Excessive force claim under 42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; Whether the officers violated “clearly established law” by forcibly handcuffing an individual; Failure to notify him that he was under arrest; Whether arguments were forfeited

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to defendants-officers where plaintiff failed to cite a similar case involving an officer’s response to an individual resisting attempts to handcuff him. As a result, plaintiff could not establish a violation of “clearly established law.” Plaintiff is the legal guardian of Derek Aaron, an autistic individual. When police tried to arrest Derek for home invasion and a violent robbery at a gas station, he pulled his hands away and refused to place them behind his back for cuffing. After issuing verbal threats and grabbing his arms, the officers took him to the ground. All charges against Derek were eventually dropped. Plaintiff sued under § 1983 for excessive force. The officers unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff failed to establish that the officers violated Derek’s “clearly established” constitutional rights and thus, was unable to satisfy the third prong of the qualified immunity analysis. The court noted that Derek was a “large man (6'4'' and 280 pounds).” Further, the officers had probable cause to arrest him “(1) for an assault at the Sunoco gas station of a customer and robbery of him and (2) for a break-in of a nearby home.” The court concluded that given his “size, the violent nature of the crimes, and the recency of each of them, the police had ample reason to perform the arrest with several officers.” In addition, Derek “tensed his body and locked his arms to prevent the officers from pulling his hands behind his back. Even after [they] took him to the ground and one of them kneed him in the side, he struggled against the officers to keep his hands in front of his body.” The court held that in “the context of the serious crimes at issue, the officers did not violate any clearly established law when they responded to” his active resistance. It rejected plaintiff’s reliance on the officers’ failure to tell Derek he was under arrest for the crimes in question. “While it may be good practice to tell a suspect that he is under arrest at the outset of an encounter, particularly where the police deny a suspect a reasonable chance to comply, or the arrest concerns a minor crime,” the court knew of no authority requiring “such notice during an arrest for two violent felonies where the officers gave the suspect ample time to comply with their orders.”

Excessive force claim under 42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; Whether the officers violated “clearly established law” by forcibly handcuffing an individual; Failure to notify him that he was under arrest; Whether arguments were forfeited

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to defendants-officers where plaintiff failed to cite a similar case involving an officer’s response to an individual resisting attempts to handcuff him. As a result, plaintiff could not establish a violation of “clearly established law.” Plaintiff is the legal guardian of Derek Aaron, an autistic individual. When police tried to arrest Derek for home invasion and a violent robbery at a gas station, he pulled his hands away and refused to place them behind his back for cuffing. After issuing verbal threats and grabbing his arms, the officers took him to the ground. All charges against Derek were eventually dropped. Plaintiff sued under § 1983 for excessive force. The officers unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff failed to establish that the officers violated Derek’s “clearly established” constitutional rights and thus, was unable to satisfy the third prong of the qualified immunity analysis. The court noted that Derek was a “large man (6'4'' and 280 pounds).” Further, the officers had probable cause to arrest him “(1) for an assault at the Sunoco gas station of a customer and robbery of him and (2) for a break-in of a nearby home.” The court concluded that given his “size, the violent nature of the crimes, and the recency of each of them, the police had ample reason to perform the arrest with several officers.” In addition, Derek “tensed his body and locked his arms to prevent the officers from pulling his hands behind his back. Even after [they] took him to the ground and one of them kneed him in the side, he struggled against the officers to keep his hands in front of his body.” The court held that in “the context of the serious crimes at issue, the officers did not violate any clearly established law when they responded to” his active resistance. It rejected plaintiff’s reliance on the officers’ failure to tell Derek he was under arrest for the crimes in question. “While it may be good practice to tell a suspect that he is under arrest at the outset of an encounter, particularly where the police deny a suspect a reasonable chance to comply, or the arrest concerns a minor crime,” the court knew of no authority requiring “such notice during an arrest for two violent felonies where the officers gave the suspect ample time to comply with their orders.”

Contract breach; Conditions precedent to the obligation to pay; Digital Media Corporation (DMC); Saba International, Inc. (SII)

Holding that plaintiffs did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conditions precedent to defendant-DMC’s obligation to pay commission fees were satisfied, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. DMC is owned by defendant-Gharbieh. Plaintiff-SII is owned by plaintiff-Alsadah. The two companies entered into a contract “to facilitate negotiations to transmit a Yemeni TV channel to audiences in the United States.” The contract required DMC to pay SII a monthly $2000 commission fee. It “specifically stated that DMC was required to pay the commission fee ‘as long as the Yemeni TV channel contract is not violated and completely enforced and payments by the Yemeni television channel are received accordingly.’” Under the contract’s terms, “DMC did not have to pay SII before Yemeni TV sent its quarterly payments to” a nonparty broadcasting company (GlobeCast), “and then GlobeCast sent payments to DMC. If these conditions precedent were not satisfied, then SII did not have the right to receive payment from DMC, and it has no cause of action for a failure to perform the contract.” The parties disputed “whether the conditions precedent to DMC’s obligation to pay were satisfied.” Defendants asserted “that Yemeni TV stopped providing services and payment to GlobeCast in 2014 because of the civil war in Yemen that disrupted the government.” The record showed “the most recent amendment to the agreement between GlobeCast and Global Connections, which was acting on behalf of Yemeni TV, was set to last until” 3/31/15. Defendants claimed “DMC last received money from GlobeCast in 2014 and supported this claim with Gharbieh’s deposition testimony to that effect.” Thus, defendants met “their initial burden of supporting their position with deposition testimony and documentary evidence.” The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to establish a genuine issue of material fact existed for trial. Their “only support for their position was Alsadah’s belief that GlobeCast still was under contract with Yemeni TV. However, [he] admitted that he had no personal knowledge that Yemeni TV still was under contract with GlobeCast, much less whether payments still had been received by GlobeCast after the civil war in 2014.” His speculation was not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Search & seizure; Automobile exception; People v Garvin; Suppression motion; Probable cause; People v Vaughn

The court held that the warrantless search of defendant’s car was supported by probable cause under the automobile exception, so the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. The case arose from a traffic stop after Sgt. Q observed defendant driving with tinted windows and making an improper turn. During the stop, defendant hesitated to exit the car, and when he opened the driver’s door Q saw what he believed was a promethazine bottle with the label removed in the door compartment. The trial court denied suppression after finding that Q could see the label-less bottle and that the totality of the circumstances gave him probable cause to search the car. On appeal, the court held that the trial court did not err in crediting Q’s testimony that he could see the bottle and tell the label had been removed, even if the body-camera video was grainy and showed less than he could see in person. The court next held that this suspicious bottle, combined with defendant’s possession of a large amount of cash, two cell phones, and a LEIN “officer caution” suggesting prior resisting, weapons, or drug history, gave Q a “fair probability” that the car contained contraband or evidence of narcotics trafficking. The court also held that the fact the first bottle turned out to be empty did not defeat probable cause because the totality of the circumstances still supported the search. It rejected defendant’s argument that Q should have used less intrusive means, noting that the search was based on probable cause and was conducted within minutes. Affirmed.

Sufficiency of the evidence; Identity; Intentional discharge of a firearm at a dwelling (MCL 750.234b); People v Oros; Discovery violation; Brady v Maryland; Waiver; People v Kowalski

The court held that the prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to identify defendant as the shooter, and that defendant waived appellate review of the late-disclosed discovery issue by agreeing to proceed to trial without the new material. The case arose from a shooting at a home where multiple bullets struck the front windows, screen door, interior wall, and kitchen, and officers recovered 18 nine-millimeter shell casings. The jury convicted defendant of intentional discharge of a firearm at a dwelling, felony-firearm, and FIP. On appeal, the court held that the identity element of firearm discharge was supported by substantial circumstantial evidence. It explained that surveillance screenshots showed a “silver SUV” passing the house, returning, and a man in a black and gold coat firing at the home before getting back into the vehicle. Defendant was tied to the shooting because he was stopped the next day while driving a silver SUV, police found a black and tan coat with a tether charger in the trunk, recovered a nine-millimeter pistol near the center console, and GPS tether data placed him in close proximity to the house at the time of the shooting. The court held that these facts provided “substantial, if not overwhelming, circumstantial evidence” of identity. As to his discovery claim, the court found that any claim of error was waived because defense counsel said he was “happy” to proceed with only the previously disclosed evidence, and defendant personally confirmed that he wanted to proceed even though the new material might be exculpatory. The court also noted that defendant failed on appeal to identify any Brady material that would have aided his case. Affirmed.

Motion to modify custody & parenting time; Subject-matter jurisdiction; The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); MCL 722.1202(1)

The court affirmed the trial court’s 7/2/25 order denying plaintiff-mother’s (Dean) motion to modify custody of the child (BD). Dean first argued “that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its custody and parenting-time orders because, as a result of her move to Georgia with BD, that state had exclusive jurisdiction under the” UCCJEA. The court noted that the “trial court maintained exclusive jurisdiction under MCL 722.1202(1) because no Michigan court determined that BD and” defendant-father (Hunter) “did not maintain a significant connection to Michigan.” Further, because “the trial court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the case under MCL 722.1202(1), the [trial] court did not err by exercising jurisdiction over this dispute.” Next, the court found that to the extent Dean challenged the 7/2/25 order, her argument lacked merit. Although the trial “court did not explicitly state that Dean had failed to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances to modify custody, the” trial court’s statements indicated that it concluded as such. The trial “court also informed Dean that she could file objections to the FOC’s recommended order, and when Dean stated that she had already done so, [it] asked Dean if she wanted to proceed with the de novo hearing on her objections that day rather than returning to court the following week. Dean responded affirmatively.” The trial “court directed Dean to file the transcript of the [6/3/25] hearing and stated that it would review the matter.” Under the circumstances, the court could not “conclude that the trial court erred by denying Dean’s motion to modify custody.”

No-fault coverage; Voluntary dismissal; MCR 2.504(A)

The court concluded that the “trial court abused its discretion when it entered the order of dismissal submitted by [plaintiff-]Progressive without motion or stipulation.” Doing so precluded appellant-State Farm “from defending its interests as an interested party or otherwise seeking to diminish the prejudice arising from voluntary dismissal.” On appeal, State Farm argued “that the trial court abused its discretion when it applied its entry of default judgment against the Ahmed defendants to [State Farm’s insured] Wilson, and State Farm (both interested parties) by entering Progressive’s order of voluntary dismissal.” State Farm claimed that “the procedures described in MCR 2.504(A) were not followed.” Relatedly, it argued that “doing so precluded their right to defend their interests in this case.” The court agreed. “Progressive never moved for voluntary dismissal as is required under MCR 2.504(A)(2).” Instead, it appeared that it “merely submitted a copy of a voluntary dismissal order, which was later entered by the trial court. As such, Progressive may have incorrectly conflated or confused the procedure for a voluntary dismissal under MCR 2.504(A)(2) and the procedure delineated in MCR 2.602(B)(3) for entering written orders concerning matters already decided by the trial court.” Thus, the court agreed “with State Farm that MCR 2.504(A)(2) did not provide a basis for dismissing this case.” It also agreed “with State Farm that it, and Wilson, had a continuing legal interest in this case notwithstanding the default judgment against the Ahmed defendants.” Also, Progressive was “incorrect in asserting that there were no remaining claims or issues after the default of the Ahmed defendants.” Similarly, Progressive’s claim “that State Farm was not aggrieved because the voluntary dismissal presumptively was ‘without prejudice,’” also was unpersuasive. Reversed and remanded.

No-fault coverage; Voluntary dismissal; MCR 2.504(A)

The court concluded that the “trial court abused its discretion when it entered the order of dismissal submitted by [plaintiff-]Progressive without motion or stipulation.” Doing so precluded appellant-State Farm “from defending its interests as an interested party or otherwise seeking to diminish the prejudice arising from voluntary dismissal.” On appeal, State Farm argued “that the trial court abused its discretion when it applied its entry of default judgment against the Ahmed defendants to [State Farm’s insured] Wilson, and State Farm (both interested parties) by entering Progressive’s order of voluntary dismissal.” State Farm claimed that “the procedures described in MCR 2.504(A) were not followed.” Relatedly, it argued that “doing so precluded their right to defend their interests in this case.” The court agreed. “Progressive never moved for voluntary dismissal as is required under MCR 2.504(A)(2).” Instead, it appeared that it “merely submitted a copy of a voluntary dismissal order, which was later entered by the trial court. As such, Progressive may have incorrectly conflated or confused the procedure for a voluntary dismissal under MCR 2.504(A)(2) and the procedure delineated in MCR 2.602(B)(3) for entering written orders concerning matters already decided by the trial court.” Thus, the court agreed “with State Farm that MCR 2.504(A)(2) did not provide a basis for dismissing this case.” It also agreed “with State Farm that it, and Wilson, had a continuing legal interest in this case notwithstanding the default judgment against the Ahmed defendants.” Also, Progressive was “incorrect in asserting that there were no remaining claims or issues after the default of the Ahmed defendants.” Similarly, Progressive’s claim “that State Farm was not aggrieved because the voluntary dismissal presumptively was ‘without prejudice,’” also was unpersuasive. Reversed and remanded.

Creation of a special assessment district (SAD); The Tax Tribunal’s (TT) exclusive jurisdiction; Hillsdale Cnty Sr Servs, Inc v Hillsdale Cnty; MCL 205.731(a); Wikman v City of Novi; Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction

The court held that the TT had exclusive jurisdiction over this case concerning a SAD. Thus, the circuit court correctly dismissed the case under MCR 2.116(C)(4) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court explained in Hillsdale “that under MCL 205.731(a), four elements must be satisfied for the [TT] to have exclusive jurisdiction[.]” The court held that all four were satisfied here. “As to the first and second elements, plaintiff seeks to initiate a proceeding for direct review of Detroit’s [11/15/23] resolution which, according to plaintiff, renewed the SAD for seven years to provide the subdivision funding for snow removal, mosquito abatement, and security services.” The court noted that when “a city council exercises its authority to levy a SAD for the cost of a public improvement, the city council is an ‘agency’ that is ‘empowered to make a decision subject to review by the’” TT. In addition, nothing in the record suggested “that the SAD renewal was not ‘final.’ Thus, when Detroit renewed the SAD, it provided a final decision for the [TT] to review, satisfying the first two elements of MCL 205.731(a).” Turning to the third element, the parties agreed “that Detroit’s renewal of the SAD relates to a ‘special assessment.’ Finally, as to the fourth element, the special assessment was imposed ‘under property tax law.’” The court disagreed with plaintiff’s assertion that the circuit court had “jurisdiction because Detroit allegedly lacked the authority to create the SAD—at least as to a SAD applied to property owners abutting public streets. Plaintiff is directly questioning the SAD’s validity, a question over which the [TT] has exclusive jurisdiction.” Because the gravamen of the complaint concerned “the validity of the SAD as applied to these particular factual circumstances,” the TT had exclusive jurisdiction. Affirmed.