Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Membership removal of chamber of commerce board members; Interpreting & applying an entity’s bylaws; Pago v Karamo; Recognition of member motions; Robert’s Rules of Order; The Nonprofit Corporation Act; MCL 450.2406(2); Mere statement of a pleader’s conclusions; ETT Ambulance Serv Corp v Rockford Ambulance, Inc; Adjournment authority; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8); El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc; Leave to amend; Futility of amendment; MCR 2.118; Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc
The court held that plaintiffs’ (local Chamber of Commerce members) complaint failed to state any legally enforceable claim arising from their attempt to remove defendants (the Chamber’s elected board), and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request to amend. Thus, summary disposition for defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8) was proper. Plaintiffs claimed that during a contentious meeting they gained control of the organization after attempting to introduce motions, leaving the premises when asked, reconvening elsewhere, and purporting to remove the existing board and elect themselves as the new one. The trial court rejected their complaint’s allegations as legally insufficient and dismissed the complaint. The trial court also concluded that the elected president had authority under the bylaws to preside and determine the order of business, and the president’s adjournment was permitted under the governing documents. On appeal, the court found that “the trial court did not err when it ruled that no portion of Robert’s Rules of Order required” the Chamber’s president to recognize plaintiff-Gunden “when he stood up or any of the motions Gunden attempted to make. On appeal, plaintiffs still have not identified any portion of Robert’s Rules of Order that provides any such requirement.” The court further found that plaintiffs’ “attempts to remove the board members and install themselves as the new board were unsupported by legal authority.” Nothing in the bylaws or Robert’s Rules permitted members to depart the meeting, reconvene elsewhere without the elected board, and exercise board-level powers. It explained that such a rule “could lead to bizarre consequences . . . .” The court also found no authority for plaintiffs’ reliance on the phrase “subject to the will of the membership” to override express bylaw provisions granting the board the exclusive authority to fill vacancies. As to amendment, plaintiffs “failed to comply with the requirement set forth in MCR 2.118(A)(4) that the proposed amendment must be in writing. This case perfectly illustrates the purpose of that requirement because the contents of plaintiffs’ contemplated amendment are, at best, vague[.]” Affirmed.
Probable cause for disruption arrest; District of Columbia v Wesby; First Amendment retaliatory arrest & no probable cause rule; 42 USC § 1983; Nieves v Bartlett; Qualified immunity & unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure; Statutory immunity; Bad faith; Anderson v Massillon
The court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disrupting a public meeting, entitling all defendants to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim while leaving her First Amendment retaliation and state tort claims partially intact. Plaintiff, an elected county commissioner, used her speaking time to criticize the sheriff, then repeatedly interrupted the clerk as the clerk read the sheriff’s response letter, continued to talk over the clerk after the chair called a point of order and banged the gavel, moved closer to record the clerk despite the clerk’s visible distress, and persisted after the chair warned that her conduct was “getting disruptive” and ordered the meeting to move on, after which deputies removed and arrested her for violating the disruption statute. The district court found no probable cause, granted plaintiff summary judgment on her Fourth and First Amendment claims, and denied immunity. On appeal, the court held that a reasonable officer could find that plaintiff acted with a purpose to “prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting” and to do an act that “obstructs or interferes with the due conduct” of the meeting, emphasizing that the deputies “saw and heard” multiple interruptions, heard the chair and audience ask her to stop, and reasonably concluded that she was blocking the meeting from moving forward, which satisfied the statute’s “low bar” for probable cause. The court also found that non arresting commissioners and the sheriff were not personally involved in the seizure because their criticism and frustration did not “cause the arrest,” and thus they were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims, but it remanded for the district court to assess whether plaintiff could fit within the limited exceptions to the no probable cause rule for retaliatory arrest under Nieves. The court further held that there was a genuine issue of fact on bad faith, noting that a jury could infer a “dishonest purpose” or “conscious wrongdoing” from evidence of premeeting communications, celebratory messages, and the sequence of events surrounding the arrest, so denial of statutory immunity on the state false arrest and civil conspiracy claims was proper. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Excessive force in mental health restraint; Graham v Connor; Qualified immunity; 42 USC § 1983; Pearson v Callahan; Municipal liability & ratification; Fed R Civ P 56; Monell v Department of Soc Servs of the City of New York
The court held that although a reasonable jury could find the officer’s punch excessive, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the asserted right was not clearly established and the defendant-city could not be held liable under Monell. Plaintiff admitted himself to a hospital for mental health treatment, refused an antipsychotic injection, and was lightly restrained by staff when an off duty officer working security twisted his arm and then punched his head into a cinderblock wall, causing head trauma. The district court granted qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim but allowed a state assault and battery claim and rejected the Monell theory. On appeal, the court held that a jury could conclude the force was excessive because plaintiff’s “resistance was not violent,” he remained polite even as he pleaded, nurses said “we were still in control,” and one told the officer “you hit a restrained person,” while less violent means of restraint were available in the small room. The court also found that policy requiring that force not be “greater than necessary” and internal recommendations that the allegation “could be sustained” were relevant but not dispositive on constitutional reasonableness. The court further held that plaintiff failed the clearly established prong because no binding case held that a single punch used to control a mentally ill patient in a perceived medical emergency violated the Fourth Amendment, explaining that existing precedent did not place the question “beyond debate” and that the conduct fell within the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force[.]” It also held that the police chief’s after the incident decision not to sustain discipline was not a final municipal policy or a “moving force” behind the injury. Affirmed.
Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; MRE 704; People v Fomby; Police truthfulness testimony; People v Lowrey; Victim criminal history & right to present a defense; Admissibility under MRE 404(a)(2); MRE 404(b)(1); People v Denson; Jury view & mistrial motion; MCL 768.28; People v Unger; Sufficiency of evidence for aiding & abetting first-degree murder; MCL 750.316; People v Plunkett; Post-Miranda silence impeachment; Doyle v Ohio; Voluntary manslaughter instruction; People v Yeager; Juror numbers in voir dire; People v Hanks; Prosecutorial misconduct; MRE 607; Ineffective assistance of counsel
The court held that the convictions of defendants-Bishop, Sharmel, and Larry for first degree premeditated murder and felony-firearm were properly affirmed because none of their evidentiary, constitutional, or instructional arguments established reversible error. The case arose from a fatal shooting at a dollar store after a mask dispute during the pandemic that escalated, leading the defendants to return together and confront the victim, after which Bishop shot him in the head. The trial court denied postjudgment motions and imposed life without parole plus a consecutive two-year firearm sentence. On appeal, the court held that the assistant manager’s lay opinion indicating coordinated action between Larry and Bishop was admissible because it was grounded in his direct perceptions at close range, noting there was “no error in the trial court’s handling of this witness’s testimony.” The court also upheld admission of a detective’s testimony describing Sharmel’s evasiveness during her interview because it reflected investigative perceptions rather than commenting on a testifying witness’s veracity. The “detective’s testimony did not improperly comment on Sharmel’s credibility as a witness or on her guilt as a criminal defendant.” The exclusion of the victim’s prior felony was affirmed because it was offered solely to support an impermissible propensity inference, and the court stated that “Bishop has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence at trial.” As to Larry, the court concluded that a rational jury could find aiding and abetting based on coordinated arrival, distraction, shooting sequence, and joint flight, holding that “a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Larry was more than merely present during the shooting[.]” The court further determined that any Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of Bishop’s own testimony and a curative instruction, explaining that “any error as to the challenged questions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court also held that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was unwarranted because nothing showed adequate provocation, and that the use of juror numbers, the prosecutor’s remarks, and related ineffective assistance claims provided no basis for relief.
Asylum & withholding of removal; The Immigration & Nationality Act (INA); Whether petitioner established that she was a member of a particular social group (PSG) subject to persecution by gangs in her home country; 8 USC §§ 1101(a)(42) & 1231(b)(3)(A); Whether the proposed PSG satisfied the “particularity” requirement for a cognizable group; Umaña-Ramos v Holder; “Internal relocation,” 8 CFR § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii); Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); Immigration Judge (IJ)
The court upheld the BIA’s denial of petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal where the PSGs on which she relied were too expansive and diverse to qualify as cognizable groups under the INA. Petitioner and her daughters entered the country illegally from El Salvador. At the removal hearing, she sought asylum, with her daughters as derivative beneficiaries. She claimed she was a member of a PSG that included Salvadoran women, single Salvadoran women who are working professionals, and salon owners in El Salvador. and that if returned to El Salvador, she would be the target of gang violence. The BIA denied her application, upholding the IJ’s determination that she had not produced sufficient evidence that her PSG was a cognizable group under the INA, and that she had not shown she was unable to relocate to a different part of El Salvador. Petitioner argued that her proposed PSGs qualified her for asylum and withholding of removal. However, the court explained that her PSG groups based on “Salvadoran women” and “single professional Salvadoran women” were too vague and nebulous to satisfy the particularity requirement. The court noted that it has previously rejected PSG groups defined by “expansive demographics” like gender, age, occupation, economic status and nationality. She maintained that the BIA erred by ruling that she had failed to show why internal relocation was unreasonable. But the court agreed that she had not even established whether her harassers were members of a gang, or whether they would attempt to find her if she relocated. Additionally, she testified that “neither she nor her daughters have ever been physically harmed in El Salvador, and that her mother and sisters continue to safely reside there . . . .”
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption; ERISA’s civil enforcement provision (29 USC § 1132(a)); Whether plaintiff’s state-law claims were “completely preempted” by ERISA; Aetna Health Inc v Davila; Whether plaintiff complained about the denial of benefits based on the employee benefit plan’s terms; Whether the claims implicated a duty that was “independent of ERISA or the plan terms”; A district court’s discretion to dismiss duplicative cases
In this putative state law claims class action removed to federal court, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiff-Patterson’s state claims where they were completely preempted by ERISA. Patterson’s employer maintained an ERISA health plan through defendant-UnitedHealth. The case arose after Patterson incurred medical bills due to a car accident. United paid the bills and sought to recover the payments he received through a suit against the involved third-party. An agreement settled that dispute. But after Patterson’s wife was injured in a separate accident and discovery revealed a plan document that said nothing “about a reimbursement obligation on the Pattersons’ part[,]” Patterson sued United and others under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, claiming that they defrauded him by requiring him to reimburse them $25,000. That case remains before the district court on remand. While that federal action was pending on appeal, Patterson filed claims in state court alleging fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. Defendants removed the case to federal court and sought dismissal. The district court agreed with them that the state law claims were a “repackaged version of his still-pending ERISA lawsuit[,]” and were preempted by ERISA. On appeal, the court held that both prongs of Davila were met here. It noted that while it had not yet addressed a case on-all-fours with this one, several other circuits have done so and concluded that “similar state law challenges to an ERISA plan’s reimbursement rights are in essence disguised suits ‘to recover benefits due’ under § 1132(a)(1)(B).” Patterson not only could “have brought a § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim, but in fact he also did bring one, albeit in his first federal lawsuit. There, [he] leveled the same core accusation that he levels here—that defendants tricked him into paying reimbursement using a misleading plan summary. This reality only reinforces the conclusion that [his] state claims double as an ERISA claim ‘to recover benefits due to him’ under § 1132(a)(1)(B).” The court also held that the second Davila prong was met where Patterson’s claims failed to “implicate a duty ‘independent of ERISA or the plan terms.’ . . . Each of defendants’ alleged breaches of duty rests entirely upon what Patterson’s ERISA-governed plan does (or does not) say.” Lastly, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case. Affirmed.
Tortious interference with a contract & with a business relationship or expectancy; Judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); Conversion; MCL 600.2919a(1)(a) & (b); Great weight of the evidence; Fraudulent transfer; Case evaluation sanctions; Application of the former MCR 2.403(O)
The court affirmed the trial court’s 5/23/22 order partially granting summary disposition in favor of defendants and affirmed the trial court’s 12/13/23 order denying plaintiffs’ motion for JNOV. It also affirmed the trial court’s 2/5/24 order denying defendants’ motion for case evaluation sanctions. The case arose “from a longstanding conflict between former business partners[.]” The court concluded that plaintiffs “failed to present documentary evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact on their tortious interference claim. Plaintiffs’ claim was premised on defendants allegedly filing postassignment collection lawsuits for unpaid dues against golf course members, and [defendant-]Marrocco allowing his dog onto the premises and driving his car on the golf course, both of which damaged plaintiffs’ goodwill.” The court noted “plaintiffs failed to present any documentary evidence in support of these allegations. With regard to tortious interference with a contract, plaintiffs presented no evidence establishing the existence of a contract that was breached. As for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, plaintiffs presented no documentary evidence to establish that defendants intentionally interfered with a valid business relationship, or any damages resulting from defendants’ alleged misconduct.” The court held that given “plaintiffs’ failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact through documentary evidence on their tortious interference claim, the trial court did not err by partially granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.” Also, as “defendant noted, plaintiffs’ argument does not delineate the standards between a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial. Instead, plaintiffs repeatedly assert that they established their claims ‘by the great weight of the evidence.’” The court found that plaintiffs’ argument failed under either standard. Further, it concluded that “the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict or for a new trial with respect to their conversion and fraudulent-transfer claims.” Finally, the court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion when declining to apply former MCR 2.403(O), and denying defendants’ request for case-evaluation sanctions.”