42 USC § 1983; Fourth Amendment; Statute of limitations; Accrual; Discovery rule; Unreasonable seizure; Unreasonable search; Excessive force; Brady v Maryland violation; Materiality; Pretrial dismissal of charges; Sua sponte dismissal; Child’s claims

The court held that plaintiff-mother’s Fourth Amendment claims against defendant-officer were time-barred, that her Brady claim against defendant-municipality failed because the criminal charges were dismissed before trial, and that the district court improperly dismissed the child’s Fourth Amendment claims against the officer sua sponte. Plaintiffs sued under § 1983 after a traffic stop, arrest, vehicle search, and delayed disclosure of dispatch tapes allegedly contradicting the officer’s preliminary-exam testimony. The district court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the court held that the one-year limitations period for the mother’s Fourth Amendment claims began at the traffic stop even under the discovery rule because she knew of “her injuries and their cause” when the arrest, search, and force occurred. It noted that her own allegations that she followed traffic laws and stopped immediately gave her reason to investigate, and the discovery rule does not wait until a plaintiff has “enough evidence to win the case[.]” The court next held that the Brady claim failed because Brady generally protects a “trial-related” disclosure right and requires materiality measured by whether suppressed evidence would have produced a different trial result. Because prosecutors dismissed the criminal case before trial, the alleged delay caused “serious hardships” but not the type of injury Brady remedies. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the child’s Fourth Amendment claims against the officer without notice because the officer had moved to dismiss only the mother’s claims, and the child received no “chance to either amend his complaint or respond[.]” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Title VII; Retaliation against an employee for opposing an employer’s discriminatory practices; 42 USC § 2000e-3(a); Protected activity; Engaging in both protected & unprotected activity; Emergency medical technician (EMT)

Holding that Title VII does not protect an employee who “needlessly and gratuitously shared nude and possibly sexually explicit images of co-workers” at work, the court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-former employer. Plaintiff-Crisp alleged that a co-worker (G) “groped her and tried to stuff her into a trash can while on the job.” Her complaint to a supervisor resulted in a requirement that the two never work the same shift again. Years later, after she recalled “there were allegedly pornographic images of” G and his wife online, Crisp, while at work, “showed those images to several EMTs.” Defendant fired her for doing so. The court noted that it could “envision scenarios where sharing such material might be necessary or warranted to substantiate a claim of sexual harassment, but this is not one of them.” If G behaved as Crisp alleged, such “conduct was deplorable and sanctionable. . . . But that would not excuse how Crisp responded. Instead of seeking redress in a lawful way, Crisp took matters two steps further by showing nude and perhaps also sexually explicit images of both [G] and his wife (who had nothing to do with [G’s] alleged workplace misconduct) to other co-workers while at work. Crisp did not need to share those images to make her point, nor can she justify showing the images of” G’s wife. The court noted that even if the Gs “posted these images online and publicly shared some of this information, that does not mean that their co-workers had to be subjected to seeing or hearing about it while on the job. In the workplace, the law requires that some things be left unseen.” These alleged “profiles are two of them.” The court noted that when “an employee engages in both protected and unprotected conduct under Title VII, she cannot use the protected conduct to seek shelter from a firing that is based on her unprotected conduct.” The fact that Crisp was complaining about G’s behavior to two co-workers “did not give her the right to also show the nude and possibly sexually explicit pictures of him and his wife.” That it may have been permissible for her to tell her co-workers about G’s “alleged workplace misconduct does not excuse her own misconduct.”

42 USC § 1983; Fourth Amendment; Statute of limitations; Accrual; Discovery rule; Unreasonable seizure; Unreasonable search; Excessive force; Brady v Maryland violation; Materiality; Pretrial dismissal of charges; Sua sponte dismissal; Child’s claims

The court held that plaintiff-mother’s Fourth Amendment claims against defendant-officer were time-barred, that her Brady claim against defendant-municipality failed because the criminal charges were dismissed before trial, and that the district court improperly dismissed the child’s Fourth Amendment claims against the officer sua sponte. Plaintiffs sued under § 1983 after a traffic stop, arrest, vehicle search, and delayed disclosure of dispatch tapes allegedly contradicting the officer’s preliminary-exam testimony. The district court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the court held that the one-year limitations period for the mother’s Fourth Amendment claims began at the traffic stop even under the discovery rule because she knew of “her injuries and their cause” when the arrest, search, and force occurred. It noted that her own allegations that she followed traffic laws and stopped immediately gave her reason to investigate, and the discovery rule does not wait until a plaintiff has “enough evidence to win the case[.]” The court next held that the Brady claim failed because Brady generally protects a “trial-related” disclosure right and requires materiality measured by whether suppressed evidence would have produced a different trial result. Because prosecutors dismissed the criminal case before trial, the alleged delay caused “serious hardships” but not the type of injury Brady remedies. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the child’s Fourth Amendment claims against the officer without notice because the officer had moved to dismiss only the mother’s claims, and the child received no “chance to either amend his complaint or respond[.]” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Resentencing where a sentence was based on inaccurate information & exceeds the corrected guidelines range; Effect of the trial court indicating it would impose the same sentence on remand; People v Francisco; People v Lockridge; Compliance with MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e); Fundamental fairness; Remedy; United States v Crosby (2d Cir); Presentence investigation report (PSIR)

Holding that Francisco and Lockridge are not in conflict, the court concluded that “resentencing is required where a defendant’s sentence is based on inaccurate information and exceeds the corrected guidelines range” even if the trial court indicated it would impose the same sentence on remand. Thus, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in part and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Defendant was convicted of AWIM and other offenses. The trial court imposed what appeared to be a within-guidelines sentence of 360 to 600 months for AWIM. The prosecution later conceded that PRV 2 was erroneously scored. The parties disagreed about what the corrected guidelines range would be. The “trial court held that 360 months was the lowest minimum sentence it found to be appropriate and that it would impose the same minimum sentence regardless of the applicable guidelines range.” The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentence but remanded. On remand, the parties entered into a stipulated order providing that the proper guidelines range was 171 to 285 months. His AWIM sentence remained the same. The court considered whether its decision in Francisco, “which held that resentencing is required in” the circumstances here, was at odds with Lockridge, which “held that Michigan’s sentencing guidelines are discretionary.” The court found that the two cases are not in conflict and reaffirmed “Francisco’s conclusion that, when a sentencing court relies on an incorrectly calculated guidelines range, a defendant is entitled to be resentenced.” Thus, it held that defendant was entitled to resentencing, and “the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his sentence. On remand, the trial court must rescore the guidelines and reconsider the sentence in light of the corrected guidelines range but may, in its discretion, impose the same sentence if [it] finds it to be reasonable and proportionate. If the sentence imposed after resentencing is not within the guidelines range, the trial court must articulate the reasons for its departure.”

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Bernstein concurred with the majority’s result, but wrote to explain his “disagreement on a fundamental point—the necessity of addressing whether” Francisco conflicts with Lockridge. He would decline to reach this question, finding that the error here was “much simpler in nature and does not require us to apply Francisco.”

Dissenting, Justice Zahra concluded the Court of Appeals correctly resolved the case by remanding for administrative correction of the PSIR. He found that resentencing was “unnecessary as the trial court clearly indicated it would have imposed the same sentence notwithstanding the inaccurate information.” He would impose “the more tailored remedy of a Crosby remand[.]”

Possession of meth; Possession of cocaine; Possession of oxycodone & alprazolam; Felony-firearm; Search warrant; Probable cause; Trash pull; Confidential informant; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to suppress; Plea negotiations; Failure to object to the scoring of OV 14; “Leader”; Sufficiency of the evidence; Great weight of the evidence; Controlled-substance exemption; MCL 333.7403; MCL 333.7303; M Crim JI 12.4a; M Crim JI 12.5

The court held that defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, that sufficient evidence supported his convictions, and that the trial court did not err by denying his requested controlled-substance jury instructions. Defendant was convicted of drug-possession and felony-firearm offenses after officers executed a search warrant at his mobile home. The trial court denied his motions for a new trial, an evidentiary hearing, and correction of sentence. On appeal, the court first found counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress because the warrant was supported by a confidential-informant tip, surveillance tying defendant to the home, and a trash pull yielding meth residue, a scale, and baggies. It reasoned that the trash-pull evidence and tip showed a sufficient basis for probable cause and that counsel reasonably declined a meritless suppression motion. The court also rejected defendant’s plea-advice claim because counsel’s affidavit and the pretrial record showed defendant understood the offer, including that he would serve “no additional time thereafter.” As to the failure to object to the OV 14 score, the court upheld the score because defendant controlled the home, allowed others to live there, knew of drug use, and possessed most drugs in his office, supporting an inference that he was a leader. The court next held that constructive possession supported the meth, cocaine, and felony-firearm convictions because the drugs and firearm were in or near defendant’s office, were accessible, and his statements showed knowledge of drug use in the home. Finally, the court held that defendant was not entitled to a special instruction or M Crim JI 12.4a because another individual (C) could not legally authorize defendant to possess or dispense C’s prescription medications. Affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to call certain witnesses; Matters of trial strategy

Holding that defense counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for not calling either of the witnesses defendant asserted he should have called, the court rejected her ineffective assistance claim. She was convicted of possession with intent to deliver meth, possession of meth within 1,000 feet of a school or library, conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver meth, and maintaining a drug house. One of the witnesses she contended should have been called was her boyfriend, W. The other was a man (L) that police learned provided large amounts of meth to defendant and W. Defense “counsel expressed concern about the prejudicial effect that references to [W’s] criminal record, or his statements to law enforcement, might have, and he explained that he declined to call” the two men as witnesses because it “would have risked providing the prosecution with additional evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defense counsel explained that calling [W] would have allowed the prosecution to elicit information only [W] would have had about the alleged conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver” meth. And while defendant asserted the men “would have testified that she was not involved in any drug transactions, . . . any such exculpatory testimony would have required [them] to admit to their own illegal conduct, and” defendant did not “acknowledge their privilege against self-incrimination.” The court added that, even if they “were willing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination, the record does not suggest that their testimony would have exonerated defendant.” It further noted “that any statements they offered would have been weighed against the very substantial evidence against defendant . . . including her own multiple admissions that demonstrated her culpability as to all” the charges for which she was convicted. Their testimony “would have been of little value to the defense while opening the door to prosecutorial opportunities to add even more evidence of” defendant’s guilt. Affirmed.

Title VII; Retaliation against an employee for opposing an employer’s discriminatory practices; 42 USC § 2000e-3(a); Protected activity; Engaging in both protected & unprotected activity; Emergency medical technician (EMT)

Holding that Title VII does not protect an employee who “needlessly and gratuitously shared nude and possibly sexually explicit images of co-workers” at work, the court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-former employer. Plaintiff-Crisp alleged that a co-worker (G) “groped her and tried to stuff her into a trash can while on the job.” Her complaint to a supervisor resulted in a requirement that the two never work the same shift again. Years later, after she recalled “there were allegedly pornographic images of” G and his wife online, Crisp, while at work, “showed those images to several EMTs.” Defendant fired her for doing so. The court noted that it could “envision scenarios where sharing such material might be necessary or warranted to substantiate a claim of sexual harassment, but this is not one of them.” If G behaved as Crisp alleged, such “conduct was deplorable and sanctionable. . . . But that would not excuse how Crisp responded. Instead of seeking redress in a lawful way, Crisp took matters two steps further by showing nude and perhaps also sexually explicit images of both [G] and his wife (who had nothing to do with [G’s] alleged workplace misconduct) to other co-workers while at work. Crisp did not need to share those images to make her point, nor can she justify showing the images of” G’s wife. The court noted that even if the Gs “posted these images online and publicly shared some of this information, that does not mean that their co-workers had to be subjected to seeing or hearing about it while on the job. In the workplace, the law requires that some things be left unseen.” These alleged “profiles are two of them.” The court noted that when “an employee engages in both protected and unprotected conduct under Title VII, she cannot use the protected conduct to seek shelter from a firing that is based on her unprotected conduct.” The fact that Crisp was complaining about G’s behavior to two co-workers “did not give her the right to also show the nude and possibly sexually explicit pictures of him and his wife.” That it may have been permissible for her to tell her co-workers about G’s “alleged workplace misconduct does not excuse her own misconduct.”

Medical malpractice; Wrongful-death saving provision; MCL 600.5852; Notice of intent (NOI); MCL 600.2912b; Tolling; MCL 600.5856(c); Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5805(8); Stare decisis; Waltz v Wyse; Miller v Mercy Mem’l Hosp; Lindsey v Harper Hosp; Omelenchuk v City of Warren

The court held that the medical-malpractice NOI tolling provision in MCL 600.5856(c) can toll the wrongful-death saving period in MCL 600.5852. Thus, it overturned Waltz. Plaintiff-personal representative sued defendants for medical malpractice after the decedent died from a pulmonary embolism. The trial court granted summary disposition and the Court of Appeals affirmed under Waltz, which held that NOI tolling does not apply to MCL 600.5852. On appeal, the court held that Waltz was wrongly decided because MCL 600.5852 is itself a limitations period subject to MCL 600.5856(c). It reasoned that MCL 600.5852 “saves” an action because it “extends the period of limitations,” and the “natural implication” is that it “creates a new limitations period” subject to tolling. The court further concluded that earlier cases supported this reading because MCL 600.5852 had been treated as a statute that could time-bar an action, meaning it functioned as a limitations period. It also held there was “no principled reason” or “demonstrated legislative intent” to require personal representatives to comply with MCL 600.2912b’s NOI requirement while denying them MCL 600.5856’s “accompanying tolling benefits.” The court next held that stare decisis did not require retaining Waltz. It reasoned that Waltz had faced “widespread and consistent criticism,” created a “piecemeal application” of the statutes that a prospective plaintiff would not anticipate, and affected only “a small set of litigants.” The court also found reliance interests weak because medical providers could not have “altered their behavior” in reliance on a procedural defense to claims not yet filed. Because plaintiff sent the NOI before the wrongful-death saving period expired and received statutory tolling, her complaint was timely. Reversed and remanded.

Justice Zahra dissented. He would have retained Waltz, reasoning that MCL 600.5852 cannot be treated as a limitations period because it refers to a separate “period of limitations” and permits suit after “the period of limitations has run.” He also emphasized that the Legislature amended MCL 600.5852 after Waltz without changing the language the decision relied on.

Justice Thomas dissented separately, joined by Justice Zahra. She agreed Waltz was likely wrongly decided, but saw no “compelling reason” to overrule it. She reasoned that it created an “administrable procedural rule” that had governed for more than 20 years, affected a narrow class of litigants, and had not caused substantial real-world harm because there were “many steps” available to file a timely action notwithstanding Waltz.

Auto negligence; Pedestrian accident; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(10); Untimely supplemental response; MCR 2.116(G)(1); Adjournment; MCR 2.503; Basic speed law; MCL 257.627; Sudden-emergency doctrine; Owner liability; MCL 257.401

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider plaintiff’s tardy response and did not err by granting defendants summary disposition in this pedestrian-injury negligence action. Thirteen-year-old RS was struck by defendant-driver’s pickup after cutting across the street between stopped vehicles instead of using a crosswalk. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition without considering plaintiff’s second response. On appeal, the court first found the trial court acted within its discretion because plaintiff filed the second response after the deadline, did not properly move to adjourn or seek leave to file a supplemental brief, and did not explain why the later arguments could not have been included in the timely response. The court next found no genuine issue of material fact as to negligence. The evidence showed defendant was driving under the assumed 25-mph limit, had just completed a left turn, and “slamm[ed] on the brakes” when RS suddenly entered her lane. The court also concluded the sudden-emergency doctrine applied because the hazard was “unsuspected,” and defendant had no meaningful time to react. The court emphasized that “[t]he law expects prudence, not perfection,” and because the driver was not negligent, defendant-owner could not be liable. Affirmed.

Medical malpractice; Wrongful-death saving provision; MCL 600.5852; Notice of intent (NOI); MCL 600.2912b; Tolling; MCL 600.5856(c); Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5805(8); Stare decisis; Waltz v Wyse; Miller v Mercy Mem’l Hosp; Lindsey v Harper Hosp; Omelenchuk v City of Warren

The court held that the medical-malpractice NOI tolling provision in MCL 600.5856(c) can toll the wrongful-death saving period in MCL 600.5852. Thus, it overturned Waltz. Plaintiff-personal representative sued defendants for medical malpractice after the decedent died from a pulmonary embolism. The trial court granted summary disposition and the Court of Appeals affirmed under Waltz, which held that NOI tolling does not apply to MCL 600.5852. On appeal, the court held that Waltz was wrongly decided because MCL 600.5852 is itself a limitations period subject to MCL 600.5856(c). It reasoned that MCL 600.5852 “saves” an action because it “extends the period of limitations,” and the “natural implication” is that it “creates a new limitations period” subject to tolling. The court further concluded that earlier cases supported this reading because MCL 600.5852 had been treated as a statute that could time-bar an action, meaning it functioned as a limitations period. It also held there was “no principled reason” or “demonstrated legislative intent” to require personal representatives to comply with MCL 600.2912b’s NOI requirement while denying them MCL 600.5856’s “accompanying tolling benefits.” The court next held that stare decisis did not require retaining Waltz. It reasoned that Waltz had faced “widespread and consistent criticism,” created a “piecemeal application” of the statutes that a prospective plaintiff would not anticipate, and affected only “a small set of litigants.” The court also found reliance interests weak because medical providers could not have “altered their behavior” in reliance on a procedural defense to claims not yet filed. Because plaintiff sent the NOI before the wrongful-death saving period expired and received statutory tolling, her complaint was timely. Reversed and remanded.

Justice Zahra dissented. He would have retained Waltz, reasoning that MCL 600.5852 cannot be treated as a limitations period because it refers to a separate “period of limitations” and permits suit after “the period of limitations has run.” He also emphasized that the Legislature amended MCL 600.5852 after Waltz without changing the language the decision relied on.

Justice Thomas dissented separately, joined by Justice Zahra. She agreed Waltz was likely wrongly decided, but saw no “compelling reason” to overrule it. She reasoned that it created an “administrable procedural rule” that had governed for more than 20 years, affected a narrow class of litigants, and had not caused substantial real-world harm because there were “many steps” available to file a timely action notwithstanding Waltz.

Auto negligence; Pedestrian accident; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(10); Untimely supplemental response; MCR 2.116(G)(1); Adjournment; MCR 2.503; Basic speed law; MCL 257.627; Sudden-emergency doctrine; Owner liability; MCL 257.401

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider plaintiff’s tardy response and did not err by granting defendants summary disposition in this pedestrian-injury negligence action. Thirteen-year-old RS was struck by defendant-driver’s pickup after cutting across the street between stopped vehicles instead of using a crosswalk. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition without considering plaintiff’s second response. On appeal, the court first found the trial court acted within its discretion because plaintiff filed the second response after the deadline, did not properly move to adjourn or seek leave to file a supplemental brief, and did not explain why the later arguments could not have been included in the timely response. The court next found no genuine issue of material fact as to negligence. The evidence showed defendant was driving under the assumed 25-mph limit, had just completed a left turn, and “slamm[ed] on the brakes” when RS suddenly entered her lane. The court also concluded the sudden-emergency doctrine applied because the hazard was “unsuspected,” and defendant had no meaningful time to react. The court emphasized that “[t]he law expects prudence, not perfection,” and because the driver was not negligent, defendant-owner could not be liable. Affirmed.

Application of the General Property Tax Act (GPTA) to easements for a billboard; MCL 211.78k(5)(e); Whether the easements were beyond the statute’s scope & invalid; Whether they were not “true easements”; Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter; Whether they could not be assigned & were now void; Whether they were appurtenant or in gross; Whether they violated public policy

Rejecting plaintiff-Harper Land Company’s (HLC) arguments that the billboard easements at issue were beyond the GPTA’s scope and otherwise invalid, the court held that HLC was not entitled to relief on appeal. Since 2000, defendant/counterplaintiff-Outfront Media leased the parcel of real property involved in the case to display a billboard. In 2011, defendant-Carll purchased the property and entered into a lease (the Lease Agreement) with Outfront. He also later entered into an agreement with a nonparty (F) granting it four perpetual easements over the property (the Easement Agreement), which was recorded. As part of that Agreement, Carll also assigned F his rights under the Lease Agreement. The property was later forfeited to defendant-county treasurer and placed in foreclosure in 3/19. It went unredeemed. In 7/19, F assigned its rights under both Agreements to defendant/counterplaintiff-Outdoor Equities. A copy of F’s assignment of the Easement Agreement was recorded. In 9/19, HLC purchased the property at auction. Under “MCL 211.78k(5)(e), ‘all existing recorded and unrecorded interests in [a foreclosed] property are extinguished, except a visible or recorded easement . . . .’” HLC did not directly challenge this statute’s validity or dispute that the easements “were ‘visible or recorded’ as required by” the provision. Rather, it argued that they were “beyond the statute’s scope and otherwise invalid because (1) they are not ‘true easements,’ (2) they could not be assigned by [F] to Outdoor and are thus now void, and (3) they violate public policy.” As to the first argument, HLC contended that the easements “effectively grant Outdoor a fee simple interest in the Property.” But the court found that HLC failed to show that the Easement “Agreement’s easements, burdensome as they may be, do not constitute . . . ‘true easements’ such that they would not survive foreclosure under MCL 211.78k(5)(e).” Next, while the court agreed “with HLC that the easements at issue are in gross,” it disagreed that they could not survive F’s assignment to Outdoor. Finally, HLC failed to show “that its public-policy arguments are ‘clearly rooted in the law,’” so as to provide it a path to relief here. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s partial award of summary disposition to Outfront and Outdoor.

Application of the General Property Tax Act (GPTA) to easements for a billboard; MCL 211.78k(5)(e); Whether the easements were beyond the statute’s scope & invalid; Whether they were not “true easements”; Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter; Whether they could not be assigned & were now void; Whether they were appurtenant or in gross; Whether they violated public policy

Rejecting plaintiff-Harper Land Company’s (HLC) arguments that the billboard easements at issue were beyond the GPTA’s scope and otherwise invalid, the court held that HLC was not entitled to relief on appeal. Since 2000, defendant/counterplaintiff-Outfront Media leased the parcel of real property involved in the case to display a billboard. In 2011, defendant-Carll purchased the property and entered into a lease (the Lease Agreement) with Outfront. He also later entered into an agreement with a nonparty (F) granting it four perpetual easements over the property (the Easement Agreement), which was recorded. As part of that Agreement, Carll also assigned F his rights under the Lease Agreement. The property was later forfeited to defendant-county treasurer and placed in foreclosure in 3/19. It went unredeemed. In 7/19, F assigned its rights under both Agreements to defendant/counterplaintiff-Outdoor Equities. A copy of F’s assignment of the Easement Agreement was recorded. In 9/19, HLC purchased the property at auction. Under “MCL 211.78k(5)(e), ‘all existing recorded and unrecorded interests in [a foreclosed] property are extinguished, except a visible or recorded easement . . . .’” HLC did not directly challenge this statute’s validity or dispute that the easements “were ‘visible or recorded’ as required by” the provision. Rather, it argued that they were “beyond the statute’s scope and otherwise invalid because (1) they are not ‘true easements,’ (2) they could not be assigned by [F] to Outdoor and are thus now void, and (3) they violate public policy.” As to the first argument, HLC contended that the easements “effectively grant Outdoor a fee simple interest in the Property.” But the court found that HLC failed to show that the Easement “Agreement’s easements, burdensome as they may be, do not constitute . . . ‘true easements’ such that they would not survive foreclosure under MCL 211.78k(5)(e).” Next, while the court agreed “with HLC that the easements at issue are in gross,” it disagreed that they could not survive F’s assignment to Outdoor. Finally, HLC failed to show “that its public-policy arguments are ‘clearly rooted in the law,’” so as to provide it a path to relief here. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s partial award of summary disposition to Outfront and Outdoor.

Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); In re Hudson; Criminal sexual conduct (CSC)

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § (b)(i) supported terminating respondent-father’s parental rights, the court affirmed the termination order. Respondent pled guilty to CSC III against the “child’s mother, who is also respondent’s biological daughter. Respondent’s parental rights to the mother were terminated in 2003.” A short time after they “reconnected in 2022, the mother moved in with respondent and he performed an unofficial marriage ceremony. The mother” later gave birth to the child involved “in this appeal, and later DNA testing confirmed that respondent is the child’s biological father.” He contended that § (b)(i) did “not apply because he was not the mother’s legal father.” The court found this argument was misplaced because § (b)(i) “does not require the existence of a legal relationship between the respondent and the victim.” There was no dispute “that the child and her mother are half-siblings and that respondent is their biological father. Given that” he pled guilty to CSC III “against his child’s mother, who is also her half-sibling, we are not left with ‘a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake’ by finding that respondent sexually abused his child’s sibling.” The court further concluded that, “considering this sexual abuse, the trial court did not clearly err by finding a reasonable likelihood that the child would be sexually abused if returned to respondent’s care.”

Termination of parental rights; Best interests; Parent-child bond; Mental health; Domestic violence; Permanency; Relative placement; Fictive kin; MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(ii)

The court held that termination was in the best interests of three of the children (K1, K2, and K3), but that remand was required as to the fourth (K4) because the trial court did not properly consider whether K4’s placement with fictive kin qualified as relative placement. The trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights under multiple grounds after years of services, continued emotional instability, domestic violence concerns, and instability following a brief reunification. On appeal, the court found no error as to the best interests of K1, K2, and K3. The record showed respondent failed to benefit from mental-health services, continued to minimize domestic violence, lacked emotional regulation, threatened the caseworker in open court, and did not achieve the stability needed to parent children with special needs. The court also found the parent-child bond weighed in favor of termination because the older children’s desire to protect respondent showed an unhealthy bond, and the younger children had only a minimal bond. As to K4, however, the court found additional analysis was required because the amended definition of “relative” includes certain fictive kin with “a strong positive emotional tie or role” in the child’s or parent’s life. Because the trial court and parties did not determine whether K4’s caregiver qualified under MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(ii), the court vacated the best-interest determination as to K4. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.