony that he only drew the knife in the off-camera area after being punched by a witness, the jury was free to rely on testimony that he had the knife from the beginning of his assault and that [A] was unarmed. Ball’s testimony that he discarded the knife after the assault is corroborated because the police located the knife. And his testimony that [A] had some sort of weapon was refuted by the fact that, unlike Ball, [A] was searched for weapons when he entered the club.” Next, the prosecution introduced other acts “evidence which refuted Ball’s claim that he was afraid that if he got into a fight he could die as a result of his skull having been fractured in” 11/21. Finally, his “overall credibility was weakened because the prosecution was able to present testimony showing how Ball’s version of events kept morphing to better suit the evidence uncovered by the police.” Next, as to Ball’s waiver of right to counsel claim, the court held that “the trial court substantially complied with the requirements in Anderson and MCR 6.005(D)” at the 10/24/23 hearing. As a result, his initial “waiver of counsel was valid and he [was] not entitled to automatic reversal. Further, at each subsequent proceeding, the trial court substantially complied with MCR 6.005(E), and, to the extent that it did not, Ball has not established prejudice as a result of the court’s failure.” Finally, contrary to his “argument on appeal, his comments on the sixth day of trial did not render his request to represent himself ambiguous because he stated that he unequivocally wanted to represent himself in light of his extreme distrust of his standby lawyer.”
Custody modification; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Stoudemire v Thomas; Best interests; MCL 722.23; Kuebler v Kuebler; Parenting time suspension; MCL 722.27a(3); Barretta v Zhitkov; Judicial bias; MCR 2.003(C); Kern v Kern-Koskela; ADA accommodation; Peden v Detroit
The court held that the trial court properly awarded plaintiff-father sole physical custody and joint legal custody but erred by suspending defendant-mother’s parenting time without the clear and convincing evidence required by statute. Plaintiff filed a paternity action while the parties lived together, and after defendant moved out the trial court found no established custodial environment and granted plaintiff temporary primary physical custody with supervised parenting time for defendant. Following additional motions, the trial court entered a final order awarding plaintiff sole physical custody, maintaining joint legal custody, and suspending defendant’s parenting time based on her failure to provide a psychological evaluation and concerns about food allergies. It also denied defendant’s motions to disqualify the judge and for ADA accommodations. On appeal, the court held that the findings on the best interest factors were supported by the record and affirmed the custody and child support rulings. On the parenting time issue, the court held that suspension was improper because the trial court made no finding that defendant’s conduct would endanger the child and quoted that suspension requires evidence showing danger to the child’s health. The court rejected defendant’s judicial bias claim because the record did not show deep seated favoritism or antagonism, and it rejected her ADA argument because she provided no documentation to support her claimed disability. Vacated in part and remanded.
Whether the trial court properly interpreted MCL 500.3116(2) when it decided that the statute precluded plaintiff’s subrogation claim; Citizens Ins Co v Pezzani & Reid Equip Co, Inc (On Remand); Special conflict panel
Concluding that the case was consistent with Pezzani, the court affirmed the trial court’s award of summary disposition to defendant-Family Tire. It held that plaintiff-Frankenmuth Insurance ’s claim was barred by MCL 500.3116(2), but noted that if “we were not bound by Pezzani, we would reach the opposite result because we believe Pezzani was wrongly decided, so we call for the convening of a special panel in accordance with MCR 7.215(J)(3) to consider whether Pezzani was correct in affording preclusive effect to MCL 500.3116(2) to bar a claim against a nonmotorist tortfeasor.” Plaintiffs-the Calls “suffered injuries when their vehicle came in contact with a tire that had fallen off a vehicle going in the opposite direction.” The Calls received hundreds of thousands of dollars in PIP benefits from Frankenmuth, which sought recovery from Family Tire, “asserting that Family Tire improperly secured a tire while rotating the tires on the vehicle.” The issue on appeal was “whether the trial court properly interpreted MCL 500.3116(2) when it decided that that statute precluded Frankenmuth’s subrogation claim against Family Tire.” Frankenmuth argued “that the statute does not bar its claim, so the trial court erred when it dismissed that claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8).” In 1993, the court “issued a published opinion that discussed MCL 500.3116[,] Pezzani.” The court noted that in “the 32 years since Pezzani was issued, it has rarely been cited as authority in the opinions of this Court, although it was discussed in two unpublished opinions.” It concluded that relying on the holding in Pezzani it was required to affirm.
Intervention as of right, FedRCivP 24(a)(2); Whether the potential intervenor showed a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; Whether its interests will be impaired absent intervention; Adequacy of representation; Jurisdiction; 28 USC § 1291; The collateral-order doctrine; Cohen v Beneficial Indus Loan Corp; Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
The court held that intervenor-Fraternal Order of Police, Capitol City Lodge #9 (the FOP) met the requirements to intervene as of right in this excessive force case brought against defendant-City of Columbus, Ohio. Thus, it reversed the district court’s denial of the FOP’s motion to intervene. Plaintiff-estate alleged that the City’s police force “has a policy or custom of using excessive force against Black people” that resulted in the death of plaintiff’s decedent. The complaint cited provisions of the City’s CBA with the FOP, and suggested changes such as a new disciplinary system. The FOP asserted that it had “both a contractual right and a legal obligation” to intervene. On appeal, the court first addressed its jurisdiction, explaining that although the appeal did not fit under the category of cases for which § 1291 grants it jurisdiction, it had jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. The court noted it had previously held that “‘an order completely denying intervention is immediately reviewable by way of an interlocutory appeal.’” The court agreed with the FOP “that the district court’s order worked as such a complete denial permitting an interlocutory appeal, despite its express invitation for FOP to renew its motion should the case progress to equitable remedies.” Turning to the merits, the court held that the FOP had a “substantial legal interest in the liability phase” where it established a potential impact on its members. The court noted that district courts in the Sixth Circuit “have repeatedly allowed FOP to intervene when the litigation directly implicated the ongoing vitality of provisions that came about as a result of the union’s critical efforts in the collective bargaining process and the rights of its members.” It concluded that “the factual allegations and legal claims for relief support FOP’s plea to intervene.” Further, it determined that the circumstances showed “the City’s defense possibly will be inadequate to protect FOP’s substantial legal interests.” Thus, it held that the FOP “met the requirements of Rule 24(a).”