Disability discrimination in employment claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Whether “night blindness” is a legally cognizable disability under the ADA as amended by the ADA Amendments Act; 42 USC § 12102(1)(A); “Major life activity” (§ 12102(2)(A)); Wade v General Motors Corp (Unpub 6th Cir); Retaliation; Failure to accommodate; Judgment as a matter of law; FedRCivP 50

Noting that it had not “yet issued a binding opinion addressing whether night blindness qualifies as a disability under the ADA[,]” the court held that “driving is inherently dependent on the ability to see, and seeing is a major life activity that the ADA expressly recognizes.” Thus, it affirmed the jury’s verdict for plaintiff-Edwards, concluding she supported her ADA disability discrimination claim that defendant-former employer (Shelby County, Tennessee) discriminated against her based on her night blindness. On appeal, the County argued that “the jury erred in finding Edwards disabled because (1) night blindness is not a legally cognizable disability under the ADA, (2) driving (particularly night driving) is not a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA, and (3) Edwards’s ability to drive at night demonstrates that she is not substantially limited in any major life activity.” It cited the court’s decision in Wade, where it held that night blindness was not an ADA-covered disability. But Wade was decided before the 2008 ADA Amendments Act, which “substantially broadened the definition of disability and explicitly rejected the narrower approach of cases like Wade.” Under the amended standard, “an impairment need not ‘significantly or severely restrict’ a major life activity to qualify as substantially limiting.” As to whether driving is a major life activity, night driving was a requirement of plaintiff’s job. The court found that the proper focus was “on whether Edwards’s impairment substantially limits her ability to see.” It concluded that she offered sufficient evidence that “her night blindness qualified as a disability.” The court made clear that “night blindness is not a disability per se. There may be a case where a mild difficulty seeing at night does not substantially limit any major life activity.” Instead, it held “that the jury was not unreasonable in finding, based on the evidence presented at trial, that Edwards’s night blindness constituted a disability insofar as it substantially limited her ability to see.” As to her admission that she does sometime drive at night when she has no alternative, the jury was entitled to weigh her credibility. “[I]ndividuals who can technically perform an activity, but with difficulty, pain, or risk, may still be substantially limited.” The court also upheld the verdict for Edwards on her retaliation claim, concluding the County did not meet “its burden of showing that no reasonable jury could have found that Edwards engaged in protected activity and was retaliated against for doing so.” Finally, it upheld the verdict for failure to accommodate her asthma. There was “sufficient support for the conclusion that Edwards’s asthma imposes substantial limitations that entitle her to ADA protection.”