Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Attorney referral fees; Whether summary disposition before discovery was premature; Prejudice; Whether the objection to the referral fee was timely made; MRPC 1.5(e); Law Offices of Jeffrey Sherbow, PC v Fieger & Fieger
The court held that the grant of summary disposition for defendants “was premature as discovery had not begun in earnest” and that the trial court erred to the extent it determined an objection to the attorney referral fee at issue was timely. Thus, the court reversed and remanded. According to the complaint, plaintiff and defendant-attorney Herman “had a professional relationship wherein plaintiff would send Herman client referrals in exchange for a referral fee.” In 2018, plaintiff had a meeting with nonparty-P, who was seeking to begin a medical malpractice claim. On or about the same day, plaintiff referred P to defendants. When it became clear they were not going to pay the referral fee, plaintiff asserted they breached their agreement. The court held that the “trial court erred when it granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because a decision under that subrule was premature and prejudiced plaintiff. Defendants based their motion on testimony that contradicted allegations in plaintiff’s complaint that plaintiff did not have an opportunity to challenge. As the trial court recognized, there was a potential that further discovery could reveal evidence that would rebut [P’s] testimony, such as written evidence of her agreeing to plaintiff’s fee. Indeed, such a document was in defendants’ possession but was not produced to plaintiff, despite being the subject of a document request, before plaintiff filed his response brief. Once the trial court recognized this fact, it should have denied defendants’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” As to the trial court’s determination that P’s 2022 objection to the referral fee was timely made, the court was “bound to follow Sherbow’s holding that ‘the clients must have objected at the time they were informed of the agreement in order for there to be a violation of MRPC 1.5(e).’” It found that while P’s “objection at the settlement hearing was not completely irrelevant, it was not sufficient to render the purported referral fee agreement unenforceable under MRPC 1.5(e)[.]”
Alleged violations of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Sexual harassment; Sexually-hostile educational environment; Whether plaintiff stated a claim under the ELCRA; Principle that governmental immunity is not an available defense to an ELCRA claim; Whether a trial court’s order is appealable as of right; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v); Distinguishing Hamed v Wayne Cnty; The law-of-the-case doctrine; Rott v Rott
Holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear defendants’ (school district and employees) appeal as of right, the court dismissed it. Plaintiff-student sued defendants alleging multiple violations of the ELCRA arising out of “a sexual relationship she had with a teacher.” She claimed defendants knew or should have known about it but turned a blind eye. She did not allege that they were “vicariously liable under the ELCRA for the teacher’s sexual abuse . . . .” Defendants unsuccessfully sought summary disposition on the basis they were entitled to governmental immunity. They then filed this appeal. Plaintiff responded by arguing that governmental employees and entities do not have immunity from suit for claims under ELCRA, thus eliminating the court’s jurisdiction to hear defendants’ appeal as one as of right. The court previously denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without offering any analysis. It now found that the main issue here was whether the complaint stated “an actionable claim under the ELCRA” and that it lacked jurisdiction because “the resolution of this issue has nothing to do with governmental immunity[.]” As to defendants’ contention a footnote in Hamed controlled, the “actual holding in Hamed has nothing to do with governmental immunity.” In addition, this case did “not involve public services under the ELCRA, . . . it does not involve quid pro quo sexual harassment, and [plaintiff] has not alleged that defendants are vicariously liable for unforeseeable criminal acts.” The court noted that in Hamed the Supreme Court “explained that an employer may be held liable for an employee's criminal conduct if the employer knew of or reasonably should have foreseen the misconduct and did nothing about it. The allegations in [plaintiff’s] complaint track that theory of liability.” The only legal issue presented in defendants’ brief on appeal was whether her complaint stated “a valid claim under the ELCRA, not whether governmental immunity applies.” Given that their “motion did not implicate governmental immunity, the order denying the motion to dismiss the ELCRA claims was not a final order within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v)” and the court did not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal as an appeal of right. Finally, because the order denying plaintiff’s motion to dismiss “did not decide the merits of the claims at issue on appeal, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply.”
Sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction of AWIGBH; People v Blevins; Intent; Mutually exclusive offenses; People v Davis (Davis I & II); People v McKewen
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s AWIGBH conviction, and that the trial court did not err by also convicting her of felonious assault. Her convictions arose out an altercation with the victim (F) in which she struck F, and a tree, with her vehicle. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the AWIGBH conviction. “The testimony regarding the damage to the tree and defendant’s truck, along with the debris from the truck scattered around the tree, support the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was traveling at a high rate of speed when she struck the tree and” F. That defendant “was driving fast was evidenced by [F’s] need to run to reach the safety of the tree, barely reaching the tree before being struck by defendant’s truck.” In addition, the “damage to defendant’s truck was so great that when she drove toward [F] the second time, the damage prevented her from reaching” F. And there was “no evidence that defendant attempted to brake or swerve before hitting [F] and the tree, also indicating that defendant intended to cause great bodily harm to” F. It concluded that “a rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to inflict great bodily harm on” F. The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by convicting her of both charges because the offenses are mutually exclusive. “Relying on Davis I and McKewen, defendant argues that her felonious assault conviction should be vacated because the convictions were contradictory and mutually exclusive. Under Davis II, however, convictions for AWIGBH and felonious assault are not mutually exclusive.” In convicting defendant of AWIGBH, the trial court found she acted with the intent to cause F great bodily harm less than murder. “Convicting defendant of felonious assault, however, did not require an express finding that [she] acted without the intent to cause [F] great bodily harm. In fact, when making its findings in support of defendant’s felonious assault conviction, the trial court found that defendant acted with the intent to scare and harm” F. Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence for a CSC II conviction under MCL 750.520c(1)(a) & (2)(b); People v DeLeon; Credibility determinations; Principle that the prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence; Uncorroborated testimony; MCL 750.520h
Finding no merit in defendant-Hawkins’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the court affirmed his CSC II conviction. “The victim testified that, while she was fully clothed, Hawkins twice used his hand to touch her ‘private part’—referring to her vaginal area—and once touched her buttocks. This evidence established that [he] engaged in sexual contact with the clothing covering the immediate area of [her] intimate parts. The victim explained that Hawkins left and returned multiple times to inappropriately touch her. She also recalled feeling movement by [his] hand when he touched her vaginal area and buttocks. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person could construe Hawkins as having intentionally touched the victim for a sexual purpose.” Further, there was no dispute that, when the abuse occurred, “the victim was 12 years old and Hawkins was more than 17 years old. A rational jury could therefore find that the prosecution proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court noted that Hawkins did not challenge any element of the CSC II offense – instead, he attacked “the victim’s credibility by noting several times when she testified that she did not recall certain details about the incident.” Apart from the fact the court does not interfere with the jury’s credibility determinations, “the victim’s memory was not as limited as Hawkins suggests. Although [she] could not recall which specific night the abuse happened, she knew the general time frame. She also remembered how many times she was touched, where she was touched, how she was touched, and how far apart each touching occurred. The jury could consider all those factors when weighing [her] truthfulness and credibility.” Hawkins further questioned whether she “had reason to lie about the sexual assault.” However, the jury was likewise “able to consider and weigh” the evidence on which he relied for this argument, and make its own credibility assessments. “The prosecution met its evidentiary burden in this case.” While Hawkins argued that the victim’s testimony was uncorroborated, he also conceded a CSC II conviction can be sustained based on such testimony. Further, the prosecution presented corroborating evidence.
Motion to withdraw a guilty plea; MCR 6.310; Effect of defendant’s misconduct after accepting the plea; MCR 6.310(B)(3); Whether the trial court’s deviation from the Cobbs agreement entitled to defendant to withdraw his plea; People v Cobbs; Contempt of court; People v Mysliwiec
The court held that defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea. He was previously convicted of CSC III for sexually assaulting the minor victim. The victim’s mother and grandmother then obtained PPOs against him. Despite this, he called both the grandmother and the mother from prison, sent them letters from prison, and had third parties contact the victim via Facebook in an effort to obtain her phone number. He was subsequently charged with and pled guilty to aggravated stalking. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court held defendant in contempt for his behavior toward the victim and her family. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to withdraw his plea after determining that it was not going to abide by the Cobbs agreement. “[D]efendant’s conduct during sentencing, particularly during the victim-impact statement and allocution, was disruptive, disrespectful, and threatening. The trial court made several demands for defendant to stop talking during the victim-impact statement and to stop interrupting the trial court.” However, he repeatedly ignored these demands and his “behavior escalated from distasteful remarks and interruptions to offensive and confrontational gestures toward the victim and the victim’s family that required intervention by officers of the court.” Defendant claimed that “because the trial court informed him that it would not be following the Cobbs agreement, he was entitled to withdraw his plea. But MCR 6.310(B)(3) makes it clear that a defendant may not withdraw the plea if the defendant ‘fail[s] to comply with an order of the court pending sentencing.’ Defendant repeatedly and willfully defied several directives of the court during the sentencing hearing.” This misconduct “resulted in him violating the court’s orders and being held in contempt of court. His willful and defiant conduct constituted misconduct under MCR 6.310(B)(3). The trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s actions nullified the Cobbs agreement was proper and not error. The court’s conclusion that this misbehavior resulted in the waiver of his right to withdraw his plea was also appropriate.” Affirmed.
Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; Scoring of OV 4; Remorse
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence outside of the guidelines recommendation that was proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the circumstances surrounding it. Defendant was convicted of CSC II for sexually assaulting his girlfriend’s five-year-old daughter. The trial court sentenced him as a third-habitual offender to 12 to 30 years. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to a minimum term that exceeded the guidelines recommendation of 36 to 106 months. “Although the trial court’s decision to exceed the guidelines primarily rested on the harm suffered by the victim, the court also considered the danger that defendant posed to society. Defendant’s lengthy criminal background indicated to the” trial court that he was a risk to the public. “Defendant’s extensive criminal history demonstrated a clear inability to conform his behavior to the requirements of law and suggested an unnatural sexual appetite that continued despite the lengthy gap between defendant’s first and most recent sexual offense involving a child.” In addition, contrary to defendant’s argument, “the OVs failed to fully account for the victim’s and her mother’s psychological harm.” The trial court assessed 10 points under OV 4 “and adequately explained why OV 4 failed to fully account for the lifetime harm defendant’s actions inflicted upon the victim.” Further, although defendant “expressed remorse at sentencing, the victim’s mother also told the [trial] court that, when she caught defendant in the act, he tried to blame the victim for what happened, even as he apologized.” Finally, along with the other “valid reasons outlined by the sentencing court, we conclude that it would have imposed the identical out-of-guidelines sentence without consideration of any improper factors. This was a small departure considering the gravity of defendant’s crime and his criminal history.” Affirmed.
Admission of hearsay testimony under MRE 803A (tender years exception); Harmless error; People v Gursky; Prosecutorial misconduct; Use of a leading question in questioning a child witness; People v Johnson; Sentencing; Mandatory 25-year minimum under MCL 750.520b(2)(b); Cruel &/or unusual punishment; People v Benton; Whether MCL 750.520b(2)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine; People v Murray
While the court found a statement by a victim (D) “plainly failed the test for admissibility under MRE 803A[,]” it held that the error was harmless – in light of the other evidence admitted at trial, admission of this hearsay was not outcome determinative. Defendant-Swider also was not entitled to relief based on the prosecution’s asking D one leading question, and he failed to show any error related to the use of a diagram during D’s testimony. As to his sentencing challenges, his claim that the mandatory minimum 25-year sentence for his CSC I convictions constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment was rejected in Benton, a binding decision. Likewise, Murray required rejection of his separation of powers argument. He was convicted of multiple counts of CSC I and II for sexually abusing a member of his family, D, and her childhood friend, E, when the two girls were around five to eight years old. The court first determined that the challenged testimony by D “about her disclosure to her aunt was merely a recitation of her own prior out-of-court statement. Although euphemistic in content, the statement that Swider ‘would do stuff to me’ was evidence offered for the truth of the matter asserted—that Swider sexually abused” D. Thus, it was inadmissible hearsay. But the court noted the statement “was vague and did not bolster the more specific allegations of abuse by the complainants. At most, the statement was cumulative to [D’s] extensive testimony about the repeated sexual acts perpetrated by Swider against her.” In addition, E “testified about ‘[c]ountless’ instances of abuse committed by Swider. Together, the complainants’ testimony, subject to cross-examination, minimized any prejudicial effect that admission of the hearsay statement had on Swider.” The court noted that D and E gave “highly corroborating accounts of the other person’s victimization—including both testifying that they were in the same room during some of the abuse. The prosecution also presented evidence of suspicious cards sent by Swider to [D] and her family after she disclosed her allegations of abuse, including one card sent to [D] that reminded her of his rule against snitching.” Affirmed.
Great weight of the evidence challenges to CSC I & II convictions; People v Lemmon; Plain error review; People v Musser
Rejecting defendant’s great weight of the evidence challenge to the jury’s verdict convicting him of CSC I and II, the court affirmed. He contended the evidence preponderated “so heavily against the verdict it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow” it to stand. His argument was based “on attacking the victim’s credibility.” However, while he was “able to identify inconsistencies in” her preliminary exam and trial testimonies, “her trial testimony did not directly contradict her” preliminary exam testimony – rather, it “provided additional details. [She] testified at trial that she screamed when defendant assaulted her in bed and that [he] masturbated while she was in the shower. Neither of these details were mentioned in her preliminary” exam testimony. Although inconsistencies between the preliminary exam and trial testimonies “may have impeached her testimony to some extent, these inconsistencies were relatively minor and did not go to the essential elements of the crimes. Thus, the victim’s trial testimony was not ‘seriously impeached,’ and the case was not ‘marked by uncertainties and discrepancies.’” Defendant additionally asserted she “lacked credibility because she lied about the assaults to exact revenge on [him] for taking away her quinceañera.” There was testimony he “was a strict stepfather who took away the victim’s phone and did not permit her to have a quinceañera.” There was also testimony they had a father-daughter relationship and that the victim “waited until after her mother and defendant’s relationship ended to report the assaults out of fear of splitting her family apart. Given the jury’s verdict, it appears the jury rejected defendant’s retribution theory, at least in part, which it was entitled to do.” Next, he contended the jury must have had doubts about the victim’s credibility because it acquitted him “of two counts of CSC I involving penile-vaginal penetration and cunnilingus, as well as all counts related to his stepson.” But the court could not speculate whether the jury did so based on possible doubts about the victim’s credibility. The testimony related to the two CSC I charges, which tended “to support sexual contact but not penetration, is equally reasonable to explain the jury’s verdicts.”
Sentencing; Imposition of a departure sentence; People v Lockridge; People v Dixon-Bey; People v Steanhouse
Concluding the trial court failed to sufficiently justify its departure from the guidelines in sentencing defendant, the court remanded either for resentencing or for the trial court to further articulate its justification for its sentencing decision. Defendant pled guilty to CSC II and was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to “365 days in jail, followed by 60 months of probation. After [he] violated the terms of his probation, the trial court revoked [his] probation and resentenced” him to 15 to 30 years, a 12-year upward departure from his guidelines range. The court found that it “identified several appropriate factors for the departure sentence.” It referred to his history of committing CSC offenses, and “opined that defendant did not take advantage of or benefit from previous programming.” The court noted that a “defendant’s extensive criminal history and likelihood to reoffend are appropriate considerations supporting a departure sentence.” The trial court also considered his probation violations, and found that he “needed more punishment and more help. Our Supreme Court has determined that ‘a defendant’s conduct while on probation’ may constitute an appropriate justification for departing from the applicable guidelines range.” But the trial court further “identified several additional factors that are contemplated by the sentencing guidelines, but . . . did not explain why the guidelines did not adequately account for” them. In addition, it failed to score OV 11, if it was “applicable, but instead imposed a departure sentence on the basis that defendant had sexually abused the victim by penile-vaginal penetration on several occasions.” The court added that the trial court’s stated justification did “not explain why OV 11 would not adequately account for the criminal sexual penetration, or penetrations, that occurred.” And it failed to address why OVs 4 and 10 “did not account for the victim’s psychological injury and defendant’s exploitation of [her] mental disabilities.” The court determined remand was required “for the trial court either to resentence defendant or to articulate appropriate reasons supporting imposition of a sentence that exceeded the top end of the guidelines range by 12 years, and to address the proportionality of the extent of the particular departure sentence imposed.” It retained jurisdiction.
Material misrepresentation on a renewal application for insurance
Concluding that there was “a genuine issue of material fact whether plaintiff made a material misrepresentation on” his renewal application for insurance, the court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing his claim for benefits and remanded. Because there were questions of fact as to “whether omission of the Equinox was a misrepresentation, and whether the misrepresentations regarding the Pontiac G6 and plaintiff’s marital status were material, summary disposition was inappropriate.”
Negligence & misrepresentation claims against an insurance agency; Causation; Ray v Swager; Skinner v Square D Co; Distinguishing “duty to defend” cases; Distinction between fraud or misrepresentation & a broken promise; Reasonable reliance; Ottawa Kent Insurance Agency (OKIA)
The court held that plaintiff-Hoekstra’s negligence claim against defendant-insurance agency (OKIA) failed for lack of adequate evidence as to causation and that his misrepresentation claim failed as a matter of law. Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for OKIA. The case arose from OKIA’s “alleged failure to follow Hoekstra’s directive to procure an insurance policy covering, along with a condominium in Michigan, a mobile home located in Florida. OKIA, an independent insurance agency, did secure a homeowner’s policy for Hoekstra on the” condo but did not make sure it “also included liability coverage on the Florida property.” After Hoekstra’s sister-in-law (J) fell and broke her hip during a stay at the Florida property, she obtained a default judgment against him (he intentionally did not file an answer to her complaint). He “then filed this action against OKIA to recover monies that he owed under the default judgment[.]” The court concluded “that in the context of the particular circumstances of this case and the damages claimed by Hoekstra, factual or ‘but for’ causation required proof of an actual substantive determination that [he] was liable in the premises liability suit or, arguably, evidence that demonstrated more likely than not that [J] would have succeeded in her suit had it gone to trial.” The court noted that “there was no actual or true substantive determination of liability. Hoekstra was not free to simply do nothing and allow the default judgment to enter just because his brother told him to do so and then turn around and try to recover the amount of the judgment from OKIA on the basis that OKIA’s negligence caused the entry of the default judgment and Hoekstra’s damages.” Further, to the extent the court had to “speculate to properly resolve this case, we find as a matter of law that [J’s] lawsuit was untenable and would likely have failed had a defense been presented.” Specifically, it concluded “summary disposition would have been justified in [J’s] action on the basis of the open and obvious danger doctrine, as it existed at the time of the lawsuit, and the fact that [she] had actual knowledge of the alleged hazard[.]” As to misrepresentation, the court’s “ruling on causation relative to the negligence claim” equally applied to this claim. The court added that this “was not a case of fraud; at most, Hoekstra merely showed a broken promise.”
No-fault claim; Abandoned issue; Failure to preserve the issue; Motion to settle the record to substitute for missing transcripts; MCR 7.210(B)(2)(a)
Holding in this no-fault case that plaintiff abandoned appellate review by failing to settle the record, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for no cause of action entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff contended “the trial court erred when it admitted the video. However, there are no available transcripts for the trial, and because plaintiff failed to file to settle the record, it cannot be determined whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the video.” Plaintiff argued “the trial court erred when it admitted the surveillance video at trial and thus she” was entitled to a new trial. However, she abandoned this issue. The “transcripts for the trial and the hearing for the motion for new trial were deemed unavailable in [1/23]. Plaintiff did not file a motion to settle the record to substitute for the missing transcripts, as required by MCR 7.210(B)(2)(a). And there is no court order excusing plaintiff’s defect.”
Statutory notice requirements for invoking the highway exception of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); MCL 691.1404; Exact location & nature of the defect; Nature of plaintiff’s injury; Known witnesses; Timely notice; Service of process; Whether supplemental information was sufficient to cure previous deficiencies
Concluding “that plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of MCL 691.1404 was fatal to her claim under the” GTLA’s highway exception, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of defendant-City’s motion for summary disposition. “Plaintiff’s initial notice was deficient because, although served within 120 days of her injury, it did not specify the exact location and nature of the defect or the injury she sustained, nor did it name her son as a witness.” The court noted her initial notice only stated “that a ‘defective road’ caused her injuries. This vague description, without more, was not sufficient to notify the City of the exact nature of the defect.” Further, her initial notice simply stated “that her claim was for ‘personal injuries,’ without elaborating on the particular nature of those injuries.” Finally, contrary to her claim, “her son was a known witness who should have been disclosed in her notice to the City.” The court added that the “notice did not even specify the date of her fall.” Plaintiff next argued “that the supplemental information she provided after sending the initial notice cured its deficiencies.” The court disagreed. She was correct “that notice under MCL 691.1404(1) ‘need not be provided in any particular form and is sufficient if it is timely and contains the requisite information.’” The court noted that it “has explained that not all the information required by MCL 691.1404(1) need necessarily be included with the plaintiff’s initial notice, but rather ‘it is sufficient if a notice received by the governmental agency within the 120-day period contains all the required elements.’” Thus, it has held that “a supplemental notice, properly served, may cure an inadequate initial notice.” But the court noted that she “was required to provide the requisite notice under MCL 691.1404(1) within 120 days of her injury.” Plaintiff tried to cure the initial notice’s deficiencies with supplemental information in e-mails to a liability claims adjustor (D) “that included her medical records and photographs of the defective road.” The 120-day period here expired on 12/25/20, “a court holiday. Accordingly, the final day of the statutory period was extended to the next business day, which was Monday,” 12/28/20. It was undisputed that her “attorney’s e-mail to [D] attaching plaintiff’s medical records was sent on” 12/29/20, and that the photos of the defective road were emailed to D on 5/5/21. “Thus, plaintiff’s supplemental information was not timely provided” and the trial court could not properly consider it as part of her notice. “MCL 691.1404 must be enforced as written even if the untimely submission results in no prejudice.” The trial court did not err in holding that her “supplemental information was insufficient because it was untimely.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Failure to make meaningful change; In re Williams; Failure to participate in & benefit from the services offered; In re Atchley; Best interests of the child; In re White; Relative placement; MCL 712A.19a(8)(a)
Holding that § (c)(i) was met and that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. Her rights were terminated on the basis of untreated mental health issues, substance abuse issues, and abandonment. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the DHHS failed to prove a statutory ground for termination. “The record establishes respondent had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication . . . .” For the majority of this case, she “refused to make efforts to address her substance abuse and mental health issues; she only began participating in services after the supplemental petition was filed.” In addition, she “failed to take even one of the 27 scheduled drug screens prior to the termination hearing.” And even if she “completed a drug screen on the day of the termination hearing, that was insufficient to show she was addressing her substance abuse issue.” The court also rejected her claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests. The trial court acknowledged the child’s “placement with her grandparents, but found the need to provide her with stability and permanency outweighed the fact that she was placed with relatives.” Respondent demonstrated she was not committed to reunifying with the child “through her lack of compliance with her case service plan until after the supplemental petition was filed.” She also showed her disinterest in reunifying with the child by only visiting her 9 of the 47 times she could have. In addition, the child “was bonded with her grandparents and never spoke of respondent. There was no evidence presented that respondent had a bond with [the child], apart from respondent’s own testimony. The caseworker opined that terminating respondent’s parental rights would provide [the child] with permanence, stability, finality, and safety.”