The Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC); Vehicle owner petition for a hearing on the reasonableness of incurred towing & storage fees; MCL 257.252a; Timeliness; Noll v Ritzer; “Shall”; Effect of an irregularity in a police department’s compliance with the procedures in MCL 257.252d for validly impounding a vehicle; Notice of abandonment issued by the Secretary of State

The court held that MCL 257.252a requires “that a vehicle owner’s petition challenging the reasonableness of towing or storage fees must be filed within 20 days of the date of a notice of abandonment.” The petition here, filed after that deadline, was untimely and thus, petitioner was “not entitled to a district court hearing and” issuance of an order. Rather, the district court had to dismiss the petition and erred in not doing so. The vehicle was towed from the scene of an accident by respondent at a police department’s request. Petitioner later became the titled owner of the vehicle and “filed a petition in the district court requesting a hearing to determine ‘the reasonableness of the towing/storage fees.’” The district court ruled in respondent’s favor. On appeal, the circuit court ruled in petitioner’s favor. Respondent then appealed to the court, which agreed with respondent that “MCL 257.252a requires a vehicle owner to request a hearing by filing a petition within 20 days after receiving notice of the abandonment of the owner’s vehicle, and because petitioner filed its petition more than 20 days after receiving this notice, the district court erred by holding a hearing and issuing an order on the petition.” MCL 257.252a(6) states in part that: “A request for a hearing shall be made by filing a petition with the court specified in the notice described in subsection (5)(c) within 20 days after the date of the notice.” The court held that this provision “mandates that a request for a hearing be made within 20 days after the date of the notice of abandonment. The mandatory nature of the 20-day filing requirement is reiterated elsewhere in MCL 257.252a, illustrating the Legislature’s emphasis on the necessity of compliance with this deadline.” Petitioner did not file its petition until “36 days after the Secretary of State provided” the notice. The court found that nothing in the MVC “indicates that an irregularity in complying with the procedures outlined in MCL 257.252d excuses a vehicle’s owner from complying with the” deadline. And even if the notice was missing certain elements, the court saw “no reason why this would delay the petition-filing deadline” as petitioner proposed. It vacated the circuit court’s order reversing the district court’s order and remanded with instructions for the circuit court to “vacate the district court’s order and remand for the petition to be dismissed with prejudice.”

Chapter 13 confirmation; 11 USC § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I); Whether the provisions of § 1325(a) are mandatory; Shaw v Aurgroup Fin Credit Union; Ineligibility for a discharge under chapter 13 due to a previous Chapter 7 discharge; § 1328(f); Carroll v Sanders (In re Sanders); The three options for dealing with allowed secured claims under § 1325(a)(5); Whether the secured creditor’s non-acceptance of the plan prevented the bankruptcy court from confirming it; Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP)

The BAP held that absent a secured claim holder’s acceptance or the surrender of the secured property, the bankruptcy court could not confirm a chapter 13 plan that provided for the holder to “retain its lien until the earlier of payment in full of the underlying debt under applicable non-bankruptcy law or completion of plan payments.” Thus, it reversed the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of Debtor-Tucker’s chapter 13 plan, and remanded. After receiving a discharge under chapter 7, Tucker filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy. Appellant-secured creditor (Santander) had a lien on Tucker’s vehicle and objected to her proposed plan, which sought to modify the interest rate on their contract. Under § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I), “unless a secured creditor accepts the plan, the secured creditor is entitled to retain its lien ‘until the earlier of . . . the payment of the underlying debt determined under nonbankruptcy law; or . . . discharge under’” § 1328. As § 1328(f) rendered Tucker “ineligible for a chapter 13 discharge, she could not technically satisfy” § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I). Thus, she “proposed a creative alternative: Santander would retain its lien until the completion of all plan payments, not the entry of the chapter 13 discharge.” Santander objected, arguing that she was “rewriting” the statute, and that without its acceptance, the plan could not be confirmed. The bankruptcy court overruled the objection, and while acknowledging that Shaw held that § 1325(a) is “mandatory,” still confirmed the plan. The BAP held that § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) unambiguously “requires that a secured creditor either retain its lien until its allowed secured claim is paid in full under applicable non-bankruptcy law or the discharge is entered under” § 1328. These “are the only two possible events in the” statutory text that trigger “release of a secured creditor’s lien.” The BAP concluded that, “without Santander’s acceptance, the Debtor was not permitted” to modify § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I)’s text “by essentially adding ‘(cc) completion of all payments under the plan,’ a non-existent provision.” Shaw, in which the “Sixth Circuit unequivocally stated that a bankruptcy court has ‘no discretion’ to depart from the mandatory provisions in” § 1325(a), was controlling.

“Deliberate indifference” due process claim under 42 USC § 1983; Pretrial detainee's suicide; Qualified immunity; Whether defendant-jail social worker “responded unreasonably” to the known suicide risk such that her actions constituted more than “ordinary negligence”; Campbell v Riahi; Lawler v Hardeman Cnty; Whether plaintiff could establish a violation of “clearly established law”

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to defendant-O’Neil, holding that plaintiff-Estate could not offer a case that “clearly established” that her compromise decision regarding suicide-prevention procedures showed “deliberate indifference” to the risk that the Estate’s decedent (Lovell) would kill himself. After a long battle with mental illness, Lovell, a pretrial detainee, committed suicide while in defendant-County’s jail. Despite several precautions to prevent his actions, he successfully killed himself after he was mistakenly given regular bedding instead of the suicide-prevention blanket that O’Neil had ordered for him. His Estate sued individual corrections officers, O’Neil, her employer, and the County under § 1983, alleging that the individual defendants had acted with deliberate indifference to the risk that Lovell would kill himself. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granted all the individual defendants except O’Neil qualified immunity, as well as summary judgment to the employer and county. On her appeal, the court focused on the second element of the qualified immunity analysis—whether “O’Neil violated clearly established law ‘at the time’ she examined Lovell.” It applied the standard that existed when the incident occurred, 2020, when pretrial detainees had to “meet the same constitutional rules as convicted prisoners.” The court knew “of no case that would have ‘put [O’Neil] on notice that’” her compromise solution of removing Lovell from a padded cell and using alternative methods to reduce his agitation, such as the special blanket, “qualified as the type of unreasonable response that could render her liable.” It noted that even “officials who respond ‘carelessly’ to a risk do not necessarily respond in a deliberately indifferent way. And a reasonable person could believe that O’Neil did not respond carelessly.” Thus, she was improperly denied qualified immunity. The court also rejected the Estate’s challenge to its jurisdiction. Remanded.

Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging retaliatory prosecution claims under the First Amendment & malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment; Presumption of “probable cause” created by a grand jury indictment; Municipal liability; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Distinguishing Lozman v City of Riviera Beach

The court held that plaintiff-Petsche’s retaliatory-prosecution and malicious-prosecution claims against the individual defendants failed where he was unable to rebut the presumption of probable cause created by a grand jury indictment. The retaliatory-prosecution claim against defendant-City also failed as the court found that the case on which he relied, Lozman, was legally and factually distinguishable. Petsche, a former member of the City Council, sued the City, defendant-Mayor, and other city officials under § 1983 for allegedly engaging in retaliation for actions he took during his tenure on the Council. Petsche was in the roofing business, and the company that was constructing a new police station chose his company as a subcontractor. Petsche voted on many issues related to the construction process. When the Mayor discovered Petsche’s involvement, he investigated and then wrote to the Ohio Ethics Commission, which referred the matter to the prosecutor’s office. Petsche was indicted by a grand jury but subsequently acquitted after a bench trial. He claimed that the individual defendants were aware of his roofing business and intended to punish him for his position on a city debt issue. The district court granted all defendants summary judgment on all claims. Petsche only appealed as to his § 1983 retaliatory-prosecution and malicious-prosecution claims. The court held that his claims against the individual defendants failed where he was unable to rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the grand jury indictment. A grand jury indictment establishes probable cause. A plaintiff can rebut probable cause by offering “substantial evidence that the indictment was tainted.” But the court held that he failed to do so. It also concluded that his Monell claim against the City was properly dismissed, rejecting his reliance on Lozman. That case involved a retaliatory arrest and the “Supreme Court has not extended Lozman’s retaliatory-arrest rule to the retaliatory-prosecution context.” Thus, the court remained “bound by the default rule requiring a retaliatory-prosecution plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of probable cause.” It added that he offered no evidence undermining “the presumption of regularity by the prosecutor. This materially distinguishes this case from the circumstances in Lozman.” Affirmed.

The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act (UEFJA); MCL 691.1173; Whether Michigan trial courts can decline to enforce a foreign judgment by using MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); The Full Faith & Credit Clause

As a matter of first impression, the court held that the UEFJA does not authorize “Michigan trial courts to decline to enforce a judgment issued by another state’s court by invoking MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f)” when the grounds for doing so would be based on “evaluating the merits of the foreign judgment or its potential conflict with Michigan public policy[.]” Defendants contended that the trial court was authorized under “MCL 691.1173, to use MCR 2.612(C)(1) to refuse to domesticate and enforce” plaintiff’s New York judgment. The court noted that it has “recognized that Michigan courts are required to enforce foreign judgments that undoubtedly violate our state’s public policy.” And it concluded here that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compelled it “to hold that, despite MCL 691.1173’s seemingly broad language, an attack on a foreign judgment made under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) due to disagreement with the merits of that judgment or a conflict with our state’s public policy falls outside of the limited scope of collateral attacks a Michigan court may entertain to the enforceability of a foreign judgment. To hold otherwise would allow MCL 691.1173 and MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) to create a back-door public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause despite the United States Supreme Court’s clarification that no such exception exists.” The court determined that its approach was “consistent with the constitutional-doubt canon of statutory interpretation, which requires us to construe a statute, if it is fairly possible to do so, in such a way as not to violate the Constitution.” In so holding, the court joined its “sister courts in other UEFJA jurisdictions which, from our survey, have uniformly concluded that, beyond challenging jurisdiction, a lack of due process safeguards, and procurement of a judgment by fraud, a motion for relief from judgment may not be used to avoid enforcement of a foreign judgment.” In this case “the trial court had no authority under MCL 691.1173, out of disagreement with the merits of the New York judgment or due to a conflict with Michigan public policy, to decline to enforce the New York judgment by finding relief warranted under MCL 2.612(C)(1)(f).” Thus, it “properly declined to analyze defendants’ challenge to the enforceability of the foreign judgment and hence did not abuse its discretion in denying [their] motion to strike.”

“Deliberate indifference” due process claim under 42 USC § 1983; Pretrial detainee's suicide; Qualified immunity; Whether defendant-jail social worker “responded unreasonably” to the known suicide risk such that her actions constituted more than “ordinary negligence”; Campbell v Riahi; Lawler v Hardeman Cnty; Whether plaintiff could establish a violation of “clearly established law”

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to defendant-O’Neil, holding that plaintiff-Estate could not offer a case that “clearly established” that her compromise decision regarding suicide-prevention procedures showed “deliberate indifference” to the risk that the Estate’s decedent (Lovell) would kill himself. After a long battle with mental illness, Lovell, a pretrial detainee, committed suicide while in defendant-County’s jail. Despite several precautions to prevent his actions, he successfully killed himself after he was mistakenly given regular bedding instead of the suicide-prevention blanket that O’Neil had ordered for him. His Estate sued individual corrections officers, O’Neil, her employer, and the County under § 1983, alleging that the individual defendants had acted with deliberate indifference to the risk that Lovell would kill himself. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granted all the individual defendants except O’Neil qualified immunity, as well as summary judgment to the employer and county. On her appeal, the court focused on the second element of the qualified immunity analysis—whether “O’Neil violated clearly established law ‘at the time’ she examined Lovell.” It applied the standard that existed when the incident occurred, 2020, when pretrial detainees had to “meet the same constitutional rules as convicted prisoners.” The court knew “of no case that would have ‘put [O’Neil] on notice that’” her compromise solution of removing Lovell from a padded cell and using alternative methods to reduce his agitation, such as the special blanket, “qualified as the type of unreasonable response that could render her liable.” It noted that even “officials who respond ‘carelessly’ to a risk do not necessarily respond in a deliberately indifferent way. And a reasonable person could believe that O’Neil did not respond carelessly.” Thus, she was improperly denied qualified immunity. The court also rejected the Estate’s challenge to its jurisdiction. Remanded.

Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging retaliatory prosecution claims under the First Amendment & malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment; Presumption of “probable cause” created by a grand jury indictment; Municipal liability; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Distinguishing Lozman v City of Riviera Beach

The court held that plaintiff-Petsche’s retaliatory-prosecution and malicious-prosecution claims against the individual defendants failed where he was unable to rebut the presumption of probable cause created by a grand jury indictment. The retaliatory-prosecution claim against defendant-City also failed as the court found that the case on which he relied, Lozman, was legally and factually distinguishable. Petsche, a former member of the City Council, sued the City, defendant-Mayor, and other city officials under § 1983 for allegedly engaging in retaliation for actions he took during his tenure on the Council. Petsche was in the roofing business, and the company that was constructing a new police station chose his company as a subcontractor. Petsche voted on many issues related to the construction process. When the Mayor discovered Petsche’s involvement, he investigated and then wrote to the Ohio Ethics Commission, which referred the matter to the prosecutor’s office. Petsche was indicted by a grand jury but subsequently acquitted after a bench trial. He claimed that the individual defendants were aware of his roofing business and intended to punish him for his position on a city debt issue. The district court granted all defendants summary judgment on all claims. Petsche only appealed as to his § 1983 retaliatory-prosecution and malicious-prosecution claims. The court held that his claims against the individual defendants failed where he was unable to rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the grand jury indictment. A grand jury indictment establishes probable cause. A plaintiff can rebut probable cause by offering “substantial evidence that the indictment was tainted.” But the court held that he failed to do so. It also concluded that his Monell claim against the City was properly dismissed, rejecting his reliance on Lozman. That case involved a retaliatory arrest and the “Supreme Court has not extended Lozman’s retaliatory-arrest rule to the retaliatory-prosecution context.” Thus, the court remained “bound by the default rule requiring a retaliatory-prosecution plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of probable cause.” It added that he offered no evidence undermining “the presumption of regularity by the prosecutor. This materially distinguishes this case from the circumstances in Lozman.” Affirmed.

Petition to set aside prior convictions under the Setting Aside Convictions Act (SACA); “Serious misdemeanors” within the meaning of MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii); “Crime” (MCL 780.752(1)(a)); “Enumerated subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)”; “Misdemeanor”

The court held that the trial court correctly ruled that defendant’s “two misdemeanor convictions that were initially charged as felonies constituted ‘serious misdemeanors’ within the meaning of MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii).” Thus, it affirmed the order denying in part her “petition to set aside her prior convictions under the SACA[.]” The court determined that the “trial court properly concluded that ‘enumerated in subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)’ modified only ‘serious misdemeanor’ in MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii). That subparagraph is thus properly read as defining a ‘serious misdemeanor’ as including a violation charged as a crime but reduced to or pleaded to as a misdemeanor.” The court noted that defendant’s “convictions for false pretenses and embezzlement, while misdemeanors, were originally charged as ‘crimes’ within the meaning of MCL 780.752(1)(a). Those misdemeanor convictions” thus constituted “‘serious misdemeanors’ within the meaning of MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxiii), and [she] could not have those convictions set aside until the waiting period in MCL 780.621d(2) had elapsed (which it had not done when [she] applied for her convictions to be set aside).” The court found that its “conclusion that the phrase ‘enumerated in subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)’ in MCL 780.811(1)(a)(xxii) modifies only ‘serious misdemeanor’ is bolstered by application of the last-antecedent rule. That rule provides that, in general, ‘a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the last antecedent, unless something in the subject matter or dominant purpose requires a different interpretation.’” Applying the rule in this case supported that ‘“enumerated in subparagraphs (i) to (xxii)’ should be read to modify only ‘serious misdemeanor’ as the last antecedent.” The court concluded that applying the rule here was “not perfunctory but simply supports the best reading of the statute . . . and nothing in the statute suggests that a different interpretation should control.”

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request admission of all of the police interview; MRE 106; Rule of completeness; Prejudice; Prosecutorial misconduct; Misleading the jury during closing argument

Concluding that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and his prosecutorial misconduct claim failed, the court affirmed his convictions of second-degree murder, felony-firearm, FIP, and carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent. Defendant faulted “his trial counsel for stipulating to permit the jury to hear some, but not all, of the statement that he gave to law-enforcement officers following his arrest in Illinois.” The court agreed “with the trial court's assessment that it was unlikely that defendant would flee Michigan in fear for his life because of the pending drug charge.” Although “the officers did not bring up the shootings until later in the interview, defendant was aware that he was implicated in a much more serious crime than the drug-possession case.” The court found that counsel “did not render deficient representation by deciding that the omitted portions of defendant's interview would be more harmful than helpful to the defense.” It held that the fact that “defense counsel engaged in sound trial strategy by stipulating to admit only portions of the interview is especially clear when considering that the prosecutor did not emphasize defendant’s question about getting ‘caught’ until her closing argument. Defense counsel was not aware until after the close of evidence that the portion of the interview in which defendant referred to getting ‘caught’ would be highlighted for the jury.” Defendant further insisted “that his counsel should have moved to admit his statements during the police interview denying guilt.” The court concluded “that counsel's decision not to seek admission of that portion of the interview did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Finally, to the extent defendant suggested “the jury should have heard the portion of the police interview in which defendant indicated that ‘quite a few guys’ also went by the nickname ‘Chicago,’ [he] cannot show either deficient performance or prejudice because that fact was supported by evidence at other points in the trial.” He also couldn’t “establish prejudice, so the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a new trial or a Ginther hearing on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Sentencing; Motion for early termination of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e)(1); Whether the district court properly considered the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors; United States v Evans (6th Cir order); Whether a district court can employ a blanket rule requiring a defendant to complete a certain proportion of their supervised release

In this consolidated appeal of two motions for early termination of supervised release, the court held for the first time in this circuit that “district courts cannot employ a blanket rule requiring defendants to complete a certain proportion of their supervised-release term without conducting an individualized assessment of the relevant § 3553(a) factors[.]” Defendant-Collins pled guilty to a drug conspiracy charge and was sentenced to 180 months in prison and 8 years of supervised release. He moved for early termination of his release under § 3583(e)(1) three times. The district court denied all three motions, even though it allowed in its First Order that “further supervision appeared unnecessary to deter Collins or to protect the public.’” On the second motion, in a one-paragraph order it noted that Collins had yet to complete half of his supervised-release term, and that it had a custom of requiring that at least half the supervision term be served before a defendant’s request for early termination will be considered. In denying his third motion, it rejected his argument challenging the “fifty-percent custom.” It explained “that ‘the need to adequately deter criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes’” were the factors underlying the custom. Collins argued on appeal that its methodology did not properly consider the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The court noted that it had “yet to address head-on the propriety of a district court’s ‘custom’ not to consider motions for early termination of supervised release before at least fifty percent of a defendant’s supervised-release term has elapsed.” Doing so here, it held that this is improper. A defendant’s portion of time “served cannot be the sole animating force behind a court’s early-termination decision—[§ 3583(e)(1)] mandates that such decisions flow from individualized inquiries based on the relevant § 3553(a) factors. A blanket rule, or custom, is not individualized.” The court also noted that the district court’s statements in the Third Orders related to deterrence and public protection “directly contradict[ed]” its statement in the First Order, and it did not explain “why it changed its mind. Not did it offer any other § 3553(a) factor to which the proportion of the term completed is relevant.” Reversed and remanded.

The district court’s rejection of a plea agreement; FedRCrimP 11(c)(1)(C) & (c)(3)(A); Whether the district court exercised “sound judicial discretion” when rejecting the agreement; Deference to the government’s plea bargaining choices; Sentencing; Application of the five level enhancement under USSG § 4B1.5(b) for engaging “in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct”

The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of defendant-Vannelli’s plea agreement, concluding the district court “provided sound, case-specific reasons for rejecting” it. Further, the district court properly applied the § 4B1.5(b) enhancement in sentencing him. Vannelli pled guilty to four charges related to the sexual abuse of a minor. He entered into a plea agreement for a sentence of 180 months. The district court chose to review the PSR before deciding whether to accept the agreement. The PSR recommended a 324-to-405-month sentence, which included a five-level enhancement for engaging “‘in a “pattern of activity” involving prohibited sexual conduct.’” The district court rejected the agreement, finding the sentence inadequate. Vannelli did not withdraw his plea but proceeded to sentencing where the district court imposed a sentence of 252 months in prison followed by lifetime supervised release. He argued that it erred by rejecting his plea agreement and miscalculated his Guidelines range by improperly applying the § 4B1.5(b) enhancement. As to the former, he argued that the district court failed to exercise “sound judicial discretion” when rejecting the agreement. The court disagreed, finding that the district court “identified and explained plenty of sound and individualized reasons for” doing so. It “emphasized Vannelli’s knowledge of the victim’s age” (13) and the need to protect the public. Without “law enforcement’s prompt and effective intervention, Vannelli ‘would have traveled four to five hours, raped a 13 year old, taken her back to South Carolina,’ and continued the abuse.” A longer sentence was justified by the need to protect other minors. In addition, it determined “that the proposed sentence would contribute to nationwide sentencing disparities.” The court found Vannelli’s argument that the district court did not give adequate deference to the government’s plea bargain choices was “overstate[d],” noting that a “district court isn’t a mere rubber stamp for the parties’ agreed-upon sentence.” The court also upheld the sentencing enhancement. “Vannelli completed one offense on [9/25/22], when he solicited and received multiple nude photos from the minor victim. He then committed another offense on [9/27/22], when he traveled from South Carolina to Tennessee to have sex with her.” Further, the offenses occurred in different locations, and “differed in kind.”

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); Overtime pay for a third-party home care provider’s live-in workers; Exemptions; 29 USC § 213; Pickens v Hamilton-Ryker IT Sols, LLC; Regulation of the home care industry; The “Live-In Exemption” (29 USC § 213(b)(21); The Companionship Services Exemption (§ 213(a)(15)); The 2013 Third-Party Regulation (29 CFR §§ 552.109(a) & (c)); The Companionship Services Definition (§ 552.6); Validity under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); Loper Bright Enters v Raimondo; “Express delegations”; Whether the express delegation in the Companionship Services Exemption extended to the Live-In Exemption; Long Island Care at Home, Ltd v Coke; Standing to challenge the companionship services definition

In this enforcement proceeding against defendants-Americare Healthcare Services and its owner, the court held that the FLSA’s 2013 Third-Party Regulation (related to third-party employers of home care workers and overtime requirements) was a valid exercise of expressly delegated authority. It also held that neither defendant had standing to challenge § 552.6’s definition of “companionship services.” Americare is a third-party provider of home care services. All of its home care workers are live-in workers. Most of them are hired to serve their family members in their family homes. Plaintiff-Department of Labor brought this proceeding asserting that defendants failed to compensate their employees in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements for a three-year period. “Under a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor in 2013, third-party employers of home care workers are not permitted to claim either the ‘Companionship Services Exemption’ or the ‘Live-In Exemption’ to the” requirements. Defendants argued that this regulation was invalid under the APA. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment. On appeal, the court reviewed the two exemptions. Defendants conceded that the Companionship Services Exemption contained an “express delegation of authority to the Secretary,” and the court found that Coke “clearly compels that conclusion.” It further noted that there “is a significant overlap” between the two exemptions. The court held that the express delegation language in the Companionship Services Exemption created “a clear textual link between the exemptions, extending the discretion afforded to the agency in the Companionship Services Exemption to the Live-In Exemption insofar as they cover the overtime pay of the same employees: live-in companionship service workers.” And applying Loper Bright’s three-step framework, the court held that “the 2013 Third-Party Regulation is a valid exercise of the Department’s expressly delegated authority under the Companionship Services Exemption, including the limited application of that authority to the Live-In Exemption” It also upheld the district court’s ruling that defendants lacked standing to challenge the Companionship Services Definition because their overtime obligations were “traceable to the 2013 Third-Party Regulation (which prevents them from availing themselves of the exemption), not to the Companionship Services Definition.” Affirmed.

The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act (UEFJA); MCL 691.1173; Whether Michigan trial courts can decline to enforce a foreign judgment by using MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); The Full Faith & Credit Clause

As a matter of first impression, the court held that the UEFJA does not authorize “Michigan trial courts to decline to enforce a judgment issued by another state’s court by invoking MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f)” when the grounds for doing so would be based on “evaluating the merits of the foreign judgment or its potential conflict with Michigan public policy[.]” Defendants contended that the trial court was authorized under “MCL 691.1173, to use MCR 2.612(C)(1) to refuse to domesticate and enforce” plaintiff’s New York judgment. The court noted that it has “recognized that Michigan courts are required to enforce foreign judgments that undoubtedly violate our state’s public policy.” And it concluded here that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compelled it “to hold that, despite MCL 691.1173’s seemingly broad language, an attack on a foreign judgment made under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) due to disagreement with the merits of that judgment or a conflict with our state’s public policy falls outside of the limited scope of collateral attacks a Michigan court may entertain to the enforceability of a foreign judgment. To hold otherwise would allow MCL 691.1173 and MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) to create a back-door public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause despite the United States Supreme Court’s clarification that no such exception exists.” The court determined that its approach was “consistent with the constitutional-doubt canon of statutory interpretation, which requires us to construe a statute, if it is fairly possible to do so, in such a way as not to violate the Constitution.” In so holding, the court joined its “sister courts in other UEFJA jurisdictions which, from our survey, have uniformly concluded that, beyond challenging jurisdiction, a lack of due process safeguards, and procurement of a judgment by fraud, a motion for relief from judgment may not be used to avoid enforcement of a foreign judgment.” In this case “the trial court had no authority under MCL 691.1173, out of disagreement with the merits of the New York judgment or due to a conflict with Michigan public policy, to decline to enforce the New York judgment by finding relief warranted under MCL 2.612(C)(1)(f).” Thus, it “properly declined to analyze defendants’ challenge to the enforceability of the foreign judgment and hence did not abuse its discretion in denying [their] motion to strike.”