Attorney sanctions; Artificial intelligence (AI); Fabricated legal authority; MCR 1.109(E); MCR 7.216(C); Nonexistent cases; New trial motion; Juror misconduct; MCR 2.611; Affidavit requirement; Sherry v East Suburban Football League; Vexatious appeal; Attorney fees

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or evidentiary hearing, but that sanctions were required because plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly submitted “fabricated and unsupported legal authority” generated through AI. Plaintiff sought a new trial after a medical-malpractice jury found defendant was not negligent, alleging juror misconduct based on an off-the-record post-verdict discussion. The court first held that the motion was procedurally defective because the alleged facts did “not appear in the record,” so MCR 2.611(D)(1) required affidavits, but plaintiff’s attorney affidavits “were not notarized and were therefore invalid.” The court further held that plaintiff failed to show any alleged misconduct “materially affected her substantial rights,” particularly where her criminal-law presumption-of-prejudice authorities did not apply to a civil medical malpractice action. The court then held that counsel’s citation conduct violated MCR 1.109(E)(5). Counsel cited nonexistent cases in the trial court, again cited a nonexistent case on appeal, cited real cases for propositions “they do not support,” and filed an AI-assisted Notice of Correction that repeated “the same kind of verification failure.” The court held that AI may be useful, but lawyers “remain responsible for the filings they sign and submit” and must verify that authorities exist and support the propositions asserted. The court noted that there was no published Michigan case law on “the appropriate sanction under MCR 7.216(C)(1) or MCR 1.109(E)(6) for an attorney’s submission of fabricated or unsupported legal authority resulting from the misuse of generative” AI but courts in other jurisdictions “have recognized that such conduct may warrant monetary sanctions[.]” Because counsel’s brief “grossly disregarded the requirements of fair presentation” and violated court rules, the court remanded for a determination of defendant’s actual damages and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, payable by plaintiff’s counsel personally. Affirmed and remanded.

Sentencing; Cruel or unusual punishment; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; Second-degree murder; Parolable life sentence; Young adult offender; People v Taylor; People v Parks; People v Stovall; Motion for relief from judgment

The court held that defendant’s parolable life sentence for second-degree murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16 under current binding caselaw. Defendant was 20 years old when she was involved in a shooting that resulted in two deaths. She pled guilty to two counts of open murder, was convicted after a degree hearing of two counts of second-degree murder, and received concurrent parolable life sentences. On remand from the Supreme Court to consider her appeal in light of Taylor, the court first held that no current case required relief for a 20-year-old convicted of second-degree murder who received an individualized, nonmandatory parolable life sentence. Parks did not apply because it involved “first-degree murder, mandatory life without the possibility of parole, and applied only to 18-year-olds[.]” Stovall was closer because it involved “a parolable life sentence for second-degree murder,” but it applied only to “actual juveniles[.]” And Taylor did not alter the result because, although it applied to 19- and 20-year-olds, it involved “first-degree murder and mandatory life without parole.” The court next declined to extend those cases because defendant relied only on the “bare fact” that she was 20 years old when she participated in murder and offered no factual record, expert report, expert testimony, lay testimony, or request for judicial notice to support a broader constitutional rule. Because the record contained no basis to conclude that either the Legislature or the sentencing judge acted in an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual manner, the trial court did not reversibly err by denying relief. Affirmed.

Second-degree murder; Sufficiency of the evidence; Malice; Self-defense; MCL 780.972; Prosecutorial error; Facts not in evidence; Sympathy; Evidentiary error; Relevance; MRE 602; MRE 401; MRE 403

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s second-degree murder conviction, that the challenged prosecutorial remarks did not deny him a fair trial, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony about a knife sheath. Defendant was convicted after his roommate died from sharp-force trauma to the neck. Defendant claimed he acted in self-defense during a struggle over a knife. On appeal, the court first held that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of causation and malice because defendant admitted during the 911 call that “the knife slit [the victim’s] throat,” DNA evidence connected both men to the knife, and the victim’s injuries involved severe trauma, multiple “tails” from the wound, and a separate stab wound to the back of the neck. The court also held that the prosecution disproved self-defense because the physical evidence did not support defendant’s claim that “the knife just came across” the victim’s neck, and the evidence of multiple controlled attacks allowed a rational juror to find that deadly force was not necessary. The court next rejected defendant’s prosecutorial-error claims, holding that the prosecutor’s remarks about immobilization, an attack from behind, the absence of another knife, defendant’s injuries, and the amount of blood at the scene were either supported by the evidence or were reasonable inferences from it. The court further held that any potential error was cured by instructions that the lawyers’ arguments were not evidence and that the jury must not be influenced by sympathy. Finally, the court held that the trial court properly allowed the victim’s mother to testify that she later found a knife sheath in the basement where defendant lived because her testimony was based on personal knowledge, was relevant to whether defendant used a knife, and was not unfairly prejudicial in light of stronger evidence connecting him to the knife. Affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Plea negotiations; Cross-examination; Effect of defense counsel’s illness during the trial; Investigation of the case

Holding that the trial court did not err in denying defendant-Gilliam’s motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed his CSC I convictions. He asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide information about a plea offer, failing “to properly cross-examine the complaining witnesses,” failing to reasonably investigate the case, and due to her illness. Regarding the first claim, as there was no record evidence “that trial counsel failed to properly inform Gilliam of the terms of the plea agreement, he” could not establish the factual predicate of the claim. Further, “without evidence to prove that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the plea-bargaining stage,” the court could not review whether her “advice prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings.” As to the cross-examination claim, the transcripts supported “the trial court’s recollection that trial counsel raised doubt about the credibility of the witnesses against Gilliam at trial. During” her cross-examination of victim-CD, “CD admitted that her police report was written in part by someone else, and that the report had been changed multiple times by an officer. Trial counsel also repeatedly noted discrepancies between information written in reports and statements made by those witnesses at trial. Trial counsel attempted to cast doubt on the lab results when she engaged in a line of questioning to suggest that Gilliam’s DNA could have been transferred via skin or sweat onto CD. And finally, although her line of questioning was ultimately objected to, trial counsel did attempt to question the thoroughness and completeness of the investigating officer’s reports during her cross-examination of” an officer. The court further concluded that the trial court did not clearly err “in finding that trial counsel’s investigation into the factual background of the case was adequate.” And it found that her “health issues did not lead her performance to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness or affect the outcome of the proceedings.”

Challenges to candidate affidavits of identity (AOIs); MCL 168.558(2) (correct legal name requirement); Burden of proof; MCL 168.558(3); Purported Michigan Campaign Finance Act violations; Standing; MCL 169.215(17); Preelection campaign statement; MCL 169.233(2)(a); Alleged late fee owed

As to one of the two mayoral candidates at issue, the court held that plaintiff failed to establish that one candidate’s (nonparty-R) AOI violated MCL 168.558(2). As to the other candidate (nonparty-M), it concluded that even assuming plaintiff had standing, the trial court correctly rejected his challenges based on purported Michigan Campaign Finance Act violations on the merits. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s requests for relief as to these two candidates, leaving them on the ballot. His challenge as to R arose from the spelling of her first name on her AOI. In the first line, it was spelled “Elen.” Further down the form she stated she wished it to appear on the ballot spelled “Elene.” Plaintiff alleged the latter was the correct spelling and as a result, the AOI was “fatally defective[.]” He asserted that he offered uncontroverted proof that her first name was Elene. But all he provided were “a few documents filed in a federal case many years ago.” They did not prove the correct spelling of R’s “first name, let alone that [R] is not using the name she was given at birth. It is entirely possible that the spelling of [R’s] name on the few documents plaintiff found is incorrect.” He bore the burden to produce “a sufficient record to prove his claim” and the court held that the record he presented did not meet this burden. As to M, he argued she “must be disqualified because she did not file a preelection campaign statement before the [8/22] primary election, or a postelection campaign statement for” that election. But “she did file the preelection statement; it was the Wayne County Clerk who then ‘deleted’ it and directed [M] to amend it to reference the [11/22] general election.” Further, the Clerk was correct “that the statement was not required as to the” primary election. M intended to be a candidate on the primary ballot. But “there was no mayoral election placed on this ballot. [M] could not have been a candidate or nominee for Highland Park Mayor in that particular election, as the office did not appear on that ballot at all. As a result, MCL 169.233(2)(a) did not require [M] to file a preelection or postelection campaign statement” as to that primary election. As to plaintiff’s assertion that M “owes a $25 late fee related to a 2011 campaign filing[,]” the record was “inadequate to show that the fee was not paid.”

Attorney sanctions; Artificial intelligence (AI); Fabricated legal authority; MCR 1.109(E); MCR 7.216(C); Nonexistent cases; New trial motion; Juror misconduct; MCR 2.611; Affidavit requirement; Sherry v East Suburban Football League; Vexatious appeal; Attorney fees

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or evidentiary hearing, but that sanctions were required because plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly submitted “fabricated and unsupported legal authority” generated through AI. Plaintiff sought a new trial after a medical-malpractice jury found defendant was not negligent, alleging juror misconduct based on an off-the-record post-verdict discussion. The court first held that the motion was procedurally defective because the alleged facts did “not appear in the record,” so MCR 2.611(D)(1) required affidavits, but plaintiff’s attorney affidavits “were not notarized and were therefore invalid.” The court further held that plaintiff failed to show any alleged misconduct “materially affected her substantial rights,” particularly where her criminal-law presumption-of-prejudice authorities did not apply to a civil medical malpractice action. The court then held that counsel’s citation conduct violated MCR 1.109(E)(5). Counsel cited nonexistent cases in the trial court, again cited a nonexistent case on appeal, cited real cases for propositions “they do not support,” and filed an AI-assisted Notice of Correction that repeated “the same kind of verification failure.” The court held that AI may be useful, but lawyers “remain responsible for the filings they sign and submit” and must verify that authorities exist and support the propositions asserted. The court noted that there was no published Michigan case law on “the appropriate sanction under MCR 7.216(C)(1) or MCR 1.109(E)(6) for an attorney’s submission of fabricated or unsupported legal authority resulting from the misuse of generative” AI but courts in other jurisdictions “have recognized that such conduct may warrant monetary sanctions[.]” Because counsel’s brief “grossly disregarded the requirements of fair presentation” and violated court rules, the court remanded for a determination of defendant’s actual damages and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, payable by plaintiff’s counsel personally. Affirmed and remanded.

Medical malpractice vs ordinary negligence; Professional relationship; Medical judgment; Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc; Licensed health facility; MCL 600.5838a; Fiduciary duty; Corporate directors; Murphy v Inman; Fraudulent concealment

In consolidated appeals, the court held that plaintiffs’ claims against defendant-hospital sounded in medical malpractice, not ordinary negligence, and that their claims against the individual defendants also failed. Plaintiffs sued after their child (TW) was seriously injured during spinal-fusion surgery when the bur at the end of a drill allegedly “skipped” and lacerated tissue covering the spinal cord. In the first appeal, the court held that the trial court properly dismissed the ordinary-negligence claim against the hospital (Corewell) because the hospital was a licensed health facility capable of malpractice, the injury occurred during surgery and thus “within the course of a professional relationship,” and the claim raised questions of medical judgment outside common knowledge. The court reasoned that expert testimony would be needed to explain the surgery, the drill and bur, the drill’s proper function and maintenance, and the plausibility of the doctor’s “explanation of the malfunction.” In the second appeal, the court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ later action against hospital officers, directors, and employees was an impermissible collateral attack, but affirmed dismissal on other grounds. The court held that plaintiffs’ theory against the individual defendants depended on their alleged status as hospital employees or agents, and because the allegations “essentially mirror” the allegations against the hospital, they likewise sounded in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence. The court also found that plaintiffs failed to establish a fiduciary-duty claim because they did not show that the individual defendants owed a duty “to act for TW’s benefit rather than for Corewell’s benefit,” and failed to establish fraud because their allegations resembled discovery or spoliation assertions, not fraudulent concealment. Affirmed.

Personal jurisdiction under the civil RICO statute; 18 USC § 1965(b); FedRCivP 4(k)(1)(C); Venue; § 1965(a); Whether “the ends of justice” required the Michigan district court to exercise jurisdiction

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court lacked authority to exercise personal jurisdiction in this civil RICO case where there were no “minimum contacts” established as to a group of defendants, and “the ends of justice” did not require that they be sued in Michigan. The Michigan putative class members sued one defendant (Waller) residing in North Carolina “and nine other defendants (the proliferous Trivest entities) residing in Florida” under RICO and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act for allegedly engaging in racketeering when selling them solar panel systems. Venue was proper “in Michigan because Waller undisputedly has minimum contacts there. But” it was undisputed “that the Trivest defendants have zero contacts with Michigan[.]” The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that it had personal jurisdiction over the Trivest defendants under § 1965(b), “which expands a district court’s personal jurisdiction when ‘it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court[].’” On appeal, the court first reviewed the venue provision, § 1965(a), which provides that “a civil RICO action may be ‘instituted’ only in a district where a defendant ‘resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.’” It held that such an action can only be brought in a district where “minimum contacts” are established as to at least one defendant. Here, Waller had such contacts, but the other nine defendants had none. The question then became “whether the ‘ends of justice require’ that this suit be litigated in Michigan—when all nine of the Trivest defendants reside in Florida, and Waller’s company (which sold the solar-panel systems to these plaintiffs) apparently had an office there.” The court concluded “that neither the plaintiffs nor the district court . . . have identified reasons that ‘require’ litigation of this suit in Michigan.” The court held “that interests of convenience cannot ‘require,’ for purposes of § 1965(b), that a defendant be haled into a district in which it lacks minimum contacts.” Thus, it reversed the order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss and remanded. Further, as “the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Trivest defendants . . . it lacked power to decide their motions to compel arbitration” and the court vacated the order denying those motions.

Medical malpractice vs ordinary negligence; Professional relationship; Medical judgment; Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc; Licensed health facility; MCL 600.5838a; Fiduciary duty; Corporate directors; Murphy v Inman; Fraudulent concealment

In consolidated appeals, the court held that plaintiffs’ claims against defendant-hospital sounded in medical malpractice, not ordinary negligence, and that their claims against the individual defendants also failed. Plaintiffs sued after their child (TW) was seriously injured during spinal-fusion surgery when the bur at the end of a drill allegedly “skipped” and lacerated tissue covering the spinal cord. In the first appeal, the court held that the trial court properly dismissed the ordinary-negligence claim against the hospital (Corewell) because the hospital was a licensed health facility capable of malpractice, the injury occurred during surgery and thus “within the course of a professional relationship,” and the claim raised questions of medical judgment outside common knowledge. The court reasoned that expert testimony would be needed to explain the surgery, the drill and bur, the drill’s proper function and maintenance, and the plausibility of the doctor’s “explanation of the malfunction.” In the second appeal, the court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ later action against hospital officers, directors, and employees was an impermissible collateral attack, but affirmed dismissal on other grounds. The court held that plaintiffs’ theory against the individual defendants depended on their alleged status as hospital employees or agents, and because the allegations “essentially mirror” the allegations against the hospital, they likewise sounded in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence. The court also found that plaintiffs failed to establish a fiduciary-duty claim because they did not show that the individual defendants owed a duty “to act for TW’s benefit rather than for Corewell’s benefit,” and failed to establish fraud because their allegations resembled discovery or spoliation assertions, not fraudulent concealment. Affirmed.

Unjust enrichment claim related to an alleged stormwater overcharge; Wright v Genesee Cnty; Youmans v Charter Twp of Bloomfield; Retained benefit; Distinguishing Ganson v Detroit Pub Sch (Unpub) & Corey v Wayne Cnty (Unpub); Assumpsit; Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA)

In this case involving an alleged stormwater overcharge, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant-Drainage District summary disposition of plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim or in dismissing his assumpsit claim. Plaintiff, a property owner in defendant-Royal Oak, pays the city for water and sewer services. He alleged “that the Drainage District has overcharged the city for stormwater disposal since at least 2017, and the city has passed that overcharge on to its residents.” On appeal, the District argued it should have been granted summary disposition because the complaint did not allege that it “‘retained’ the benefit collected from the putative class, i.e., the alleged stormwater overcharge.” The court disagreed. It found the unpublished cases on which the District relied were distinguishable. Plaintiff here “alleged that the Drainage District received the funds from the alleged overpayments and used the funds to pay the charge that it was assessed by the GLWA. As the trial court noted, the complaint does sufficiently allege that the Drainage District received a benefit from plaintiff (the alleged overpayment), and then used that benefit by applying the funds to pay the Drainage District’s debt to GLWA. The fact that the Drainage District no longer has the specific funds at issue in its possession does not defeat plaintiff’s claim.” It concluded that the fact “the Drainage District already used the benefit to pay its own liabilities to the GLWA does not change the equities as between plaintiff and the Drainage District.” The trial court correctly ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment. As to plaintiff’s cross-appeal, the trial court also correctly dismissed his assumpsit claim because the Michigan Supreme Court has held that this cause of action was abolished. Affirmed and remanded.

Plat dedication restrictions; Right to use a road for installation of water lines; Whether the dedication language was ambiguous; Permanent injunction; Moot issues as to entry of a temporary restraining order & preliminary injunction; Claim for negligent installation of the water lines; No cause of action

The court held that the language of the plat dedication at issue and the survey included in the plat provided evidence of intent that the private roads were available for utility installation. It also concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant-Walby failed to prove a negligence claim against plaintiffs based on their contractor’s actions. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for plaintiffs and the trial court’s order that a permanent injunction issue, as well as the judgment of no cause of action on Walby’s counterclaim. The parties own property in a private plat subdivision. The case arose when plaintiffs sought to install water lines needed to connect their homes to municipal water taps at the west end of the subdivision. The issue on appeal was “the extent of plaintiffs’ right to use Charlen Drive for the installation of their water lines.” Resolving this turned “on the interpretation of the original 1956 dedication.” The court concluded that the dedication language was “clear and unambiguous. It simply provides that the ‘private roads . . . are dedicated to the sole and only use of the lot owners . . . .’ The dedication contains no express prohibition against using Charlen Drive or Florence Court to install public utilities. The plain language of the dedication restricts who may use the private roads, not to what use the private roads may be put.” In addition, nothing in the language mandated “that all public utilities must be installed using the private 6-foot easements running along the north and south borders of the subdivision. Rather, it is the opposite. The plain language of the dedication restricts the use of the easements to utilities. It does not limit the installation of utilities to the private easements.” In his counterclaim, Walby argued that plaintiffs’ contractor (S) “negligently installed the water lines” and proximately caused him damages. The trial court gave multiple reasons for finding no cause of action, including that Walby did not establish that the S “negligently installed the water lines. This finding was not clearly erroneous.” Its finding that the damage to Walby’s private water lines in the excavation process was not due to S’s negligence was also not clearly erroneous. And its finding that “Walby failed to mitigate his damages” was supported by the evidence.

Plat dedication restrictions; Right to use a road for installation of water lines; Whether the dedication language was ambiguous; Permanent injunction; Moot issues as to entry of a temporary restraining order & preliminary injunction; Claim for negligent installation of the water lines; No cause of action

The court held that the language of the plat dedication at issue and the survey included in the plat provided evidence of intent that the private roads were available for utility installation. It also concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant-Walby failed to prove a negligence claim against plaintiffs based on their contractor’s actions. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for plaintiffs and the trial court’s order that a permanent injunction issue, as well as the judgment of no cause of action on Walby’s counterclaim. The parties own property in a private plat subdivision. The case arose when plaintiffs sought to install water lines needed to connect their homes to municipal water taps at the west end of the subdivision. The issue on appeal was “the extent of plaintiffs’ right to use Charlen Drive for the installation of their water lines.” Resolving this turned “on the interpretation of the original 1956 dedication.” The court concluded that the dedication language was “clear and unambiguous. It simply provides that the ‘private roads . . . are dedicated to the sole and only use of the lot owners . . . .’ The dedication contains no express prohibition against using Charlen Drive or Florence Court to install public utilities. The plain language of the dedication restricts who may use the private roads, not to what use the private roads may be put.” In addition, nothing in the language mandated “that all public utilities must be installed using the private 6-foot easements running along the north and south borders of the subdivision. Rather, it is the opposite. The plain language of the dedication restricts the use of the easements to utilities. It does not limit the installation of utilities to the private easements.” In his counterclaim, Walby argued that plaintiffs’ contractor (S) “negligently installed the water lines” and proximately caused him damages. The trial court gave multiple reasons for finding no cause of action, including that Walby did not establish that the S “negligently installed the water lines. This finding was not clearly erroneous.” Its finding that the damage to Walby’s private water lines in the excavation process was not due to S’s negligence was also not clearly erroneous. And its finding that “Walby failed to mitigate his damages” was supported by the evidence.

Child’s best interests; Relative placement; In re Mason; Permanency; Stability; Adoption; Parent’s disappearance; Substance abuse

The court held that the trial court did not err by finding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. After the child’s mother died, respondent was identified as the putative father and later established legal paternity, but the DHHS alleged that he had been using heroin with the mother in the child’s presence when she overdosed and died. Respondent initially made progress on his service plan and had a “very strong bond” with the child, but later disappeared, stopped communicating with the foster-care worker, and could not be located despite petitioner’s efforts. On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly considered the child’s placement with relatives because “a child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination,” but that factor was “not dispositive.” The court explained that the trial court “considered JS’s placement with relatives and properly weighed that factor against termination,” while also recognizing that the relatives were “open to adoption” and had strong bonds with the child, giving her “permanency, stability, and finality.” The court next rejected respondent’s claim that the trial court rushed to terminate his rights because he had been missing since June 2024, the trial court gave him “roughly six months” to reappear before ordering a permanent-custody petition, and by the best-interest ruling he had been missing “for over a year.” Given respondent’s disappearance, substance-abuse concerns, and the child’s stability in a relative placement willing to adopt, the court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred. Affirmed.