42 USC § 1983; Pretrial detainee’s drug overdose death in jail; Municipal liability; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Failure to train claim; Adequacy of the training program; Helphenstine v Lewis Cnty; Distinguishing Linden v City of Southfield & Wright v Louisville Metro Gov’t; Deliberate indifference element; Board of Cnty Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty v Brown; “Obviousness”; Causation; Failure to medically screen claim; Requirement that plaintiff allege the existence of a clear & persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct; Claim based on a municipal custom of jail overcrowding; Failure to sufficiently allege a causal link; Claim based on a municipal policy of jail underfunding; Unlawful action requirement

The court held that plaintiff stated a plausible claim against defendant-County for failure to train related to her father’s (Lewis) drug overdose death while in pretrial detention. But it concluded that she did not plausibly state her claims “that the County maintained policies of inadequate medical screenings, underfunding, and overcrowding[.]” Thus, it reversed the district court’s grant of the County’s motion to dismiss as to the failure to train claim but affirmed as to plaintiff’s other municipal liability claims. As to the first element of the failure to train claim, the court found the complaint plausibly established “that the County’s training program did not adequately teach jail staff how to recognize and respond to medical emergencies relating to drug overdoses.” The court noted that jail staff did not “provide or call for any medical care upon Lewis’s arrival, despite surveillance footage depicting him ‘unstable on his feet and hunched over,’ Lewis’s previous admission that he had taken drugs, and the officers’ discovery of drug paraphernalia and a powdery substance in his vehicle.” Throughout the approximately 17 hours he was at the detention facility, at least 10 individuals interacted with him. “Despite having policies in place, not even one individual properly medically screened Lewis, regularly monitored him, or otherwise sought or provided medical care—even as he defecated uncontrollably on himself, laid in his own feces, and banged his head into his cell door.” And after staff eventually discovered he was not breathing, they “administered chest compressions, but no one called 911 for another 40 minutes.” The court also held that plaintiff sufficiently pled the deliberate indifference element. It concluded this case presented “one of the ‘narrow’ circumstances from which we may infer deliberate indifference based on a single incident.” It found the two components of the “obviousness” required for the single-violation path were supported by the complaint’s allegations. Finally, the court held that plaintiff satisfied the third element, causation. “Had even one person recognized that Lewis was experiencing an overdose, they may have provided or otherwise sought out medical care that could have saved his life.”

Motion to suppress; Search & seizure; Probable cause based on collective police knowledge; People v Nguyen; Vehicle search & search incident to arrest; Due process; Officer’s false explanation for a traffic stop; People v Joly; Prosecutorial error; Preservation & plain-error review; People v Carines; Alleged burden shifting; People v McGhee; Curative jury instructions; As-applied challenge to the FIP statute; MCL 750.224f; Second Amendment; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc v Bruen; Historical tradition of firearm regulation

The court held that defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied, the prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof, and MCL 750.224f was constitutional as applied to him. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, CCW, FIP, and felony-firearm, third or subsequent offense. Police stopped him after two undercover cocaine purchases. The stopping officer falsely cited a stolen-vehicle investigation, and subsequent searches uncovered cocaine and a firearm. The trial court denied defendant’s suppression and dismissal motions. On appeal, the court concluded that the investigating officers’ collective knowledge supplied probable cause to stop and arrest him. The stopping officer’s lack of personal knowledge was irrelevant because “this was a team investigation, and the relevant question is whether the entire police team had probable cause to stop and arrest defendant.” The court also determined that the vehicle search and search incident to arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Defendant’s due-process challenge to the officer’s false explanation likewise failed because “attempting to stall a suspected drug dealer until police backup arrives does not constitute misconduct or an unfair investigatory process.” The court next rejected his unpreserved burden-shifting claim, explaining that “defendant opened the door to the prosecutor’s questions about the unproduced evidence on re-direct examination” by suggesting that the failure to obtain surveillance footage made the investigation unreliable. Even assuming plain error, defendant failed to show that his substantial rights were affected given the brief reference and overwhelming evidence of guilt. Further, “the trial court’s instructions dispelled any prejudice arising from the prosecutor’s questioning.” Finally, the court rejected defendant’s as-applied challenge to MCL 750.224f, finding that the prosecution satisfied Bruen’s historical-tradition requirement. Given his extensive criminal history, including violent and assaultive conduct, “our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation includes prohibiting individuals such as him from possessing firearms, at least until certain requirements are satisfied indicating his willingness and ability to follow the law.” Affirmed.

Motion to suppress; Probable cause for a search warrant; Limitation on DEA operational plan evidence; Plain error review; Rights to confrontation & to present a defense; FRE 402 & 403; Relevance; Misleading or confusing the jury; Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree murder of a federal officer; 18 USC §§ 1111 & 1114; Lying in wait; Premeditation; Self-defense; Jury instructions; Due Process Clause; Intentional killing while engaging in a drug-trafficking offense; § 848(e)(1); Pinkerton liability (co-conspirator liability); Foreseeability; “Engaging in an offense punishable under” § 841(b)(1)(A); Substantive-connection requirement; Participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy; Possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute; Aiding & abetting; Life sentence; Procedural & substantive reasonableness

The court held that defendant-Goddard’s motion to suppress was properly denied, and that the district court’s limitation on evidence about the DEA’s operational plan did not violate his and defendant-Cortner’s constitutional rights or the FREs. It also held that sufficient evidence supported Goddard’s first-degree murder of a federal officer (D) conviction, both defendants’ convictions of intentionally killing D while engaging in a drug-trafficking offense, and Cortner’s convictions of participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy and possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute. Finally, it held that Cortner’s life sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. The case arose from the execution of a search warrant by federal law-enforcement agents. Goddard fatally shot D during the search. On appeal, among other things, Goddard and Cortner argued “that the district court’s decision to limit testimony about the operational plan violated their constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense.” Reviewing the issue for plain error, the court found that they could not “clear that ‘high bar.’” It noted that “courts have excluded similar evidence for the reasons the district court gave here.” Thus, they could not “show that the district court’s decision is ‘clearly contrary to the law’ in this Circuit.” As to their FRE arguments, it concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling “that the operational-plan evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under Rule 402” and, alternatively, that it “could mislead the jury and thus barred its admission under Rule 403.” The court also rejected Cortner’s arguments challenging his conviction under § 848(e)(1) for intentionally killing D. It held that the district court did not commit legal error in instructing the jury that it could convict him “using a Pinkerton theory of co-conspirator liability,” concluding that “Pinkerton liability is not plainly inconsistent with § 848(e)(1).” And the Pinkerton instruction did not “plainly violate the Due Process Clause.” The court also held that the evidence was sufficient “to satisfy the elements of Pinkerton liability.” A rational jury could have found that Goddard killed D “to advance the charged drug-trafficking conspiracy” and that the killing “was reasonably foreseeable to Cortner.” Affirmed.

Commerce Clause challenge; United States v Lopez; Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); 18 USC § 924(e); Different-occasions requirement; Erlinger v United States; FRE 403; Offer to stipulate; Old Chief v United States

The court held that defendant-Mixon’s Commerce Clause challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent. It also held, in an issue of first impression, that the district court did not abuse its discretion under FRE 403 by admitting evidence about his 2000 robbery despite his offer to stipulate that it occurred on a different occasion from his other ACCA predicate offenses. Defendant carjacked a woman at gunpoint after her late-night shift, fled from Tennessee into Virginia, and was later arrested with the stolen firearm. A jury convicted him of carjacking and several firearm offenses. In a bifurcated second phase, the jury considered whether he had at least three qualifying prior convictions committed on different occasions for purposes of ACCA’s sentencing enhancement. On appeal, the court first rejected his as-applied Commerce Clause challenge, explaining that “our post-Lopez precedents have long foreclosed Mixon’s position.” The firearm had previously moved in interstate commerce, as had the carjacked vehicle, and defendant himself transported both across state lines while fleeing police. The court next addressed whether the government could present evidence about his prior robbery rather than accept his proposed stipulation that it occurred on a different occasion from his other prior offenses. It expressly identified this as “an issue of first impression,” noting that after Erlinger, defendants are “entitled to have a jury resolve ACCA’s occasions inquiry unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court declined to extend Old Chief’s rule requiring acceptance of a felon-status stipulation to ACCA’s different-occasions inquiry. Unlike felon status, the occasions inquiry depends on circumstances such as timing, proximity, and the relationship among offenses, and defendant’s proposed stipulation would have resolved only part of that inquiry. The court also found that the district court’s bifurcation reduced the danger that evidence of the earlier robbery would improperly affect the jury’s consideration of the current offenses. Concluding that the evidence retained legitimate probative value and did not create unfair prejudice substantially outweighing that value, the court determined that the district court “did not abuse its wide discretion under Rule 403 in allowing the government to prove the ACCA enhancement with evidence of its choosing.” Affirmed.

Acquiescence; Collateral estoppel; MCR 2.116(C)(7) & (I); Leahy v Orion Twp; Monat v State Farm Ins Co; Defaults; MCR 2.603(D)(1); Good cause; Meritorious defense; Requests for admission; MCR 2.312(B)(1); Default judgment; Cumulative error

The court held that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiffs’ acquiescence claim on collateral-estoppel grounds but did not abuse its discretion by setting aside defendants’ initial default or declining to enter a default judgment based on their failure to respond to requests for admission. Plaintiffs alleged that for several years they landscaped a 0.13-acre strip of land on defendants’ adjoining parcel and that defendants acquiesced to the resulting property boundary. After defendants plowed the disputed land, plaintiffs sued for acquiescence, trespass, and waste. The trial court dismissed the acquiescence claim based on a 1991 foreclosure judgment involving the disputed land. Plaintiffs later prevailed on their trespass and waste claims at a bench trial and were awarded $5,364.44. On appeal, the court concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply because “the question at issue—whether defendants acquiesced to property lines established by plaintiffs’ landscaping over the eastern border of their property—was not actively litigated in and determined by the 1991 judgment of foreclosure.” Further, plaintiffs were not asserting the same legal right involved in the foreclosure, and the foreclosure judgment did not suggest “that an owner of an adjacent parcel may not bring a claim of acquiescence.” As to the initial default, the trial court acted within its discretion where defendants responded shortly after the deadline, promptly moved to set aside the default, offered explanations for the delay, and presented evidence of a meritorious defense through their continued use of the disputed land. The court also upheld the refusal to enter a default judgment after defendants failed to answer requests for admission. Although the clerk had entered a second default, MCR 2.312 provides that unanswered requests are deemed admitted, while “the court rules do not provide for default as a remedy for a party’s failure to respond to requests for admission.” Finally, cumulative error did not warrant relief because the acquiescence ruling was the only error. The court vacated the dismissal of the acquiescence claim and remanded for further proceedings.

The trial court’s jurisdiction; Delay in ruling on a motion for default judgment; Arguments related to a defendant’s alleged reliance on an order in a prior case; Adequacy of the trial court’s factual findings; Judicial misconduct claim; Monetary sanctions award due to frivolous claims; MCL 600.2591; Waiver; Res judicata; Alpena Cnty Bd of Cnty Rd Comm’rs v Tadajewski

Holding, among other things, that the trial court had jurisdiction, that it did not reversibly err in handling plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, and that there was no error in its award of costs and fees to the Road Commission defendants, the court affirmed. In a prior case, Alpena Cnty, defendant-County Road Commission alleged that plaintiff “had been placing dangerous obstructions on the portion of the roadway adjacent to his property.” The trial court in that case granted the Road Commission summary disposition. While his appeal in that case was pending, plaintiff filed this action seeking to quiet title as to the portions of the road, “and he continued to allege that his property had been improperly altered and infringed upon.” In addition to the Road Commission and two of its attorneys, plaintiff named Berg Assessing & Consulting and its owner (collectively referred to as BAC) as defendants. The trial court granted the Road Commission defendants summary disposition. It later granted BAC’s motions to set aside the default entered due to lack of proper service, and for summary disposition. On appeal, plaintiff first asserted “that because the register of actions contains no proof of service of a summons, the trial court” had no jurisdiction to grant BAC summary disposition. But the court found this issue meritless given that all “defendants, including BAC, contested plaintiff’s claims on the merits.” Further, it saw “no basis to conclude that the trial court otherwise lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter as it did.” As to his claim that “the trial court took too long to rule on his motion for a default judgment after” the default was entered against BAC and that this prejudiced him, “BAC operated under the assumption that a default judgment had already been entered, and it moved to have it set aside, providing good cause—improper service of the complaint—and an affidavit of meritorious defense.” In regard to the sanctions award, plaintiff waived his issues as to the lack of a hearing on his objections. Further, the record showed that the trial court allowed him “to raise his objections at the motion hearing, and accepted and considered [his] additional written objections,” before issuing its order awarding the Road Commission defendants $46,334 in costs and fees.

42 USC § 1983; Pretrial detainee’s drug overdose death in jail; Municipal liability; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Failure to train claim; Adequacy of the training program; Helphenstine v Lewis Cnty; Distinguishing Linden v City of Southfield & Wright v Louisville Metro Gov’t; Deliberate indifference element; Board of Cnty Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty v Brown; “Obviousness”; Causation; Failure to medically screen claim; Requirement that plaintiff allege the existence of a clear & persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct; Claim based on a municipal custom of jail overcrowding; Failure to sufficiently allege a causal link; Claim based on a municipal policy of jail underfunding; Unlawful action requirement

The court held that plaintiff stated a plausible claim against defendant-County for failure to train related to her father’s (Lewis) drug overdose death while in pretrial detention. But it concluded that she did not plausibly state her claims “that the County maintained policies of inadequate medical screenings, underfunding, and overcrowding[.]” Thus, it reversed the district court’s grant of the County’s motion to dismiss as to the failure to train claim but affirmed as to plaintiff’s other municipal liability claims. As to the first element of the failure to train claim, the court found the complaint plausibly established “that the County’s training program did not adequately teach jail staff how to recognize and respond to medical emergencies relating to drug overdoses.” The court noted that jail staff did not “provide or call for any medical care upon Lewis’s arrival, despite surveillance footage depicting him ‘unstable on his feet and hunched over,’ Lewis’s previous admission that he had taken drugs, and the officers’ discovery of drug paraphernalia and a powdery substance in his vehicle.” Throughout the approximately 17 hours he was at the detention facility, at least 10 individuals interacted with him. “Despite having policies in place, not even one individual properly medically screened Lewis, regularly monitored him, or otherwise sought or provided medical care—even as he defecated uncontrollably on himself, laid in his own feces, and banged his head into his cell door.” And after staff eventually discovered he was not breathing, they “administered chest compressions, but no one called 911 for another 40 minutes.” The court also held that plaintiff sufficiently pled the deliberate indifference element. It concluded this case presented “one of the ‘narrow’ circumstances from which we may infer deliberate indifference based on a single incident.” It found the two components of the “obviousness” required for the single-violation path were supported by the complaint’s allegations. Finally, the court held that plaintiff satisfied the third element, causation. “Had even one person recognized that Lewis was experiencing an overdose, they may have provided or otherwise sought out medical care that could have saved his life.”

Acquiescence; Collateral estoppel; MCR 2.116(C)(7) & (I); Leahy v Orion Twp; Monat v State Farm Ins Co; Defaults; MCR 2.603(D)(1); Good cause; Meritorious defense; Requests for admission; MCR 2.312(B)(1); Default judgment; Cumulative error

The court held that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiffs’ acquiescence claim on collateral-estoppel grounds but did not abuse its discretion by setting aside defendants’ initial default or declining to enter a default judgment based on their failure to respond to requests for admission. Plaintiffs alleged that for several years they landscaped a 0.13-acre strip of land on defendants’ adjoining parcel and that defendants acquiesced to the resulting property boundary. After defendants plowed the disputed land, plaintiffs sued for acquiescence, trespass, and waste. The trial court dismissed the acquiescence claim based on a 1991 foreclosure judgment involving the disputed land. Plaintiffs later prevailed on their trespass and waste claims at a bench trial and were awarded $5,364.44. On appeal, the court concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply because “the question at issue—whether defendants acquiesced to property lines established by plaintiffs’ landscaping over the eastern border of their property—was not actively litigated in and determined by the 1991 judgment of foreclosure.” Further, plaintiffs were not asserting the same legal right involved in the foreclosure, and the foreclosure judgment did not suggest “that an owner of an adjacent parcel may not bring a claim of acquiescence.” As to the initial default, the trial court acted within its discretion where defendants responded shortly after the deadline, promptly moved to set aside the default, offered explanations for the delay, and presented evidence of a meritorious defense through their continued use of the disputed land. The court also upheld the refusal to enter a default judgment after defendants failed to answer requests for admission. Although the clerk had entered a second default, MCR 2.312 provides that unanswered requests are deemed admitted, while “the court rules do not provide for default as a remedy for a party’s failure to respond to requests for admission.” Finally, cumulative error did not warrant relief because the acquiescence ruling was the only error. The court vacated the dismissal of the acquiescence claim and remanded for further proceedings.