The eJournal provides summaries of the latest opinions from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court. The summaries also include a PDF of the opinion and identifies the judges, key issues, and relevant practice area(s). Subscribe here.

Includes a summary of one Michigan Court of Appeals published opinion under Family Law.

RECENT SUMMARIES

    • Criminal Law (3)

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      e-Journal #: 86770
      Case: People v. Bonam
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27b; People v Berklund; MRE 403; People v Watkins; Sufficiency of the evidence for an unlawful imprisonment conviction (MCL 750.349b); “Restrain” (MCL 750.349b(3)(a)); People v Chelmicki; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a self-defense jury instruction; M Crim JI 7.22; Lack of evidence to support an instruction; Futile request; Trial strategy; Failure to preserve objections to the victim testifying via Zoom; MCR 6.006; People v Jemison; Prejudice

      Summary:

      The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of other incidents under MCL 768.27b, and that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s unlawful imprisonment conviction. It also rejected his claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a self-defense jury instruction and preserve objections to the victim testifying via Zoom. He was also convicted of domestic violence and assault by strangulation. The court noted that “evidence of other acts of domestic violence is probative because it makes it more likely that the defendant committed an act of domestic violence for which” defendant is charged. It addressed all six Watkins factors. Considering “the similarities and differences between the other-acts evidence and the charged offenses, the first Watkins factor appears neutral.” Next, the court found that, “because there is no bar under MCL 768.27b on considering other acts of domestic violence that postdate the charged conduct and the [7/24] incidents occurred quite closely in time to the [5/24] incident for which defendant was charged” the second factor favored admission. The court concluded that the “third factor, the infrequency of the other acts, does not support excluding the evidence given defendant’s commission of three additional acts of domestic violence.” It also saw no “relevant intervening acts under the fourth factor. And the fifth factor, the lack of reliability of the evidence supporting the occurrence of the other acts,” favored admission because the 7/24 incidents were on video, a detective testified as to the content of the “videos at trial, and there is no dispute that this evidence accurately portrayed” the incidents. As to the sixth factor, the “incidents bolstered the likelihood that defendant committed the charged offenses” despite the victim’s trial testimony that she still loved him, “that she did not want to have to testify, and that she had wanted the matter to be dismissed. In sum, applying the Watkins factors generally indicates that the evidence of the [7/24] incidents was quite probative.” And there was no indication that it “injected extraneous conditions designed to arouse bias, sympathy, or shock among the jurors, nor that it stirred such passion in the jury as to ‘divert [it] from rational consideration of defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charged offenses.’” Affirmed.

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      e-Journal #: 86771
      Case: People v. Mack
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Swartzle, Ackerman, and Trebilcock
      Issues:

      Miranda right to counsel; Edwards v Arizona; Reinitiation of custodial interrogation; People v Fenderson; Knowing, intelligent & voluntary waiver; People v Cipriano; Juror challenges for cause; MCR 2.511(E)(10); Prior prosecution by prosecuting attorney’s office; People v Eccles

      Summary:

      The court held that defendant validly reinitiated communication with police and voluntarily waived his Miranda right to counsel after invoking it, and that the trial court was required to excuse prospective jurors who previously had been prosecuted by the same prosecutor’s office. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and firearm offenses. During custodial interrogation, defendant initially waived his rights but later unequivocally requested an attorney. Detectives stopped the interrogation and began leaving, after which defendant asked what they wanted to discuss, stated that he could “talk all day long,” and agreed to continue without counsel. On appeal, the court held that these statements reflected “several ‘affirmative request[s] to reinitiate the interrogation without an attorney’ and ‘an expression of willingness to talk generally about the investigation without counsel.’” It rejected defendant’s assertion that the detectives improperly pressured him after his invocation. Police are not prohibited from all communication following a request for counsel, and the brief exchanges here constituted “careful police work, not unconstitutional pressure placed on defendant to continue to custodial interrogation.” The totality of the circumstances also supported a voluntary waiver. Defendant was coherent, had significant prior experience with police, received food and water, was not threatened or physically mistreated, and no detective suggested he would receive leniency by continuing the interview. As to jury selection, defendant challenged the dismissal for cause of six prospective jurors who previously had been prosecuted by the county Prosecutor’s Office. Binding precedent foreclosed his argument. Under MCR 2.511(E)(10) and Eccles, once a prospective juror falls within the provision, “‘the trial court is without discretion to retain that juror, who must be excused for cause,’” regardless of whether the juror claims an ability to remain impartial. Affirmed.

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      e-Journal #: 86769
      Case: People v. Wright
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Borrello and Bazzi; Concurring in part, Dissenting in part – Lievense
      Issues:

      Allegedly anonymous jury; Use of juror numbers; Due process; People v Williams; People v Hanks; Hearsay; Statements for medical treatment or diagnosis; MRE 803(4); Sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) examination; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Sufficiency of the evidence; Unlawful imprisonment; MCL 750.349b; Jury unanimity; Alternative means of sexual penetration; People v Cooks; People v Chelmicki

      Summary:

      The court held that: 1) referring to prospective jurors by number did not violate defendant’s due-process rights, 2) the complainant’s statements during her SANE examination were admissible under the medical-treatment hearsay exception, 3) sufficient evidence supported unlawful imprisonment, and 4) a specific unanimity instruction was not required for the CSC I charge. He was convicted of CSC I and unlawful imprisonment arising from a violent sexual assault. On appeal, defendant first asserted that using juror numbers created an anonymous jury. The court disagreed because no biographical information was shown to have been withheld, counsel’s questioning demonstrated familiarity with jurors’ backgrounds, and nothing suggested the numbering practice impaired meaningful voir dire or undermined the presumption of innocence. “Where the record reflects that jurors were referred to by number, rather than by name, solely for logistical convenience,” without withholding material information, “no due process violation occurs.” The complainant’s statements to the SANE nurse were also admissible. She sought emergency medical treatment shortly after the assault and received medication for potential disease exposure. Thus, “the record supports that the complainant sought medical treatment, and her statements to medical personnel fall within” MRE 803(4). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. As to unlawful imprisonment, evidence that defendant carried the complainant into another room, physically restrained her, and held her down while sexually assaulting her permitted a rational jury to find the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the general unanimity instruction was sufficient. CSC I requires sexual penetration, which can be accomplished by alternative means, and “this case did not involve allegations of multiple, distinct incidents of nonconsensual sexual penetration.” Because the evidence concerned a single violent sexual assault and there was no basis to conclude the jurors were confused about the factual basis of guilt, “jury unanimity as to the specific means of penetration was not required.” Affirmed.

    • Family Law (2)

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      e-Journal #: 86832
      Case: In re Baby Doe
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Swartzle and Trebilcock; Dissent – Ackerman
      Issues:

      Safe Delivery of Newborns Law (SDNL); Nonsurrendering parent’s petition for custody; MCL 712.10(1); 28-day filing deadline; Notice by publication; Actual notice; Child-placing agency’s reasonable efforts; MCL 712.7(f); DNA testing; MCL 712.11; Sufficiency of petitioner’s 12/1/25 submission

      Summary:

      The court held that under the SDNL, the nonsurrendering parent’s 28-day period to petition for custody begins when notice of the newborn’s surrender is published, rather than when the parent receives actual notice, and petitioner therefore timely sought custody. Baby Doe was surrendered on 10/18/25. Adoption Associates personally notified petitioner, who was incarcerated, on 10/29/25 and published notice the next day. Petitioner submitted an inmate request form on 12/1/25 stating, “I’m writing to file a 28 day petition for rights to my child.” The circuit court later ordered DNA testing. On appeal, the court concluded MCL 712.10(1) establishes a “simple, straightforward starting-line and deadline” of 28 days after notice “has been published.” Reading §§ 7, 10, and 17 together, it determined that “notice-by-publication is a necessary form of notice in every case” because publication triggers the filing deadline. But publication alone ordinarily does not satisfy an agency’s separate obligation under MCL 712.7(f) to make reasonable efforts to notify a known parent. When reliable identifying and location information exists, the agency must use “modern, reliable, affordable methods of direct communication” because “notice” that is not actually noticed “can hardly be called notice.” Here, publication on 10/30/25 started the 28-day period. Because the final day fell on Thanksgiving and the following day was also a court holiday, petitioner had until 12/1/25 to act. The court declined to decide whether his 12/1 inmate request actually constituted a legally sufficient SDNL petition. Adoption Associates did not adequately preserve that issue, and unresolved factual and legal questions remained concerning where the document was sent, the prison mailbox rule, applicable pleading standards, and the effect of petitioner’s later counseled petition. Those issues were for the circuit court to address in the first instance. Affirmed and remanded.

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      This summary also appears under Termination of Parental Rights

      e-Journal #: 86773
      Case: In re VEJ
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Stepparent adoption; Termination of parental rights; MCL 710.51(6)(a); Ability to support or assist in supporting the child; $0 child-support order; Relevant two-year period; Clear & convincing evidence; Financial, medical & guardianship circumstances

      Summary:

      The court held that the trial court erred by finding that respondent had the ability to support or assist in supporting the child for the full two-year period required by MCL 710.51(6)(a), and therefore termination of his parental rights for a stepparent adoption was improper. Respondent suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in 5/23, was placed under a full guardianship, required extensive rehabilitation and care, and was unable to continue working. His divorce judgment set child support at $0. Petitioners sought termination in 12/25. On appeal, the court explained that because a $0 support order “shall be treated in the same manner as if no support order has been entered,” the trial court was required to examine respondent’s actual ability to provide support. That inquiry required consideration of his “income, expenses, and general financial status and situation.” Working backward through the relevant two-year period, the court found evidence of an ability to contribute during the final 11 months through Social Security Disability benefits and some evidence of financial assets during part of 2024. But from 12/12/23 through early 4/24, “we detect virtually no evidence in the record that respondent had the ability to support or assist in supporting the child.” He had essentially no income, minimal funds, no control over his bank accounts, and remained dependent on family members. His medical condition was equally significant. He had a full guardian, could not make informed medical or financial decisions, and required substantial assistance with his own care. Indeed, “the record shows that respondent was unable to even care for himself during that period.” Because petitioners had to prove ability to support throughout a full two-year period by clear and convincing evidence, their failure under subsection (6)(a) made consideration of subsection (6)(b) unnecessary. Reversed.

    • Litigation (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86772
      Case: Auro Rehab Servs LLC v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Dismissal discovery sanction; MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c); Vicencio v Ramirez; Kalamazoo Oil Co v Boerman

      Summary:

      Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s action with prejudice as a discovery sanction, the court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded. The court noted that dismissal “‘is a drastic step that should be taken cautiously.’” It set forth seven relevant factors to consider in Vicencio. “In dismissing the action, the trial court did not engage with the relevant factors, did not consider any other available options on the record, and did not explain why it deemed dismissal the just and proper sanction in this case.” In the absence of such reasoning, the court was “unable to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision on appeal. When a trial court fails to conduct the required on-the-record analysis, the proper course is to vacate and remand for the trial court to consider the relevant factors and other available options.” The court stated that, on “remand, should the trial court conclude that dismissal is just and proper, [it] must explain its rationale, including its consideration of other available options, so as to facilitate meaningful appellate review.” The court noted that it did not decide here “that sanctions were unwarranted. The record appears to support defendant’s allegations that plaintiff violated the court rules by failing to timely disclose and produce relevant records, to otherwise respond to discovery requests, and to supplement its responses.” But defendant failed to “identify any court orders that plaintiff directly violated, plaintiff did produce some records and witnesses for deposition, and plaintiff agreed that it would provide additional records and allow witnesses to be redeposed. The required sanction for failing to respond to a motion or appear for a hearing on a motion is costs, not dismissal.” Further, the record did not show “that the trial court considered whether a sanction less drastic than dismissal with prejudice would serve the interests of justice.”

    • Termination of Parental Rights (1)

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      This summary also appears under Family Law

      e-Journal #: 86773
      Case: In re VEJ
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Stepparent adoption; Termination of parental rights; MCL 710.51(6)(a); Ability to support or assist in supporting the child; $0 child-support order; Relevant two-year period; Clear & convincing evidence; Financial, medical & guardianship circumstances

      Summary:

      The court held that the trial court erred by finding that respondent had the ability to support or assist in supporting the child for the full two-year period required by MCL 710.51(6)(a), and therefore termination of his parental rights for a stepparent adoption was improper. Respondent suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in 5/23, was placed under a full guardianship, required extensive rehabilitation and care, and was unable to continue working. His divorce judgment set child support at $0. Petitioners sought termination in 12/25. On appeal, the court explained that because a $0 support order “shall be treated in the same manner as if no support order has been entered,” the trial court was required to examine respondent’s actual ability to provide support. That inquiry required consideration of his “income, expenses, and general financial status and situation.” Working backward through the relevant two-year period, the court found evidence of an ability to contribute during the final 11 months through Social Security Disability benefits and some evidence of financial assets during part of 2024. But from 12/12/23 through early 4/24, “we detect virtually no evidence in the record that respondent had the ability to support or assist in supporting the child.” He had essentially no income, minimal funds, no control over his bank accounts, and remained dependent on family members. His medical condition was equally significant. He had a full guardian, could not make informed medical or financial decisions, and required substantial assistance with his own care. Indeed, “the record shows that respondent was unable to even care for himself during that period.” Because petitioners had to prove ability to support throughout a full two-year period by clear and convincing evidence, their failure under subsection (6)(a) made consideration of subsection (6)(b) unnecessary. Reversed.

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