Providing material support for terrorist acts; MCL 750.543k(1)(b); Act of terrorism; “Violent felony” (MCL 750.543b(h)); Kidnapping; MCL 750.349; Gang-membership felonies; MCL 750.411u; Felony-firearm; MCL 750.227b; Jury instructions; Invalid theory; People v Urbanski

The court held that kidnapping is not a “violent felony” under Michigan’s Antiterrorism Act and that defendant’s convictions had to be vacated because the jury instructions allowed conviction on that invalid theory. Defendant was convicted of gang-membership felonies, providing material support for terrorist acts, and felony-firearm based on his alleged support for a plot involving Governor Whitmer. On appeal, the court first held that kidnapping could not serve as the underlying “act of terrorism” because the statutory definition requires an act that “would be a violent felony,” and a violent felony requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against an individual[.]” The court explained that when the Antiterrorism Act was enacted, the kidnapping statute contained force language, but the Legislature later amended MCL 750.349 and “removed from the kidnapping statute all references to force[.]” Thus, because “the ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force’ is not an element of kidnapping,” the court held that kidnapping is not a violent felony under MCL 750.543b(h). The court rejected the prosecution’s reliance on jury instructions because they “do not have the force of law” and are “not legal authority.” It also rejected reliance on federal antiterrorism law and the Act’s reference to kidnapping in the definition of “dangerous to human life,” reasoning that “under the plain language of the statutes as they currently exist, kidnapping is not an act of terrorism.” The court next held that the instructional error required reversal because the trial court specifically identified kidnapping as a violent felony, the jury heard “considerable testimony about the plot to kidnap Governor Whitmer,” and there was no way to know whether the jury relied on the invalid kidnapping theory. Because the material-support conviction supplied the underlying felony for the gang-membership and felony-firearm convictions, all convictions were vacated and the case was remanded.

Unqualified juror; MCL 600.1307a(1)(d) (served in the last 12 months); MCR 2.511(D) & (E); MCL 600.1354(1); Whether an error was structural; People v Miller; Plain error review; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to present a photo; Relevance; Intent; Failure to request a mitigating-circumstances instruction (M Crim JI 17.4) as to AWIGBH & a mistake of fact instruction as to first-degree home invasion; Cumulative error; Sentencing; Refusal to admit guilt; People v Pennington; Proportionality; People v Lampe; Within-guidelines presumption

The court concluded that while there was a clear, obvious error, defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the basis that one or more of her jurors were unqualified due to having served as a juror in the last 12 months. It rejected her ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and held that she was not entitled to resentencing. Her sentence was not impermissibly based on the fact she maintained her innocence at sentencing and was proportionate. She was convicted of first-degree home invasion, AWIGBH, and aggravated domestic violence. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of 54 months to 20 years, 54 months to 10 years, and 12 months, respectively. As to her claim she was entitled to a new trial due to one or more unqualified jurors, based on Miller the court rejected her argument that this was a structural error. Applying plain-error analysis, it found the record showed “the trial court was aware that several jurors selected for defendant’s trial were also selected to serve on other juries, and the documentation submitted by defendant” showed that this was so. The trial “court’s jury-selection system appears to all but guarantee the seating of unqualified jurors, and the [trial] court knew or should have known that several of defendant’s jurors were unqualified.” Thus, the court concluded “that this was a clear, obvious error.” But defendant did not “overcome the presumption that her jurors were impartial, i.e., that the plain error affected substantial rights.” She simply offered “speculation that recent jury service might have affected the jurors’ attitudes regarding the criminal justice system or that inexperienced jurors might have deferred to experienced jurors during deliberations.” The court also rejected her claims that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) present a photo and (2) request M Crim JI 17.4 as to AWIGBH and a mistake of fact instruction as to first-degree home invasion. It also rejected her ineffective assistance cumulative error claim. As to her sentencing, the court found that she did not “overcome the presumption that her within-guidelines sentence was proportionate.” Affirmed.

Proffer agreement; Specific performance; Distinguishing People v Jackson; Narration testimony; Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; People v Fomby; Burden shifting; Prosecutorial error; People v Fyda; Prosecutorial misconduct; Innuendo; MRPC 3.4(e); Hearsay; Impeachment; MRE 613(b); Sentencing; Cruel or unusual punishment; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP); People v Hall

The court held that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the proffer agreement, a new trial, or resentencing. He was convicted of felony murder after evidence showed that the victim was followed by two masked men at a hotel, attacked outside, shot twice in the back, and left without his backpack. On appeal, the court first held that the prosecution did not have to honor the proffer agreement because the agreement remained in effect only if defendant gave a “truthful and complete statement,” and trial evidence strongly indicated that he lied by minimizing his alleged accomplice’s (S) involvement. The court distinguished Jackson because, unlike that case, defendant “breached the agreement by lying about the involvement of” S. The court next held that detectives’ narration of hotel security footage was admissible lay opinion under MRE 701 because they closely reviewed numerous videos, the testimony helped the jury follow the suspects’ movements, and neither detective improperly opined on defendant’s guilt. The court also rejected defendant’s burden-shifting claim because the prosecutor’s comments challenged the weakness of defendant’s self-defense theory rather than requiring him to prove innocence, and the prosecutor permissibly argued that defendant’s version was “uncorroborated by any single piece of evidence.” It further found that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by suggesting defendant changed his story during the proffer process because defendant admitted he understood the prosecution wanted him to cooperate against S as the shooter, so the prosecutor had a basis to ask about that inconsistency. As to S’s letter, the court agreed it was inadmissible because defendant neither wrote nor read it during the relevant timeframe. But it found no error affecting substantial rights given the “overwhelming amount of evidence demonstrating that [S] was the person who shot” the victim, including testimony that S apologized for shooting him. Finally, the court held that mandatory LWOP for felony murder was not cruel or unusual punishment for defendant, who was 27, because Hall remains binding for defendants age 21 or older. Affirmed.

Bindover; Motion to quash; Probable cause; People v Taylor; Kidnapping; Restraint; MCL 750.349; CSC II under MCL 750.520c(1)(c); Momentary restraint; People v Chelmicki; Victim resistance; People v Kosik

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by binding defendant over on kidnapping and CSC II charges, and the circuit court did not err by denying his motion to quash. The complainant, a 16-year-old who had been stranded outside at night without a working phone connection, accepted defendant’s offer of food, Wi-Fi, and a place to charge his phone. On appeal, defendant argued that the kidnapping charge failed because the complainant voluntarily went to defendant’s home, received food and access to Wi-Fi, and was not physically held there. The court rejected that argument, explaining that MCL 750.349 defines “restrain” as restricting a person’s movements or confining the person in a way that interferes with liberty without consent, and that the Legislature imposed no minimum time requirement. The court emphasized that restraint may exist even if the victim is “held for even a moment,” and the prosecution does not have to show that the victim resisted. The court held that the evidence supported bindover because, once inside defendant’s bedroom, defendant repeatedly touched the complainant, grabbed him from behind around the torso, kissed him, slapped his rear end, made inappropriate comments and gestures, told him there were other people in the home, and discouraged him from contacting anyone. The complainant testified that defendant was larger than he was, that he became scared and uncomfortable, and that he felt he “couldn’t move” after defendant began touching him and telling him not to call or text anyone. Because conflicting evidence and reasonable doubt about guilt are for the jury at the bindover stage, the district court’s probable-cause determination was not outside the range of principled outcomes. Affirmed.

Child support; Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF); Second income; 2021 MCSF 2.01(C); Variable income; 2021 MCSF 2.02(A); De novo hearing; Presentation of proofs; Witness examination; MRE 614(a); Mode of examination; MRE 611; Authentication; MRE 901

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding defendant-mother’s second income from the child support calculation where plaintiff-father failed to present evidence of the amount of that income at the de novo hearing. Plaintiff objected to a referee’s proposed child support order, arguing in part that defendant continued to work a second job at a restaurant and that this income should have been included. On appeal, the court first noted that child support must be calculated under the MCSF, which includes “[w]ages, overtime pay, commissions, bonuses, or other monies from all employers,” and that variable income from “overtime, second jobs, bonuses, or profit sharing” should be calculated using information from at least the preceding 12 months. But the court held that plaintiff did not offer proof of defendant’s restaurant income at the hearing. Although defendant acknowledged she still worked at the restaurant and had paystubs available, plaintiff did not call her as an adverse witness, did not present the paystubs or other income evidence, and waited until after the trial court ran the child support calculation to seek questioning. The court rejected plaintiff’s reliance on MRE 614(a) because defendant was never sworn as a witness on the child support issue and declined to testify after the trial court sustained plaintiff’s objection to testimony about an FOC document. The court also held that MRE 611 and MRE 901 did not help plaintiff because they govern witness examination and authentication, not whether a party may question a witness after proofs closed and the trial court rendered its decision. Affirmed.

Appellate jurisdiction; Aggrieved party; MCR 7.203(A)(1); Dora v Lesinski; Stipulated dismissal; Distinguishing Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC; Consent order; Reservation of appellate rights; No-fault insurance; PIP benefits; Assignment

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal because she was not an aggrieved party after stipulating to dismissal of her remaining claims with prejudice without reserving appellate rights. Plaintiff filed a first-party no-fault action seeking PIP benefits after a motor-vehicle accident. The trial court granted defendant-Farmers partial summary disposition on certain medical-expense claims based on an assignment to a medical provider. The parties later stipulated to dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice and submit the matter to binding arbitration. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff could not appeal from the stipulated final order because “[a] party is not aggrieved . . . by an order to which that party has consented,” and a stipulated order reflects “the parties’ agreement rather than a judicial determination of contested rights.” The court further held that a party may preserve review of an earlier interlocutory ruling in a stipulated dismissal, but “where a party agrees to a final dismissal with the same opposing party and fails to reserve appellate rights, the stipulated dismissal extinguishes any claim of appeal from earlier rulings involving that party.” Applying that rule, the court reasoned that the stipulated order broadly dismissed plaintiff’s remaining claims against Farmers with prejudice and “contains no such reservation.” The court also distinguished Jaber because that case involved a later stipulated dismissal with a different defendant, while here “Farmers both obtained the partial summary disposition ruling and was a party to the later stipulated dismissal[.]” Because plaintiff failed to preserve appellate review in the stipulated order, she was not aggrieved under MCR 7.203(A)(1). Dismissed.

Action for uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage & personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Appellate jurisdiction; Failure to reserve right to appeal in a stipulated order of dismissal; Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC (Jaber II)

In this insurance dispute, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ appeal because they did not “reserve their right to appeal in the stipulated order of dismissal.” They sought UM/UIM coverage and PIP benefits from defendant-insurer for a hit-and-run accident. On defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, the trial court dismissed the UM/UIM claims. The parties continued litigating the “PIP claims but ultimately stipulated to dismissal. The stipulated order provided that plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed with prejudice, but did not include any reservation of appellate rights.” On appeal, the court reviewed its decision in Jaber II and noted that, unlike in that case, defendant here “was a party to the stipulated order. Thus, it was entitled to claim protection under the contract as a party. The stipulated order of dismissal” stated that plaintiffs’ claims against defendant “‘are dismissed with prejudice and without costs and fees to the parties.’ The parties used broad language in dismissing plaintiffs’ ‘claims’ against defendant—a party to the stipulated order—with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ ‘claims’ against defendant included both their UM/UIM claims and their PIP claims. Thus, when plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal of their ‘claims’ against defendant, the stipulation applied to their PIP claims as well as their UM/UIM claims previously dismissed.” Given that they “consented to dismiss their ‘claims’ against defendant with prejudice and did not reserve any appellate rights, they cannot challenge the trial court’s decisions with respect to any of these ‘claims’ on appeal.” Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellate jurisdiction; Aggrieved party; MCR 7.203(A)(1); Dora v Lesinski; Stipulated dismissal; Distinguishing Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC; Consent order; Reservation of appellate rights; No-fault insurance; PIP benefits; Assignment

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal because she was not an aggrieved party after stipulating to dismissal of her remaining claims with prejudice without reserving appellate rights. Plaintiff filed a first-party no-fault action seeking PIP benefits after a motor-vehicle accident. The trial court granted defendant-Farmers partial summary disposition on certain medical-expense claims based on an assignment to a medical provider. The parties later stipulated to dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice and submit the matter to binding arbitration. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff could not appeal from the stipulated final order because “[a] party is not aggrieved . . . by an order to which that party has consented,” and a stipulated order reflects “the parties’ agreement rather than a judicial determination of contested rights.” The court further held that a party may preserve review of an earlier interlocutory ruling in a stipulated dismissal, but “where a party agrees to a final dismissal with the same opposing party and fails to reserve appellate rights, the stipulated dismissal extinguishes any claim of appeal from earlier rulings involving that party.” Applying that rule, the court reasoned that the stipulated order broadly dismissed plaintiff’s remaining claims against Farmers with prejudice and “contains no such reservation.” The court also distinguished Jaber because that case involved a later stipulated dismissal with a different defendant, while here “Farmers both obtained the partial summary disposition ruling and was a party to the later stipulated dismissal[.]” Because plaintiff failed to preserve appellate review in the stipulated order, she was not aggrieved under MCR 7.203(A)(1). Dismissed.

Action for possession after land contract forfeiture; Subject-matter jurisdiction under the Summary Proceedings Act; MCL 600.5704; MCL 600.5726; Land contract language/lack of a forfeiture clause; Waiver; Other available remedies; MCL 600.5750

The court held that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action for possession after land contract forfeiture under the Summary Proceedings Act (SPA) where the contract did not contain a forfeiture clause. Thus, it vacated the circuit court’s order that affirmed the district court’s judgment of possession after land contract forfeiture and order of eviction, and remanded to the district court for entry of an order dismissing the case without prejudice. Reviewing the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint for possession after land contract forfeiture, the court noted “that paragraph 4 alleges: ‘The land contract was forfeited in accordance with the terms of the land contract.’” But plaintiff’s claim was based on the written land contract, which she “attached to the complaint in compliance with MCR 2.113(C)(1). In doing so, the land contract ‘was made a part of the pleading for all purposes.’” And it was clear from the land contract language “that its terms do not ‘expressly provide for termination or forfeiture, or give the vendor the right to declare a forfeiture, in consequence of the nonpayment of any moneys required to be paid under the contract or any other material breach of the contract’” as required under MCL 600.5726. Thus, it was “not apparent from the complaint’s allegations that the matter alleged comes within summary proceedings to recover possession of premises under the” SPA and that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. Plaintiff’s waiver argument failed “because courts, whether upon challenge or sua sponte, are obliged to address the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction[.]” While plaintiff could not proceed in the district court under the SPA, “other judicial process and remedies are available to her.”

Negligence; Postaccident conduct; Flight evidence; Johnson v Austin; Motion in limine; Adjournment; MCR 2.503; Mistrial; Attorney misconduct; Motion for a new trial; Remittitur; MCR 2.611(E)(1); Noneconomic damages; Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp

The court held that the trial court did not err by: 1) admitting evidence of defendant-driver’s postaccident conduct, 2) denying defendants’ requests for an adjournment or mistrial, 3) denying a new trial based on plaintiff’s counsel’s closing argument, or 4) refusing remittitur of the jury’s $20 million noneconomic-damages award. Plaintiff’s decedent was snow blowing his driveway when the driver lost control of defendant-company’s van, crossed the roadway, struck him, and left before police arrived. On appeal, the court first held that evidence the driver left the scene without providing contact information was relevant because it tended to show he knew he had “done something wrong,” which was pertinent to breach of duty in the negligence claim. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying an adjournment after the driver failed to appear during trial because there was “no evidence demonstrating where [he] was or the reason for his absence” and no guarantee he would appear after a brief delay. It deemed defendants’ mistrial argument waived because the ground argued on appeal differed from the ground raised below. As to the new-trial motion, the court acknowledged that some closing-argument references were irrelevant or improper after liability was stipulated, including references to the driver’s flight, lack of apology, subsequent remedial measures, and professional-athlete salary comparisons. But it held that defendants did not show they were denied a fair trial because the jury was instructed that counsel’s arguments were not evidence, the verdict was well below plaintiff’s suggested figures, and the record supported the award. Finally, the court held that remittitur was not warranted because the evidence showed catastrophic injuries, chronic pain, multiple surgeries, likely future surgeries, and a long-term loss of quality of life, making the $5 million past and $15 million future noneconomic-damages award within the range reasonable minds could deem just compensation. Affirmed.

Action for uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage & personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Appellate jurisdiction; Failure to reserve right to appeal in a stipulated order of dismissal; Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC (Jaber II)

In this insurance dispute, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ appeal because they did not “reserve their right to appeal in the stipulated order of dismissal.” They sought UM/UIM coverage and PIP benefits from defendant-insurer for a hit-and-run accident. On defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, the trial court dismissed the UM/UIM claims. The parties continued litigating the “PIP claims but ultimately stipulated to dismissal. The stipulated order provided that plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed with prejudice, but did not include any reservation of appellate rights.” On appeal, the court reviewed its decision in Jaber II and noted that, unlike in that case, defendant here “was a party to the stipulated order. Thus, it was entitled to claim protection under the contract as a party. The stipulated order of dismissal” stated that plaintiffs’ claims against defendant “‘are dismissed with prejudice and without costs and fees to the parties.’ The parties used broad language in dismissing plaintiffs’ ‘claims’ against defendant—a party to the stipulated order—with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ ‘claims’ against defendant included both their UM/UIM claims and their PIP claims. Thus, when plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal of their ‘claims’ against defendant, the stipulation applied to their PIP claims as well as their UM/UIM claims previously dismissed.” Given that they “consented to dismiss their ‘claims’ against defendant with prejudice and did not reserve any appellate rights, they cannot challenge the trial court’s decisions with respect to any of these ‘claims’ on appeal.” Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Negligence; Postaccident conduct; Flight evidence; Johnson v Austin; Motion in limine; Adjournment; MCR 2.503; Mistrial; Attorney misconduct; Motion for a new trial; Remittitur; MCR 2.611(E)(1); Noneconomic damages; Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp

The court held that the trial court did not err by: 1) admitting evidence of defendant-driver’s postaccident conduct, 2) denying defendants’ requests for an adjournment or mistrial, 3) denying a new trial based on plaintiff’s counsel’s closing argument, or 4) refusing remittitur of the jury’s $20 million noneconomic-damages award. Plaintiff’s decedent was snow blowing his driveway when the driver lost control of defendant-company’s van, crossed the roadway, struck him, and left before police arrived. On appeal, the court first held that evidence the driver left the scene without providing contact information was relevant because it tended to show he knew he had “done something wrong,” which was pertinent to breach of duty in the negligence claim. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying an adjournment after the driver failed to appear during trial because there was “no evidence demonstrating where [he] was or the reason for his absence” and no guarantee he would appear after a brief delay. It deemed defendants’ mistrial argument waived because the ground argued on appeal differed from the ground raised below. As to the new-trial motion, the court acknowledged that some closing-argument references were irrelevant or improper after liability was stipulated, including references to the driver’s flight, lack of apology, subsequent remedial measures, and professional-athlete salary comparisons. But it held that defendants did not show they were denied a fair trial because the jury was instructed that counsel’s arguments were not evidence, the verdict was well below plaintiff’s suggested figures, and the record supported the award. Finally, the court held that remittitur was not warranted because the evidence showed catastrophic injuries, chronic pain, multiple surgeries, likely future surgeries, and a long-term loss of quality of life, making the $5 million past and $15 million future noneconomic-damages award within the range reasonable minds could deem just compensation. Affirmed.

Action for possession after land contract forfeiture; Subject-matter jurisdiction under the Summary Proceedings Act; MCL 600.5704; MCL 600.5726; Land contract language/lack of a forfeiture clause; Waiver; Other available remedies; MCL 600.5750

The court held that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action for possession after land contract forfeiture under the Summary Proceedings Act (SPA) where the contract did not contain a forfeiture clause. Thus, it vacated the circuit court’s order that affirmed the district court’s judgment of possession after land contract forfeiture and order of eviction, and remanded to the district court for entry of an order dismissing the case without prejudice. Reviewing the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint for possession after land contract forfeiture, the court noted “that paragraph 4 alleges: ‘The land contract was forfeited in accordance with the terms of the land contract.’” But plaintiff’s claim was based on the written land contract, which she “attached to the complaint in compliance with MCR 2.113(C)(1). In doing so, the land contract ‘was made a part of the pleading for all purposes.’” And it was clear from the land contract language “that its terms do not ‘expressly provide for termination or forfeiture, or give the vendor the right to declare a forfeiture, in consequence of the nonpayment of any moneys required to be paid under the contract or any other material breach of the contract’” as required under MCL 600.5726. Thus, it was “not apparent from the complaint’s allegations that the matter alleged comes within summary proceedings to recover possession of premises under the” SPA and that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. Plaintiff’s waiver argument failed “because courts, whether upon challenge or sua sponte, are obliged to address the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction[.]” While plaintiff could not proceed in the district court under the SPA, “other judicial process and remedies are available to her.”

Child protective proceedings; Emergency removal; Procedural due process; In re Rood; Notice; MCR 3.920; MCR 3.963; MCR 3.965; MCR 3.974; Preliminary hearing; Protective custody

The court held that the trial court plainly erred by removing respondent-mother’s children from her care without following the procedural requirements governing preadjudication emergency removal. The DHHS filed an amended petition seeking removal after a new domestic-violence allegation, and the trial court held what it called an emergency removal hearing the same day, without respondent present. On appeal, the court first held that the proceeding did not qualify as a valid emergency removal hearing because “the trial court did not enter an order providing for taking the children into protective custody before holding the purported emergency removal hearing,” and the children were “still in respondent’s custody at the time of the hearing.” The court further reasoned that the “24-hour window in which to hold an emergency removal hearing was not triggered” until after the protective-custody order was entered. The court next held that the trial court lacked authority to order removal because “neither the original petition nor the amended petition had been authorized,” which was required before removal under MCR 3.974(C)(1). It also held that, if the hearing was instead an ordinary preliminary hearing, the trial court failed to provide the required notice because notice “must be given in writing or on the record at least 7 days before the hearing,” and that did not occur. Finally, the court held that the errors affected respondent’s substantial rights because the trial court’s later order relied on findings from the defective hearing, giving respondent no meaningful “opportunity to be heard.” The court emphasized that the trial court’s “blending of the emergency order for protective custody, the emergency removal hearing, and the preliminary hearing into a single, undifferentiated, and procedurally deficient hearing seriously affected the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Vacated and remanded.

Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) & (j); In re White; Reasonable reunification efforts; Preparing & updating a parent-agency treatment plan (PATP); Accommodation of a respondent’s disability; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); In re Hicks/Brown; Parenting time; Children’s best interests; Relative placement; In re Olive/Metts

The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights under §§ (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g) and (j), or in finding that doing so was in her children’s best interests. It also held that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts. Thus, it affirmed the termination orders. In her argument as to reunification efforts, she first asserted that the “DHHS did not properly prepare or update the PATP.” The court agreed that the DHHS did not comply with the statutory requirements. But it determined that “the error was harmless.” The 6/23 PATP “fully set forth what was required of respondent to remove the barriers to reunification. Although the plan did not include DHHS’s obligations, there is no question that DHHS referred [her] to a multitude of services.” She conceded this. She “acknowledged that she participated in therapy with at least two providers and attended parenting classes, supportive visitation, and multiple psychological and psychiatric evaluations.” In addition, the services accommodated her asserted disabilities. Thus, the court concluded the “DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification.” But the record showed “that respondent did not comply with many of her services and, in many respects, she failed to benefit from the services offered.” As a result, she could not “establish that she would have successfully attained reunification if a proper treatment plan had been prepared and regularly updated.” The court also found no merit in her contention that the DHHS did not make reasonable reunification efforts “because it failed to offer [her] consistent and meaningful parenting time.” As to statutory grounds for termination, over “182 days had elapsed since the initial dispositional orders, yet the conditions that led to the adjudication, and other conditions that arose thereafter, continued to exist. Respondent’s parenting skills had not improved and her mental health issues had not been adequately addressed. Further, the record clearly established that these conditions were unlikely to be rectified within a reasonable time. [She] had more than two years to make meaningful changes in her life, but she was unwilling or unable to do so. There was no evidence that if” she was given more time, she would remove the reunification barriers. Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the best interests of each child.