Municipal electric service outside limits; MCL 124.3; City of Coldwater v Consumers Energy Co; Definition of “customer”; MCL 124.3(3)(a); In re Complaint of Consumers Energy Co; Great Wolf Lodge v Public Serv Comm’n; Public Service Commission (PSC) jurisdiction & Rule 411 (“right of first entitlement”) inapplicability to municipalities; MCL 460.6(1)

In an issue of first impression concerning the interpretation of MCL 124.3(3)(a), the court held that MCL 124.3’s no-switch rule did not bar defendant-City from providing electric service to newly constructed subdivision buildings on a parcel where plaintiff-Cooperative separately served a different building. The Cooperative had long provided electric service in Resort Township, while the City held a nonexclusive franchise there. A developer requested the City provide service to nine new homes in a new subdivision on part of a larger parcel where the Cooperative already served a garage outside the subdivision. The trial court granted the City summary disposition. It found the subdivision’s buildings and facilities were not “customers” that were currently receiving or had received service from another utility within the prior three years, and that PSC Rule 411’s “right of first entitlement” did not apply to a municipal utility. On appeal, the court held the 2018 amendment defining “customer” in MCL 124.3(3)(a) as “only the building or facilities served” made the statutory inquiry building-specific rather than parcel-wide, so the relevant “customer” was the new subdivision’s buildings and facilities, which were undisputedly vacant and unserved for at least three years before development. The court rejected the Cooperative’s attempt to treat the entire parcel as the customer based on its service to a garage and infrastructure presence, emphasizing that MCL 124.3(2) turns on whether the particular buildings or facilities sought to be served are receiving, or within three years have received, service from another utility. The court also explained that Rule 411’s first-entitlement “premises” concept has no analogue in MCL 124.3 and cannot be judicially imported, particularly because municipal utilities are generally outside PSC jurisdiction. Affirmed.

The Centers for Disease Control & Prevention’s (CDC) “Dog Rule” (42 CFR § 71.51); Promulgation under the Administrative Procedure Act; 5 USC § 706(2)(C); Whether the microchip & age importation requirements in the Rule fell under the CDC’s authority; 42 USC § 264; Whether the requirements were “arbitrary & capricious”

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs’ request to enjoin defendant-CDC from implementing the modified “Dog Rule,” holding that they were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the CDC lacked authority to issue the age and microchip requirements in the Rule. To prevent rabid dogs from entering the U.S., the CDC first implemented the Dog Rule in 1956, which set requirements for importing dogs. In 2024, it updated the Rule, imposing new requirements—the dogs must be microchipped and at least 6 months old. Plaintiffs (the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance and two individuals) sued, arguing that these requirements exceeded the CDC’s authority and were “arbitrary and capricious.” They sought a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. The court agreed. It concluded that the CDC properly relied on § 264(a), which provides the CDC with the right to make and enforce regulations for the prevention of communicable diseases from foreign countries, including “‘inspection . . . and ‘other measures, as in [its] judgment may be necessary.’” The court held the microchip requirement was “statutorily authorized under the inspection provision because it is a means through which the CDC can carry out the inspections at the port of entry.” And the age requirement created “another way to ascertain the quality or condition of the dogs. Puppies under six months of age are generally uncoordinated, but that is also true of dogs infected with rabies. . . . Thus, the minimum age requirement ensures that officials at the port of entry are better able to identify potentially rabid dogs.” The court added that this requirement also fell under the “‘other measures’ catchall provision[.]” It further held that plaintiffs were unlikely to be able to show that the Rule is “arbitrary and capricious. The CDC, after conducting notice and comment rulemaking, reasonably concluded that fraudulent documents allowed rabid dogs to get into the country. By imposing the microchip requirement, the agency has made it harder to commit that fraud. And the minimum age requirement made it easier to spot potentially rabid dogs before they enter the country and ensure that rabies vaccinations were effective. It is reasonable for the CDC to have drawn the conclusions it did on this record.”

The Centers for Disease Control & Prevention’s (CDC) “Dog Rule” (42 CFR § 71.51); Promulgation under the Administrative Procedure Act; 5 USC § 706(2)(C); Whether the microchip & age importation requirements in the Rule fell under the CDC’s authority; 42 USC § 264; Whether the requirements were “arbitrary & capricious”

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs’ request to enjoin defendant-CDC from implementing the modified “Dog Rule,” holding that they were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the CDC lacked authority to issue the age and microchip requirements in the Rule. To prevent rabid dogs from entering the U.S., the CDC first implemented the Dog Rule in 1956, which set requirements for importing dogs. In 2024, it updated the Rule, imposing new requirements—the dogs must be microchipped and at least 6 months old. Plaintiffs (the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance and two individuals) sued, arguing that these requirements exceeded the CDC’s authority and were “arbitrary and capricious.” They sought a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. The court agreed. It concluded that the CDC properly relied on § 264(a), which provides the CDC with the right to make and enforce regulations for the prevention of communicable diseases from foreign countries, including “‘inspection . . . and ‘other measures, as in [its] judgment may be necessary.’” The court held the microchip requirement was “statutorily authorized under the inspection provision because it is a means through which the CDC can carry out the inspections at the port of entry.” And the age requirement created “another way to ascertain the quality or condition of the dogs. Puppies under six months of age are generally uncoordinated, but that is also true of dogs infected with rabies. . . . Thus, the minimum age requirement ensures that officials at the port of entry are better able to identify potentially rabid dogs.” The court added that this requirement also fell under the “‘other measures’ catchall provision[.]” It further held that plaintiffs were unlikely to be able to show that the Rule is “arbitrary and capricious. The CDC, after conducting notice and comment rulemaking, reasonably concluded that fraudulent documents allowed rabid dogs to get into the country. By imposing the microchip requirement, the agency has made it harder to commit that fraud. And the minimum age requirement made it easier to spot potentially rabid dogs before they enter the country and ensure that rabies vaccinations were effective. It is reasonable for the CDC to have drawn the conclusions it did on this record.”

Wrongful discharge; Violation of the Veterans’ Preference Act (VPA); Power of the Civil Service Commission & the Legislature when it comes to classified civil service employees; Const 1963, art 11, § 5 & art 4, § 48; Department of Soc Servs v Kulling; Absence of an allegation that the rights protected by Const 1963, art 1, § 2 were violated

In this case alleging wrongful discharge and violation of VPA, the court held that because the Civil Service “Commission possesses plenary power over the state-classified civil service, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint.” Plaintiff, an honorably discharged military veteran, began working for defendant-State Police in 2012. He was a state civil servant. Defendant terminated his employment in 2021. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in 2022, challenging his termination. The court compared this case to Kulling, where it held that because “the counter-plaintiff did not allege that the plaintiff deprived him of the rights guaranteed under Const 1963, art 1, § 2, and he had the right to present his retaliation claim to the Commission and to appeal that decision to circuit court, . . . the Commission had ‘exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, because it involves a state-classified civil servant.’” The court noted that “Kulling is binding under MCR 7.215(J)(1), and like the counter-plaintiff in Kulling, plaintiff here has not alleged a violation of the rights guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 2, or legislation implementing that section. Nor has he pointed to any other constitutional provision that the VPA was enacted to enforce.” Thus, the trial court “did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s employment-related claims on this basis.” Affirmed.

Employment application limitations provision; A subsequent employment agreement containing explicit integration & anti-supplementation provisions; Whether the application & employment agreement must be read together as a single contract; Effect of an express integration clause; Distinguishing Wyandotte Elec Supply Co v Electrical Tech Sys, Inc, Cutler v Spens, & Gray v Yatooma (Unpub); Whether the application’s limitations provision was inconsistent with the employment agreement; The parol-evidence rule

The court held that when an employment agreement unambiguously states “it is the parties’ entire agreement and prohibits supplementation except by a specified written modification, a limitations clause contained only in a separate employment application is not part of the” contract and cannot be used to bar a claim for breach of the contract. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ summary disposition motion. Plaintiff’s application contained a shortened six-month limitations period but his subsequent employment agreement did not. It did contain “explicit integration and anti-supplementation provisions.” Defendants’ argument that the documents “must be read together as a single contract” failed because it disregarded the employment agreement’s plain language. Reading the documents “together as a single contract would nullify” the employment agreement’s integration and modification provisions. The court also rejected their second argument, “that even if the writings are separate, the application’s limitations provision is not inconsistent with the employment agreement and therefore may be applied without violating the parol-evidence rule.” This misunderstood “both the parol-evidence rule and the role of an integration clause. The employment agreement is not silent on whether additional employment terms may be imported from outside writings; it expressly prohibits supplementation.” As to the assertion that the limitations period was “not a term of plaintiff’s employment, but merely a term of his application for employment[,]” the court noted that a “contractual provision that governs an employee’s ability to bring claims arising from his employment or termination regulates the employment relationship itself” and fell within the integration clause’s scope. The court held that the employment agreement was “a fully integrated contract that expressly supersedes prior employment agreements and prohibits supplementation by extraneous writings absent a signed written modification expressly referencing the agreement.” As the application’s limitations period was not “incorporated into the employment agreement in the manner the agreement requires, it” was not a term of the employment contract and could not “bar plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim.”

Anonymous jury; Reference to jurors by number; People v Hanks; People v Williams; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Denial of request to introduce evidence of Facebook screenshots; Right to present a defense; Sentencing; Mitigating factors of youth; People v Boykin; Miller v Alabama; Proportionality; Maximum term of years sentence under MCL 769.25

The court rejected defendant’s anonymous jury and related ineffective assistance of counsel claim. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deny him his right to present a defense by denying his request to admit screenshots taken from another individual’s (M) Facebook page. Finally, it rejected his challenges to his sentence to the maximum term of years under MCL 769.25 for his first-degree premeditated murder conviction. He was also convicted of AWIM and intentional discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 480 to 720 months for the murder conviction and 285 to 600 months for each of the others, with jail credit. The court first found that the record did not support “that the jury was ‘anonymous’ as” defined in Hanks. His ineffective assistance claim was based on defense counsel’s statement to the jurors that he would love to use their names but numbers were being used because “‘we all want you to feel safe[.]’” The court concluded the statement could “be reasonably interpreted as an attempt to build a rapport with the jury by informing the potential jurors that he did not think of them as simply a number.” As to the evidence from M’s Facebook page, while defendant theorized that M was the shooter, among other things he “did not produce any evidence to establish that it was [M’s] hand holding the gun in the first screenshot or that [M] possessed such a gun.” The court held that the trial court properly denied admission of the screenshots because they “did not tend to make it more probable that [M] was the shooter[.]” As to defendant’s murder sentence, the court disagreed with his claim that “the trial court failed to properly consider the mitigating factors of youth as set forth” in Boykin. It also concluded that defense counsel’s “sentencing memorandum was a concise and cogent argument highlighting what [he] believed were the strongest factors that weighed in favor of mitigation.” Finally, defendant did not rebut the presumption that the sentence was proportionate. He “fired a semi-automatic rifle out of a moving car filled with young people at another moving car filled with young people . . . in a populated area, killing a seventeen-year old female and injuring several others.” He also then tried “to dispose of the rifle and other evidence.” Affirmed.

Evidence of prior allegations in a CSC case; The rape-shield statute (MCL 750.520j); Trial court’s finding that the allegations were not false

Concluding that the “trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to admit evidence” in this CSC case, the court affirmed. The case arose after two “children reported sexual abuse by their stepgrandfather, defendant.” He is charged with CSC II. He contended “that the trial court clearly erred by finding that [complainant-]JF’s 2017 allegations” against her stepfather (defendant’s son) “were ‘true, not false’ because JF admitted that those allegations were fabricated.” The court held that because “the trial court found that JF’s 2017 allegations of sexual abuse against her stepfather were ‘true’ on the basis of JF’s ‘demeanor, presentation, and stated reasons for lying,’ the trial court did not clearly err by finding that JF’s 2017 allegations were true.” It concluded that contrary “to defendant’s assertions, JF’s 2017 allegations are not relevant to any motive that she might have against defendant because the 2017 allegations were singularly made against her stepfather, not defendant.” The court held that even “though the trial court failed to ‘determine the appropriate standard of proof for the admissibility of evidence of prior false allegations of sexual assault by the complainant,’ the trial court determined that ‘either by clear or convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence standard of proof,’ defendant failed to meet his burden.” 

Employment application limitations provision; A subsequent employment agreement containing explicit integration & anti-supplementation provisions; Whether the application & employment agreement must be read together as a single contract; Effect of an express integration clause; Distinguishing Wyandotte Elec Supply Co v Electrical Tech Sys, Inc, Cutler v Spens, & Gray v Yatooma (Unpub); Whether the application’s limitations provision was inconsistent with the employment agreement; The parol-evidence rule

The court held that when an employment agreement unambiguously states “it is the parties’ entire agreement and prohibits supplementation except by a specified written modification, a limitations clause contained only in a separate employment application is not part of the” contract and cannot be used to bar a claim for breach of the contract. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ summary disposition motion. Plaintiff’s application contained a shortened six-month limitations period but his subsequent employment agreement did not. It did contain “explicit integration and anti-supplementation provisions.” Defendants’ argument that the documents “must be read together as a single contract” failed because it disregarded the employment agreement’s plain language. Reading the documents “together as a single contract would nullify” the employment agreement’s integration and modification provisions. The court also rejected their second argument, “that even if the writings are separate, the application’s limitations provision is not inconsistent with the employment agreement and therefore may be applied without violating the parol-evidence rule.” This misunderstood “both the parol-evidence rule and the role of an integration clause. The employment agreement is not silent on whether additional employment terms may be imported from outside writings; it expressly prohibits supplementation.” As to the assertion that the limitations period was “not a term of plaintiff’s employment, but merely a term of his application for employment[,]” the court noted that a “contractual provision that governs an employee’s ability to bring claims arising from his employment or termination regulates the employment relationship itself” and fell within the integration clause’s scope. The court held that the employment agreement was “a fully integrated contract that expressly supersedes prior employment agreements and prohibits supplementation by extraneous writings absent a signed written modification expressly referencing the agreement.” As the application’s limitations period was not “incorporated into the employment agreement in the manner the agreement requires, it” was not a term of the employment contract and could not “bar plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim.”

Wrongful discharge; Violation of the Veterans’ Preference Act (VPA); Power of the Civil Service Commission & the Legislature when it comes to classified civil service employees; Const 1963, art 11, § 5 & art 4, § 48; Department of Soc Servs v Kulling; Absence of an allegation that the rights protected by Const 1963, art 1, § 2 were violated

In this case alleging wrongful discharge and violation of VPA, the court held that because the Civil Service “Commission possesses plenary power over the state-classified civil service, the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint.” Plaintiff, an honorably discharged military veteran, began working for defendant-State Police in 2012. He was a state civil servant. Defendant terminated his employment in 2021. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in 2022, challenging his termination. The court compared this case to Kulling, where it held that because “the counter-plaintiff did not allege that the plaintiff deprived him of the rights guaranteed under Const 1963, art 1, § 2, and he had the right to present his retaliation claim to the Commission and to appeal that decision to circuit court, . . . the Commission had ‘exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, because it involves a state-classified civil servant.’” The court noted that “Kulling is binding under MCR 7.215(J)(1), and like the counter-plaintiff in Kulling, plaintiff here has not alleged a violation of the rights guaranteed by Const 1963, art 1, § 2, or legislation implementing that section. Nor has he pointed to any other constitutional provision that the VPA was enacted to enforce.” Thus, the trial court “did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s employment-related claims on this basis.” Affirmed.

Divorce; Custody; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Compliance with the Child Custody Act; Findings on the statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Property division; Sparks v Sparks; Reserving the issue of spousal support

The court agreed with the parties that remand was necessary as to the issue of child custody because the trial court failed to “resolve any of the relevant factual disputes” as to the children’s ECE and did not “make any factual findings to support its findings on the” statutory best-interest factors. It also agreed with them “that the trial court failed to make the necessary findings to support its property-division decision,” requiring remand. Thus, it vacated the trial court’s decisions on custody and property division, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded. While the trial court determined that an ECE existed with both parties, “it did not make any findings of fact to support this conclusion.” And the court found that there was insufficient information in the record for it to determine whether the trial court’s conclusion as to the ECE was correct “because there are simply too many outstanding factual disputes. The parties sharply disputed a number of issues that go to the heart of determining the children’s” ECE, such as how involved plaintiff-father was in their lives and how they viewed him. As to the MCL 722.23 factors, the trial court “concluded that they all either favored neither party or were inapplicable. But, in so doing, [it] failed to make any” supporting factual findings and thus left the court “with no way of reviewing whether the trial court reached a well-reasoned conclusion.” As to the property division, the trial court “did not resolve the parties’ dispute about what should be included in the marital estate, nor did it resolve [their] dispute about what the value was of certain marital assets. Equally clear is that [it] failed to consider the Sparks factors or make any factual findings related to those factors.” As to defendant-mother’s issues relating to (1) the trial court’s decision to reserve the issue of spousal support and (2) the issue of paying for the children’s gym classes, the court directed the trial court to also address these matters on remand.

Municipal electric service outside limits; MCL 124.3; City of Coldwater v Consumers Energy Co; Definition of “customer”; MCL 124.3(3)(a); In re Complaint of Consumers Energy Co; Great Wolf Lodge v Public Serv Comm’n; Public Service Commission (PSC) jurisdiction & Rule 411 (“right of first entitlement”) inapplicability to municipalities; MCL 460.6(1)

In an issue of first impression concerning the interpretation of MCL 124.3(3)(a), the court held that MCL 124.3’s no-switch rule did not bar defendant-City from providing electric service to newly constructed subdivision buildings on a parcel where plaintiff-Cooperative separately served a different building. The Cooperative had long provided electric service in Resort Township, while the City held a nonexclusive franchise there. A developer requested the City provide service to nine new homes in a new subdivision on part of a larger parcel where the Cooperative already served a garage outside the subdivision. The trial court granted the City summary disposition. It found the subdivision’s buildings and facilities were not “customers” that were currently receiving or had received service from another utility within the prior three years, and that PSC Rule 411’s “right of first entitlement” did not apply to a municipal utility. On appeal, the court held the 2018 amendment defining “customer” in MCL 124.3(3)(a) as “only the building or facilities served” made the statutory inquiry building-specific rather than parcel-wide, so the relevant “customer” was the new subdivision’s buildings and facilities, which were undisputedly vacant and unserved for at least three years before development. The court rejected the Cooperative’s attempt to treat the entire parcel as the customer based on its service to a garage and infrastructure presence, emphasizing that MCL 124.3(2) turns on whether the particular buildings or facilities sought to be served are receiving, or within three years have received, service from another utility. The court also explained that Rule 411’s first-entitlement “premises” concept has no analogue in MCL 124.3 and cannot be judicially imported, particularly because municipal utilities are generally outside PSC jurisdiction. Affirmed.

Child’s removal from a parent’s care & custody; Finding that remaining in the home was contrary to the child’s welfare; MCR 3.965(B)(12); MCL 712A.13a(9); Reasonable efforts to prevent removal

The court concluded that the “trial court did not clearly err by finding that it was contrary to RR’s welfare to remain in the care and custody of respondent-mother and that reasonable efforts were made to prevent” the infant’s removal. The court noted that the “trial court’s contrary-to-the-welfare and reasonable-efforts findings were first made in the [7/31/24] ex parte order, then recited at the outset of the preliminary hearing on [8/19/24], and ultimately memorialized in the order entered after the preliminary hearing ended on [9/13/24]. In that order, as well as in the [7/31/24] ex parte order, the trial court found RR was at a substantial risk of imminent harm, that the circumstances warranted issuing the order, and that the reasons for” respondent’s other children “ROBJ and TMB being in care had not been adequately addressed by” respondent. The trial court also “found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent RR’s removal, citing his placement with his maternal aunt, who tried to abandon RR with CPS staff. Therefore, the trial court made all of the findings necessary to remove RR from [the] mother’s care and custody. Specifically, the trial court addressed all five requirements in MCL 712A.13a(9), and [it] also found that the DHHS had made reasonable efforts to prevent RR’s removal.” The court held that the “trial court’s reliance on prior findings, including reported sexual abuse by [the] mother and [her] failure to protect ROBJ and TMB from abuse, furnishes sufficient support for the trial court’s decision to remove RR. The trial court reasonably decided that it was contrary to the welfare of an infant, RR, to be placed with a parent with a history of sexual abuse of children.” Likewise, the trial court “had sufficient evidence to justify its reasonable-efforts finding. RR was placed in his maternal aunt’s home after the DHHS filed the petition, but RR’s aunt thereafter attempted to abandon RR with CPS staff, so the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the DHHS had put forth reasonable efforts to prevent removal of RR from respondent-mother’s care.” Affirmed.

§ 19b(3)(d), therapist expert testimony

§ 19b(3)(d); Expert testimony from a therapist; MRE 702; Surman v Surman; Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; Adjudication; Exercise of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(4)

The court held that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in allowing the child’s (IG) therapist (M) to testify as an expert, (2) properly exercised jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(4), and (3) did not clearly err in terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights under § (d). Respondent argued that because M had not “previously testified as an expert witness, she was not qualified to testify regarding her therapy sessions with IG. However, the mere fact that [M] had not previously testified as an expert did not disqualify her from testifying, because a witness ‘may be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[.]’” The record showed that she “had been working in the social work field for 15 years and was a licensed play therapist supervisor who had been specializing in children’s therapy for the past six years. [M] had a master’s degree in social work, a bachelor’s degree in family life education, and an associate’s degree in early childhood development.” The court concluded that given her “knowledge, skills, experience, training, and education in the area of child therapy, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing her to testify as an expert witness, under MRE 702, in the area of child therapy.” FurIher, even if it had, any error was harmless because her testimony would have been admissible under MRE 701; As to the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction, it “did not clearly err by finding that respondent had substantially failed to comply with the limited-guardianship plan.” In regard to the termination of her parental rights under § (d), the court held that “the trial court did not clearly err by determining, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent ‘substantially failed, without good cause, to comply with a limited guardianship placement plan.’” It also did not clearly err in finding that her “noncompliance disrupted her relationship with IG. The record showed that [she] had not bonded with IG before her incarceration and that IG suffered extensive trauma from having contact with respondent in prison[.]” By the end of the adjudication trial, they “had not had contact in nearly four years . . . and IG suffered from severe anxiety at the thought of reuniting with respondent.” Affirmed.

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Children’s best interests; In re White; In re Olive/Metts; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Frey; In re Hicks/Brown; Parent Agency Treatment Plans (PATP); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Holding that § (c)(i) was established as to both respondents, that termination was in the children’s best interests, and that reasonable reunification efforts were made, the court affirmed the termination order. Both respondents challenged the existence of a statutory ground for terminating their parental rights. It was “undisputed that more than 182 days had elapsed since the initial dispositional order in this case.” The conditions leading “to respondent-mother’s adjudication were [her] failure to protect her children by violating the established safety plan, her lack of parenting skills, and medical neglect.” The court concluded “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the conditions that led to adjudication—including [her] violation of the safety plan and her lack of parenting skills—had not meaningfully changed and were unlikely to do so within a reasonable amount of time.” The conditions leading “to respondent-father’s adjudication were [his] parenting skills, lack of stable housing, violation of his probation, and inconsistent drug testing.” The court concluded his “noncompliance with the PATP justified termination of” his parental rights under § (c)(i). The mother also challenged whether terminating her rights was in the children’s best interests. While the trial court acknowledged she “was bonded with the children, [it] properly considered [her] compliance with her case service plan and the children’s need for permanency and stability.” The court found that given her “noncompliance with her case service plan, the trial court properly concluded that the children’s need for permanency and stability supported that termination was in their best interests.” She further argued that the trial court erred in determining the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts. She asserted that “the DHHS failed to provide her with rent assistance despite her struggles with housing.” But the caseworker testified that she “was provided with housing resources, and [she] utilized Section 8 housing at the start of the case. Such external resources were sufficient to discharge the DHHS’s duty.” As to her reliance on Hicks/Brown, that case “requires the DHHS to adjust its services to accommodate a parent’s disability under the” ADA. She did not suggest “that her issues completing services resulted from a disability.”