Affidavit of identity (AOI) filing requirement; MCL 168.558(1); Const 1963, art 6, § 22; Filing of an AOI with a false statement; MCL 168.558(4); District court incumbent judges; Effect of performing circuit court judge duties; The Purity of Elections Clause in Const 1963, art 2, § 4(2); Whether the AOI requirement imposes additional requirements beyond those in Const 1963, art 6, § 19 for the office of judge; Amended AOI; MI Admin Code, R 168.3(2); Elector plaintiffs’ rights; Const 1963, art 2, § 4(1); Disqualification of a particular candidate

Rejecting plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges in this election case concerning a district court judgeship, the court affirmed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary disposition for defendants. Plaintiff-Sharma is a district court judge. The other two plaintiffs are electors from her district. It appeared “that, unbeknownst to Judge Sharma, she owed late filing fees” due to actions by the Treasurer of her reelection committee. As a result, she filed an AOI with a false statement that all late filing fees had been paid. Based on MCL 168.558(4), defendants concluded that due to the false statement, they “were required to disqualify Judge Sharma from the ballot.” Plaintiffs asserted that she “was not required to file an AOI.” On appeal, the court first noted that, even if this were so, she did file one and it contained false statements. “The filing of an AOI with a false statement requires her exclusion from the ballot under the plain language of MCL 168.558(4).” As to the merits of plaintiffs’ arguments, the court agreed with the Court of Claims that they were “not supported by the plain language of the Constitution. Plaintiffs’ primary position is that, under Const 1963, art 6, § 22, an AOI cannot be required of Judge Sharma.” But as a district court judge, she did “not occupy one of the three offices to which” that section applies. It next found that plaintiffs abandoned the claim that because she had “been performing the duties of a circuit court judge under a plan of concurrent jurisdiction, she is both a ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ circuit court judge.” And even if not abandoned, the court found it meritless. The fact that she was “authorized to ‘exercise the power and jurisdiction of the circuit court’ . . . does not make her a de jure circuit court judge.” The court also found plaintiffs’ reliance on the purity-of-elections clause meritless, noting that judicial officers, like almost all other candidates, are required to file an AOI. Further, the AOI requirement “does not add qualifications to the office of judge” and administrative rules for amending AOIs “do not apply in the case of false statements[.]” Finally, the court rejected the claim “that denying Judge Sharma access to the ballot harms the rights of voters,” such as the other two plaintiffs.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; A state’s taking custody of unclaimed financial accounts; Ownership of the principal; Common-law presumption that owners retain their property rights; Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act; Kemerer v State (MI App); Ownership of interest generated from the accounts; Rule that interest follows principal

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that under Michigan law, plaintiff-O’Connor (and other original owners of presumptively abandoned property subject to the state’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act) “continue to own that property—even after the state takes custody of it.” He had two non-interest-bearing financial accounts with private companies that they turned over to Michigan under the Act after they lost touch with him. The state took possession of the accounts and later deposited the money into its general fund, giving rise to this suit. After an earlier remand, the district court again dismissed O’Connor’s due-process claims, determining that the state had taken ownership of the accounts and also owned the interest, but “had provided him sufficient process.” On appeal, the court concluded that because O’Connor retained ownership of the principal and of the interest his funds generated while they were in the state’s custody, the district court’s opposite conclusion tainted the rest of its analysis of his due-process claims. “Based on the Act’s text and the history of Michigan property law, O’Connor kept ownership of the principal even after Michigan took custody of it. The statutory text repeatedly refers to the state’s control over unclaimed items as ‘custody,’ not ownership.” In addition, the Act “consistently refers to the rightful holders of the unclaimed property as ‘owners,’ not ‘former’ or ‘previous’ owners.” And the text of the Act “accords with Michigan’s common-law presumption: Owners retain their property rights even when the state holds their property and doesn’t know their identity.” As to the interest, the common-law rule that it “follows principal applies regardless of whether the principal was interest bearing at the time the state took custody.” The district court relied on a Michigan Court of Appeals case, Kemerer. But the court concluded that “available data clearly indicate that the Michigan Supreme Court wouldn’t follow” Kemerer’s holdings. First, as to the taking of ownership, “Kemerer represents an outlier holding that the Michigan Supreme Court likely wouldn’t follow. Second, Kemerer erred by concluding that the original property owner doesn’t own the interest generated while the property is in state custody.” Vacated and remanded.

Whether condo units reverted to the general common elements; The Condominium Act; MCL 559.167(3); Elizabeth Trace Condo Ass’n v American Global Enters, Inc; An amendment to the master deed that did not take effect; Equitable estoppel; Failure to record a replat of the reversion; Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vista Land & Home Dev, LLC; Comparing Wellesley Gardens Condo Ass’n v Manek (Unpub); Constitutionality of MCL 559.167(3); Settlement agreement contract; Clark v Al-Amin; MCR 2.507(G); Jurisdiction; Final order

The court held that ownership of the condo units at issue reverted to defendant/appellee-Association “10 years after construction commenced, because the units were neither complete nor withdrawn from the project.” It rejected defendant/appellant-Triple’s claims that the Association was equitably estopped from denying plaintiff-PCJ title to the units and that MCL 559.167(3) was facially unconstitutional. It also held that “the parties reached a binding settlement agreement,” and Triple’s later conduct indicating its change of heart did not release it from its obligations to abide by the terms. Triple challenged orders on appeal that (1) granted in part and denied in part PCJ’s “motion to compel compliance with a court order requiring Triple to make a second settlement payment;” (2) entered the written settlement agreement; (3) denied its summary disposition motion and instead granted it to the Association; and (4) granted PCJ’s “motion to enforce the settlement agreement and ordered the release of the second settlement payment from escrow to” PCJ. As an initial matter, the court rejected PCJ’s challenge to its jurisdiction over Triple’s claim of appeal. As to the grant of summary disposition to the Association, the court rejected Triple’s assertion that it never lost its ownership interest in the units under MCL 559.167. This involved “the interpretation and application of MCL 559.167(3) as it existed at the relevant times in this case.” The court found meritless Triple’s contention that the “units did not revert to the general common elements under MCL 559.167(3) because” they were not undeveloped. The court clearly stated in Elizabeth Trace “that, to avoid reversion under the version of MCL 559.167(3) that applies in this matter, units must be completed. That is also consistent with the plain language of the statute[.]” As Triple failed to complete construction of the units, ownership of the “units reverted to the Association in 2014[.]” While Triple asserted that the Association’s co-owners “passed a proposed first amendment to the master deed, which reinstated the subject units from the general common elements” in 2017, that amendment did not take effect and thus, the “units were never reinstated.” The court further concluded that, based on “the plain statutory language, the Association was not required to record a replat of the reversion.” Affirmed.

AWIM; MCL 750.83; Flight evidence; Consciousness of guilt; People v Unger; People v Smelley; Flight jury instruction; Firearm evidence; Relevance; MRE 401; MRE 403; Weapon of the kind used in the offense; People v Hall; People v Murphy (On Remand); Sentencing; OV 3; MCL 777.33(1)(c); OV 6; MCL 777.36(1)(a) (premeditated intent to kill); OV 19; MCL 777.49(c)

The court held that the trial court did not err by admitting flight and firearm evidence, instructing the jury on flight, or scoring OVs 3, 6, and 19. Defendant was convicted of AWIM, FIP, CCW, and felony-firearm after shooting the victim following a car accident. The trial court admitted evidence that defendant was extradited from Florida and later possessed a 9mm handgun, instructed the jury on flight, and rejected his challenges to OVs 3, 6, and 19. On appeal, the court first held that the flight instruction was supported because defendant ran from the scene after firing several shots and was later extradited from Florida and Arizona. It rejected his claim that the prosecution had to show he left Michigan to avoid arrest because the prosecutor was “not required to show that defendant was motivated by a fear of apprehension.” The court next held that the handgun evidence was relevant direct evidence because defendant later possessed a “weapon of the same kind” used in the shooting and the recovered gun “could have been used” to fire the shell casings found at the crime scene. It also held that MRE 403 did not bar the evidence, especially because the trial court instructed the jury not to treat it as bad-character evidence. Finally, the court held that OV 3 was properly scored at 25 points because the victim bled, received a tourniquet, lost consciousness, and was taken to the hospital, 50 points for OV 6 was supported because defendant threatened to kill the victim, walked across the parking lot, and fired seven shots, and 10 points for OV 19 was supported by defendant’s extraditions and failure to appear. Affirmed.

Child sexually abusive activity (CSAA); MCL 750.145c(2); Knowledge of age; “Reasonable precautions”; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise entrapment; Entrapment; Unlawful inducement; Reprehensible police conduct; People v Jade

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s CSAA conviction, but trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise entrapment as a defense. He was convicted after a sting operation in which police created an adult Grindr profile with no indication that the user was underage, but the decoy later used language implying youth and sent “15” before defendant went to meet him. On appeal, the court first held that the evidence was sufficient because the decoy said he could not drive, was getting his license at Halloween, was younger and inexperienced, and sent “15,” which the jury could reasonably infer referred to age. The court also held that the jury could find defendant failed to take reasonable precautions because he relied only on the profile age even though he knew users could lie about age and had previously encountered underage users. But the court held that counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise entrapment. Applying Jade, it reasoned that police first introduced criminality by escalating a legal adult hookup into illegal sexual activity, used ambiguous language, promised sexual favors, controlled the decoy, and conducted a “fishing operation” without a specific target or reason to suspect Grindr users sought minors. The court found a reasonable probability an entrapment defense would have succeeded under both the unlawful-inducement and reprehensible-conduct prongs because the police “introduced all criminal elements” and induced conduct defendant had not shown willingness to commit. Reversed and remanded.

Expert testimony; Allowing the jury to question an expert witness about the rates of false allegations among child sexual abuse victims; Vouching; People v Peterson; People v Thorpe; People v Sattler-VanWagoner; Whether an issue was waived or unpreserved

Holding that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the jury to ask an expert witness (C) questions that resulted in C vouching for the complainant (NN), the court vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. The case concerned allegations of CSC. NN was a child. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing C “to vouch for NN by testifying to the rates of false allegations among child sexual abuse victims” in response to juror questions. The court agreed. It found that while C “did not, as he did in Thorpe, provide jurors with a specific percentage of child sexual abuse victims who lie about their abuse, his testimony nevertheless impermissibly quantified that information in a nearly identical manner.” When he testified here “that, among the roughly 350 cases with which he was personally involved, ‘only a handful’ of child sexual abuse victims were lying about their abuse, and that it was a ‘[v]ery small percentage,’ [C] gave the jury the very same information, stopping short only of calculating the percentage for them in numerical terms. In doing so, he impermissibly vouched for the complainant. The fact that one may arrive at slightly different figures depending on how [C’s] testimony is mathematically glossed is immaterial. An expert who opines on the veracity of child sexual abuse victims generally is inferentially vouching for the complainant specifically.” The court further concluded that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Like Thorpe, this “was a ‘true credibility contest’” – the prosecution’s case consisted of NN’s “allegations, testimony by her mother regarding the complainant’s disclosure of the alleged abuse, and [C’s] expert testimony.” And defendant, like the defendant in Thorpe, “testified in his own defense, denying the allegations.” In addition, the court found that “the error ‘seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.’”

Affidavit of identity (AOI) filing requirement; MCL 168.558(1); Const 1963, art 6, § 22; Filing of an AOI with a false statement; MCL 168.558(4); District court incumbent judges; Effect of performing circuit court judge duties; The Purity of Elections Clause in Const 1963, art 2, § 4(2); Whether the AOI requirement imposes additional requirements beyond those in Const 1963, art 6, § 19 for the office of judge; Amended AOI; MI Admin Code, R 168.3(2); Elector plaintiffs’ rights; Const 1963, art 2, § 4(1); Disqualification of a particular candidate

Rejecting plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges in this election case concerning a district court judgeship, the court affirmed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary disposition for defendants. Plaintiff-Sharma is a district court judge. The other two plaintiffs are electors from her district. It appeared “that, unbeknownst to Judge Sharma, she owed late filing fees” due to actions by the Treasurer of her reelection committee. As a result, she filed an AOI with a false statement that all late filing fees had been paid. Based on MCL 168.558(4), defendants concluded that due to the false statement, they “were required to disqualify Judge Sharma from the ballot.” Plaintiffs asserted that she “was not required to file an AOI.” On appeal, the court first noted that, even if this were so, she did file one and it contained false statements. “The filing of an AOI with a false statement requires her exclusion from the ballot under the plain language of MCL 168.558(4).” As to the merits of plaintiffs’ arguments, the court agreed with the Court of Claims that they were “not supported by the plain language of the Constitution. Plaintiffs’ primary position is that, under Const 1963, art 6, § 22, an AOI cannot be required of Judge Sharma.” But as a district court judge, she did “not occupy one of the three offices to which” that section applies. It next found that plaintiffs abandoned the claim that because she had “been performing the duties of a circuit court judge under a plan of concurrent jurisdiction, she is both a ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ circuit court judge.” And even if not abandoned, the court found it meritless. The fact that she was “authorized to ‘exercise the power and jurisdiction of the circuit court’ . . . does not make her a de jure circuit court judge.” The court also found plaintiffs’ reliance on the purity-of-elections clause meritless, noting that judicial officers, like almost all other candidates, are required to file an AOI. Further, the AOI requirement “does not add qualifications to the office of judge” and administrative rules for amending AOIs “do not apply in the case of false statements[.]” Finally, the court rejected the claim “that denying Judge Sharma access to the ballot harms the rights of voters,” such as the other two plaintiffs.

Divorce; Marital home; Marital property; Aggrieved party; MCR 7.203(A); Appeal of right; Concrete & particularized injury; Federated Ins Co v Oakland Cnty Rd Comm’n; Third-party rights; Warth v Seldin; Nonparty intervention; Zalewski v Zalewski

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because defendant-husband was not an aggrieved party entitled to appeal as of right. In the divorce judgment, the trial court found defendant and his father conspired to defraud plaintiff-wife of her share of the marital home’s value, determined plaintiff was entitled to 25% of the home’s value, and gave defendant two options, paying that amount or selling the home and paying her 25% of the proceeds. On appeal, the court held that defendant failed to identify a concrete injury from the challenged sale option. It reasoned that the judgment “gives him more options than he desires,” and he could avoid the challenged sale remedy by choosing the uncontested option of paying plaintiff 25% of the appraised value. The court also noted that defendant framed his arguments around his father’s rights, including a request to strike any provision allowing “the house of his father” to be sold. Because a litigant generally cannot rest a claim on third-party rights, and defendant’s father did not intervene, defendant could not pursue his father’s interests by proxy. Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Order permitting parties to use, discuss, & elicit testimony about a nonparty patient’s disclosed medical records; Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA); Exception allowing disclosure of protected health information in judicial proceedings; 45 CFR § 164.512(e)(1); Qualified protective order; The physician-patient privilege; MCL 600.2157; Waiver of the privilege; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)

The court held that the disclosure of a nonparty male patient’s medical information was permitted under the HIPAA’s judicial proceedings exception, and that he waived his physician-patient privilege. Thus, it affirmed “the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion to permit the parties to ‘use, discuss, and elicit testimony’” about the male patient’s medical records. Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence and discriminatory denial of public services under the ELCRA based on her “claim that she was sexually assaulted by the male patient while hospitalized at” defendant-hospital. Defendants argued the trial court erred in granting her motion because HIPAA and the physician-patient privilege “protected disclosure of the male patient’s medical information and prohibit plaintiff’s use of the information in eliciting testimony from witnesses.” The court disagreed. It first determined that disclosure of the male patient’s “medical information was permitted under” § 164.512(e)(1). The trial court entered a stipulated protective order limiting the use of the documents to this case. Its later “written order on the motion limited use of the information to the instant litigation and provided that the information would be returned or destroyed after litigation is complete. This is sufficient to constitute a qualified protective order” under § 164.512(e)(1)(v). Thus, defendants’ disclosure of the “medical records was appropriate even considering the inconsistencies between the General Authorization, revocation, HIPAA Authorization, and affidavit all signed the same day.” HIPAA did not otherwise prohibit them from discussing his protected health information. As to the privilege, he executed the General Authorization, which “authorized ‘the disclosure and/or use of individually identifiable health information,’” and completed a HIPAA Authorization. The court found that defendants could not “unring the bell” as to his medical records. They “were already disclosed pursuant to the stipulated protective order.” In light of his “initial participation as a witness in the lawsuit and the relevance of his medical information to the issues being litigated, his attempt to reassert the privilege following the voluntary disclosure” was not sufficient “to bar their disclosure or use.” The court was also not persuaded by defendants’ assertion that his “waiver was not knowing or voluntary.”

Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; No-fault auto insurance policy cancellation; Whether the notice complied with MCL 500.3020(1)(b); Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co; Distinguishing Jackson v Doe (Unpub)

Holding that the auto insurance policy cancellation notice did not comply with MCL 500.3020(1)(b) and thus was ineffective, the court reversed summary disposition for defendant-insurer (CURE) and remanded. Plaintiff-insured sought PIP benefits after an auto accident. The issue on appeal was whether CURE effectively canceled his policy before the accident. It “sent the purported notice of cancellation for nonpayment on the very day” the payment was due. The court noted that in Yang, it and the Michigan “Supreme Court addressed materially similar circumstances: an insurer’s attempt to cancel a no-fault policy for nonpayment of premium by mailing a notice before the payment was past due.” Applying Yang, the 4/24/22 cancellation notice here “was ineffective as a matter of law because it was mailed before the deadline for plaintiff’s payment had passed.” The 4/5 notice CURE sent him “stated that his second installment payment was due [4/24]. When CURE sent the notice of cancellation on [4/24], plaintiff still had the remainder of that day to make a timely payment.” CURE conceded as much on appeal. Thus, the time for making the premium payment “had not yet passed when the notice was issued, and no nonpayment—the sole ground for cancellation stated in the notice—had yet occurred. Under Yang, such a notice ‘does not satisfy MCL 500.3020(1)(b).’” While CURE relied on an unpublished decision, Jackson, the notice in that case “was sent the day after nonpayment occurred, and it therefore satisfied the requirements of MCL 500.3020(1)(b).”

Order permitting parties to use, discuss, & elicit testimony about a nonparty patient’s disclosed medical records; Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA); Exception allowing disclosure of protected health information in judicial proceedings; 45 CFR § 164.512(e)(1); Qualified protective order; The physician-patient privilege; MCL 600.2157; Waiver of the privilege; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)

The court held that the disclosure of a nonparty male patient’s medical information was permitted under the HIPAA’s judicial proceedings exception, and that he waived his physician-patient privilege. Thus, it affirmed “the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion to permit the parties to ‘use, discuss, and elicit testimony’” about the male patient’s medical records. Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence and discriminatory denial of public services under the ELCRA based on her “claim that she was sexually assaulted by the male patient while hospitalized at” defendant-hospital. Defendants argued the trial court erred in granting her motion because HIPAA and the physician-patient privilege “protected disclosure of the male patient’s medical information and prohibit plaintiff’s use of the information in eliciting testimony from witnesses.” The court disagreed. It first determined that disclosure of the male patient’s “medical information was permitted under” § 164.512(e)(1). The trial court entered a stipulated protective order limiting the use of the documents to this case. Its later “written order on the motion limited use of the information to the instant litigation and provided that the information would be returned or destroyed after litigation is complete. This is sufficient to constitute a qualified protective order” under § 164.512(e)(1)(v). Thus, defendants’ disclosure of the “medical records was appropriate even considering the inconsistencies between the General Authorization, revocation, HIPAA Authorization, and affidavit all signed the same day.” HIPAA did not otherwise prohibit them from discussing his protected health information. As to the privilege, he executed the General Authorization, which “authorized ‘the disclosure and/or use of individually identifiable health information,’” and completed a HIPAA Authorization. The court found that defendants could not “unring the bell” as to his medical records. They “were already disclosed pursuant to the stipulated protective order.” In light of his “initial participation as a witness in the lawsuit and the relevance of his medical information to the issues being litigated, his attempt to reassert the privilege following the voluntary disclosure” was not sufficient “to bar their disclosure or use.” The court was also not persuaded by defendants’ assertion that his “waiver was not knowing or voluntary.”

Power of attorney; Fiduciary duty; Attorney-in-fact; In re Susser Estate; Breach of fiduciary duty; Statute of limitations; Prentis Family Found v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Inst; Conversion; MCL 600.2919a; Magley v M&W Inc; Evidentiary issues; Hearsay; MRE 802; Invited error; In re Koch Estate; Collateral estoppel; Keywell & Rosenfeld v Bithell

The court held that the trial court did not err after a bench trial in finding defendant liable for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion while acting under decedent’s durable power of attorney. Decedent appointed defendant as durable power of attorney, but the document barred gifts, creating joint assets with defendant, and compensation. Plaintiff, as personal representative of decedent’s estate, sued after disputed withdrawals, credit-card charges, account changes, and other transactions. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff on breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. On appeal, the court first deemed several pro se claims abandoned and held the validity of the power of attorney was moot because the judgment assumed defendant’s authority rather than invalidated it. The court held that defendant breached her fiduciary duty because an attorney-in-fact owes a fiduciary duty, and defendant opened a new account in her own name using decedent’s funds despite the power of attorney stating she was “not authorized” to create a joint account or asset with herself. The court also pointed to defendant endorsing a Social Security check made out to decedent and plaintiff, making gifts for car insurance and Home Depot use, and the evidence linking luxury handbag purchases to defendant’s PO box and her daughter’s email. The court further held that conversion was established because defendant wrongfully exerted “domain over decedent’s personal property inconsistent with her rights as power of attorney” through the credit-card and account conduct. It rejected defendant’s speedy-trial argument because this was a civil case, deferred to the trial court’s evidentiary and credibility rulings, and rejected her forum-shopping claim because the deed issue “was not actually relitigated.” Affirmed.

Whether condo units reverted to the general common elements; The Condominium Act; MCL 559.167(3); Elizabeth Trace Condo Ass’n v American Global Enters, Inc; An amendment to the master deed that did not take effect; Equitable estoppel; Failure to record a replat of the reversion; Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vista Land & Home Dev, LLC; Comparing Wellesley Gardens Condo Ass’n v Manek (Unpub); Constitutionality of MCL 559.167(3); Settlement agreement contract; Clark v Al-Amin; MCR 2.507(G); Jurisdiction; Final order

The court held that ownership of the condo units at issue reverted to defendant/appellee-Association “10 years after construction commenced, because the units were neither complete nor withdrawn from the project.” It rejected defendant/appellant-Triple’s claims that the Association was equitably estopped from denying plaintiff-PCJ title to the units and that MCL 559.167(3) was facially unconstitutional. It also held that “the parties reached a binding settlement agreement,” and Triple’s later conduct indicating its change of heart did not release it from its obligations to abide by the terms. Triple challenged orders on appeal that (1) granted in part and denied in part PCJ’s “motion to compel compliance with a court order requiring Triple to make a second settlement payment;” (2) entered the written settlement agreement; (3) denied its summary disposition motion and instead granted it to the Association; and (4) granted PCJ’s “motion to enforce the settlement agreement and ordered the release of the second settlement payment from escrow to” PCJ. As an initial matter, the court rejected PCJ’s challenge to its jurisdiction over Triple’s claim of appeal. As to the grant of summary disposition to the Association, the court rejected Triple’s assertion that it never lost its ownership interest in the units under MCL 559.167. This involved “the interpretation and application of MCL 559.167(3) as it existed at the relevant times in this case.” The court found meritless Triple’s contention that the “units did not revert to the general common elements under MCL 559.167(3) because” they were not undeveloped. The court clearly stated in Elizabeth Trace “that, to avoid reversion under the version of MCL 559.167(3) that applies in this matter, units must be completed. That is also consistent with the plain language of the statute[.]” As Triple failed to complete construction of the units, ownership of the “units reverted to the Association in 2014[.]” While Triple asserted that the Association’s co-owners “passed a proposed first amendment to the master deed, which reinstated the subject units from the general common elements” in 2017, that amendment did not take effect and thus, the “units were never reinstated.” The court further concluded that, based on “the plain statutory language, the Association was not required to record a replat of the reversion.” Affirmed.