Action under 42 USC § 1983 based on police officers’ participation in an eviction; Fourth Amendment seizure; Qualified immunity; Whether a seizure was “unreasonable” under Cochran v Gilliam; Hensley v Gassman; Revis v Meldrum; Whether plaintiff had a “possessory interest” in the premises; State action; “Active participation” in the eviction; Violation of “clearly established” law

The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to defendants-police officers Pittsley and Rennie, concluding that (1) plaintiff-Bender “had a possessory interest in the condo at the time of the eviction[,]” (2) her account supported a finding that they “actively participated in evicting her” without a court order, and (3) case law predating the eviction clearly established that the alleged conduct “was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Bender was the primary caregiver for her friend (C) and lived in C’s condo with her. After C died, Bender remained in the condo for about a month while she took care of her own health concerns. At this time, the condo was owned by C’s living trust, of which Bender was trustee. C’s nephew (S) went to the condo with the officers to evict her. S had shown them a superseded version of C’s will to support the eviction. This version mentioned S as a beneficiary but did not refer to the condo. There was no court order for the eviction. According to Bender, Pittsley and Rennie gave her 10 minutes to leave, “threatened to arrest her, pushed her out the door, and took her key.” She sued, alleging that “their active participation in the eviction constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” They moved for summary disposition based on qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion. On appeal, after concluding that it had jurisdiction, the court held that Bender had a possessory interest in the condo under Ohio law. Further, it found that the officers “actively participated” in the eviction, concluding that their conduct “was akin to the actions in Cochran.” According to Bender’s deposition testimony, they “‘pushed their way into the condo’ without Bender’s consent and told her that she ‘ha[d] ten minutes’ to gather her belongings and exit the condo. Rennie threatened to arrest Bender multiple times during the eviction, as in Cochran.” She also testified that Pittsley “‘took [her] key.’” The court found that ultimately, “the Officers ‘threw [Bender] out of the condo,’ ‘pushed [her] out the door,’ and left the condo only after doing so.” It held that Hensley and Cochran clearly showed that their “conduct was unreasonable” given the lack of a court order and no assertion of exigent circumstances. Additionally, case law predating the eviction (Cochran and Hensley) “made it abundantly clear that the Officers violated Bender’s Fourth Amendment rights.”

Home loan discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), & the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Whether the appeal was forfeited; Application of prima facie evidentiary standards to discrimination claims at the pleading stage; Swierkiewicz v Sorema NA; Lindsay v Yates; McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green; Whether plaintiffs stated plausible claims for relief under the well-established pleading standards; Claim not raised in appellants’ opening briefs

The court held that while the district court mistakenly applied prima facie evidentiary standards to plaintiffs-Washingtons’ home loan discrimination claims at the pleading stage, the error was harmless because they failed to state plausible claims for relief under the applicable pleading standards. They sued defendant-First National Bank (FNB) under the FHA, the ECOA, and the ADA after it denied their application for a Veterans Administration home loan. One of the plaintiffs is a disabled veteran, and he and his wife “are of mixed-race background.” They alleged that but for the husband’s disability and their race, the bank would have granted their application. The district court dismissed their case for failure to establish the prima facie elements of their FHA and ECOA claims, and for failure to state an ADA claim. As an initial matter, the court declined to find that plaintiffs forfeited their appeal. Considering the dismissal of the FHA and ECOA claims, it held that the district court erred by relying on an unpublished Sixth Circuit case when imposing a requirement that plaintiffs plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive the motion to dismiss, explaining that this conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Swierkiewicz and Sixth Circuit published precedent (Lindsay). Under Swierkiewicz, “‘a plaintiff who asserted federal employment-discrimination claims was not required to plead facts establishing a prima facie case to state a claim for relief.’” And the court concluded in Lindsay “that Swierkiewicz made ‘clear that McDonnell Douglas does not set the standard for pleading any complaint,’ including FHA discrimination claims.” But the court held that the claim required dismissal where they failed to allege “any specific factual content regarding FNB’s handling of other loan applications.” Plaintiffs also were “not required to show discrimination to survive FNB’s motion to dismiss their ECOA claim.” They were only required to allege a “plausible” claim. But again, their failure to provide specific assertions resulted in FNB being entitled to dismissal. As to the ADA claim, absent any appellate argument from plaintiffs challenging the district court’s ruling, the court also affirmed the dismissal of this claim.

Action under 42 USC § 1983 based on police officers’ participation in an eviction; Fourth Amendment seizure; Qualified immunity; Whether a seizure was “unreasonable” under Cochran v Gilliam; Hensley v Gassman; Revis v Meldrum; Whether plaintiff had a “possessory interest” in the premises; State action; “Active participation” in the eviction; Violation of “clearly established” law

The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to defendants-police officers Pittsley and Rennie, concluding that (1) plaintiff-Bender “had a possessory interest in the condo at the time of the eviction[,]” (2) her account supported a finding that they “actively participated in evicting her” without a court order, and (3) case law predating the eviction clearly established that the alleged conduct “was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Bender was the primary caregiver for her friend (C) and lived in C’s condo with her. After C died, Bender remained in the condo for about a month while she took care of her own health concerns. At this time, the condo was owned by C’s living trust, of which Bender was trustee. C’s nephew (S) went to the condo with the officers to evict her. S had shown them a superseded version of C’s will to support the eviction. This version mentioned S as a beneficiary but did not refer to the condo. There was no court order for the eviction. According to Bender, Pittsley and Rennie gave her 10 minutes to leave, “threatened to arrest her, pushed her out the door, and took her key.” She sued, alleging that “their active participation in the eviction constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” They moved for summary disposition based on qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion. On appeal, after concluding that it had jurisdiction, the court held that Bender had a possessory interest in the condo under Ohio law. Further, it found that the officers “actively participated” in the eviction, concluding that their conduct “was akin to the actions in Cochran.” According to Bender’s deposition testimony, they “‘pushed their way into the condo’ without Bender’s consent and told her that she ‘ha[d] ten minutes’ to gather her belongings and exit the condo. Rennie threatened to arrest Bender multiple times during the eviction, as in Cochran.” She also testified that Pittsley “‘took [her] key.’” The court found that ultimately, “the Officers ‘threw [Bender] out of the condo,’ ‘pushed [her] out the door,’ and left the condo only after doing so.” It held that Hensley and Cochran clearly showed that their “conduct was unreasonable” given the lack of a court order and no assertion of exigent circumstances. Additionally, case law predating the eviction (Cochran and Hensley) “made it abundantly clear that the Officers violated Bender’s Fourth Amendment rights.”

Special probation condition; MCL 771.3(3); Review of constitutional challenges to probation conditions; Special scrutiny; Restriction on contact with spouse; Freedom of association & privacy of the spousal relationship; Plain error review; Mootness; Exception for issues of public significance likely to recur yet evade judicial review; Adult Recovery Court (ARC)

Applying special scrutiny review to defendant’s constitutional challenges to a probation condition prohibiting contact with her spouse, the court held that she failed to show the trial court plainly erred in imposing and enforcing the condition under the circumstances. Thus, it affirmed the order sentencing her to 12 months in jail after violating the terms of her probation. The court first found that, because she had been discharged from her sentence, her challenge was moot, but the exception for issues of public significance likely to recur yet evade judicial review applied. Further, because the issue was not preserved, plain error review applied. The court held “that when a probation condition implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights, a court must apply special scrutiny to ensure that the condition is reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary interference with the constitutional right at issue.” It applied such scrutiny here, where defendant challenged the “condition as an unconstitutional infringement upon her freedom of association and the privacy of her spousal relationship.” Given that the record reflected that her “husband was determined to be the reason why defendant did not comply with her mandated ARC programming requirements, a graduated escalation of restrictions imposed on [her] contact with him was both reasonably related to [her] rehabilitation and narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary interference with her constitutional rights. The first prong—the reasonable relationship requirement—is satisfied.” The husband had prior convictions for meth possession “and tampering with a monitoring device, and defendant’s probation violations similarly involved relapsed meth[] use and, while spending time with [him], tether violations. [Her] violations of the ARC program’s tether requirements, in turn, undermined her rehabilitation, as the program was” imposed to help steer her away from continued drug involvement. “Thus, there was a reasonable relationship between the no-contact restriction and defendant’s rehabilitation.” The court also found that the second prong was satisfied. The no-contact “condition was evidently an adapted, final attempt to assist defendant in successfully completing the ARC program, imposed only when it was deemed necessary to interfere so significantly in [her] marriage.”

Motion to quash; Unlawfully posting a message; MCL 750.411s; Cyberstalking by proxy; Buchanan v Crisler; Unconsented contact; Probable cause; Corpus delicti rule; “Confession”; People v Washington; First Amendment; True threats; People v Burkman; People v Gerhard; Speech integral to criminal conduct; Public figure; Public concern; People v Dingee

The court held that probable cause supported defendant’s bindover for unlawfully posting a message, that the corpus delicti rule did not bar admission of his phone calls, and that remand was required for further First Amendment analysis. Defendant was charged after phone calls and Facebook posts about a police officer, including statements that he planned to go to the officer’s church and that the officer “needs to be fired.” The court first held that the district court erred by focusing on the posts themselves because, under Buchanan, MCL 750.411s criminalizes “cyberstalking by proxy,” and “‘it is not the postings themselves that are harassing to the victim,’” but the unconsented contacts arising from them. But the court held that bindover was still proper because the posts identified the officer by name, workplace, and badge number, accused him of harassment, assault, and stalking, and supported an inference that defendant knew or intended others would contact the officer. It further reasoned that the officer received calls from his lieutenant and church monsignor, changed his Facebook use and church routine, and testified the contacts made him feel “uncomfortable, threatened, and harassed.” The court next held that the corpus delicti rule did not bar admission of defendant’s phone calls because he “did not admit to all the essential elements” of unlawfully posting a message, so the calls did not constitute confessions. As to the First Amendment, the court held the circuit court did not err by treating defendant’s statement that the officer would “get a surprise” at church as potentially a true threat because, given recent attacks at places of worship, it was not “impossible” for the statement to be construed as a physical threat. But the court vacated in part because the circuit court failed to decide whether the remaining speech was “integral to criminal conduct,” including whether the officer was a public figure or the posts involved matters of public concern. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Whether the search warrants for defendant’s property were supported by “probable cause”; Whether noncriminal acts could support probable cause; Consideration of defendant’s past convictions; Motion for a judgment of acquittal; Sufficiency of the evidence; Knowingly possessing child pornography; 18 USC § 2252A(a)(5)(B)

The court held that while the individual acts supporting the search warrants for defendant-Lineback’s home and seized electronic devices may have been noncriminal, under the “totality of the circumstances” they were sufficient to support “probable cause” for the warrants to search for evidence of child pornography. It also held that his motion for a judgment of acquittal was properly denied because there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. He was convicted of knowingly possessing child pornography. He challenged the two search warrants in a motion to suppress, alleging lack of probable cause as to the home search warrant and fruit of the poisonous tree as to the electronics search warrant. The district court denied his motion to suppress and his later motion for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, the court rejected the lack of probable cause argument where there was evidence that Lineback had approached an underage youth who went to the police and informed them that “he was being solicited.” The texts he received from Lineback included photos of the boy’s face, “edited to be wearing lipstick, superimposed onto female bodies wearing pantyhose.” Lineback told him that he looked “cute” and invited him over to his house. Also, “in the background of these overt acts are Lineback’s past convictions that led to his registration as a sex offender, both of which involved sexual crimes against minors. This is enough for probable cause.” He argued that none of the photos were pornographic and the invitation to come to his house did not constitute solicitation. “But whether each isolated act alone supports probable cause is irrelevant: probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, . . . and even noncriminal acts can support a probable cause finding when they raise the suspicion of criminal activity[.]” His past convictions were also properly considered, viewed “in light of the other evidence included in the affidavit.” The court noted that “when a convicted pedophile tells a juvenile he looks cute and invites that victim to his house, the totality of the circumstances weighs differently than if he had no such conviction.” It also upheld the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal given “the weight of the circumstantial evidence.” This included the “‘age of consent’ form that he wrote to obtain a minor’s ‘consent’ before engaging in sex with him[,]” and the hard drive found in his home that contained a folder titled “Nude Boys,” in which “the FBI discovered the two images of child pornography that led to Lineback’s prosecution.” Affirmed.

Parenting time; The Child Custody Act; Whether the order on appeal was a modification; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Established custodial environment (ECE)

The court held that the order at issue on appeal “did not modify the parenting time or custody arrangements” in a prior order and thus, the trial court “was not required to consider any change in circumstances, proper cause,” ECE, or the children’s best interests. The order at issue granted plaintiff-father parenting time with the children every weekend. The court noted that the earlier order (the April order) provided that he “would have parenting time with the children every weekend.” The trial court later ruled that it was enforcing that “order and continuing to grant plaintiff parenting time with the children every weekend.” Given that it “did not order a modification or change of its” April order in the order at issue, it was not required to consider the children’s ECE, “whether there was a change in circumstances or proper cause, or whether a change in parenting time was in” their best interests. Defendant-mother contended that the “order modified the parties’ parenting time. This purportedly occurred because [they] did not follow the schedule set forth in the April order since plaintiff was exercising parenting time every other weekend until the July hearing.” She asserted that they had agreed that he “would have the children every other weekend and the trial court increased plaintiff’s parenting time by enforcing its April order that he have parenting time every weekend. But the Child Custody Act is concerned with changes to ‘previous judgments or orders[.]’”

Trust administration; Civil action versus probate proceeding; MCR 5.101; MCR 5.501(C); Probate court jurisdiction; Final order; MCR 5.801(A); Due process; Default; Trustee removal; MCL 700.7706; Breach of trust; MCL 700.7801; MCL 700.7814; Trustee compensation; Rent; Attorney fees; MCL 700.7904

The court held that although plaintiffs-beneficiaries commenced this trust-administration dispute in the wrong form, the error was procedural rather than jurisdictional, and the probate court did not err by removing defendant-former trustee or resolving the remaining trust issues. Plaintiffs filed a complaint rather than a petition seeking to remove defendant as trustee, invalidate an unsigned trust amendment, and obtain an inventory and accounting. The court first held that the case should have been brought as a probate proceeding because MCL 700.7208 and MCR 5.501(C) require a trust proceeding to be “initiated by filing a petition.” But the defect did not deprive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction because the relief sought fell “squarely within” its trust jurisdiction. The court also held that it could review the removal order because the case proceeded as a civil action, so MCR 5.801(A)(2)’s final-order rule for “a proceeding” did not apply. The court next rejected defendant’s due-process challenge because she knew about the case, received personal service, and chose not to respond, and “[d]ue process protects only the opportunity to be heard.” The court also held that removal was proper because the default admitted allegations that defendant failed to provide accountings, refused information requests, attempted to amend the trust without authority, and intended to follow an unsigned amendment contrary to the trust’s written terms. These facts showed “a serious breach of trust” or “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure” to administer the trust effectively. The court also upheld denial or reduction of defendant’s charges against the trust because she kept no logs, failed to document services, and did not overcome the presumption that services to her parents were “gratuitous.” Finally, it upheld the rent and attorney-fee rulings because defendant’s exclusive rent-free occupancy was self-dealing, and plaintiffs’ litigation remedied fiduciary breaches and “enhanced the Trust’s value.” Affirmed.

Civil sexual abuse claims; Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5851b(1)(a); Criminal sexual conduct against a minor; Discovery rule; MCL 600.5851b(1)(b); Minor tolling; MCL 600.5851; Retroactivity; Active claims; McLain v Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing; LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC; People v Russo

The court held that plaintiff’s civil sexual-abuse claims were timely because MCL 600.5851b(1)(a) applies to claims that were still active when the statute was enacted. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually abused as a young child in 2006 and 2007 by a church deacon and another child on a mission trip, recovered suppressed memories in 2020, and filed suit in 2024 when she was about 21. The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition, relying on McLain to conclude plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court erred by treating McLain as controlling because that case involved subsection (1)(b)’s discovery rule and claims that had already expired, while plaintiff relied on subsection (1)(a) and her claims were still active in 2018. The court reasoned that McLain was “not dispositive here” because plaintiff was not “seeking to ‘resuscitate’ or ‘revive’ already-lapsed claims[.]” The court next held that subsection (1)(a) extended the limitations period to age 28 for active claims. It noted that McLain described subsection (1)(a) as “a straightforward extension of the statute of limitations,” and concluded the statute “did not create a new cause of action” but only enlarged the time to file. Applying LaFontaine, the court reasoned defendants had “no vested rights in a statute of limitations defense” because plaintiff’s claims had not expired when the statute was enacted. It also found support in Russo, explaining that a revised limitations period may apply to conduct predating enactment when the prior limitations period had not yet run. The court concluded the statute’s purpose was “to broaden child sexual abuse victims’ access to civil remedies[.]” Reversed and remanded.

Right to a jury trial in a civil case; MCR 2.508(B)(1); Waiver; MCR 2.508(D)(1); Effect of the parties’ failure to preserve their constitutional right to a jury trial; The trial court’s discretion to empanel a jury; Yon v All American Transp Co, Inc

The court held that “a trial court retains discretion to empanel a jury even in cases where the parties fail to properly preserve their constitutional right to a jury trial.” Thus, as the trial court’s grant of plaintiff’s motion to proceed without a jury was based on its mistaken belief that it lacked discretion to empanel one, the court reversed and remanded. While defendants argued “the trial court erroneously permitted plaintiff to unilaterally withdraw its jury demand[,]” the court found that “plaintiff never made an appropriate demand” as required by MCR 2.508(B)(1). It also rejected their alternative argument that they “independently preserved their right by filing their own demand for a jury trial.” While their demand satisfied two of the court rule’s three requirements, “the jury fee was not paid at the time that defendants’ reliance and demand was made. Therefore, under MCR 2.508(D)(1), [they] waived their right to a jury trial.” The court then turned to whether the trial court nonetheless had discretion to empanel a jury. The trial court concluded that, under Yon, it did not. The court rejected “the Yon Court’s suggestion that it is mandatory for the nondemanding party to make an inquiry into whether the jury fee has been paid.” Rather, the court held “that the fact that an inquiry is or is not made is a circumstance that may be considered by the [trial] court when it is weighing whether to exercise its discretion to empanel a jury when the right to a jury has not been properly demanded.” The court stated that the trial court on remand “can consider the ease by which the defects in plaintiff’s jury demand could have been discovered by defendants, including the fact that [they] could have contacted the court clerk to make an inquiry as to whether the jury fee had been paid. But it should also consider that those same defects should have been more apparent to plaintiff given that plaintiff was the party that did not file the demand on a separate document and did not timely pay the jury fee as required by MCR 2.508. [It] should also consider that defendants made an independent demand for a jury trial and that they, unlike plaintiff, eventually paid the jury fee. [It] may also consider any other facts” it finds relevant.

Civil sexual abuse claims; Statute of limitations; MCL 600.5851b(1)(a); Criminal sexual conduct against a minor; Discovery rule; MCL 600.5851b(1)(b); Minor tolling; MCL 600.5851; Retroactivity; Active claims; McLain v Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing; LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC; People v Russo

The court held that plaintiff’s civil sexual-abuse claims were timely because MCL 600.5851b(1)(a) applies to claims that were still active when the statute was enacted. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually abused as a young child in 2006 and 2007 by a church deacon and another child on a mission trip, recovered suppressed memories in 2020, and filed suit in 2024 when she was about 21. The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition, relying on McLain to conclude plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court erred by treating McLain as controlling because that case involved subsection (1)(b)’s discovery rule and claims that had already expired, while plaintiff relied on subsection (1)(a) and her claims were still active in 2018. The court reasoned that McLain was “not dispositive here” because plaintiff was not “seeking to ‘resuscitate’ or ‘revive’ already-lapsed claims[.]” The court next held that subsection (1)(a) extended the limitations period to age 28 for active claims. It noted that McLain described subsection (1)(a) as “a straightforward extension of the statute of limitations,” and concluded the statute “did not create a new cause of action” but only enlarged the time to file. Applying LaFontaine, the court reasoned defendants had “no vested rights in a statute of limitations defense” because plaintiff’s claims had not expired when the statute was enacted. It also found support in Russo, explaining that a revised limitations period may apply to conduct predating enactment when the prior limitations period had not yet run. The court concluded the statute’s purpose was “to broaden child sexual abuse victims’ access to civil remedies[.]” Reversed and remanded.

Child’s removal & placement in foster care; MCL 712A.13a(9); MCR 3.965(C)(2); In re Williams; Adequate relative placement; Distinguishing In re Martin & In re Webster

Holding that the trial court clearly erred in finding that MCL 712A.13a(9)’s requirements for removal were satisfied, the court reversed the part of the order entered after the preliminary hearing that removed the child, and remanded. Respondent-father argued on appeal that the trial court erred “because the child was already in an adequate relative placement with the child’s adult sister.” The court agreed. One of the statutory conditions for removal, MCL 712A.13a(9)(b), requires a “finding that ‘[n]o provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child [was] reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child . . . .’” The record showed “that respondent had voluntarily placed the child with the child’s adult sister as part of a safety plan and had given the sister power of attorney regarding the child’s custody and care. Petitioner had confirmed that the sister’s home and custody was a safe and appropriate placement.” The trial court stated, “I understand there’s a power of attorney, but it hasn’t stopped mom or father at times to try and, you know, get the child back.” The court found that this was clear error. While there was an allegation “that the child’s mother tried to take the child back from the sister while intoxicated. . . . it was clear error for the trial court to find that respondent did so, and” the DHHS pointed to no record evidence supporting such a finding. The court was also “unpersuaded by the argument that the mere legal or hypothetical possibility of a revocation” of the power of attorney, “without more, means that it is not an adequate safeguard under the circumstances.” Further, the cases the DHHS cited, Martin and Webster, were “not particularly illuminating or persuasive” given that the court was “bound by a distinct statutory landscape.” It was not convinced “that, as a general matter, the mere duration and revocability of a power of attorney is reason to find that placement under power of attorney cannot adequately safeguard a child for purposes of MCL 712A.13a(9).”

Trust administration; Civil action versus probate proceeding; MCR 5.101; MCR 5.501(C); Probate court jurisdiction; Final order; MCR 5.801(A); Due process; Default; Trustee removal; MCL 700.7706; Breach of trust; MCL 700.7801; MCL 700.7814; Trustee compensation; Rent; Attorney fees; MCL 700.7904

The court held that although plaintiffs-beneficiaries commenced this trust-administration dispute in the wrong form, the error was procedural rather than jurisdictional, and the probate court did not err by removing defendant-former trustee or resolving the remaining trust issues. Plaintiffs filed a complaint rather than a petition seeking to remove defendant as trustee, invalidate an unsigned trust amendment, and obtain an inventory and accounting. The court first held that the case should have been brought as a probate proceeding because MCL 700.7208 and MCR 5.501(C) require a trust proceeding to be “initiated by filing a petition.” But the defect did not deprive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction because the relief sought fell “squarely within” its trust jurisdiction. The court also held that it could review the removal order because the case proceeded as a civil action, so MCR 5.801(A)(2)’s final-order rule for “a proceeding” did not apply. The court next rejected defendant’s due-process challenge because she knew about the case, received personal service, and chose not to respond, and “[d]ue process protects only the opportunity to be heard.” The court also held that removal was proper because the default admitted allegations that defendant failed to provide accountings, refused information requests, attempted to amend the trust without authority, and intended to follow an unsigned amendment contrary to the trust’s written terms. These facts showed “a serious breach of trust” or “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure” to administer the trust effectively. The court also upheld denial or reduction of defendant’s charges against the trust because she kept no logs, failed to document services, and did not overcome the presumption that services to her parents were “gratuitous.” Finally, it upheld the rent and attorney-fee rulings because defendant’s exclusive rent-free occupancy was self-dealing, and plaintiffs’ litigation remedied fiduciary breaches and “enhanced the Trust’s value.” Affirmed.