Resentencing hearing pursuant to MCL 769.25a & Miller v Alabama; Precondition to the admission of a defendant’s psychological evidence; Compelling defendant to submit to a psychological evaluation conducted by a prosecution expert; Constitutional rights against self-incrimination; Distinguishing Estelle v Smith; Buchanan v Kentucky; Kansas v Cheever; Rebuttal evidence; Life without the possibility of parole (LWOP)

The court held “that a trial court may compel a defendant to submit to a psychological examination by a prosecution expert as a precondition to admitting the defendant’s own expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing.” But any evidence obtained during such an exam is only admissible as rebuttal. Defendant-Black was convicted of first-degree felony murder and other crimes for the murder, rape, and robbery of a woman in 1987, when he was 15. He was sentenced to LWOP. At his first Miller resentencing hearing, he presented evidence from a licensed forensic psychologist. The trial court reimposed the LWOP sentence. While his appeal was pending, the court issued an opinion concerning the burden of proof at a Miller hearing. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for a second Miller hearing. Ahead of that hearing, “the trial court entered an order, giving Black the choice to either submit to a psychological examination conducted by an expert chosen by the prosecution or forgo the ability to introduce his own expert psychological evidence at the hearing.” The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court held “that if a defendant indicates an intent to introduce expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing, a trial court may compel the defendant to undergo a similar examination by a prosecution expert, consistent with the defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights against self-incrimination.” In this case, the trial court’s order did not violate Black’s “constitutional rights against self-incrimination because” it gave him “the choice of whether to submit to a court-ordered psychological examination ahead of his Miller hearing.”  But the court clarified “that any evidence gathered during the prosecution expert’s examination, or derived from such an examination, is admissible solely as rebuttal evidence and may not be admitted during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.” The court vacated the trial court’s orders to the extent it “sua sponte incorporated the record from the first Miller hearing, and to the extent the trial court relied on Black’s indication of intent to introduce psychological evidence during the first Miller hearing,” and remanded.

Concurring, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s conclusion. She wrote “separately to highlight that the federal and state caselaw that we rely on permits, but guards the scope of, a compelled examination and resulting testimony.”     

Waiver of the right to counsel; People v King; People v Anderson; MCR 6.005(D); People v Adkins (After Remand)

Holding that defendant did not establish that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid, the court affirmed his convictions of CSC I and III. He argued that “the trial court failed to comply with mandatory prerequisites necessary to support a finding that [he] knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.” The court disagreed. The record indicated “the trial court substantially complied with the substance of Anderson. [It] engaged in a lengthy colloquy with defendant in which [it] repeatedly asked [him] if he was requesting to represent himself, discussed at great length with defendant the perils of self-representation, and described in detail the limitations the trial court would place upon [his] actions at trial, such as his cross-examination of the victim. [It] also cautioned defendant that his self-representation would not be allowed to disrupt, unduly inconvenience, or burden the trial court’s conduct of the trial. [He] consistently and repeatedly assured the trial court that he understood [its] warnings regarding the pitfalls of self-representation and was unequivocal in his decision to represent himself.” The court also determined that the trial court “substantially complied with” MCR 6.005(D)’s requirements. As in Adkins, “the trial court’s failure to ‘specifically address the charged offense and the range of possible punishment [at the initial waiver] is not enough to defeat a finding of substantial compliance with the waiver procedures in this case.’” The court noted that the record was “replete with instances where the severity of the charges and the potential penalty was discussed with defendant and in defendant’s presence.”

Assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM); Intent to kill; Sufficiency of the evidence; Self-defense; Sentencing; OV 6; MCL 777.36(1)(b); Unpremeditated intent to kill; Proportionality; Reasonableness; Fourth-offense habitual offender; MCL 769.12; Youth sentencing; People v Taylor; People v Parks

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s AWIM convictions, that OV 6 was properly scored at 25 points, and that his 40-to-60-year AWIM sentence was proportionate. He was convicted after a jury trial arising from a shooting in which two masked shooters fired at an occupied SUV, one victim was grazed, and the other was shot in the head. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender. On appeal, the court found the evidence was sufficient to prove intent to kill because “minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient,” and the record showed more than 53 shell casings and 31 bullets or fragments after defendant and another shooter fired into an occupied vehicle. It rejected defendant’s self-defense theory because witness and police testimony showed neither victim had a firearm at the time of the shooting, and no weapon was found in or near the SUV. The court next found no error in the 25-point OV 6 score because the same evidence showed an unpremeditated intent to kill or at least creation of a very high risk of death or great bodily harm. Finally, the court concluded the sentence was proportionate because defendant attempted to kill two people, caused catastrophic and permanent injury to a victim under 21, and had several prior firearm-related convictions. Affirmed.

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) fees; MCL 15.234(1); Allegedly overbroad responses; “Good-faith deposit” calculation; MCL 15.234(8); Whether a fee was unwarranted under MCL 15.234(3); Civil fines; MCL 15.240b; Punitive damages; MCL 15.240a(7); Motion to disqualify the trial court judge; MCR 2.003; Cain v Department of Corr

The court held that defendant-City was permitted to charge a fee for production of the videos requested by plaintiff, and its “method of calculating its estimated fees was proper[.]” Further, the final fee it charged for his first FOIA request was proper, and it properly provided a good-faith estimate for his second and third FOIA requests. The court also rejected his claims that civil fines, costs, and punitive damages were warranted under FOIA. Finally, it concluded the trial court did not err in denying his motion to disqualify the judge. Plaintiff, a reporter, submitted three requests to the City police department (the LPD) for body-camera footage. He asserted “defendant violated FOIA by charging an impermissible fee for each request.” The trial court granted defendant summary disposition. On appeal, the court first rejected plaintiff’s claim that “defendant’s responses were overbroad and contributed to the high fee estimate.” As to his first FOIA request, the court determined that “each of the 14 videos identified was related to the relevant arrest and resulting investigation.” As to his second “request, each of the seven videos identified was related to the relevant arrests and resulting investigations.” As to his third “request, each of the four videos identified was related to the relevant arrest. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that the identified videos were responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA requests.” As to the lawfulness of the imposed fees, the relevant issue on appeal regarding the first request was “whether the final fee was compliant with MCL 15.234.” An LPD captain “attested that the actual amount of time spent processing [that] request took longer than defendant had anticipated” in calculating its estimated fee but it “did not increase the fee to reflect the actual time spent. Because the final fee was less than the fee would be for the actual time spent processing the request, [it] was compliant with MCL 15.234(1).” The issue on appeal as to the second and third requests, for which plaintiff did not pay the deposit, was “whether the fee estimates complied with MCL 15.234.” The court found the record supported that defendant’s response to those requests “constituted a ‘good-faith calculation of the total fee’” as required by MCL 15.234(8). Affirmed.

Healthcare provider action for payment for medical expenses under MCL 500.3157; “Reasonably necessary” services; MCL 500.3107(1)(a); Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co; Nervomatrix/Trigger Point Impedance Imaging (TPII) treatment to provide back pain relief

The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff-healthcare provider failed to create an issue of fact as to whether the Nervomatrix/TPII treatment administered to defendant’s insured was objectively reasonable and necessary. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. The insured received the Nervomatrix/TPII treatment from plaintiff after being involved in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff sought payment from defendant under MCL 500.3157 for the treatment. Under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) and Krohn, the services for which payment of no-fault “benefits is sought must be both (1) objectively reasonable and (2) necessary for an insured’s care, recovery or rehabilitation. A treatment that is experimental and not generally accepted in the medical community is not reasonable or necessary” unless it is shown to be efficacious. While it is generally a fact question “whether the services or products provided were reasonably necessary . . . in some cases, it may be possible for the trial court to decide the reasonableness or necessity of an expense as a matter of law.” Plaintiff asserted that the treatment at issue “is accepted in the medical community and that its claim was supported by” a doctor’s (M) report. While M supported the use of the Nervomatrix device, he also described the “treatment as ‘novel,’ as an addition to ‘conventional’ treatments, and as requiring additional research to ascertain its efficacy. Defendant presented evidence that certain of the studies upon which [M’s] report relied were conducted by the manufacturer of the Nervomatrix device and that the studies do not demonstrate that treatments with [it] produced better results than placebo treatment. Plaintiff in response” failed to show “the trial court that the treatment was accepted in the medical community,” or to show its efficacy.

Healthcare provider action for payment for medical expenses under MCL 500.3157; “Reasonably necessary” services; MCL 500.3107(1)(a); Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co; Nervomatrix/Trigger Point Impedance Imaging (TPII) treatment to provide back pain relief

The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff-healthcare provider failed to create an issue of fact as to whether the Nervomatrix/TPII treatment administered to defendant’s insured was objectively reasonable and necessary. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. The insured received the Nervomatrix/TPII treatment from plaintiff after being involved in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff sought payment from defendant under MCL 500.3157 for the treatment. Under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) and Krohn, the services for which payment of no-fault “benefits is sought must be both (1) objectively reasonable and (2) necessary for an insured’s care, recovery or rehabilitation. A treatment that is experimental and not generally accepted in the medical community is not reasonable or necessary” unless it is shown to be efficacious. While it is generally a fact question “whether the services or products provided were reasonably necessary . . . in some cases, it may be possible for the trial court to decide the reasonableness or necessity of an expense as a matter of law.” Plaintiff asserted that the treatment at issue “is accepted in the medical community and that its claim was supported by” a doctor’s (M) report. While M supported the use of the Nervomatrix device, he also described the “treatment as ‘novel,’ as an addition to ‘conventional’ treatments, and as requiring additional research to ascertain its efficacy. Defendant presented evidence that certain of the studies upon which [M’s] report relied were conducted by the manufacturer of the Nervomatrix device and that the studies do not demonstrate that treatments with [it] produced better results than placebo treatment. Plaintiff in response” failed to show “the trial court that the treatment was accepted in the medical community,” or to show its efficacy.

Dismissal for lack of service; MCR 2.102(E); Setting aside dismissal; MCR 2.102(F); Applicability of MCR 2.105(K)(3)

Holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing the case for lack of service, the court affirmed. The parties were married. The summons was issued on 12/10/24 and expired on 3/11/25. “MCR 2.105(A)(1)-(2) required plaintiff to serve process on defendant personally or by registered or certified mail, before the” expiration date. But “the returned proof of service indicated that process was served on [12/19/24], by certified mail on plaintiff, ‘Willie Morgan,’ not defendant.” While plaintiff asserted “that this error was a technical deficiency, the mailing address where service was made was associated with an attorney who represented defendant in an unrelated matter. In other words, plaintiff failed to show that defendant actually received service of process, given that the attorney did not accept service on [her] behalf.” The court concluded that, for “these reasons, dismissal was proper because plaintiff failed to provide proof of service before the summons expired, and because there was no proof of service” he failed to “meet the conditions required under MCR 2.102(F) to set aside the dismissal.” The court added that MCR 2.105(K)(3) did not alter this result. The trial court record did “not indicate that defendant was informed of the action timely. The only individual served with process was an attorney who was not representing [her] in this dispute and did not accept service on defendant’s behalf.” Further, she did not submit to the trial court’s jurisdiction during the proceedings.

Quiet-title action; Abandonment on appeal; Inadequate briefing; MCR 7.212(C)(7); Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(8) & (10); Requests for admissions

The court held that plaintiff abandoned his appellate arguments by failing to support them with record citations, legal authority, or analysis. Plaintiff sued to quiet title to Detroit property. Defendant produced a notarized quitclaim deed showing ownership. The trial court granted defendant summary disposition after plaintiff failed to respond to requests for admissions and failed to support his ownership claim. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff did not properly present any issue for review. Although plaintiff asserted that the property was not properly transferred to defendant, he cited no record facts supporting that claim and cited no authority showing that possession of allegedly abandoned property gave him legal title. Because plaintiff provided “no analysis, no citation to the record, and no citation to applicable law,” his arguments were abandoned. Affirmed.

Tax foreclosure; Surplus proceeds; General Property Tax Act; MCL 211.78t; Rafaeli retroactivity; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Schafer v Kent Cnty; Statute of limitations; Accrual; Law of the case; Binding published decision

The court held that its prior published decision in Petition I controlled and required vacating the trial court’s orders disbursing tax-foreclosure surplus proceeds to claimants. After claimants sought surplus proceeds from 2014 tax-foreclosure sales under MCL 211.78t, the trial court denied petitioner-State Treasurer’s summary-disposition motions and later ordered petitioner to disburse the proceeds. On appeal, the court found Petition I dispositive because it arose from the same proceeding, involved the same parties, and addressed the same statute-of-limitations issues. In that published decision, the court concluded the claims accrued in 2014 when petitioner retained the surplus proceeds, that the three-year limitations period expired in 2017, and that neither Rafaeli nor MCL 211.78t “revived claims that were already time-barred.” The court reasoned Petition I was binding under MCR 7.215(J)(1), also established the law of the case, and specifically required “entry of summary disposition in favor of petitioner.” Because the trial court later ordered disbursement despite that controlling ruling, the orders here could not stand. Vacated and remanded for entry of summary disposition for petitioner.

Quiet-title action; Abandonment on appeal; Inadequate briefing; MCR 7.212(C)(7); Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(8) & (10); Requests for admissions

The court held that plaintiff abandoned his appellate arguments by failing to support them with record citations, legal authority, or analysis. Plaintiff sued to quiet title to Detroit property. Defendant produced a notarized quitclaim deed showing ownership. The trial court granted defendant summary disposition after plaintiff failed to respond to requests for admissions and failed to support his ownership claim. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff did not properly present any issue for review. Although plaintiff asserted that the property was not properly transferred to defendant, he cited no record facts supporting that claim and cited no authority showing that possession of allegedly abandoned property gave him legal title. Because plaintiff provided “no analysis, no citation to the record, and no citation to applicable law,” his arguments were abandoned. Affirmed.

Tax foreclosure; Surplus proceeds; General Property Tax Act; MCL 211.78t; Rafaeli retroactivity; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Schafer v Kent Cnty; Statute of limitations; Accrual; Law of the case; Binding published decision

The court held that its prior published decision in Petition I controlled and required vacating the trial court’s orders disbursing tax-foreclosure surplus proceeds to claimants. After claimants sought surplus proceeds from 2014 tax-foreclosure sales under MCL 211.78t, the trial court denied petitioner-State Treasurer’s summary-disposition motions and later ordered petitioner to disburse the proceeds. On appeal, the court found Petition I dispositive because it arose from the same proceeding, involved the same parties, and addressed the same statute-of-limitations issues. In that published decision, the court concluded the claims accrued in 2014 when petitioner retained the surplus proceeds, that the three-year limitations period expired in 2017, and that neither Rafaeli nor MCL 211.78t “revived claims that were already time-barred.” The court reasoned Petition I was binding under MCR 7.215(J)(1), also established the law of the case, and specifically required “entry of summary disposition in favor of petitioner.” Because the trial court later ordered disbursement despite that controlling ruling, the orders here could not stand. Vacated and remanded for entry of summary disposition for petitioner.

Termination under § 19b(3)(k)(ii); Anticipatory neglect; Due process; Assumption of jurisdiction after the adjudication bench trial; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Reasonable reunification efforts; Aggravated circumstances; MCL 722.638; MCL 712A.19a(2); Credibility; Children’s best interests; In re Sanborn; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Distinguishing In re Casto

The court rejected respondent-father’s due process violation claims, holding that the trial court did not err in taking jurisdiction of the children at issue pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), or plainly err in finding that reasonable reunification efforts were made. It also held that § (k)(ii) supported termination, and that the trial court did not err in finding termination was in the children’s best interests. Finally, the court rejected respondent’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The case arose after one of respondent’s biological children not involved in the case, SB, reported that he had sexually abused her and his stepdaughter, EE. As to respondent’s due process claim and the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction, it “heard and reviewed the testimony of SB, EE, and respondent, and ultimately determined that SB’s and EE’s testimony along with the substantiated CPS history of abuse was more credible.” The court affirmed “the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction because respondent has failed to demonstrate [its] findings were erroneous in any way; let alone arbitrary.” As to reasonable reunification efforts, the adjudication order and a CPS worker’s testimony showed that various reasonable efforts were made. The court also noted “there was no duty to provide services” here given that “there was ‘a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances . . . .’” The court next held that, at “a minimum, the trial court’s finding that respondent sexually abused SB clearly” supported termination pursuant to § (k)(ii) “because under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, there is a reasonable likelihood that respondent would abuse the children that are the subject of the petition.” In addition, “a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s determination that termination was in the children’s best interests.” Finally, finding that there were “key differences” between this case and Casto, the court concluded that respondent “failed to adequately establish that his counsel’s performance was deficient, much less prejudicial.” Affirmed.

Termination of parental rights; § 19b(3)(m)(i); Continuing parent-child relationship harmful; CSC I & II; Sexual abuse of sibling; Anticipatory neglect; Emotional harm; Best interests; Parent-child bond; Parenting ability; Adoption; Relative placement

The court held that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was supported under § (m)(i) and that termination of both respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The father was convicted of CSC I and CSC II after sexually assaulting his child’s (ERS) half-sibling (AMB), respondent-mother pled guilty to witness interference after trying to bribe AMB to change her testimony, and the trial court terminated the father’s rights to ERS and the mother’s rights to all four children. On appeal, the court found § (m)(i) supported termination of the father’s parental rights because he had the required CSC convictions and continuation of the parent-child relationship would harm ERS. The court rejected his claim that incarceration eliminated any risk, reasoning that he ignored emotional harm and that the trial court could consider “grooming behaviors during visits and conversations” even while he was incarcerated. It also applied anticipatory neglect because the father had been in AMB’s life for nearly 10 years, and his sexual abuse of AMB was “indicative of how he may treat ERS in the future.” As to the mother, the court found termination was in the children’s best interests because she protected the father, disbelieved and bribed AMB, violated court orders, and showed “a willingness to violate the law to protect the abuser of her child.” As to the father, his parenting ability was “criminally inadequate,” his bond with ERS was weak, and the foster placement offered stability and adoption. Affirmed.