42 USC § 1983; Free Exercise Clause; Commercial learner’s permit (CLP); Commercial driver’s license; Social Security number (SSN); Religious exemption; Mootness; Declaratory relief; Injunctive relief; Voluntary cessation; Qualified immunity; Clearly established right; Neutral & generally applicable law; 49 CFR § 383.153(e)(1); § 383.73(g)(1); MCL 257.307(1)(a); Bowen v Roy; Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v Comer; Espinoza v Montana Dep’t of Revenue; Michigan Department of State (MDOS); Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot and that defendant-MDOS help-desk worker was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim. Plaintiff, who lacked an SSN because of a sincerely held religious belief and an SSA-granted religious exemption, sued after the MDOS denied her CLP application for failure to provide an SSN. The district court dismissed her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot after the FMCSA issued guidance allowing Michigan to process her application without an SSN, and it granted the help desk worker (Tabor) qualified immunity. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff’s requests for prospective relief were moot because defendants were no longer refusing to process her application based on the lack of an SSN, and “no ongoing controversy” remained for declaratory relief. It rejected plaintiff’s voluntary-cessation argument, reasoning that Michigan officials made a “genuine course correction” in response to federal guidance, were implementing policy changes, and there was no “fair prospect” they would return to the old interpretation. The court next held that Tabor was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff identified only the generalized right to be free from religious discrimination in public benefits, while the relevant statutes and regulations facially required an SSN and contained no religious exemption. The court reasoned that Bowen was more analogous than plaintiff’s public-benefits cases because a reasonable official could view the SSN requirement as “the kind of neutral, generally applicable law that does not infringe on religious liberty” despite incidental burdens. Because Tabor’s interpretation was at most a “‘reasonable but mistaken judgment’” about an open legal question, qualified immunity applied. Affirmed.

42 USC § 1983; Free Exercise Clause; Commercial learner’s permit (CLP); Commercial driver’s license; Social Security number (SSN); Religious exemption; Mootness; Declaratory relief; Injunctive relief; Voluntary cessation; Qualified immunity; Clearly established right; Neutral & generally applicable law; 49 CFR § 383.153(e)(1); § 383.73(g)(1); MCL 257.307(1)(a); Bowen v Roy; Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v Comer; Espinoza v Montana Dep’t of Revenue; Michigan Department of State (MDOS); Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot and that defendant-MDOS help-desk worker was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim. Plaintiff, who lacked an SSN because of a sincerely held religious belief and an SSA-granted religious exemption, sued after the MDOS denied her CLP application for failure to provide an SSN. The district court dismissed her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot after the FMCSA issued guidance allowing Michigan to process her application without an SSN, and it granted the help desk worker (Tabor) qualified immunity. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff’s requests for prospective relief were moot because defendants were no longer refusing to process her application based on the lack of an SSN, and “no ongoing controversy” remained for declaratory relief. It rejected plaintiff’s voluntary-cessation argument, reasoning that Michigan officials made a “genuine course correction” in response to federal guidance, were implementing policy changes, and there was no “fair prospect” they would return to the old interpretation. The court next held that Tabor was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff identified only the generalized right to be free from religious discrimination in public benefits, while the relevant statutes and regulations facially required an SSN and contained no religious exemption. The court reasoned that Bowen was more analogous than plaintiff’s public-benefits cases because a reasonable official could view the SSN requirement as “the kind of neutral, generally applicable law that does not infringe on religious liberty” despite incidental burdens. Because Tabor’s interpretation was at most a “‘reasonable but mistaken judgment’” about an open legal question, qualified immunity applied. Affirmed.

Mutual release provision in a business purchase agreement; Plain & unambiguous language; Parol evidence; Integration or merger clause; UAW-GM Human Res Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp

Holding that the plain and unambiguous language of the parties’ mutual release barred plaintiff’s action, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. The parties to the appeal were physicians. The dispute concerned an alleged business partnership. Before bringing this action for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and an accounting, plaintiff sold his interest in a property referred to as the “15 Mile location” via a Purchase Agreement that contained the mutual release. The court concluded that the release language was “unequivocal in manifesting the parties’ intent to discharge each other from any and all claims or potential claims ‘of any nature whatsoever,’ except as expressly preserved in the Purchase Agreement. Although the release expressly references claims related to the ownership and operation of 15 Mile Center, LLC, such specificity is superfluous in light of the all-encompassing terms of the general release, and nothing in the instrument suggests any limitation to claims involving 15 Mile Center, LLC exclusively. Even if, as plaintiff asserts, the Purchase Agreement pertained solely to the 15 Mile location, it does not follow that the parties were precluded from negotiating a comprehensive general release resolving all other potential disputes as part of the same transaction.” The court found that his argument on appeal was essentially “an impermissible attempt to introduce parol evidence to alter the clear release language in order to preserve his claim to an alleged share of profits from” another location, contrary to the parol evidence rule. Further, the Agreement contained a merger clause. To the extent he asserted “reliance on alleged misrepresentations by defendant” as to an intent to address disputes about profits from the other location after “completion of the 15 Mile transaction,” that clause rendered “any such reliance unreasonable.”

Sentence validity; Reliance on inaccurate information or a misconception of law; People v Jackson; Sex offender registration; The Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Scope of remand; People v Lampe; Striking a SORA requirement from the judgment without resentencing; Whether defendant was entitled to resentencing as an equitable remedy; Jail credit; People v Smith

The court held that under the circumstances, “it would have been improper for the trial court to grant relief beyond the removal of defendant from the SORA registry” as directed by the court. There was no “need for a plenary resentencing proceeding” and he was not entitled to resentencing as an equitable remedy because an adequate legal remedy existed. Finally, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his request for jail credit for time spent on electronic monitoring and house arrest while on appellate bond. He appealed from the amended judgment of sentence that reflected the removal of the requirement that he register under the SORA. He argued that resentencing was required on the basis his sentences were “invalid because they were predicated on inaccurate information—specifically, an alleged legal misconception that he was required to register as a sex offender[.]” But the court found that they “were not predicated on a misconception of law; rather, they were imposed in accordance with the law as it existed at the time of sentencing.” The court held in a prior appeal “that requiring defendant to register as a sex offender for 15 years constituted cruel or unusual punishment because it was unjustifiably disproportionate to the offense.” As a result, it “remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter an order removing [him] from the sex offender registry.” The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently “likewise concluded that defendant and other offenders whose crimes lacked a sexual component were entitled to removal from the registry. In so ruling, [it] emphasized that its holding was both narrow and workable, distinguishing nonsexual offenders entitled to removal from those who must remain on the registry.” The court also rejected his assertion that “striking the SORA requirement from the judgment without resentencing” contravened the Supreme Court’s opinion. Multiple other appellate decisions and Supreme Court orders supported “the conclusion that removal from SORA, without complete resentencing, is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances presented here.” Affirmed.

Aggravated stalking; MCL 750.411i; Personal protection order (PPO) violation; Sufficiency of the evidence; Authentication; MRE 901; Voice identification; MRE 901(b)(5); Text messages; Social media posts; “Unconsented contact”; Electronic communications

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s aggravated-stalking conviction and that her authentication argument did not undermine the sufficiency analysis. Defendant was convicted after she repeatedly called, texted, and posted about the complainant while a PPO was in effect. The court first held that defendant’s authentication argument was “misplaced” because evidence may be authenticated by testimony from a witness with knowledge, and a voice may be authenticated by someone who has heard it before. The complainant testified about why she believed the communications came from defendant, including her familiarity with defendant’s voice and the consistency between the texts and defendant’s social media activity. The court also noted that sufficiency review considers “‘all of the evidence admitted by the trial court,’” even if a defendant claims some evidence was erroneously admitted. The court next held that the evidence was “more than sufficient” to prove aggravated stalking. The complainant received numerous threatening texts, multiple phone calls, and social media posts identifying her by name and prompting third parties to contact her. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence showed a “willful pattern of repeated, unconsented, and menacing contact, in violation of MCL 750.411i” and the PPO. Affirmed.

Sufficiency of the evidence for a second-degree murder conviction; Malice; People v Bailey; Intent; People v Henderson; Factual findings after a bench trial; People v Legg

The court held that the trial court sufficiently articulated its factual findings on the intent element after defendant-Wright’s bench trial, and that there was sufficient evidence of malice to support his second-degree murder conviction. The case arose from his fatal shooting of his fiancée, F. While the trial “court did not expressly state that Wright acted with malice when he shot [F], its findings are sufficient to establish that it did, in fact, make such a finding.” Its findings reflected that it determined the prosecution’s theory of the case was “credible. It repeatedly found that [F] had been murdered, not that she had been shot accidentally during a shootout with another vehicle, which was Wright’s theory of the case. Considered as a whole,” the court concluded that the trial “court was aware of the factual issue—i.e. whether Wright was culpable for [F’s] death—and it resolved that issue by finding that he had murdered her in the second degree.” As to the sufficiency of the evidence, “Wright admitted to the police that he had gotten into an argument with [F] before the shooting, that he had his gun on his lap, and that he fired the gun ‘recklessly’ in her direction even though she was in his line of fire. After shooting her, he did not render her any medical aid, nor seek assistance for her. Instead, he enlisted” a friend to hide her body and dispose of the gun. “He denied knowing her whereabouts to her family, suggesting that she was with another man. But he told multiple of his own acquaintances that she was dead, which was a problem for him.” He also coerced another man into helping him dispose of F “cell phone, body, and vehicle.” The court added that, even “viewing Wright’s version of events in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is still sufficient evidence of malice. Specifically, [he] admitted that he fired his gun toward another vehicle while knowing that [F] was in his line of fire.” The court held that the “act of shooting toward an occupied vehicle—knowing that his own passenger was in the line of fire—demonstrates a willful and wanton disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of his behavior is to cause death.” Affirmed.

No-fault insurance; PIP benefits; Priority; MCL 500.3114; Domicile; Minor child of divorced parents; Custody order; Joint physical custody; 50/50 parenting time; “Step-down” policy provision; Resident of household; Grange Ins Co of MI v Lawrence; Stare decisis; Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co

The court held that Grange’s rule treating a custody order as dispositive of a minor child’s domicile for no-fault purposes was wrongly decided and must be overruled. Plaintiff was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident while traveling to school from her father’s house. The trial court applied Grange to conclude she was domiciled with her father because the divorce judgment provided for joint physical custody and 50/50 residence time, even though plaintiff actually spent about 75% of her time at her mother’s home. The trial court also found plaintiff was a resident of her father’s household for purposes of a step-down provision in his policy with defendant=Esurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings. On appeal, the court held that a custody order “creates the custodial environment from which domicile can be established,” but does not itself establish domicile for purposes of MCL 500.3114. The court reasoned that custodial environment and domicile are distinct concepts, that the Child Custody Act does not purport to establish no-fault domicile, and that Grange was especially flawed in 50/50 custody cases because it allowed a child’s domicile to shift “weekly or daily” despite the common-law rule that a person has only one domicile. The court also held that stare decisis favored overruling Grange because the rule had proven impractical, generated little reliance, undermined insurers’ ability to assess risk, and departed from the traditional multifactor domicile analysis. Going forward, a custody order is the starting point and generally reflects domicile when the parties act consistently with it. But when the child’s actual living arrangements are “clearly inconsistent” with the order, it “should not be considered representative of the child’s domicile. In all cases, courts should” consider the actual facts, including the Workman and Dairyland factors, where the child spends most time, and where the child sleeps most nights. Because the lower courts relied on Grange to find plaintiff domiciled with her father and to find her a resident of his household, the court vacated both rulings and remanded to the trial court.

Justice Thomas concurred. She agreed with the majority’s critique of Grange and with the holding that a judgment of divorce or custody order is only a starting point in determining a minor child’s domicile for no-fault purposes, but she would have resolved the case more narrowly because the relevant Grange language about 50/50 parenting time appeared in dicta. She wrote separately to emphasize that family courts are not tasked with making domicile determinations and generally do not draft custody, parenting-time, or support orders with later no-fault priority disputes in mind.

Child custody; Proper cause or change of circumstances; Best interests; MCL 722.23; Established custodial environment (ECE); Clear & convincing evidence; Legal custody; Physical custody; School district; MCL 722.26a; Friend of the Court (FOC) report; MCL 552.505(1)(g); Domestic violence; Court-order violations

The court held that the trial court did not err by awarding defendant-father primary physical and sole legal custody of the parties’ children and changing their school district. Plaintiff-mother argued the trial court improperly revisited custody, but the court held that proper cause existed because the mother unilaterally enrolled the children in a different school district without the father’s consent, which “unquestionably had the potential to significantly affect the children’s well-being.” The court did not need to decide whether her repeated contact with a romantic partner, despite a no-contact order, also established proper cause. The court next rejected the mother’s challenge to the FOC report because the trial court did not admit it as an exhibit, used it only for “background and context,” and made independent findings on the best-interest factors. As to those factors, the court held that the trial court’s findings were not against the great weight of the evidence. The record supported findings that the mother “blatantly violated” court orders, minimized domestic violence involving her romantic partner, moved the children out of their school district without a clear reason, caused a burdensome commute, and contributed to instability in the children’s home and school lives. The father’s home, by contrast, was stable, routine-based, and permanent. The court concluded “the trial court centered the children’s interests” rather than punishing the mother for violating orders. Affirmed.

No-fault insurance; PIP benefits; Priority; MCL 500.3114; Domicile; Minor child of divorced parents; Custody order; Joint physical custody; 50/50 parenting time; “Step-down” policy provision; Resident of household; Grange Ins Co of MI v Lawrence; Stare decisis; Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co

The court held that Grange’s rule treating a custody order as dispositive of a minor child’s domicile for no-fault purposes was wrongly decided and must be overruled. Plaintiff was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident while traveling to school from her father’s house. The trial court applied Grange to conclude she was domiciled with her father because the divorce judgment provided for joint physical custody and 50/50 residence time, even though plaintiff actually spent about 75% of her time at her mother’s home. The trial court also found plaintiff was a resident of her father’s household for purposes of a step-down provision in his policy with defendant=Esurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings. On appeal, the court held that a custody order “creates the custodial environment from which domicile can be established,” but does not itself establish domicile for purposes of MCL 500.3114. The court reasoned that custodial environment and domicile are distinct concepts, that the Child Custody Act does not purport to establish no-fault domicile, and that Grange was especially flawed in 50/50 custody cases because it allowed a child’s domicile to shift “weekly or daily” despite the common-law rule that a person has only one domicile. The court also held that stare decisis favored overruling Grange because the rule had proven impractical, generated little reliance, undermined insurers’ ability to assess risk, and departed from the traditional multifactor domicile analysis. Going forward, a custody order is the starting point and generally reflects domicile when the parties act consistently with it. But when the child’s actual living arrangements are “clearly inconsistent” with the order, it “should not be considered representative of the child’s domicile. In all cases, courts should” consider the actual facts, including the Workman and Dairyland factors, where the child spends most time, and where the child sleeps most nights. Because the lower courts relied on Grange to find plaintiff domiciled with her father and to find her a resident of his household, the court vacated both rulings and remanded to the trial court.

Justice Thomas concurred. She agreed with the majority’s critique of Grange and with the holding that a judgment of divorce or custody order is only a starting point in determining a minor child’s domicile for no-fault purposes, but she would have resolved the case more narrowly because the relevant Grange language about 50/50 parenting time appeared in dicta. She wrote separately to emphasize that family courts are not tasked with making domicile determinations and generally do not draft custody, parenting-time, or support orders with later no-fault priority disputes in mind.

Subject-matter jurisdiction; Family division jurisdiction; MCL 600.1021(1)(a); Divorce judgment; Corporate separateness; Piercing the corporate veil; Conversion; Statutory conversion; MCL 600.2919a; Civil embezzlement; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) & (C)(8)

The court held that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff-corporation’s conversion and civil-embezzlement claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged defendant, the ex-wife of plaintiff’s sole shareholder, withdrew more than $68,000 from plaintiff’s corporate accounts after the divorce. The trial court treated the case as a disguised divorce-property dispute, but the court held that was error because a corporation is presumed to be a “separate and distinct legal entity from its owner, ‘even when a single individual owns and operates the entity.’” Because plaintiff was not a party to the divorce, the family division lacked authority to adjudicate plaintiff’s claims, and the civil division had jurisdiction over the conversion action. The court also rejected the trial court’s alternative conclusion that defendant could not convert funds because she remained an authorized signatory. Accepting the complaint as true, plaintiff alleged it held legal title to the funds, defendant lacked actual authority to withdraw them, and she procured cashier’s checks payable to herself. The court reasoned that authorized access did not defeat conversion or civil embezzlement as a matter of law because embezzlement involves a person who obtains possession through a position of trust and then “dishonestly converts the money” to personal use. Reversed and remanded.

Mootness; Final judgment; Jury verdict; MCR 2.515(B); MCL 600.309a; Limited remand; Amended judgment; Offset; Practical legal effect

The court held that plaintiff’s appeal was moot because the trial court entered an amended judgment on remand giving plaintiff the relief it sought. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred by failing to incorporate the jury’s $22,575.09 damages award into the final judgment. The court recognized that under MCR 2.515(B), “a trial court is required to enter judgment in accordance with the jury’s findings,” and that a judgment must “reflect and give effect” to the jury’s factual determinations. But after plaintiff appealed, the court entered a limited remand directing the trial court to reconsider plaintiff’s motion to correct the judgment. On remand, the trial court entered an amended judgment offsetting plaintiff’s $22,575.09 award against defendant’s $36,000 award, thereby “complying with the applicable law and court rules.” Because plaintiff had already received the relief sought on appeal, “there is no longer an existing controversy,” and no appellate decision could have a practical legal effect. Dismissed.

Subject-matter jurisdiction; Family division jurisdiction; MCL 600.1021(1)(a); Divorce judgment; Corporate separateness; Piercing the corporate veil; Conversion; Statutory conversion; MCL 600.2919a; Civil embezzlement; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) & (C)(8)

The court held that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff-corporation’s conversion and civil-embezzlement claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged defendant, the ex-wife of plaintiff’s sole shareholder, withdrew more than $68,000 from plaintiff’s corporate accounts after the divorce. The trial court treated the case as a disguised divorce-property dispute, but the court held that was error because a corporation is presumed to be a “separate and distinct legal entity from its owner, ‘even when a single individual owns and operates the entity.’” Because plaintiff was not a party to the divorce, the family division lacked authority to adjudicate plaintiff’s claims, and the civil division had jurisdiction over the conversion action. The court also rejected the trial court’s alternative conclusion that defendant could not convert funds because she remained an authorized signatory. Accepting the complaint as true, plaintiff alleged it held legal title to the funds, defendant lacked actual authority to withdraw them, and she procured cashier’s checks payable to herself. The court reasoned that authorized access did not defeat conversion or civil embezzlement as a matter of law because embezzlement involves a person who obtains possession through a position of trust and then “dishonestly converts the money” to personal use. Reversed and remanded.

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Children’s best interests; In re White

Holding that § (c)(i) was established and that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. Over 182 days elapsed between entry of the initial dispositional order and the termination hearing. “The petition alleged respondent neglected or refused to provide care and custody of the children, and the home or environment was an unfit place for” them to live. She “obtained housing for about eight months during the proceedings but was unable to maintain it for financial reasons[.]” The court found it significant that she “did not complete parenting classes despite multiple referrals in the three-year pendency of the case.” And while she completed a psychological evaluation, she “did not complete individual therapy as recommended. The necessity of” the classes and the therapy was reflected in her treatment of her older son, who was not at issue in this case. The DHHS asserted that she “was ‘inappropriate’ during parenting time with [him], got into loud verbal arguments with him, and tried to take his clothes away because ‘she bought them.’” Her treatment of that child was probative of how she may treat the two children involved here (M and S). “Evidence supported the conclusion that respondent took no responsibility for the children being in care and took virtually no steps to improve her parenting ability or address her mental health issues, despite” the time she had to do so. She did not show “that she can provide proper care and custody, maintain income, or maintain appropriate housing.” As to the children’s best interests, M’s “well-being in care, the advantage of stability and permanence at” the home where he was living and at school, and his placement’s willingness to adopt outweighed the parent-child bond and M’s relative placement, supporting a finding that termination was in M’s best interests. While there was a strong bond between S and respondent, and S was also placed with a relative, S’s “well-being in his preadoptive home, the advantages of that stable environment, and [S’s] preference for remaining there suggest termination was in” S’s best interests.