Probable cause for disruption arrest; District of Columbia v Wesby; First Amendment retaliatory arrest & no probable cause rule; 42 USC § 1983; Nieves v Bartlett; Qualified immunity & unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure; Statutory immunity; Bad faith; Anderson v Massillon

The court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disrupting a public meeting, entitling all defendants to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim while leaving her First Amendment retaliation and state tort claims partially intact. Plaintiff, an elected county commissioner, used her speaking time to criticize the sheriff, then repeatedly interrupted the clerk as the clerk read the sheriff’s response letter, continued to talk over the clerk after the chair called a point of order and banged the gavel, moved closer to record the clerk despite the clerk’s visible distress, and persisted after the chair warned that her conduct was “getting disruptive” and ordered the meeting to move on, after which deputies removed and arrested her for violating the disruption statute. The district court found no probable cause, granted plaintiff summary judgment on her Fourth and First Amendment claims, and denied immunity. On appeal, the court held that a reasonable officer could find that plaintiff acted with a purpose to “prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting” and to do an act that “obstructs or interferes with the due conduct” of the meeting, emphasizing that the deputies “saw and heard” multiple interruptions, heard the chair and audience ask her to stop, and reasonably concluded that she was blocking the meeting from moving forward, which satisfied the statute’s “low bar” for probable cause. The court also found that non arresting commissioners and the sheriff were not personally involved in the seizure because their criticism and frustration did not “cause the arrest,” and thus they were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims, but it remanded for the district court to assess whether plaintiff could fit within the limited exceptions to the no probable cause rule for retaliatory arrest under Nieves. The court further held that there was a genuine issue of fact on bad faith, noting that a jury could infer a “dishonest purpose” or “conscious wrongdoing” from evidence of premeeting communications, celebratory messages, and the sequence of events surrounding the arrest, so denial of statutory immunity on the state false arrest and civil conspiracy claims was proper. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.