Sufficiency of the evidence; Self-defense; Deadly force; MCL 780.972(1)(a); AWIM; MCL 750.83; Carrying a concealed weapon; MCL 750.227; Felony-firearm; MCL 750.227b; Initial aggressor; Excessive force; People v Dupree; People v Guajardo

The court held that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to disprove defendant’s self-defense theory beyond a reasonable doubt. He was convicted of AWIM, CCW, and felony-firearm after surveillance video showed him firing multiple shots toward two people (S and D) at a gas station. He claimed he acted in self-defense because he feared S, but the prosecution presented video and physical evidence showing no shots came from S and D’s location. On appeal, the court held that the jury could reject defendant’s testimony because the video did not show either S or D with a firearm, showed them in a “‘defensive-type position,’” and the physical evidence showed “‘[t]here was no evidence that any gun was fired from the west side of the parking lot.’” The court also reasoned that defendant admitted nothing stopped him from leaving, that he moved toward the place he claimed the threat was coming from, and that seven casings were fired from his weapon. Thus, the jury could find he escalated the encounter, used excessive force, and did not honestly and reasonably believe deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. Affirmed.

Motion to correct an invalid sentence; Delayed sentence agreement; MCL 771.1(2); People v Smith; People v Cannon; Imposition of a jail sentence after successful completion of a delay period; Failure to explicitly state the reason for the delayed sentence; Harmless error; Intermediate sanction; MCL 769.34(4)(a); MCL 769.31(b); Whether the reasons articulated for the jail sentence were based on factors accounted for in the PRV score; Ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence (JOS); Presentence investigation report (PSIR)

The court held that defendant-Degen’s sentence of 365 days in jail was not invalid and thus, the trial court properly denied his motion to correct an invalid sentence. His sentence did not violate MCL 771.1(2), and the trial court did not violate MCL 769.31(b) and 769.34(4) by imposing a jail term instead of an intermediate sanction. The parties entered into a plea agreement with delayed sentencing, under which, upon “successful completion of the conditions, the prosecution would agree to reduce his first-degree home invasion charges to third-degree home invasion[.]’” It also stated there was no sentencing agreement. Defendant complied with the conditions. The PSIR recommended the trial court “grant the terms of the delay and sentence Degen to two days in jail with two days of jail credit.” The trial court dismissed the first-degree home invasion charges and added the third-degree home invasion convictions, but declined to adopt the sentencing recommendation. On appeal, the court noted that nothing in MCL 771.1(2) “requires a trial court to sentence a defendant to probation after the delay, even when a defendant complies with the conditions of the delay.” Because he established “eligibility for leniency at the end of the 11-month period, the trial court reduced Degen’s most serious charges from first-degree home invasion to third-degree home invasion, which resulted in a considerable reduction of his” guidelines range. The court concluded that “a sentence involving incarceration in jail following a defendant’s successful completion of a delay period is not necessarily improper under MCL 771.1(2), and Degen” did not show “that the trial court was obligated to sentence him to probation.” Further, any procedural error in its failing “to explicitly state the reason for the delayed sentence” at the time of the plea was harmless. As to his intermediate sanction argument, “the trial court adequately stated reasonable grounds to sentence him to one year” in jail under MCL 769.34(4)(a). Affirmed but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting his JOS to reflect his third-degree home invasion convictions and sentences.

Minor guardianship; Petition to terminate guardianship; Court-structured plan; MCL 700.5209(2)(b)(ii) & (iii); Continued guardianship; MCL 700.5209(2)(c); Best interests; MCL 700.5101(a); Parental care, love, guidance & attention; Substantial disruption of parent-child relationship; Fundamental parental rights; Due process; In re Versalle Guardianship; Statement of factual findings & conclusions; In re Williams; Rittershaus v Rittershaus

The court held that the probate court did not err in finding appellants-parents failed to substantially comply with the court-structured plan, but erred by continuing the guardianship without making the factual findings required by MCL 700.5209(2)(c). The minor was placed in a full guardianship with his maternal grandparents after the mother’s mental-health hospitalization. The probate court later entered a court-structured reunification plan requiring, among other things, the father’s compliance with probation and domestic-violence programming and mother’s continued mental-health stability. On appeal, the court upheld the noncompliance findings, concluding the father failed to complete the domestic-violence program, failed to provide probation reports or releases, and had not shown meaningful behavioral progress, while the mother did not provide sufficient evidence she was stable and compliant with treatment. The court summarized that appellants had “not demonstrated that the probate court” erred as to noncompliance. But the court vacated the continuation order because the probate court’s order merely stated that continuing the guardianship was in the child’s best interests and “did not make any reviewable findings of fact regarding the requirements of MCL 700.5209(2)(c).” The court directed that, on remand, the probate court must address the statutory requirements and “the best-interest factors under MCL 700.5101(a)” using current information. Vacated and remanded.

Stepparent adoption; Termination of parental rights under MCL 710.51(6); “Regular & substantial support” for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a); Incarcerated parent; In re Caldwell; In re MSL

Holding that the trial court’s focus on the impact on the child of what support respondent-father might be able to provide was erroneous in light of MSL, the court vacated its decision ruling that petitioners could not satisfy MCL 710.51(6)(a), and remanded for a proper analysis. The trial court denied petitioners-mother and stepfather’s “request to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to the child under MCL 710.51(6) and” dismissed their petition for stepparent adoption. The issue on appeal was “what constitutes ‘regular and substantial’ support for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a) in the context of an incarcerated parent whose ability to provide support for his or her child is severely limited by indigency resulting from incarceration.” In determining respondent’s ability to aid in providing the child with regular and substantial support, the trial court “considered his income, expenses, and finances in light of his incarceration and found that he had modest prison earnings that were ‘quickly consumed’ by his purchases of essential personal items. However, [it] did not explicitly find that the evidence established that [he] did not have the requisite ‘ability to support, or assist in supporting,’ his child under MCL 710.51(6)(a).” It instead erroneously “focused on the substantive impact of the support on the child and concluded that respondent could manage only ‘symbolic support’ for the child falling short of making ‘a meaningful difference’ in the child’s life, and therefore was not able to provide ‘substantial’ support for purposes of” the statute. Pursuant to MSL, “the proper focus in evaluating whether support is ‘substantial’ for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a) is on the parent’s ability to pay, not the impact of support on the child’s life.” The court also rejected respondent’s reliance on “Caldwell as establishing a brightline earnings threshold below which a noncustodial parent cannot be shown capable of providing substantial support.” It directed the trial court on remand to redetermine whether he “was able to provide substantial support for the two-year lookback period by considering respondent’s income, finances, and situation from [his] standpoint, rather than the extent to which [his] potential support would have affected the child’s life.”

Dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with a discovery order; MCR 2.313(A)(6) & (B)(2); Dean v Tucker; Vicencio v Ramirez

Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this case with prejudice for failure to comply with a discovery order without considering the applicable legal framework, the court vacated the dismissal order and remanded. It noted that, before “dismissing a case as a sanction for a discovery violation, the trial court should consider the” Dean factors. The trial court here “did not engage in any meaningful analysis of the Dean factors or determine whether a less severe sanction was warranted before ordering dismissal.” It also failed to “consider whether plaintiffs’ admittedly delayed supplemental responses sufficiently complied with the discovery order. While [it] expressed frustration with plaintiffs’ previous discovery violations and stated that it was dismissing the action for the reasons set forth in defendants’ brief, the [trial] court did not conduct the requisite examination on the record, or in its order of dismissal, and in doing so, necessarily abused its discretion.” The court noted that while dismissal may have been an appropriate sanction given “plaintiffs’ prior dismissal and repeated discovery violations, ‘[d]ismissal is a drastic step that should be taken cautiously,’ and ‘[o]ur legal system favors disposition of litigation on the merits.’” The court found that the “trial court’s six-minute hearing did not comport with these principles.”

Guardianship; Conservatorship; Legally incapacitated individual; Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC); Removal of guardian; MCL 700.5310; MCL 700.5306(1); Appointment of a guardian ad litem; MCL 700.5303(3); MCL 700.5306a(1)(e) & (x); Removal of conservator; Good cause; MCL 700.5414; Fiduciary duties; MCL 700.1212(1); MCL 700.5416; Change of venue; Forum-shopping; In re Guardianship of Redd

The court held that the probate court abused its discretion by removing appellant-Guardian Care as guardian sua sponte and by removing appellant as conservator without identifying good cause. Appellant had served as guardian for the legally incapacitated individual for more than 15 years and later as conservator, then moved to change venue after the ward relocated to Macomb County. The probate court treated the venue motion as forum-shopping, initiated review on its own, removed appellant as guardian and conservator, and appointed appellee as successor fiduciary. On appeal, the court held that EPIC did not authorize the probate court to remove the guardian sua sponte, explaining that “the probate court abused its discretion by sua sponte removing Guardian Care without the filing of a petition.” The court also held that the probate court failed to support removal under the governing suitability standard because it “failed to adequately explain how Guardian Care’s conduct in this case warranted Guardian Care’s removal as guardian.” As to the conservatorship, the court held that the probate court also abused its discretion because it “omitted any discussion of the conservatorship or ‘good cause’ standard,” and the record contained “no meaningful evidence of problematic conduct by Guardian Care.” Reversed and remanded.

Minor guardianship; Petition to terminate guardianship; Court-structured plan; MCL 700.5209(2)(b)(ii) & (iii); Continued guardianship; MCL 700.5209(2)(c); Best interests; MCL 700.5101(a); Parental care, love, guidance & attention; Substantial disruption of parent-child relationship; Fundamental parental rights; Due process; In re Versalle Guardianship; Statement of factual findings & conclusions; In re Williams; Rittershaus v Rittershaus

The court held that the probate court did not err in finding appellants-parents failed to substantially comply with the court-structured plan, but erred by continuing the guardianship without making the factual findings required by MCL 700.5209(2)(c). The minor was placed in a full guardianship with his maternal grandparents after the mother’s mental-health hospitalization. The probate court later entered a court-structured reunification plan requiring, among other things, the father’s compliance with probation and domestic-violence programming and mother’s continued mental-health stability. On appeal, the court upheld the noncompliance findings, concluding the father failed to complete the domestic-violence program, failed to provide probation reports or releases, and had not shown meaningful behavioral progress, while the mother did not provide sufficient evidence she was stable and compliant with treatment. The court summarized that appellants had “not demonstrated that the probate court” erred as to noncompliance. But the court vacated the continuation order because the probate court’s order merely stated that continuing the guardianship was in the child’s best interests and “did not make any reviewable findings of fact regarding the requirements of MCL 700.5209(2)(c).” The court directed that, on remand, the probate court must address the statutory requirements and “the best-interest factors under MCL 700.5101(a)” using current information. Vacated and remanded.

Children’s best interests; Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re Kellogg; In re Mota; In re LaFrance; Parent-child bond; Consideration of relative placement; In re Atchley; In re Olive/Metts; “Relative” (MCL 712A.13a(1)(j))

The court held that the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, but its failure to consider the children’s relative placement in making its best-interests determination required reversal. The case arose because of respondent-father’s sexual abuse of his children’s half-sister (S). On appeal, he only challenged the trial court’s finding that terminating his parental rights was in his children’s best interests. He contended it erred by applying the anticipatory neglect doctrine “because he treated his seven children different from how he treated” their mother’s (nonrespondent-JB) two children from her prior relationship. He also asserted that S, “age 11, was significantly older than his children, who were all under age four.” The court found his arguments unavailing. He was S’s stepfather, and she “referred to him as her ‘stepdad’ while testifying. She lived together with respondent, JB, and her eight siblings and half-siblings before JB became aware of the sexual abuse. She did not tell anyone what [he] was doing to her because she was scared and thought she would ‘lose everything’ if she did.” While he contended he treated her “‘drastically different’ from how he treated his own children, the record” did not support this claim. The court concluded this case was “more like Mota than Kellogg or LaFrance.” Further, it found reasonable the trial court’s concern about “the possibility of mental harm to the children in light of respondent’s repeated denials of wrongdoing and claims of fabrication” by JB and S. It noted that he tried “to convince JB not to say anything about what she witnessed and to persuade” S not to say anything about his conduct. The court next determined that he erroneously asserted a bond with the children, “which weighed against termination, but the absence of a bond was not a key factor in the [trial] court’s best-interests determination in any event.” However, because “the trial court failed to consider the children’s placement with JB when it” made its best-interests determination, the court vacated that determination and remanded, retaining jurisdiction.

Stepparent adoption; Termination of parental rights under MCL 710.51(6); “Regular & substantial support” for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a); Incarcerated parent; In re Caldwell; In re MSL

Holding that the trial court’s focus on the impact on the child of what support respondent-father might be able to provide was erroneous in light of MSL, the court vacated its decision ruling that petitioners could not satisfy MCL 710.51(6)(a), and remanded for a proper analysis. The trial court denied petitioners-mother and stepfather’s “request to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to the child under MCL 710.51(6) and” dismissed their petition for stepparent adoption. The issue on appeal was “what constitutes ‘regular and substantial’ support for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a) in the context of an incarcerated parent whose ability to provide support for his or her child is severely limited by indigency resulting from incarceration.” In determining respondent’s ability to aid in providing the child with regular and substantial support, the trial court “considered his income, expenses, and finances in light of his incarceration and found that he had modest prison earnings that were ‘quickly consumed’ by his purchases of essential personal items. However, [it] did not explicitly find that the evidence established that [he] did not have the requisite ‘ability to support, or assist in supporting,’ his child under MCL 710.51(6)(a).” It instead erroneously “focused on the substantive impact of the support on the child and concluded that respondent could manage only ‘symbolic support’ for the child falling short of making ‘a meaningful difference’ in the child’s life, and therefore was not able to provide ‘substantial’ support for purposes of” the statute. Pursuant to MSL, “the proper focus in evaluating whether support is ‘substantial’ for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a) is on the parent’s ability to pay, not the impact of support on the child’s life.” The court also rejected respondent’s reliance on “Caldwell as establishing a brightline earnings threshold below which a noncustodial parent cannot be shown capable of providing substantial support.” It directed the trial court on remand to redetermine whether he “was able to provide substantial support for the two-year lookback period by considering respondent’s income, finances, and situation from [his] standpoint, rather than the extent to which [his] potential support would have affected the child’s life.”

Guardianship; Conservatorship; Legally incapacitated individual; Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC); Removal of guardian; MCL 700.5310; MCL 700.5306(1); Appointment of a guardian ad litem; MCL 700.5303(3); MCL 700.5306a(1)(e) & (x); Removal of conservator; Good cause; MCL 700.5414; Fiduciary duties; MCL 700.1212(1); MCL 700.5416; Change of venue; Forum-shopping; In re Guardianship of Redd

The court held that the probate court abused its discretion by removing appellant-Guardian Care as guardian sua sponte and by removing appellant as conservator without identifying good cause. Appellant had served as guardian for the legally incapacitated individual for more than 15 years and later as conservator, then moved to change venue after the ward relocated to Macomb County. The probate court treated the venue motion as forum-shopping, initiated review on its own, removed appellant as guardian and conservator, and appointed appellee as successor fiduciary. On appeal, the court held that EPIC did not authorize the probate court to remove the guardian sua sponte, explaining that “the probate court abused its discretion by sua sponte removing Guardian Care without the filing of a petition.” The court also held that the probate court failed to support removal under the governing suitability standard because it “failed to adequately explain how Guardian Care’s conduct in this case warranted Guardian Care’s removal as guardian.” As to the conservatorship, the court held that the probate court also abused its discretion because it “omitted any discussion of the conservatorship or ‘good cause’ standard,” and the record contained “no meaningful evidence of problematic conduct by Guardian Care.” Reversed and remanded.