Breach of contract claim related to brokering the sale of a hockey team; Condition precedent; Harbor Park Mkt, Inc v Gronda; Constructive discharge; Tortious interference with a business expectancy

Holding that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract and tortious interference with a business expectancy claims, the court affirmed. The trial court determined that, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the parties had a contract in which plaintiff would be paid some amount of money if he brokered the sale of” an amateur hockey team defendants owned. But it dismissed his claim because he “failed to satisfy the contract’s terms.” The court agreed. Under the terms of the “alleged contract, plaintiff’s brokering the sale of the team was a condition precedent for” defendants’ performance of the contract—if he brokered the sale, they would pay him “a percentage of the total sale amount.” It was undisputed that he “did not broker the sale of the team, so he failed to satisfy the condition precedent to receiving payment, and he has ‘no cause of action.’” He contended this was one of those times a condition precedent did not have to be satisfied, asserting that “defendants prevented him from satisfying the condition precedent by constructively discharging him.” The court held that he did not create a question of fact on this issue because, considered in “context, a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would not feel compelled to resign.” He never claimed that any of the money defendant-Israel was allegedly refusing to pay him “related to plaintiff’s employment” and he admitted “that he had spoken with Israel about plaintiff training his replacement[.]” And another team employee (R) “confirmed that plaintiff had taken steps to train her to replace him. Additionally, plaintiff’s employment contract was set to expire” four months from when Israel allegedly spoke to R. The court added that he “technically could have still brokered the sale of the team after being constructively discharged, so defendants did not prevent this condition precedent from occurring, even if” they constructively discharged him. As to his tort claim, the court agreed with the trial court “that plaintiff had only presented evidence of his general negotiations with the city, which do not rise to the level of a business expectancy.” Further, even if he “did have a valid business expectancy, he failed to produce any admissible evidence that Israel interfered with it.” The court also agreed with the trial court that he did not show that he was damaged by that alleged interference.

OWI third offense; MCL 257.625(1)(b) & MCL 257.625(9)(c); Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v Trakhtenberg; Hearsay within hearsay; MRE 805; Judicial impartiality; Questioning witnesses; MRE 614(b); People v Stevens

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel because, although counsel performed deficiently by overlooking a favorable statement in a witness’s (R) medical records, defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Further, counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek redaction of the preliminary-exam judge’s questioning because it did not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. Police responded to a rollover crash and found defendant outside the vehicle and R trapped inside. Defendant repeatedly told the officer and the in-car camera that he had been driving and had been drinking, including “I’m going to jail for drinking and driving, I have to accept that” and “I still got behind a wheel and I’m still drinking.” R later testified at the preliminary exam that she, not defendant, had been driving, and that testimony was played for the jury after she died before trial. On appeal, the court held that defense counsel performed deficiently because her failure to find the ambulance record was “an omission rather than a decision to not pursue a certain avenue of defense,” and her failure to present it therefore “cannot be said to have been the result of reasonable trial strategy.” However, it found defendant was not prejudiced because the jury already heard R testify that she told “the ambulance drivers” she was the driver, so the omitted record was largely cumulative and only “slightly bolstered [R’s] claim that she was the driver.” The court also noted that the report was not wholly favorable because it stated that R claimed to be the driver, but the ambulance technician also wrote “it was proven while on scene that [R] was not” the driver. The court lastly held that the preliminary-exam judge’s questions were proper because they “focused on eliciting fuller and more exact testimony” as well as “additional relevant information[.]” The court also found “that the judge’s tone and demeanor were generally neutral[.]” Affirmed.

Alleged Brady v Maryland violation; Materiality; People v Chenault; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to testimony; Failure to ask for a jury instruction on AWIM’s lesser included offense of AWIGBH; Failure to object to the final oral jury instructions

The court concluded that defendant was not entitled to relief based on the alleged Brady violation because there was “not a reasonable probability that disclosure of” the information would have changed the trial’s outcome. But it remanded for an evidentiary hearing on two of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He was convicted of AWIM, FIP, and felony-firearm. His Brady claim concerned the prosecution’s failure to disclose that the shooting victim (P) “had a conviction for an offense that included an element of dishonesty, which defendant could have used at trial to attack [P’s] credibility pursuant to MRE 609(a)(1).” As to whether this evidence was material, there was “no dispute that defendant shot [P] in the back as he was running out of the home. Defendant” admitted this but asserted that “if the jury had reason to question [P’s] credibility, then it could have disbelieved [P’s] ‘self-serving testimony’ that he did not have a gun and there was no physical altercation between” them before P was shot. It was “not apparent what is self-serving about this portion of [P’s] testimony, but regardless, even if the jury did not believe any of [his] testimony, that would not be affirmative evidence that [P] had a gun or that there was a physical altercation between [them] such that defendant could claim self-defense. The jury had to decide the case on the basis of the evidence, and not knowing whether [P] had a gun or whether there was a physical altercation between [P] and defendant is not evidence—it is the absence of evidence.” Thus, the court concluded that, “to any extent that hearing about” P’s prior conviction “may have caused the jury to question [his] credibility, there is still not a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant’s trial would have been different.” The court rejected his ineffective assistance claim related to failure to object to another witness’s testimony. But it found that the evidence supported a jury instruction on AWIGBH and it was unclear why defense counsel did not request it. Defense counsel also “did not object after the trial court failed to orally instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the elements of the offenses during final instructions.” Thus, the court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on these two claims, retaining jurisdiction.

Exclusion of defendant’s concealed pistol license (CPL) application; Relevance; CCW (MCL 750.227); CPL applications; MCL 28.425b(14); Denial of request for a jury instruction on carrying a pistol for a lawful purpose (M Crim JI 11.14); MCL 750.231a(1)(e); Amended information; Due process; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Violation of a discovery order; Prejudice; Failure to meet with defendant to develop a defense; Transporting a firearm in a vehicle (MCL 750.227d); Cumulative error; Second Amendment; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen; People v Langston

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant’s CPL application or in denying his request to include M Crim JI 11.14 in the jury instructions. His right to due process was not violated by the information amendment adding a misdemeanor charge, and the court rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Finally, it held that MCL 750.227 and 750.227d did “not violate the Second Amendment as applied to” him. Thus, it affirmed his CCW and transporting a firearm in a vehicle convictions. As to his due process claim, he did not show “his defense was prejudiced by the amendment adding the” transporting a firearm in a vehicle misdemeanor charge. Next, while he “sought to admit his CPL application into evidence; there is no indication in the record that defendant was prepared to offer a fingerprinting receipt into evidence. Yet . . . MCL 28.425b(14) provides only that the fingerprinting receipt ‘serves as a [CPL]’ after 45 days. Therefore, defendant’s CPL application could not serve as a CPL under the plain language of the statute. Further, even if the CPL application document defendant offered for admission included his fingerprinting receipt, the receipt serves as a CPL only ‘when carried with a state-issued driver license or personal identification card.’ Defendant admitted during the traffic stop and at trial that he did not have a CPL, and he points to no evidence that he was carrying his fingerprinting receipt and either a driver’s license or personal identification card when he was arrested.” He bore the burden to prove he was properly licensed, “and the trial court did not err in determining that the CPL application was not relevant to that issue.” As to the request for M Crim JI 11.14, the court concluded “the trial court did not err in interpreting the jury instruction’s requirements and did not abuse its discretion in determining that it did not apply to the facts of this case.” The pistols here were found in the vehicle’s glove compartment. The court noted that this “could reasonably be described as a ‘closed case or container,’ but not one ‘designed for the storage of firearms.’” Under MCL 750.321a(1)(e), “the ‘closed case’ must be one ‘designed for the storage of firearms.’” Thus, the court held that the “jury instruction is properly interpreted in the same way, to avoid deviating from the applicable law.”

Judicial impartiality; Structural error; People v Stevens; Sufficiency of the evidence; Third-degree child abuse in the presence of another minor; MCL 750.136d(1)(d); Intent; People v Dillard

The court held that defendant was not denied a fair trial because the trial judge did not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality, and that sufficient evidence supported his third-degree child-abuse conviction. The charges arose from a domestic incident in which the children’s mother, JD, and the two older children testified that defendant became enraged, broke part of a bedroom door, pulled JD’s hair, and, while seven-year-old MT was present, kicked 12-year-old BT, pushed him down, stomped on his hand, and struck him in the back of the head with a glass bottle. On appeal, the court explained that piercing the veil of impartiality is structural error. The court held that the judge’s interruptions largely reflected permissible efforts to “promote expedition,” keep testimony relevant, and “clear up confusion.” It found that the judge’s questions about defendant’s car keys were directed at clarifying testimony, not “invad[ing] the prosecutor’s role.” The court also emphasized that the record revealed no facially hostile language, no “skeptical, confrontational approach,” and curative instructions that the jury was not to treat the trial court’s comments or questions as evidence or pay attention to any opinion the jury may think the trial court had. The court next held that the evidence was sufficient because BT testified defendant “slammed” his foot on BT’s finger, and intent could be inferred from defendant’s “use of physical violence” and from “the natural consequences of his acts[.]” Affirmed.

Auto negligence; Comparative fault; MCL 500.3135(2)(b); Huggins v Scripter; Rear-end collision presumption; MCL 257.402(a); White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; Sudden-emergency doctrine; Vander Laan v Miedema; Underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits; Insurance policy interpretation

The court held that, even assuming defendant-driver (Bardo) was negligent because her brake lights and turn signal were not working, plaintiff was more than 50% at fault as a matter of law for rear-ending defendant’s vehicle, so plaintiff’s negligence claim and derivative UIM claim failed. Plaintiff rear-ended Bardo after both vehicles turned westbound. Plaintiff testified that it was “clear and sunny,” nothing obstructed her view, and she did not see Bardo’s vehicle until “we were close,” at which point she swerved and braked but still struck it. The trial court granted summary disposition to Bardo and Home-Owners (plaintiff’s insurer). On appeal, the court held that plaintiff remained presumptively negligent under the rear-end collision statute because she could not invoke the sudden-emergency doctrine. It explained that there was nothing “unusual” about encountering “nonmoving or slow-moving vehicles” on a residential road and that the situation was not “unsuspected” because the potential peril must not have been “in clear view for any significant length of time, and [be] totally unexpected.” The court next found that plaintiff had a clear view the entire time she traveled the 412 feet from the intersection and yet testified that she only saw Bardo’s vehicle when it was “stopped,” showing that “even if Bardo was merely driving very slowly in the lane of travel,” plaintiff still would have rear-ended her. The court therefore concluded that “no reasonable juror could conclude that Bardo was more at fault for the collision than plaintiff,” so MCL 500.3135(2)(b) barred tort recovery and plaintiff’s UIM claim failed as well. Affirmed.

Judicial impartiality; Structural error; People v Stevens; Sufficiency of the evidence; Third-degree child abuse in the presence of another minor; MCL 750.136d(1)(d); Intent; People v Dillard

The court held that defendant was not denied a fair trial because the trial judge did not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality, and that sufficient evidence supported his third-degree child-abuse conviction. The charges arose from a domestic incident in which the children’s mother, JD, and the two older children testified that defendant became enraged, broke part of a bedroom door, pulled JD’s hair, and, while seven-year-old MT was present, kicked 12-year-old BT, pushed him down, stomped on his hand, and struck him in the back of the head with a glass bottle. On appeal, the court explained that piercing the veil of impartiality is structural error. The court held that the judge’s interruptions largely reflected permissible efforts to “promote expedition,” keep testimony relevant, and “clear up confusion.” It found that the judge’s questions about defendant’s car keys were directed at clarifying testimony, not “invad[ing] the prosecutor’s role.” The court also emphasized that the record revealed no facially hostile language, no “skeptical, confrontational approach,” and curative instructions that the jury was not to treat the trial court’s comments or questions as evidence or pay attention to any opinion the jury may think the trial court had. The court next held that the evidence was sufficient because BT testified defendant “slammed” his foot on BT’s finger, and intent could be inferred from defendant’s “use of physical violence” and from “the natural consequences of his acts[.]” Affirmed.

Quiet title; Failure to state a valid defense; MCR 2.116(C)(9); Pleading admissions; MCR 2.111(E)(1); Waiver for missing transcript; MCR 7.210(B)(1)(a); People v Anderson; Judicial disqualification; MCR 2.003(C)(1); TT v KL

The court held that defendants waived appellate review of their challenge to the quiet-title summary-disposition ruling by failing to provide the relevant hearing transcript. It also held that the existing record independently supported quieting title in plaintiff, and it rejected defendants’ judicial-disqualification claim. Plaintiff purchased the property at a foreclosure sale after defendants lost multiple prior lawsuits and appeals challenging the foreclosure. He then brought this quiet-title action alleging defendants continued trying to cloud title to the property. Defendants answered only paragraphs 1 through 27 of the complaint and did not respond to paragraphs 28 through 53, which included the quiet-title allegations and plaintiff’s assertion that he owned the parcel “in fee simple absolute.” On appeal, the court held that review of the summary-disposition ruling was waived because the order granted relief “for the reasons stated on the record,” defendants filed no written response to the motion, and “without a transcript or any written objections from defendants, we are ‘unable to review [defendants’] objections and the trial court’s reason for the decision.’” The court next held that, even aside from waiver, summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(9) because allegations in a complaint “are admitted if not denied in the responsive pleading,” and defendants failed to answer the paragraphs setting out plaintiff’s causes of action. The court also held that defendants’ discovery challenge was waived for the same transcript-related reason and lacked merit because further discovery had no reasonable chance of supporting their position once the allegations were effectively admitted. Finally, the court held that disqualification was not warranted because an assigned judge found there was “absolutely no evidence of any bias or appearance of bias,” and that defendants’ allegations rested on “‘speculation, hearsay, disagreements with’” prior rulings, and “‘ill-contrived conspiracies.’” Affirmed.

Breach of contract claim related to brokering the sale of a hockey team; Condition precedent; Harbor Park Mkt, Inc v Gronda; Constructive discharge; Tortious interference with a business expectancy

Holding that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract and tortious interference with a business expectancy claims, the court affirmed. The trial court determined that, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the parties had a contract in which plaintiff would be paid some amount of money if he brokered the sale of” an amateur hockey team defendants owned. But it dismissed his claim because he “failed to satisfy the contract’s terms.” The court agreed. Under the terms of the “alleged contract, plaintiff’s brokering the sale of the team was a condition precedent for” defendants’ performance of the contract—if he brokered the sale, they would pay him “a percentage of the total sale amount.” It was undisputed that he “did not broker the sale of the team, so he failed to satisfy the condition precedent to receiving payment, and he has ‘no cause of action.’” He contended this was one of those times a condition precedent did not have to be satisfied, asserting that “defendants prevented him from satisfying the condition precedent by constructively discharging him.” The court held that he did not create a question of fact on this issue because, considered in “context, a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would not feel compelled to resign.” He never claimed that any of the money defendant-Israel was allegedly refusing to pay him “related to plaintiff’s employment” and he admitted “that he had spoken with Israel about plaintiff training his replacement[.]” And another team employee (R) “confirmed that plaintiff had taken steps to train her to replace him. Additionally, plaintiff’s employment contract was set to expire” four months from when Israel allegedly spoke to R. The court added that he “technically could have still brokered the sale of the team after being constructively discharged, so defendants did not prevent this condition precedent from occurring, even if” they constructively discharged him. As to his tort claim, the court agreed with the trial court “that plaintiff had only presented evidence of his general negotiations with the city, which do not rise to the level of a business expectancy.” Further, even if he “did have a valid business expectancy, he failed to produce any admissible evidence that Israel interfered with it.” The court also agreed with the trial court that he did not show that he was damaged by that alleged interference.

Auto negligence; Comparative fault; MCL 500.3135(2)(b); Huggins v Scripter; Rear-end collision presumption; MCL 257.402(a); White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; Sudden-emergency doctrine; Vander Laan v Miedema; Underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits; Insurance policy interpretation

The court held that, even assuming defendant-driver (Bardo) was negligent because her brake lights and turn signal were not working, plaintiff was more than 50% at fault as a matter of law for rear-ending defendant’s vehicle, so plaintiff’s negligence claim and derivative UIM claim failed. Plaintiff rear-ended Bardo after both vehicles turned westbound. Plaintiff testified that it was “clear and sunny,” nothing obstructed her view, and she did not see Bardo’s vehicle until “we were close,” at which point she swerved and braked but still struck it. The trial court granted summary disposition to Bardo and Home-Owners (plaintiff’s insurer). On appeal, the court held that plaintiff remained presumptively negligent under the rear-end collision statute because she could not invoke the sudden-emergency doctrine. It explained that there was nothing “unusual” about encountering “nonmoving or slow-moving vehicles” on a residential road and that the situation was not “unsuspected” because the potential peril must not have been “in clear view for any significant length of time, and [be] totally unexpected.” The court next found that plaintiff had a clear view the entire time she traveled the 412 feet from the intersection and yet testified that she only saw Bardo’s vehicle when it was “stopped,” showing that “even if Bardo was merely driving very slowly in the lane of travel,” plaintiff still would have rear-ended her. The court therefore concluded that “no reasonable juror could conclude that Bardo was more at fault for the collision than plaintiff,” so MCL 500.3135(2)(b) barred tort recovery and plaintiff’s UIM claim failed as well. Affirmed.

Quiet title; Failure to state a valid defense; MCR 2.116(C)(9); Pleading admissions; MCR 2.111(E)(1); Waiver for missing transcript; MCR 7.210(B)(1)(a); People v Anderson; Judicial disqualification; MCR 2.003(C)(1); TT v KL

The court held that defendants waived appellate review of their challenge to the quiet-title summary-disposition ruling by failing to provide the relevant hearing transcript. It also held that the existing record independently supported quieting title in plaintiff, and it rejected defendants’ judicial-disqualification claim. Plaintiff purchased the property at a foreclosure sale after defendants lost multiple prior lawsuits and appeals challenging the foreclosure. He then brought this quiet-title action alleging defendants continued trying to cloud title to the property. Defendants answered only paragraphs 1 through 27 of the complaint and did not respond to paragraphs 28 through 53, which included the quiet-title allegations and plaintiff’s assertion that he owned the parcel “in fee simple absolute.” On appeal, the court held that review of the summary-disposition ruling was waived because the order granted relief “for the reasons stated on the record,” defendants filed no written response to the motion, and “without a transcript or any written objections from defendants, we are ‘unable to review [defendants’] objections and the trial court’s reason for the decision.’” The court next held that, even aside from waiver, summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(9) because allegations in a complaint “are admitted if not denied in the responsive pleading,” and defendants failed to answer the paragraphs setting out plaintiff’s causes of action. The court also held that defendants’ discovery challenge was waived for the same transcript-related reason and lacked merit because further discovery had no reasonable chance of supporting their position once the allegations were effectively admitted. Finally, the court held that disqualification was not warranted because an assigned judge found there was “absolutely no evidence of any bias or appearance of bias,” and that defendants’ allegations rested on “‘speculation, hearsay, disagreements with’” prior rulings, and “‘ill-contrived conspiracies.’” Affirmed.

Due process; Mathews v Eldridge; Incarcerated respondent’s presence; In re Vasquez; Incomplete record; Jordan v Department of Health & Human Servs

The court held that the termination order had to be vacated because the record was too undeveloped to determine whether the trial court violated respondent’s due process rights by conducting the termination hearing in her absence. The DHHS sought termination after respondent was arrested while driving a stolen vehicle with her child (TV) unsecured and a firearm beside the child. The amended petition later alleged that respondent participated in the foster-home shooting in which the foster mother and her father were killed, the foster father was wounded, and TV was abducted and later recovered. On appeal, the court held that the trial court gave inconsistent explanations for finding that respondent’s absence on 4/7/25 was voluntary, at times relying on an off-record jail communication that “the reason she is not here today is her refusal to be present,” and at other times relying on respondent’s failure to provide medical documentation after the prior adjournment. The court next held that, because there was no record evidence establishing the content of the jail communication, “with whom from the jail it was made, and the basis for the jail’s understanding,” the court could not determine whether the trial court erred in finding respondent refused to appear. It also held that the incomplete record prevented meaningful review of whether proceeding in respondent’s absence satisfied due process, explaining that, as in Jordan, the record was “‘too incomplete to facilitate meaningful appellate review[.]’” Thus, it remanded for fact-finding on the reason for respondent’s absence, using record evidence sufficient for appellate review, and directed the trial court to decide whether it properly proceeded in her absence. Vacated and remanded.