Administrative agency decision; Elevator journeyman’s license; Elevator Licensing Act (ELA); MCL 338.2156(4); Supervisor of elevator construction or service; Agency interpretation; Authorized by law; Reconsideration; Bureau of Construction Codes (BCC); Elevator Safety Board (ESB)

The court held that defendant-LARA’s denial of plaintiff’s application for an elevator journeyman’s license was authorized by law and that the circuit court properly reinstated that denial on reconsideration. Plaintiff sought a license based on his supervisory experience in the elevator industry, but the BCC, ESB, and LARA determined that he lacked the required experience under MCL 338.2156(4). On appeal, the court first held that MCL 338.2156(4) requires board approval, passage of an examination, and “three years’ continuous employment as a supervisor of elevator construction or service,” and that LARA reasonably interpreted qualifying supervisory experience to require supervision of elevator fieldwork. The court explained “that ‘we must consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme[,]’” and under the ELA, work must be performed by a licensed journeyman or someone under a licensed journeyman’s immediate supervision. The court rejected plaintiff’s broader reading because it “would be an absurd interpretation to grant an applicant with only three years of indirect, tangential supervisory experience a license to perform elevator work, immediately supervise unlicensed workers, or both.” The court next found that LARA had discretion to limit the type of supervisory experience required for approval because otherwise “there would be no need for its approval in the first place.” Applying that interpretation, the court noted that LARA’s decision did not violate a statute, exceed its authority, or involve unlawful procedures, and it did not act arbitrarily because the requirements could “reasonably be understood as efforts to promote safety, standardization, and code compliance within the elevator industry.” Finally, the court held that the second circuit-court judge properly granted reconsideration because the first judge “had no basis to disturb” LARA’s authorized decision. Affirmed.

Stockbroker regulation; Refusal to register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA); 15 USC §§ 78s(b) & (c); Violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act & Rule 10(b)–5; Whether the FINRA had statutory jurisdiction over plaintiff despite his refusal to register; §§ 78o–3(b)(7) & (h)(1); Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) “exhaustion” requirement (§ 78y(c)(1); SEC v Jarkesy

In an amended opinion (see eJournal #85497 in the 4/13/26 edition for the original), the court clarified that petitioner-Smith’s actions were “entirely different” than those in a film it referenced, but again held that despite failing to register, he still was subject to the FINRA’s jurisdiction. Thus, it again denied his petition for review of respondent-SEC’s order upholding sanctions against him for violations of securities-related laws and administrative rules.

Stockbroker regulation; Refusal to register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA); 15 USC §§ 78s(b) & (c); Violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act & Rule 10(b)–5; Whether the FINRA had statutory jurisdiction over plaintiff despite his refusal to register; §§ 78o–3(b)(7) & (h)(1); Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) “exhaustion” requirement (§ 78y(c)(1); SEC v Jarkesy

In an amended opinion (see eJournal #85497 in the 4/13/26 edition for the original), the court clarified that petitioner-Smith’s actions were “entirely different” than those in a film it referenced, but again held that despite failing to register, he still was subject to the FINRA’s jurisdiction. Thus, it again denied his petition for review of respondent-SEC’s order upholding sanctions against him for violations of securities-related laws and administrative rules.

Obstructing a police officer; MCL 750.81d; First Amendment; Right to film police; Time, place, & manner restrictions; Overbreadth; People v Morris; As-applied challenge; Traffic stop safety; People v Campbell; Void for vagueness; Fair notice; Brady v Maryland violation; Bill of particulars; MCR 6.112(E); Ineffective assistance of counsel

The court held that defendant’s conviction of obstructing a police officer did not violate his First Amendment rights and that MCL 750.81d was not overbroad or void for vagueness. Defendant, a self-described “First Amendment Auditor,” recorded a nighttime traffic stop but repeatedly moved closer after a trooper directed him to stay back, turned on his phone flash toward the trooper, and ignored warnings that he was interfering with the stop. The court first held that the First Amendment protects recording police in public, agreeing that “there is a constitutional right to film governmental officials engaged in their duties in a public place,” but the right is not unlimited and remains “subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.” The court next held that MCL 750.81d is not facially overbroad because Morris held the statute does not permit conviction “solely on the basis of constitutionally protected speech” and requires “some physical refusal to comply with a command[.]” The court also held that the statute was constitutional as applied because the trooper never ordered defendant to stop filming and instead gave location and flash-related directions tied to officer safety. The court reasoned that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger,” and defendant’s conduct “impeded the troopers’ ability to conduct the traffic stop” by forcing one trooper to stop processing the driver’s information and assist with defendant. The court further held that the commands were narrowly tailored because defendant still had “a close position from which he could film the traffic stop,” while giving officers room to “efficiently and safely complete” it. As to vagueness, the court held that MCL 750.81d gives fair notice because the obstruction provision reaches a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command, and its limitation to “physical” interference does not reach pure speech. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s remaining Brady, bill-of-particulars, cumulative-error, and ineffective-assistance arguments because the alleged prosecutor-office relationship with one of the troopers was not suppressed or material, the preliminary exam gave adequate notice, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless arguments. Affirmed.

Monetary damages on a breach of contract claim; Great weight of the evidence; Tolling under MCL 600.5855 due to fraudulent concealment; Damages award & evidence; Business Advisory Services (BAS); Elixir Advisory Services (EAS)

The court held that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff could seek money damages for his breach of contract claim. It also held that the jury’s (1) finding that there was a contract breach, (2) finding that defendant-CIG engaged in fraudulent concealment, and (3) $3 million damages award were not against the great weight of the evidence. The contract contained two equity-earning provisions that formed the basis of the dispute. Defendant asserted that plaintiff was improperly allowed to seek money damages. It first contended that this put him “in a better position than if defendant had performed under the contract.” But the court saw nothing in the record showing that allowing him “to recover the monetary value of his owed equity puts him in a better position than having the equity. In both instances, plaintiff would recover the same value, just different forms—money, or a property interest that has the same value—of it.” Second, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in “declining to award specific performance.” As to the great weight of the evidence, defendant first challenged the jury’s finding that there was a breach. It asserted that nothing showed “plaintiff met the revenue hurdles required to obtain an equity interest in BAS.” The court disagreed. Evidence indicating that he did so included (1) his testimony that defendant’s founder (M) “assured him at the annual reviews that he had earned equity; (2) no performance reviews explicitly mentioned plaintiff failing to meet any hurdle rate or failing to accrue equity; (3) the performance reviews had numerous references to revenue targets being met; and (4) CIG created a spreadsheet showing plaintiff earning 3.33% equity every year.” While there was opposing evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining “the overwhelming weight of the evidence did not favor defendant.” It likewise failed to show the great weight of evidence favored it on the fraudulent concealment issue. Finally, as to the damages calculation, the amount of revenue a CIG subsidiary (EAS) had was relevant where plaintiff’s case was based “on the view that defendant was hiding or sheltering consulting income by allocating it to EAS instead of BAS [.]” The court noted that “plaintiff had sought nearly $6 million in damages, and the jury awarded $3 million.” Affirmed.

Obstructing a police officer; MCL 750.81d; First Amendment; Right to film police; Time, place, & manner restrictions; Overbreadth; People v Morris; As-applied challenge; Traffic stop safety; People v Campbell; Void for vagueness; Fair notice; Brady v Maryland violation; Bill of particulars; MCR 6.112(E); Ineffective assistance of counsel

The court held that defendant’s conviction of obstructing a police officer did not violate his First Amendment rights and that MCL 750.81d was not overbroad or void for vagueness. Defendant, a self-described “First Amendment Auditor,” recorded a nighttime traffic stop but repeatedly moved closer after a trooper directed him to stay back, turned on his phone flash toward the trooper, and ignored warnings that he was interfering with the stop. The court first held that the First Amendment protects recording police in public, agreeing that “there is a constitutional right to film governmental officials engaged in their duties in a public place,” but the right is not unlimited and remains “subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.” The court next held that MCL 750.81d is not facially overbroad because Morris held the statute does not permit conviction “solely on the basis of constitutionally protected speech” and requires “some physical refusal to comply with a command[.]” The court also held that the statute was constitutional as applied because the trooper never ordered defendant to stop filming and instead gave location and flash-related directions tied to officer safety. The court reasoned that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger,” and defendant’s conduct “impeded the troopers’ ability to conduct the traffic stop” by forcing one trooper to stop processing the driver’s information and assist with defendant. The court further held that the commands were narrowly tailored because defendant still had “a close position from which he could film the traffic stop,” while giving officers room to “efficiently and safely complete” it. As to vagueness, the court held that MCL 750.81d gives fair notice because the obstruction provision reaches a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command, and its limitation to “physical” interference does not reach pure speech. Finally, the court rejected defendant’s remaining Brady, bill-of-particulars, cumulative-error, and ineffective-assistance arguments because the alleged prosecutor-office relationship with one of the troopers was not suppressed or material, the preliminary exam gave adequate notice, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless arguments. Affirmed.

Successive motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.502(G)(2); Newly discovered evidence; People v Johnson; People v Allen; MCR 6.508(D)(3); The People v Cress factors; Reasonable diligence & good cause; The probable outcome & actual prejudice

Holding that the trial court failed to “apply the correct legal framework” and made factual and legal errors in granting defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment, the court vacated and remanded. Defendant and his girlfriend (M) were arrested in connection with a drive-by shooting. He was convicted of multiple charges in 2000, including second-degree murder. The court concluded that the trial court was correct that the 2019 affidavit from one of the surviving victims (W) that defendant attached to his successive motion was newly discovered. But it found that the trial court “fell short in applying the fourth prong of Cress” to this new evidence. The “trial court found the jury should have ‘had the benefit of evaluating Mr. [W’s] credibility,’ which is distinct from concluding a reasonable juror could find the testimony credible.” And the court could not find record support for the trial court’s determination that M’s Walker hearing testimony “was new evidence for purposes of MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b).” The same was true as to some of defendant’s police misconduct allegations. Thus, it vacated “the trial court’s findings and holding as to all evidence” except the 2019 affidavit. For the “other pieces of evidence, the trial court must begin with the procedural hurdle set forth in MCR 6.502” on remand. The court also noted that even assuming the trial court was correct about defendant’s trial counsel being ineffective, that was insufficient at this stage. The trial court had to consider defendant’s “direct appeal and his first motion for relief from judgment to assess whether these arguments were previously addressed and, if not, whether [he] alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. [It] did not do so when determining good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a), and its failure to do so was clear error.”

Specific performance of a plea agreement; Requirement that a plea bargain be stated on the record or reduced to a signed writing to be effective; Detrimental reliance; Prosecutorial misconduct/error; Impeachment with other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); People v VanderVliet; People v Werner; Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Dixon-Bey; Justification for an upward departure; Operating while intoxicated (OWI); Operating while license suspended or revoked (OWLS)

The court held that (1) defendant was not entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement, (2) he did not show reversible error based on his prosecutorial misconduct claim, and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upward departure sentence. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, OWI causing death, OWI causing serious injury, OWLS causing death, and OWLS causing serious injury. The trial court sentenced him to 10 to 15 years each for manslaughter, OWI causing death, and OWLS causing death, and 38 to 60 months each for the other convictions. He contended that he was entitled to specific performance of a “plea offer because he accepted it and relied upon it to his detriment.” The court disagreed. It noted that his “attorney’s statement in response to the prosecutor’s [9/23] e-mail that defendant ‘will be doing a voluntary bind-over to circuit court, at a minimum to keep the written plea offer in tact [sic]’ . . . does not mean that defendant had accepted the offer detailed in the e-mail. On the contrary, the unambiguous language in the e-mail indicated that defendant sought merely to keep the offer open, which further indicated that he wanted to decide later whether to accept it.” The court added that his “subsequent actions confirmed that he had not accepted the agreement.” He sought a Cobbs conference and then “a Killebrew agreement. The trial court reasonably concluded that the request for a Killebrew agreement amounted to a counteroffer, and therefore a rejection of the original offer, and that both events were evidence that negotiations were ongoing, not that defendant had accepted an offer. In fact, the record shows that the parties continued to negotiate after [he] first filed a motion for specific performance. Courts are not compelled to enforce ‘tentative’ plea bargains.” The court also held that the prosecution did not commit misconduct in eliciting “testimony about defendant once previously getting ‘behind the wheel after drinking[.]’” Finally, the trial “court explained its reasons for departing from the guidelines, and for the extent of the departure, the minimum of which was just 20 months above the guideline range.” Affirmed.

Sufficient evidence; Conspiracy to unlawfully dispense controlled substances; Healthcare fraud; Exclusion of evidence of the elimination of a federal regulation known as the “X-waiver rule”; Allegedly “speculative” testimony; FRE 401; Hearsay; Text messages; FRE 403; Whether a witness exceeded the permissible scope of lay witness testimony; FRE 701; Evidence of patient deaths; Denial of motion to sever trial; Jury instructions on conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances; Mens rea; Deliberate ignorance; Cumulative error; Untimely motion to correct or reduce a sentence

The court affirmed all three defendants’ convictions of conspiracy to unlawfully dispense controlled substances and healthcare fraud, holding for the first time in a published opinion that evidence of patient deaths can be admitted if the government can establish a connection to the defendants. A jury convicted defendants-Herrell, Grenkoski, and McFarlane (all doctors) of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, healthcare fraud, and money laundering arising from their participation in a “pill mill.” All three challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. The court cited extensive precedent upholding convictions in these type of cases where there was evidence of the same factors that described defendants’ clinic’s “typical practices” and defendants. It also rejected Grenkoski’s challenge to his conviction for conspiracy to commit health care fraud. Herrell and McFarlane appealed the district court’s ruling excluding evidence of the repeal of a federal regulation known as the “X-waiver rule.” But the court agreed that introducing this evidence would only “confuse” the jury given the temporal discrepancy between when the conspiracy ended and when the regulation was repealed. It rejected Grenkoski’s claim that the district court improperly allowed three hearsay statements into evidence, holding that they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted or were offered to establish mens rea. The court also upheld the admission of testimony about patient deaths if the government showed a connection to the defendants, noting it had done so previously in an unpublished case and that other courts have ruled similarly. While the district court erred in not following its own ruling as to one witness, the court found the error was harmless because, under the circumstances, the “passing reference to separate patient deaths was largely cumulative and would not have ‘materially affect[ed]’ the jury’s verdict.” McFarlane’s motion to sever her trial was properly denied where she only gave “‘generalized concerns’” about spillover evidence. The court also rejected defendants’ challenges to the jury instructions on the elements of conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances and deliberate ignorance, and Grenkoski’s cumulative error claim.

Referendum petition; Petition circulator certificate; City or township requirement; MCL 168.544c; Wickman v Norway Twp Clerk; Michigan Zoning Enabling Act; MCL 125.3402; Mandamus; Conflict panel; MCR 7.215(J)

The court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to mandamus relief compelling defendants to accept their referendum petition sheets and place the referendum on the ballot. Plaintiffs circulated a petition seeking a referendum on a township zoning ordinance regulating solar-energy facilities, but the township clerk rejected the petition sheets because the circulators listed mailing addresses rather than their city or township in the circulator’s certificate. On appeal, the court held that Wickman controlled because its facts were “nearly identical,” and that under stare decisis, the court was required “‘to reach the same result in a case that presents the same or substantially similar issues’” as a prior published decision. The court next rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Wickman was wrongly decided because the terms “City” and “Township” should be read as mailing-address designations rather than political subdivisions. The court reasoned that those words have “specific legal meanings” under Michigan law, and the Michigan Election Law “repeatedly refers to cities or townships in the context of political subdivisions.” The court also held that MCL 168.544c(4)’s reference to notice by certified mail did not change the analysis because that “singular reference to mailing” did not show that the Legislature intended a USPS mailing address to satisfy the certificate requirement. The court further rejected plaintiffs’ argument about nonresident circulators because a circulator who does not live in a city or township could accurately write “none” in that space. Finally, while the court recognized that voter disenfranchisement is “a significant concern,” it held that the concern was “more appropriately addressed by the Legislature” and did not permit the court to disregard the statute’s clear language. Affirmed.

Monetary damages on a breach of contract claim; Great weight of the evidence; Tolling under MCL 600.5855 due to fraudulent concealment; Damages award & evidence; Business Advisory Services (BAS); Elixir Advisory Services (EAS)

The court held that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff could seek money damages for his breach of contract claim. It also held that the jury’s (1) finding that there was a contract breach, (2) finding that defendant-CIG engaged in fraudulent concealment, and (3) $3 million damages award were not against the great weight of the evidence. The contract contained two equity-earning provisions that formed the basis of the dispute. Defendant asserted that plaintiff was improperly allowed to seek money damages. It first contended that this put him “in a better position than if defendant had performed under the contract.” But the court saw nothing in the record showing that allowing him “to recover the monetary value of his owed equity puts him in a better position than having the equity. In both instances, plaintiff would recover the same value, just different forms—money, or a property interest that has the same value—of it.” Second, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in “declining to award specific performance.” As to the great weight of the evidence, defendant first challenged the jury’s finding that there was a breach. It asserted that nothing showed “plaintiff met the revenue hurdles required to obtain an equity interest in BAS.” The court disagreed. Evidence indicating that he did so included (1) his testimony that defendant’s founder (M) “assured him at the annual reviews that he had earned equity; (2) no performance reviews explicitly mentioned plaintiff failing to meet any hurdle rate or failing to accrue equity; (3) the performance reviews had numerous references to revenue targets being met; and (4) CIG created a spreadsheet showing plaintiff earning 3.33% equity every year.” While there was opposing evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining “the overwhelming weight of the evidence did not favor defendant.” It likewise failed to show the great weight of evidence favored it on the fraudulent concealment issue. Finally, as to the damages calculation, the amount of revenue a CIG subsidiary (EAS) had was relevant where plaintiff’s case was based “on the view that defendant was hiding or sheltering consulting income by allocating it to EAS instead of BAS [.]” The court noted that “plaintiff had sought nearly $6 million in damages, and the jury awarded $3 million.” Affirmed.

Mootness; General Motors Corp v Department of Treasury; Bona-fide purchaser; Notice; Richards v Tibaldi; Effect of a lis pendens; Ligon v Detroit; State Court Administrative Office (SCAO)

Holding that this land contract forfeiture case was moot, the court vacated in part the circuit court’s orders to the extent they unwound plaintiff’s sale of the property to a third party, affirmed in part, and dismissed the appeal as moot. Plaintiff appealed a circuit court order (1) denying defendant’s application for leave to appeal from a district court judgment of possession entered nunc pro tunc, but (2) remanding to the district court for entry of an order vacating that judgment of possession and instead entering the approved SCAO “Judgment of Possession After Land Contract Forfeiture.” Plaintiff asserted that the second part of the order “would have no practical effect.” The court agreed. On 5/31/23, the circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens defendant had filed on the property, and ordered the notice of lis pendens be discharged. Days later, plaintiff sold the property to the third party (P). “After plaintiff’s sale of the property, no court is able to enforce any equitable relief relating to the property, and defendant admitted that reclaiming the property is impossible. Even though the district court never entered the proper SCAO form of the judgment of possession, entry of such an order now—whether dated in the present or retroactively—would have no legal effect.” Thus, the court vacated circuit court orders relating to the possession issue as moot. It also found no merit in defendant’s argument that P “was not a bona-fide purchaser because he knew plaintiff may not have title to the property” based on the notice of lis pendens. The court noted that a “‘lis pendens has no effect on fixed property rights that already exist at the time’” it is filed. And plaintiff and P “waited until after the circuit court discharged the lis pendens before closing the sale on the property. Defendant” presented no support for its claim that it had “a superior ownership interest in the property. Moreover, defendant offered no support for its contention that the discharge of the lis pendens did not mean the title was marketable.”

Governmental immunity; Government Tort Liability Act (GTLA); MCL 691.1407(2); Gross negligence; Proximate cause; Intentional torts; Good-faith immunity; Odom v Wayne Cnty; False arrest; False imprisonment; Assault & battery; Intentional & negligent infliction of emotional distress (IIED & NIED); Loss of consortium

The court held that remand was required because the trial court did not make the necessary determinations to support its denial of summary disposition to defendants-police officers. Plaintiffs sued numerous police officers after officers detained plaintiffs-Lisa and Joshua during a shooting investigation, allegedly removed them from the home, handcuffed them, and held them for several minutes before releasing them. On appeal, the court first declined to address defendants’ argument that they were entitled to common-law good-faith immunity on the intentional-tort claims because that issue was first raised in a motion for reconsideration and therefore was not properly preserved. As to plaintiffs’ negligence-based claims, the court held that MCL 691.1407(2) governed and required defendants to establish that they were acting within the scope of their authority, that the governmental agency was engaged in a governmental function, and that their conduct did not amount to gross negligence that was “the proximate cause” of the alleged injury. Although the trial court found it undisputed that the officers acted within their scope as police officers, the court held that it did not analyze whether defendants were engaged in a governmental function or whether their conduct amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. The court also noted that the trial court appeared to analyze only whether the complaint was “sufficiently pled,” and did not determine whether a factual dispute existed under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or whether defendants were entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Because the trial court also failed to separately analyze plaintiffs’ gross-negligence, ultra vires, and IIED theories, further proceedings were required. Vacated and remanded.

Governmental immunity; Government Tort Liability Act (GTLA); MCL 691.1407(2); Gross negligence; Proximate cause; Intentional torts; Good-faith immunity; Odom v Wayne Cnty; False arrest; False imprisonment; Assault & battery; Intentional & negligent infliction of emotional distress (IIED & NIED); Loss of consortium

The court held that remand was required because the trial court did not make the necessary determinations to support its denial of summary disposition to defendants-police officers. Plaintiffs sued numerous police officers after officers detained plaintiffs-Lisa and Joshua during a shooting investigation, allegedly removed them from the home, handcuffed them, and held them for several minutes before releasing them. On appeal, the court first declined to address defendants’ argument that they were entitled to common-law good-faith immunity on the intentional-tort claims because that issue was first raised in a motion for reconsideration and therefore was not properly preserved. As to plaintiffs’ negligence-based claims, the court held that MCL 691.1407(2) governed and required defendants to establish that they were acting within the scope of their authority, that the governmental agency was engaged in a governmental function, and that their conduct did not amount to gross negligence that was “the proximate cause” of the alleged injury. Although the trial court found it undisputed that the officers acted within their scope as police officers, the court held that it did not analyze whether defendants were engaged in a governmental function or whether their conduct amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. The court also noted that the trial court appeared to analyze only whether the complaint was “sufficiently pled,” and did not determine whether a factual dispute existed under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or whether defendants were entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Because the trial court also failed to separately analyze plaintiffs’ gross-negligence, ultra vires, and IIED theories, further proceedings were required. Vacated and remanded.

Tax foreclosure surplus proceeds; The General Property Tax Act; MCL 211.78t; Claim accrual; Schafer v Kent Cnty; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Already extinguished claims; Failure to pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period; Limitations period for claims against the state; MCL 600.6452(1); Class-action tolling; State Treasurer’s standing; Equitable estoppel

The court held that because respondents failed to “pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period, their claims” for surplus proceeds from tax foreclosure sales “were time-barred before MCL 211.78t was enacted in 2020.” Further, neither Schafer nor Rafaeli revived already extinguished claims. Thus, the court reversed the orders denying petitioner-State Treasurer summary disposition in these consolidated appeals and remanded for entry of summary disposition for petitioner. The common decisive question on appeal concerned when respondents’ claims accrued. “Was it (a) in 2014, when the foreclosure sales generated surplus proceeds that petitioner retained; (b) at some later date after the enactment of MCL 211.78t in 2020; or (c) when” the Supreme Court held in Schafer “that the statute applies retrospectively?” The court agreed with petitioner that the claims “accrued when the tax-foreclosure sales occurred in 2014 and therefore became time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations well before the Legislature enacted MCL 211.78t.” It noted that “the focus of the accrual inquiry is not when a particular statutory remedy becomes available. The relevant question is when the underlying injury occurred and the claimant could have pursued relief through an available cause of action. Respondents’ argument rests largely on the premise that their claims did not exist until” the Supreme Court ruled “that MCL 211.78t applied retrospectively. But” this conflicted with the analysis in Rafaeli and Schafer. Rafaeli, rather than creating a new right, “recognized that former property owners already possessed a vested interest in the surplus proceeds. The constitutional right to just compensation existed at the time the foreclosure sales occurred. The Legislature’s subsequent enactment of MCL 211.78t established a statutory mechanism for vindicating that right. It did not create the substantive right itself.” And the Supreme Court confirmed this in Schafer. Respondents’ claims accrued in 2014 when their properties were sold and surplus proceeds resulted. The inverse-condemnation claim elements were complete at that point. When the claims accrued, claims against the State were governed by MCL 600.6452(1). Thus, “respondents were required to bring their inverse-condemnation claims by approximately [9/17]. They did not do so.”

Mootness; General Motors Corp v Department of Treasury; Bona-fide purchaser; Notice; Richards v Tibaldi; Effect of a lis pendens; Ligon v Detroit; State Court Administrative Office (SCAO)

Holding that this land contract forfeiture case was moot, the court vacated in part the circuit court’s orders to the extent they unwound plaintiff’s sale of the property to a third party, affirmed in part, and dismissed the appeal as moot. Plaintiff appealed a circuit court order (1) denying defendant’s application for leave to appeal from a district court judgment of possession entered nunc pro tunc, but (2) remanding to the district court for entry of an order vacating that judgment of possession and instead entering the approved SCAO “Judgment of Possession After Land Contract Forfeiture.” Plaintiff asserted that the second part of the order “would have no practical effect.” The court agreed. On 5/31/23, the circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens defendant had filed on the property, and ordered the notice of lis pendens be discharged. Days later, plaintiff sold the property to the third party (P). “After plaintiff’s sale of the property, no court is able to enforce any equitable relief relating to the property, and defendant admitted that reclaiming the property is impossible. Even though the district court never entered the proper SCAO form of the judgment of possession, entry of such an order now—whether dated in the present or retroactively—would have no legal effect.” Thus, the court vacated circuit court orders relating to the possession issue as moot. It also found no merit in defendant’s argument that P “was not a bona-fide purchaser because he knew plaintiff may not have title to the property” based on the notice of lis pendens. The court noted that a “‘lis pendens has no effect on fixed property rights that already exist at the time’” it is filed. And plaintiff and P “waited until after the circuit court discharged the lis pendens before closing the sale on the property. Defendant” presented no support for its claim that it had “a superior ownership interest in the property. Moreover, defendant offered no support for its contention that the discharge of the lis pendens did not mean the title was marketable.”

Tax foreclosure surplus proceeds; The General Property Tax Act; MCL 211.78t; Claim accrual; Schafer v Kent Cnty; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Already extinguished claims; Failure to pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period; Limitations period for claims against the state; MCL 600.6452(1); Class-action tolling; State Treasurer’s standing; Equitable estoppel

The court held that because respondents failed to “pursue inverse-condemnation claims within the then-applicable limitations period, their claims” for surplus proceeds from tax foreclosure sales “were time-barred before MCL 211.78t was enacted in 2020.” Further, neither Schafer nor Rafaeli revived already extinguished claims. Thus, the court reversed the orders denying petitioner-State Treasurer summary disposition in these consolidated appeals and remanded for entry of summary disposition for petitioner. The common decisive question on appeal concerned when respondents’ claims accrued. “Was it (a) in 2014, when the foreclosure sales generated surplus proceeds that petitioner retained; (b) at some later date after the enactment of MCL 211.78t in 2020; or (c) when” the Supreme Court held in Schafer “that the statute applies retrospectively?” The court agreed with petitioner that the claims “accrued when the tax-foreclosure sales occurred in 2014 and therefore became time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations well before the Legislature enacted MCL 211.78t.” It noted that “the focus of the accrual inquiry is not when a particular statutory remedy becomes available. The relevant question is when the underlying injury occurred and the claimant could have pursued relief through an available cause of action. Respondents’ argument rests largely on the premise that their claims did not exist until” the Supreme Court ruled “that MCL 211.78t applied retrospectively. But” this conflicted with the analysis in Rafaeli and Schafer. Rafaeli, rather than creating a new right, “recognized that former property owners already possessed a vested interest in the surplus proceeds. The constitutional right to just compensation existed at the time the foreclosure sales occurred. The Legislature’s subsequent enactment of MCL 211.78t established a statutory mechanism for vindicating that right. It did not create the substantive right itself.” And the Supreme Court confirmed this in Schafer. Respondents’ claims accrued in 2014 when their properties were sold and surplus proceeds resulted. The inverse-condemnation claim elements were complete at that point. When the claims accrued, claims against the State were governed by MCL 600.6452(1). Thus, “respondents were required to bring their inverse-condemnation claims by approximately [9/17]. They did not do so.”