Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Dental disciplinary action; Alleged violations of the Public Health Code; MCL 333.16221(a), (b)(i), & (h); Board of Dentistry’s Disciplinary Subcommittee (BDDS); Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs (LARA); First superseding administrative complaint (FSAC)
The court affirmed the final order of discipline entered by the BDDS against respondent-dentist (Isaac). Because Isaac failed to respond within 30 days to the FSAC, petitioner-LARA “was required to treat the allegations in the complaint as admissions. . . . the FSAC alleged that Isaac had not submitted proof of completing the continuing-education courses or of paying the fine and restitution and had violated” a prior order (the April order). The FSAC also “alleged that Isaac had sent ‘several obscene emails’ to LARA.” The FSAC claimed that “Isaac was subject to discipline under MCL 333.16221(h), and also under MCL 333.16221(b)(vi). The BDDS was empowered to impose sanctions on the basis of the allegations and admissions.” Isaac’s appellate briefing was “focused, in large part, on whether LARA placed unreasonable standards on her for the continuing-education requirement, but the time to make this argument was during the 30-day period stated in the FSAC. The BDDS followed the law when it complied with the ‘admission’ mandate of MCL 333.16231(9).” Thus, there was no error. To the extent she argued “that the decision to impose sanctions was arbitrary and capricious,” the court held that such an argument failed “in light of the admissions and other circumstances.” It also held that the conclusion Isaac failed to comply with the April order and should “be subject to discipline under MCL 333.16221(h) was not arbitrary and capricious.” Further, as for MCL 333.16221(b)(vi), the court concluded that given “the crude and unprofessional manner in which Isaac communicated with LARA, given that she repeatedly wished death upon persons involved in her case, and given that she did not prove that she had rectified the issues leading to the initial disciplinary proceedings, the conclusion that Isaac should be subject to discipline under MCL 333.16221(b)(vi) was not arbitrary and capricious.” It was a reasonable inference that she “lacked ‘the propensity . . . to serve the public in the licensed area in a fair, honest, and open manner.’” The court also held that “the extent of the sanctions imposed was not arbitrary and capricious in light of the history of the proceedings.” The final order “stated that Isaac’s license was suspended but would be reinstated, under a period of probation, if she underwent evaluations, complied with the April order, and paid a $5,000 fine.”
Application for disability retirement benefits; Due process; Whether plaintiff had a legitimate property interest in obtaining benefits; Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp; MCL 38.67a(5); Jurisdiction over the claim of appeal; MCR 7.203(A)(1)(a); Natural Res Def Council v Department of Envtl Quality; Effect of the lack of subpoena power; Treating a claim of appeal as an application for leave to appeal; Independent medical advisor (IMA)
The court held that the “lack of subpoena power did not divest the administrative proceedings” as to appellant’s application for disability retirement benefits from appellee “of having the character of quasi-judicial proceedings.” But while the court did not have jurisdiction over his claim of appeal, it granted leave to appeal. As to the merits, it held that he did “not have a legitimate property interest in obtaining disability retirement benefits,” and affirmed appellee’s decision denying his benefit application. The court concluded that while “the ability to subpoena witnesses to testify or produce documents is a characteristic common to court actions, indeed a vital one, we are unaware of any case where the lack of one such characteristic, while all others are present, renders the proceedings as nonjudicial.” The court noted that appellant had and used “the opportunity to call witnesses and introduce documentary evidence, and there is no suggestion that [he] attempted to—but could not—call certain witnesses because he lacked subpoena power.” Turning to the merits, he argued that “his right to due process was violated because under MCL 38.67a(5), an applicant for disability retirement benefits must obtain certification from an IMA that the applicant is permanently disabled.” However, the court found it did not need to address his constitutional claim because he “had no reasonable expectation of receiving disability retirement benefits absent the relevant statute.” To have such a reasonable expectation, he had to first show he satisfied all three of MCL 38.67a(5)’s requirements. There was no dispute he applied “for benefits with the retirement board and that [he] was a state employee for at least 10 years.” Although there was also no dispute he did not “obtain certification that he was permanently incapacitated, appellant claims that the process by which one obtains such certification is fundamentally unfair because the medical advisor is not an impartial decisionmaker. But this puts the cart before the horse because before the Court can examine whether procedural safeguards—such as an impartial decisionmaker—have been met, appellant must show he has a reasonable expectation to receive disability retirement benefits. Because [he] cannot show more than a unilateral expectation to obtain” the benefits, he could not show he had a protected property interest in them.
Justiciability; American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA or the Act); Whether the Act’s Offset Provision is impermissibly vague under the Spending Clause; Whether a plaintiff-state was provided “clear notice” of ARPA’s conditions when it accepted funds under the Act
The court held that plaintiff-Kentucky’s claim against defendants (collectively the Treasury) challenging the ARPA was not justiciable and vacated the district court’s injunction to the extent it barred enforcement of the Act’s Offset Provision against Kentucky. But it affirmed the injunction as to plaintiff-Tennessee because it found that Tennessee’s claims were justiciable and that Tennessee was deprived of the requisite “clear notice” of ARPA’s conditions when it accepted funds under the Act. The Offset Provision forbids “the States from enacting tax cuts and then using ARPA funds to ‘directly or indirectly offset a reduction in [their] net tax revenue’ resulting from such tax cuts.” Under another provision, if a State violates “the Offset Provision, Treasury may initiate a recoupment action to recover the misused funds.” The court noted that Treasury had “promulgated an implementing regulation (‘the Rule’) that disavowed” plaintiffs’ interpretation of the “Provision and established certain safe harbors permitting the States to cut taxes.” Plaintiffs did not present any “evidence of a concrete plan to violate the Rule, so they failed to establish that Treasury will imminently seek recoupment because of any demonstrated policy they wish to pursue. And because Kentucky offered no evidence for any other theory of injury, the Rule mooted its challenge to the Offset Provision.” But Tennessee did claim another distinct injury—the burden of compliance costs. Thus, the court found its claim was justiciable. As to the merits, it held that the Offset Provision was “impermissibly vague under the Spending Clause. Because the Offset Provision is subject to a range of plausible meanings, Tennessee was deprived of the requisite ‘clear notice’ of ARPA’s conditions when it accepted the funds.” The court made it clear it was not holding that the Provision is “‘unconstitutional’ under the Spending Clause.” Instead, it ruled that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the “Provision does not clearly explain (1) how to calculate a ‘reduction’ in net tax revenue, (2) how to determine whether such a reduction resulted from a tax cut, or (3) how to tell what particular conduct constitutes an ‘indirect’ offset. And Treasury’s attempted liquidation of the Offset Provision via the Rule in no way followed clearly from the Offset Provision’s text. Thus, Tennessee may legitimately discontinue the compliance procedures entailed by the Rule, and if, as a result, it should engage in conduct Treasury deems a violation of the Offset Provision, Treasury may not” respond with enforcement proceedings.
Licensing; The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; Whether plaintiffs had a property interest in a vendor’s license; Detroit Code § 34-1-34(e), (f), & 34-1-35; Whether defendant-City acted “irrationally” by not renewing the licenses
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiffs-vendors did not have a property interest in vendor licenses and thus, affirmed summary judgment for defendant-City of Detroit on their Fourteenth Amendment claims after the City refused to renew their licenses. Detroit refused to renew the licenses because plaintiffs were located within a 300-foot exclusion zone of Little Caesar’s Arena. They sued, arguing that the City violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The court first considered whether plaintiffs possessed a property interest in their licenses. It held that “[a] State’s decision to offer benefits or licenses does not create a property interest ‘if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.’” The court noted that under the Detroit Code, licenses are not guaranteed, and the City retained the “discretion to deny or suspend licenses to prevent a violation of the rules or to protect public safety. . . . ‘The law is clear that a party cannot have a property interest in a discretionary benefit.’” Plaintiffs argued that they had renewed their licenses in the past and expected to do so again. But the court explained that “renewals in the past do not justify expectations of renewal in the future—or, as we have put it, getting a license before does not justify ‘assuming that [the license] would be issued again.”’ However, plaintiffs were entitled to first preference of other available locations, pursuant to the Code, and the court noted that two of them received new licenses for other locations. The court also held that Detroit had a rational reason for denying the applications—preventing sidewalk congestion—and that “a 300-foot exclusion zone is ‘a rational way to correct it.’”
Motion to suppress defendant’s statement to police while in the hospital; Whether defendant was in custody; People v Barritt; Voluntariness of the statement; People v Cipriano; Colorado v Connelly; Child Protective Services (CPS)
Holding that defendant was not in custody when he was interviewed in his hospital room and that the statement he gave police was voluntarily made, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He was in the hospital due to chest pains. A police detective (S) and a CPS worker interviewed him about a sexual abuse complaint from his stepdaughter, who identified him as the perpetrator. The interview was video recorded. He was charged with CSC counts. He argued that the trial court erred in concluding he was not in custody at the time of the interview and that his statement was voluntary. As to the custody issue, the court noted that the fact he “was interviewed in his hospital room weighs against finding that he was in custody, because a hospital room does not present the same coercive atmosphere as a police station or other environment where control by the police is evident.” In addition, the 40-minute interview was “not oppressive or otherwise indicative of a custodial atmosphere.” Although it was true his “freedom of movement was limited by the medical treatment he was receiving, particularly the intravenous fluids[,]” law enforcement did not formally restrain him. “And while the door to the hallway was closed, it was not locked.” The court noted that the fact someone entered the room during the interview showed “defendant was not restrained to the confines of the hospital room. Moreover, closing the door could be viewed as a considerate gesture given the nature of the subject matter discussed.” The fact S was armed did not change the court’s conclusion. She never touched her weapon during the interview, and it “was holstered on her right side and slightly behind her, obscured from defendant’s view[.]” As to voluntariness, he did not establish the necessary predicate that his statement was “the product of police coercion.” The court noted that police routinely question “suspects without warning, quite obviously when they have cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime. We have never held, and we reject the notion, that these facts constitute police coercion.” The court also noted that there was no indication he was “deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention[,]” or that he was in pain. The video did not indicate that he was in any “way compromised or confused.”
Extended deadlines for FOIA responses authorized by Executive Order No. 2020-38; Adequacy of defendant’s FOIA responses; MCL 15.233(1)
The court held that at the time of defendants’ response to plaintiff’s FOIA requests, “they acted timely under then-existing law” (Executive Order No. 2020-38). Also, the trial court did not err by holding that defendants’ eventual response was compliant with FOIA. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendants-Kent County and Kent County Health Department summary disposition. Plaintiff argued that they did not have a valid basis for the “delayed response to plaintiff’s request because Executive Order No. 2020-38, which extended the relevant deadlines, did not have a proper statutory basis.” While it was “undisputed that defendants did not comply with the timeframes laid out by FOIA, it is likewise undisputed that defendants did comply with the modified timeframes provided by Executive Order No. 2020-38. Under this order, the deadline to respond to a request was extended to 10 days, and public bodies were authorized to issue a notice ‘extending the period of time in which to respond for as long as the public body deems necessary’ before the expiration of the order.” Also, the court noted that “to the extent that compliance with a request required ‘in-person efforts,’ the public body was authorized to ‘defer that portion of the request until the expiration of this order or any order that follows from it.’” Plaintiff argued that this executive order could not “shield defendants from liability because Governor Whitmer did not have the statutory authority to issue it.” Defendants argued and the trial court concluded that “defendants reasonably relied on Executive Order 2020-38 because it was effective at the time of plaintiff’s request.” The court concluded that as “the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recently observed, our Supreme Court’s holding in 2020 that Governor Whitmer’s executive orders were invalid beyond April 30 of that year was intended to apply prospectively.” The court noted the Supreme Court explained that “‘the executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic now lack any basis under Michigan law.’” It further noted that the Supreme Court also said that “‘the [statute] cannot continue to provide a basis for the Governor to exercise emergency powers.’” The court found that although the then-existing “law was later held to be without proper authority, our Supreme Court has made it clear that courts are not to undo or unravel those then-permissible acts of a local official. If our Supreme Court disagrees, it will need to revisit and clarify the matter.”
Factual basis for a petition for mental health treatment; MCL 330.1434 of the Mental Health Code; “Person requiring treatment” (MCL 330.1401(1)(b)); Incorporation of the parties’ agreement into the probate court order; Adult Protective Services (APS)
The court concluded that the probate “court did not err by holding the mental health hearing because petitioner adequately supported the petition with facts asserting that respondent required treatment.” In addition, the probate “court did not abuse its discretion by declining to make a ruling on the parties’ impromptu, informal agreement that the hospital refrain from contacting respondent’s father until the conclusion of an APS investigation.” Thus, the court affirmed the probate court’s order that respondent receive mental health treatment. The parties did “not dispute that respondent qualifies as a person requiring treatment.” Petitioner (a social worker) “checked the box in the petition indicating respondent was unable to attend to her basic physical needs which were required to avoid serious harm. Petitioner also asserted that respondent presented ‘very similar’ to her previous admissions for psychosis and delusional parasitosis. In addition to the petition, two clinical certificates were provided by two psychiatrists, as required by MCL 330.1434(3) and (4), who determined that respondent suffered from mental illness and diagnosed respondent with unspecified psychotic disorder. The certificates noted respondent’s paranoia and disorganization, inability to attend to her basic physical needs, and inability to understand her need for treatment. One certificate also determined that respondent posed a risk of unintentional harm. The certificates provided factual support for their conclusions, stating respondent’s paranoia, disorganization, isolation in her home, poor nutrition, and disheveled appearance. The facts stated in the petition were supported by the petitioner’s personal and professional observations as a social worker. The two clinical certificates also set forth facts that supported the petition with the doctors’ determinations.” Thus, the petition “met the statutory requirements and the probate court did not err by holding a hearing to determine whether respondent required mental health treatment.” Respondent also contended that it “erred when it refused to incorporate into its order requiring mental health treatment the parties’ agreement that the hospital refrain from contacting respondent’s father until after the APS investigation.” The court disagreed. The probate “court, in managing its own docket, had the discretionary authority to not consider an agreement the parties made minutes earlier at the hearing in which the trial court was tasked solely with determining whether the petition sufficed to warrant ordering respondent to undergo mental health treatment.” Affirmed.
Discovery sanctions; Vicencio v Ramirez
While the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant-State Farm’s motion to dismiss without a proper legal analysis, it declined State Farm’s invitation to decide what particular sanction was appropriate. The court vacated the trial court’s order denying State Farm’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit brought by plaintiff-Darling for failure to comply with a discovery order and remanded for the trial court to fashion an appropriate remedy for Darling’s conduct. It retained jurisdiction. State Farm argued that the trial court abused its discretion and ignored the court’s directives in a prior remand order by denying the motion to dismiss. The trial court “denied State Farm’s motion to dismiss because Darling ‘complied with extensive discovery.’” State Farm argued that “the trial court abused its discretion by doing so because dismissal with prejudice was the only principled sanction for Darling’s willful noncompliance with court orders. When deciding whether to dismiss a case for a discovery violation, the trial court should consider the” nonexhaustive factors in Vicencio. In this case, the “trial court gave virtually no analysis justifying its order denying State Farm’s motion to dismiss. The trial court certainly did not ‘carefully evaluate all available options on the record’ or explain why the Vicencio factors did not support the requested sanctions.” The court held that by “failing to employ the proper legal analysis, the trial court necessarily abused its discretion.”
Jurisdiction; Challenge to the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA or the Act); The ARPA’s “Offset Provision” (42 USC § 802(c)(2)(A)); “Justiciable controversy”; Mootness; The “pall” theory
The court reversed the district court and vacated the order that permanently enjoined the ARPA’s Offset Provision’s enforcement, holding that defendants’ (collectively the Treasury) credible disavowal of plaintiff-Ohio’s broad view of the Offset Provision mooted the case. The Offset Provision “forbids a state from using the funds ‘to either directly or indirectly offset a reduction in the net tax revenue’ that ‘result[s] from’ a tax cut.” Ohio alleged that this constituted “a prohibition on tax cuts during ARPA’s ‘covered period,’ . . . and that such a condition would violate the Constitution in multiple respects[.]” The district court agreed. On appeal, the court concluded that “irrespective of whether Ohio established its initial standing to sue, its challenge is now moot.” It noted that the Treasury had later promulgated a rule that disavowed Ohio’s interpretation of the Offset Provision and explained that it would not enforce the Provision as per se prohibiting tax cuts. Moreover, the injury that Ohio asserted in its complaint—its uncertainty about the Provision’s “meaning—'is now gone.’” Also, Ohio had already accepted the funds. The court considered the theory for continued jurisdiction offered by the district court, which the court called the pall theory – that the “the Offset Provision ‘casts a pall over [Ohio’s] abilities to contemplate’ desired tax changes because it must labor under ‘an unlawfully-imposed quandary in determining how to exercise its sovereign taxing power.’” However, the court held that “[i]t is not enough that a statute may impose some ‘subjective chill’ in the abstract upon a plaintiff’s desired course of conduct. . . . Rather, to mount a pre-enforcement challenge and obtain an injunction, the plaintiff must show why there is some realistic, likely risk of an enforcement proceeding if it were to engage in its desired behavior.” Finding that Ohio “came up short” in this regard, the court vacated the permanent injunction because it had “no reason to believe that Treasury will not abide by its disavowal of Ohio’s interpretation of the Offset Provision as it administers the statute.”
Request to surcharge a trustee; MCL 700.7901(2)(c) & (j); MCL 700.7902; Validity of a trust; MCL 700.7402(1); MCL 700.7406; Settlors’ intent; Breach of a trustee’s fiduciary duties; “Good faith” & “bad faith”; Personal representative (PR)
Holding that the probate court did not make a mistake in determining the settlors’ intent or by finding that appellee-trustee (Joyce) did not breach her fiduciary duties, the court affirmed the order denying appellant-PR’s (Conti) request to surcharge her for transfers of the decedent’s assets. The decedent, Raymond, was Joyce’s father. He and his wife, Carol, had five other children, including interested parties-Regina and Kristy, Patrick, and Teresa. Raymond and Carol executed a living trust. They named Joyce the trustee and sole beneficiary. After the Frisbies passed away, Conti was appointed as an independent PR, “ordered to investigate all contested transactions, and he was authorized to claw back the value of the transacted funds for any transactions that were deemed inappropriate.” He filed a petition for surcharge against Joyce, seeking a judgment “of $490,112.96 for allegedly improper disposals of the estate’s assets.” After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the probate court denied the petition. On appeal, Conti challenged “whether the trust was in accord with the settlors’ intent[.]” The probate court determined that the testimony “established ‘Joyce was attempting to follow her parent’s [sic] wishes, which was to make sure that there was enough money to take care of Teresa. They left the trust funds to Joyce with the direction to Joyce that she take care of Teresa.’ The probate court’s factual findings were supported by the testimony.” Conti also argued that Joyce breached her duty of care, and “the express terms of the trust, when she transferred over $300,000 to Patrick during Raymond’s lifetime.” However, the record showed “that the money was not transferred into the trust account, or to Patrick, until after Raymond’s death.” In addition, it was undisputed that “Regina and Kristy consented to the transfer to Patrick. In fact, there was testimony that they demanded it. Joyce believed Patrick would execute their parents’ wishes. She agreed to initiate the transfer to Patrick as a compromise, which is not sufficient to establish bad faith.” The court noted that while she “had misgivings about the transfer and testified it was against her better judgment, it does not establish bad faith. Further, there was no evidence that Joyce acted secretly or with selfish motivations.”