The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine (arising from the First Amendment); Winkler v Marist Fathers of Detroit; First Protestant Reformed Church of Grand Rapids v DeWolf; Defamation; False-light invasion of privacy; Perrone v Bugarin (Unpub); Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Concert of action; Breach of contract; American Muslim Diversity Association (AMDA)

Holding that the trial court correctly ruled that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred plaintiff-Ahmed’s breach of contract and tort claims, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. He worked for defendant-AMDA as an assistant Imam until its board of trustees terminated the contractual relationship after domestic violence allegations were made against him. He asserted claims for breach of contract, defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, IIED, and concert of action. On appeal, the court concluded the “trial court correctly determined that resolution of Ahmed’s breach-of-contract claim would require [it] to delve into ecclesiastical matters. The contract stated that the board of trustees reserved the right to cancel the contract ‘if there are any violation [sic] in contractual agreement, any activities against principles of Islam, or any activity subversive to the mission and objective of AMDA by the Qa’ari Imam as determined by the’” board. While the board found “the domestic-violence allegations could not be substantiated, it may have also determined that Ahmed violated the contract or engaged in activity contrary to the principles of Islam or subversive to AMDA’s mission and objective. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the trial court from examining and second-guessing the decision of the board of trustees that it would be best for AMDA if Ahmed no longer served as an assistant Imam.” As to his tort claims, the court found that analyzing the “defamation and false-light invasion of privacy claims would require determining the truth or falsity of defendants’ alleged statements calling into question whether Ahmed was qualified to perform the duties of an assistant Imam. [He] alleged that defendants falsely stated he was not so qualified and lacked the character required and expected of an assistant Imam.” The court “will not second-guess a religious entity’s investigation and evaluation of allegations involving its leaders or its method of communicating matters relevant to such allegations.” Plaintiff’s IIED and concert of action claims also failed because they involved “evaluating defendants’ decisions and method of reaching” them.

Member claims against a union related to seniority loss; Duty of fair representation (DFR); Goolsby v Detroit; Promissory estoppel; Tortious interference with a business relationship; Hope Network Rehab Servs v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n; Statute of limitations; Effect of a bankruptcy court ruling; In re Detroit (Bankr ED MI); Breach of contract claims against an employer; Detroit Fire Fighters Association Local 344 (DFFA); Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

The court held in one of these two cases on appeal that the union defendants were entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff-Brown’s DFR, promissory estoppel, and tortious interference with a business relationship claims. In the other case, it held that the City defendants were entitled to summary disposition of Brown and plaintiff-Ferguson’s breach of contract claims. Plaintiffs were City firefighters and members of defendant-DFFA. They went on “duty disability retirement” due to injuries before the 2014 CBA became operative. That CBA “affected the seniority status of firefighters who had taken duty disability retirement” and was incorporated into the City’s plan entered in its bankruptcy case. Plaintiffs’ suit asserted “claims primarily related to their loss of seniority.” On appeal, in Docket No. 371453, the court rejected the union defendants’ statute of limitations argument as to Brown’s DFR claim. But it held that the trial court erred in denying them summary disposition because his demotion did not breach the CBA given that “seniority was a part of the selection process for the promotion, and Brown had no seniority” when he returned to work after an 18-year absence. Further, because his “DFR claim involved the seniority provisions of the 2014 CBA, it should have been dismissed pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s ruling.” The court also held that the trial court erred in not dismissing his promissory estoppel claims. He was “not entitled to relief by recasting his” dismissed just cause claim as one for promissory estoppel. In addition, the union defendants were entitled to summary disposition on his tortious interference claim because he failed to show that their “conduct was wrongful per se.” As to Docket No. 371516, Ferguson’s contract breach claim against the City defendants failed because he did not “provide any support for his contention that [their] failure to return him to work within 25 years of his anniversary date was disciplinary.” His promissory estoppel claim was the same in substance as his dismissed just cause claim (a ruling he did not appeal), and Brown’s promissory estoppel claim against these defendants failed for the same reason as the one against the union defendants did. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the union defendants summary disposition in Docket No. 371453 and the City defendants in Docket No. 371516.

Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Particularized reasonable suspicion for a stop under Terry v Ohio; People v Pagano; People v Prude; Illinois v Wardlow; Collective knowledge; People v Nguyen; Pat-down search; People v Custer

The court held that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress because (1) the officer who stopped him had reasonable suspicion to do so, (2) the decision to perform a pat-down search of his person was justified, and (3) the use of handcuffs was warranted under the circumstances. The court first concluded that the totality of the circumstances known by a police sergeant (B) and an officer (M) at the time of defendant’s seizure supported “the existence of an ‘objectively reasonable particularized suspicion’ that [he] was ‘engaged in, or about to be engaged in, criminal activity.’” While his presence in the high crime area, or his refusal to listen to M or answer questions, by themselves, were not sufficient, additional factors supported his detention. A shooting was reported to have occurred in the area of the laundromat where he was seen moving about in the dark and scanning the street and parking lot. B “was justified in recognizing the ‘relevant characteristics’ of the laundromat, including its reputation for being a problematic hangout in a high crime area and reportedly being the location of the shootings less than an hour earlier, in determining whether the totality of the circumstances of defendant’s apparent lookout presence at the” laundromat’s corner entrance “was ‘sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.’” Before stopping defendant, M was told that the shooting had occurred “near the laundromat and that defendant was the only individual seen near” it during B’s drive-by and observation from across the street. B “testified that he radioed his observations of the phone flashlight inside the dark, defunct laundromat and defendant exhibiting” lookout behavior to other officers, and M “testified that he received and was acting on [B’s] relayed observations.” The court held that “it was reasonable for [M] to suspect that defendant was involved in criminal activity on the basis of this collective knowledge, and he had reasonable suspicion to stop [him] to investigate the shooting allegations and his related suspicious behavior.” It also held that “the use of handcuffs to detain and separate defendant from” the shooting-related chaos “until the Terry stop and pat down could safely occur, was warranted.” Affirmed.

Sentencing; Scoring of OV 12 (contemporaneous felonious criminal acts); MCL 777.42(1)(b), (d), & (g); MCL 777.42(2)(a)(i)-(ii); People v Teike; Common-law obstruction of justice; Assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer causing serious impairment (APO-CSI) (MCL 750.81d(3)); Assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer (R&O)

The court held that the trial court erred in scoring OV 12 at 10 points because defendant’s “two dismissed R&O counts were subsumed into his obstruction conviction and” thus, did not constitute separate contemporaneous felonious criminal acts. He was charged with third-offense domestic violence; AWIM as to one officer (P); and three R&O counts, one for each officer. He later pled no contest to “second-offense domestic violence, APO-CSI as to [P], and common-law obstruction of justice” in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. He was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender to 48 to 270 months for APO-CSI and otherwise to time served. On appeal, the court found Teike instructive. Here, in “setting forth the factual basis for the obstruction plea, the trial court found that defendant ‘chose to continue fleeing and resisting and obstructing the efforts of’” Officer H and other officers on the scene. Thus, his acts of resisting or obstructing H and another officer (M) were “used to establish the obstruction conviction. Those acts do not constitute separate felonious criminal acts relative to the obstruction conviction because they cannot be separated from the acts that were used to establish that charge.” And because they “resulted in a separate conviction, they” also did not constitute separate felonious criminal acts as to the APO-CSI conviction. As a result, the trial court erred in scoring “10 points for OV 12 based on those acts.” In rejecting the prosecution’s argument to the contrary, the court noted that “the parties’ intentions in formulating a plea are not record evidence of criminal acts.” It held that because defendant’s acts of resisting H and M “were used to establish the separate obstruction conviction, the record does not support a finding of two contemporaneous felonious criminal acts against a person for purposes of scoring OV 12.” Further, correcting the error reduced “defendant’s total OV level from IV to III” as to the APO-CSI conviction and altered the guidelines range, entitling him to resentencing on that offense. The court affirmed his sentence for obstruction, vacated his APO-CSI sentence, and remanded “for resentencing and correction of the sentencing information reports for both convictions.”

Possession with intent to deliver meth; MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i); Maintaining a drug house; MCL 333.7405(1)(d); Other-acts evidence; MRE 404(b); MRE 403; Limiting instruction; MRE 105; Double jeopardy; Separate prosecutions; Blockburger v United States; Alternative theory of guilt; People v Urbanski; General unanimity instruction; M Crim JI 3.11(3); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Right to counsel at critical stage; Fourth Amendment; Arrest warrant; Protective sweep; Plain view; Search warrant; Probable cause; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); Confrontation Clause; Invited error

The court held that the 3/29 raid evidence was properly admitted as other-acts evidence and did not create a double-jeopardy, unanimity, or ineffective assistance of counsel basis for reversal. It also rejected his right-to-counsel, search-and-seizure, confrontation, and other ineffective-assistance claims. Defendant was convicted of possessing meth with intent to deliver and maintaining a drug house after officers entered his garage residence to execute an arrest warrant on 9/11, saw suspected meth and a pipe in plain view, obtained a search warrant, and recovered meth, scales, packaging materials, mail, and a debit card. The trial court also admitted evidence from the 3/29 raid at the same location, including defendant’s recorded statements about drug-dealing practices. On appeal, the court first held that the 3/29 evidence was admissible under MRE 404(b) because it was probative of knowledge, intent, and common scheme, and its volume did not substantially outweigh its value where intent to deliver was the “central dispute at trial.” The court next held that double jeopardy was not violated because the 3/29 conduct was not submitted as an alternative theory of guilt, and the jury was instructed that other-acts evidence involved conduct “for which he is not on trial” and that it “must not convict” him because of other bad conduct. It also held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a more specific limiting instruction, a narrower date range, or a specific unanimity instruction because defendant failed to show prejudice and the prosecution tried the 9/11 events as the charged conduct. The court further held that the prior right-to-counsel violation in defendant’s earlier case did not taint this case, the arrest warrant allowed officers to enter the residence when they reasonably believed defendant was inside, and any suppression motion would have been futile. Finally, the court held that the challenged officer testimony was invited by defense counsel and, in any event, was not hearsay because it explained “‘why police officers acted as they did.’” Affirmed.

Sufficiency of the evidence; AWIM; MCL 750.83; Intent to kill; Circumstantial evidence; People v Ericksen; Sentencing proportionality; Habitual offender; MCL 769.10; Guidelines sentence; People v Steanhouse; People v Boykin; People v Posey (On Remand)

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s AWIM conviction and that his within-guidelines sentence was proportionate. Defendant was convicted of AWIM and related firearm and child-abuse offenses after the victim was shot in the lower back immediately after exiting her apartment with her two children. His defense was that another person fired the gunshot, but the evidence showed he was the only person in the apartment when the shot was fired. On appeal, the court held that the evidence supported a finding of actual intent to kill because “‘minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient’” to prove state of mind, and the jury could consider the parties’ toxic relationship, the prior incident in which defendant held a gun to the victim’s head, the argument just before the shooting, the bullet’s trajectory through the door, his effort to end the victim’s 911 call, and his instruction to a child not to tell anyone what happened. The court reasoned that intent “‘to kill may be inferred’” from facts including the use of a deadly weapon, injury to the victim, and attempts to hide evidence. It also held that the 29-year, 8-month minimum sentence for AWIM was reasonable and proportionate because it fell within the guidelines range, the trial court considered the offense and offender, and the circumstances included life-threatening injuries and danger to the children. Affirmed.

Member claims against a union related to seniority loss; Duty of fair representation (DFR); Goolsby v Detroit; Promissory estoppel; Tortious interference with a business relationship; Hope Network Rehab Servs v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n; Statute of limitations; Effect of a bankruptcy court ruling; In re Detroit (Bankr ED MI); Breach of contract claims against an employer; Detroit Fire Fighters Association Local 344 (DFFA); Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

The court held in one of these two cases on appeal that the union defendants were entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff-Brown’s DFR, promissory estoppel, and tortious interference with a business relationship claims. In the other case, it held that the City defendants were entitled to summary disposition of Brown and plaintiff-Ferguson’s breach of contract claims. Plaintiffs were City firefighters and members of defendant-DFFA. They went on “duty disability retirement” due to injuries before the 2014 CBA became operative. That CBA “affected the seniority status of firefighters who had taken duty disability retirement” and was incorporated into the City’s plan entered in its bankruptcy case. Plaintiffs’ suit asserted “claims primarily related to their loss of seniority.” On appeal, in Docket No. 371453, the court rejected the union defendants’ statute of limitations argument as to Brown’s DFR claim. But it held that the trial court erred in denying them summary disposition because his demotion did not breach the CBA given that “seniority was a part of the selection process for the promotion, and Brown had no seniority” when he returned to work after an 18-year absence. Further, because his “DFR claim involved the seniority provisions of the 2014 CBA, it should have been dismissed pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s ruling.” The court also held that the trial court erred in not dismissing his promissory estoppel claims. He was “not entitled to relief by recasting his” dismissed just cause claim as one for promissory estoppel. In addition, the union defendants were entitled to summary disposition on his tortious interference claim because he failed to show that their “conduct was wrongful per se.” As to Docket No. 371516, Ferguson’s contract breach claim against the City defendants failed because he did not “provide any support for his contention that [their] failure to return him to work within 25 years of his anniversary date was disciplinary.” His promissory estoppel claim was the same in substance as his dismissed just cause claim (a ruling he did not appeal), and Brown’s promissory estoppel claim against these defendants failed for the same reason as the one against the union defendants did. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the union defendants summary disposition in Docket No. 371453 and the City defendants in Docket No. 371516.

Boundary dispute; Quiet title; Acquiescence; 15-year period; MCL 600.5801(4); Tacking; Predecessors in title; Killips v Mannisto; Houston v Mint Group LLC; Bench trial; Exclusion of exhibit; MRE 1006 (summary of voluminous writings)

The court held that plaintiffs established title to the disputed boundary strip by acquiescence and that defendants failed to show error in the exclusion of their handwritten-note exhibit. Plaintiffs sued to quiet title to a strip of land between neighboring properties, alleging acquiescence, among other claims, after defendants replaced a fence and claimed the disputed area. After a bench trial, the trial court quieted title in plaintiffs’ favor. On appeal, the court held that plaintiffs could tack their predecessors’ use to satisfy the 15-year period because “‘[t]he acquiescence of predecessors in title can be tacked,’” and privity is not required. The court next held that the evidence supported acquiescence because the prior owners and defendants treated the privacy fence as the boundary from 1996 to 2011, the prior owners planted flowers and shrubs along the fence, and defendants did not use the disputed strip or object. Plaintiffs then continued to landscape and use the strip, and by the time defendants relied on a later survey, the required period had already run because a “boundary line long acquiesced in” should not be disturbed by new surveys. The court also held that defendants failed to show error as to Exhibit R because it contained “exact reproductions” of selected notebook entries rather than a summary of voluminous material under MRE 1006. Affirmed.

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine (arising from the First Amendment); Winkler v Marist Fathers of Detroit; First Protestant Reformed Church of Grand Rapids v DeWolf; Defamation; False-light invasion of privacy; Perrone v Bugarin (Unpub); Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Concert of action; Breach of contract; American Muslim Diversity Association (AMDA)

Holding that the trial court correctly ruled that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred plaintiff-Ahmed’s breach of contract and tort claims, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. He worked for defendant-AMDA as an assistant Imam until its board of trustees terminated the contractual relationship after domestic violence allegations were made against him. He asserted claims for breach of contract, defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, IIED, and concert of action. On appeal, the court concluded the “trial court correctly determined that resolution of Ahmed’s breach-of-contract claim would require [it] to delve into ecclesiastical matters. The contract stated that the board of trustees reserved the right to cancel the contract ‘if there are any violation [sic] in contractual agreement, any activities against principles of Islam, or any activity subversive to the mission and objective of AMDA by the Qa’ari Imam as determined by the’” board. While the board found “the domestic-violence allegations could not be substantiated, it may have also determined that Ahmed violated the contract or engaged in activity contrary to the principles of Islam or subversive to AMDA’s mission and objective. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the trial court from examining and second-guessing the decision of the board of trustees that it would be best for AMDA if Ahmed no longer served as an assistant Imam.” As to his tort claims, the court found that analyzing the “defamation and false-light invasion of privacy claims would require determining the truth or falsity of defendants’ alleged statements calling into question whether Ahmed was qualified to perform the duties of an assistant Imam. [He] alleged that defendants falsely stated he was not so qualified and lacked the character required and expected of an assistant Imam.” The court “will not second-guess a religious entity’s investigation and evaluation of allegations involving its leaders or its method of communicating matters relevant to such allegations.” Plaintiff’s IIED and concert of action claims also failed because they involved “evaluating defendants’ decisions and method of reaching” them.

Boundary dispute; Quiet title; Acquiescence; 15-year period; MCL 600.5801(4); Tacking; Predecessors in title; Killips v Mannisto; Houston v Mint Group LLC; Bench trial; Exclusion of exhibit; MRE 1006 (summary of voluminous writings)

The court held that plaintiffs established title to the disputed boundary strip by acquiescence and that defendants failed to show error in the exclusion of their handwritten-note exhibit. Plaintiffs sued to quiet title to a strip of land between neighboring properties, alleging acquiescence, among other claims, after defendants replaced a fence and claimed the disputed area. After a bench trial, the trial court quieted title in plaintiffs’ favor. On appeal, the court held that plaintiffs could tack their predecessors’ use to satisfy the 15-year period because “‘[t]he acquiescence of predecessors in title can be tacked,’” and privity is not required. The court next held that the evidence supported acquiescence because the prior owners and defendants treated the privacy fence as the boundary from 1996 to 2011, the prior owners planted flowers and shrubs along the fence, and defendants did not use the disputed strip or object. Plaintiffs then continued to landscape and use the strip, and by the time defendants relied on a later survey, the required period had already run because a “boundary line long acquiesced in” should not be disturbed by new surveys. The court also held that defendants failed to show error as to Exhibit R because it contained “exact reproductions” of selected notebook entries rather than a summary of voluminous material under MRE 1006. Affirmed.