Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims; Conspiracy claims; Qualified immunity; Absolute immunity; Monell v Department of Soc Servs claim against a city

The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs-Reguli and Hancock’s malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims, holding that defendants were entitled to either qualified immunity or absolute immunity. Reguli, a lawyer and parents’ rights activist, helped her client, Hancock, evade a state-court order that would separate her from her child. Hancock was charged with a felony, “custodial interference,” and Reguli was charged with felony counts of “accessory after the fact” and a misdemeanor count of “facilitation of a felony for custodial interference.” They were convicted, but the verdict was later overturned by the state appellate court on the basis plaintiffs’ alleged actions were not consistent with the relevant statutory language. Plaintiffs sued on various federal and state claims, which were dismissed. The issues on appeal here included federal malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims, and a Monell claim. As to the malicious prosecution claims, plaintiffs argued there was no probable cause to prosecute them where they had not committed a crime. The court has “explored the possibility that reasonable legal mistakes can create probable cause.” To determine whether defendants had probable cause, a court “‘need only decide whether the officers’ interpretation sinks to unreasonable.’” But it did not have to conclusively decide that here because the individual defendants were entitled to immunity on other grounds. It held that defendants-Russ and O’Neil were entitled to qualified immunity. Even “if the lack of a visitation order was material, the plaintiffs don’t cite a single case—state or federal—that requires officers to disclose the absence of any arguably material information during an investigation.” Also entitled to qualified immunity was the lawyer for the state Department of Children’s Services, whose “conduct was well-within the bounds of her discretionary functions.” And defendants-prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity for omitting certain language from the indictment given that “drafting the indictment is a prosecutor’s key function in initiating a prosecution.” Immunity was also fatal to the conspiracy claims. As to the Monell claim against defendant-city, which relied on a ratification theory, the court found that plaintiffs misunderstood ratification. Because “O’Neil’s decisions were ‘constrained by the official policies of [the police chief],’ he lacked ‘final policymaking authority.’” As a result, plaintiffs could not “bring a successful Monell claim against the city, even if the officers violated their constitutional rights.”

Defamation; False light invasion of privacy; First Amendment; Defamation by implication; Smith v Anonymous Joint Enter; Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n; Rhetorical hyperbole; Ireland v Edwards; Qualified privilege; Actual malice; Political campaign speech; Necessarily subjective statements; Edwards v Detroit News, Inc; Social media “like”; Republication

The court held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiff’s defamation and false-light claims arising from statements made during a state senate campaign. Plaintiff had sued her former employer in federal court, the lawsuit settled, and defendant-candidate’s political opponent later used excerpts from the federal summary-judgment opinion in a campaign mailer. The court first held that most challenged statements were not actionable because they were not “about” plaintiff and instead targeted the opposing campaign, while the few statements directly referencing plaintiff were “neither damaging to her reputation nor objectively false.” The court next rejected plaintiff’s defamation-by-implication theory as to most statements because they had “no defamatory implications with regard to” plaintiff, others were “rhetorical hyperbole,” were “plainly true,” or were campaign platitudes. The court also held that defendant did not republish another person’s alleged defamatory statement merely by “like”-ing it on social media because a Facebook “like” is only “a mere sign of approval” and “does not communicate that statement to a new audience.” As to defendant’s statements that the mailer was “an untruth” and “misleading and untrue,” the court held that even assuming a defamatory implication could be drawn, the statements were protected by qualified privilege because the mailer made defendant’s workplace conduct “a matter of public concern,” and there was no evidence he acted in bad faith or with actual malice. The court reasoned that the federal summary-judgment opinion did not establish plaintiff’s claims as facts because a court deciding summary judgment “does not make findings of fact[,]” and the case settled without a liability determination. Finally, the court held that some of the statements were independently protected as “necessarily subjective” because they had several plausible meanings, including criticism of the opponent’s use of the lawsuit rather than an accusation that plaintiff lied. Affirmed.

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims; Conspiracy claims; Qualified immunity; Absolute immunity; Monell v Department of Soc Servs claim against a city

The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs-Reguli and Hancock’s malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims, holding that defendants were entitled to either qualified immunity or absolute immunity. Reguli, a lawyer and parents’ rights activist, helped her client, Hancock, evade a state-court order that would separate her from her child. Hancock was charged with a felony, “custodial interference,” and Reguli was charged with felony counts of “accessory after the fact” and a misdemeanor count of “facilitation of a felony for custodial interference.” They were convicted, but the verdict was later overturned by the state appellate court on the basis plaintiffs’ alleged actions were not consistent with the relevant statutory language. Plaintiffs sued on various federal and state claims, which were dismissed. The issues on appeal here included federal malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims, and a Monell claim. As to the malicious prosecution claims, plaintiffs argued there was no probable cause to prosecute them where they had not committed a crime. The court has “explored the possibility that reasonable legal mistakes can create probable cause.” To determine whether defendants had probable cause, a court “‘need only decide whether the officers’ interpretation sinks to unreasonable.’” But it did not have to conclusively decide that here because the individual defendants were entitled to immunity on other grounds. It held that defendants-Russ and O’Neil were entitled to qualified immunity. Even “if the lack of a visitation order was material, the plaintiffs don’t cite a single case—state or federal—that requires officers to disclose the absence of any arguably material information during an investigation.” Also entitled to qualified immunity was the lawyer for the state Department of Children’s Services, whose “conduct was well-within the bounds of her discretionary functions.” And defendants-prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity for omitting certain language from the indictment given that “drafting the indictment is a prosecutor’s key function in initiating a prosecution.” Immunity was also fatal to the conspiracy claims. As to the Monell claim against defendant-city, which relied on a ratification theory, the court found that plaintiffs misunderstood ratification. Because “O’Neil’s decisions were ‘constrained by the official policies of [the police chief],’ he lacked ‘final policymaking authority.’” As a result, plaintiffs could not “bring a successful Monell claim against the city, even if the officers violated their constitutional rights.”

The Anti-Kickback Statute (42 USC § 1320a-7b); Denial of proposed jury instruction on an advice-of-counsel defense; Denial of a motion for a mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct; Prejudice; Hearsay; Failure to renew an argument in the district court

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the prosecutor’s remark about defendant-Harris’s attorneys’ law firm did not prejudice defendant and did not require a new trial. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a jury instruction on an advice-of-counsel defense. A jury convicted Harris of violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute. He first argued on appeal that the district court erred by denying his proposed jury instruction on his advice-of-counsel defense. But the court noted that he had “failed to disclose all pertinent facts to his attorney.” Significantly, he did not inform counsel that he paid his employees for each patient instead of paying them a regular salary. This fact was crucial to the legality of his actions, and the district court did not err by declining to give the instruction. Harris also argued that the district court abused its discretion by not granting him a requested mistrial based on the prosecutor’s reference to Harris’s defense team and his prior dealings with their law firm. As the government did “not dispute that the prosecutor made an improper remark[,]” the court reviewed the four relevant considerations in determining whether prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced a defendant. It held that the district court did not abusee its discretion by finding that the prosecutor’s remark did not prejudice Harris. The remark had “little potential to mislead” the jury where Harris’s objection prevented a response and “the district court told the jury to disregard the comment.” In addition, the government’s case was strong, the remark was “isolated,” and its “brevity” made it appear “more like a spur-of-the-moment mistake than a Machiavellian maneuver.” Finally, the court held that the district court did not err by admitting only part of a recorded meeting between Harris, his business partners, and a pair of federal law-enforcement officers based on hearsay concerns, noting that he never renewed his objection to “this half-measure” and finding that the district “court correctly appreciated that the full tape contained inadmissible hearsay.” Affirmed.

Confrontation Clause; The district court’s refusal to order production of a government witness’s criminal file; The “cross-examination guarantee”; Limits on cross-examination; Boggs v Collins

The court joined several other circuits by holding “that the Confrontation Clause does not grant a defendant a pretrial right to compelled discovery of documents that might assist” in cross-examining a government witness. It also held that the district court did not violate defendant-Taylor’s right of confrontation by limiting his cross-examination. A jury convicted Taylor of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and FIP. The court previously reversed the convictions after determining that the district court violated the Confrontation Clause and remanded for a new trial. A new jury convicted him again. Taylor now again raised a Confrontation Clause claim on appeal, arguing that he was improperly limited when cross-examining a government witness (H). When he was unable to secure information about H’s alleged criminal activity from state entities, he filed a renewed motion to show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt for failing to produce the court file, asserting he was entitled to the documents under the Confrontation Clause. The government moved in limine to limit the scope of Taylor’s cross-examination of H. The district court granted that motion in part and denied Taylor’s renewed motion. He argued on appeal that it erred by refusing to order the production of H’s criminal file. The court noted that the “right to confrontation does not create a concomitant right to pretrial discovery.” It explained that Taylor could still cross-examine H about his record without seeing the file itself. As to his claim that the district court’s limitations on cross-examination violated his confrontation rights, “‘[t]he key issue is whether the jury had enough information’ about the witness’s motives for testifying ‘despite the limits placed on cross-examination.’” The court applies a three-step process to analyze whether the right of confrontation was violated by limits on cross-examination. Here, it found it did not need to go beyond the first step. “The district court did not err by prohibiting Taylor from cross-examining [H] about the underlying facts and circumstances of his 2022 drug-possession conviction and his 2023” FIP charge. Taylor was allowed to cross-examine to establish H’s “bias, prejudice, or motive to testify[.]” The district court did not bar him from asking H “about his possible status as a suspect” and it gave him “significant leeway in” cross-examining H. He “took full advantage” of it. Affirmed.

Stepparent adoption; Termination of parental rights under the Adoption Code; MCL 710.51(6); In re NRC; MCR 2.612’s applicability in adoption proceedings; MCL 710.64(1); MCR 3.806; MCL 710.21a; Distinguishing In re Neagos; Relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a); Fisher v Belcher

In this stepparent adoption case, the court held that the trial court had authority under MCR 2.612 to vacate its prior order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in doing so pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a). Petitioners argued that “(1) the trial court lacked authority to vacate its prior order under MCR 2.612 because that court rule does not apply to adoption proceedings,” and (2) even if it did, the trial court reversibly erred in awarding respondent relief. The court disagreed in both respects. As to their first argument, petitioners relied on MCL 710.64(1) and MCR 3.806, asserting that they “bar trial courts from awarding relief under MCR 2.612 from an order or judgment in an adoption proceeding.” But the court found no “such prohibition in the plain language of those provisions.” As to their citation to MCL 710.21a, it concluded that applying “MCR 2.612, and the discretion it affords trial courts to provide relief from prior judgments and orders in limited circumstances, comports with the full range of the Adoption Code’s stated purposes and the courts’ role in their proper balancing.” Petitioners also heavily relied on Neagos, a 1989 published case. But the court found it “plainly distinguishable.” And to the extent it was inconsistent with the conclusion that “a trial court has the authority to grant relief to a party in an adoption proceeding under MCR 2.612[,]” the court declined to follow it. As to petitioners’ second argument, the court found “no reversible error in the trial court’s decision to vacate its prior termination order on the basis of mistake.” Respondent moved for relief from the order less than a year after it was entered. And the trial court “admitted that it had based its initial termination decision on its mistaken belief that all of the statutory requirements of MCL 710.51(6)(b) had been met, which was a valid basis for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a).” The record showed that respondent “had an existing parent-child relationship with AYS and made repeated efforts to maintain [it] during the relevant time period, with petitioner-mother rebuffing his requests for visitation unless he would agree to relinquish his parental rights.” Further, it was “clear from the record that the trial court was not aware of this information at the time that it rendered its termination decision.” Affirmed.

Relief from removal; Failure to meet the 30-day appeal deadline; 8 CFR § 1003.38(b); Whether the filing deadline was jurisdictional or “a mandatory claim-processing rule”; Jurisdiction to review under the “safe harbor” provision (8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(D)); Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) jurisdiction was restricted by the 30-day deadline; Whether the two-part test in Holland v Florida (requiring extraordinary circumstances & due diligence) applied to tolling issues; Whether petitioner’s factual circumstances met Holland’s elements; Deferential standard of review; Immigration judge (IJ)

The court denied petitioner-Baro’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of her motion to equitably toll the 30-day appeal deadline as to the denial of her application for relief from removal, holding that she failed to meet the required due-diligence element. It also held that this 30-day deadline is not jurisdictional and that courts should review the BIA’s ultimate equitable-tolling conclusions under a deferential standard. Baro failed to appeal the denial of relief from removal within the 30-day time limit. She asked the BIA to equitably toll the deadline for her delayed appeal, citing her hospitalization for sickle-cell anemia and her struggles to engage a new attorney. The BIA denied her request, ruling that she “failed to offer objective medical evidence” that her health problems continued after she was discharged from the hospital, and that her inability to obtain an appointment with her new attorney for several weeks “was not an extraordinary circumstance that could toll the deadline.” Thus, it dismissed her appeal as untimely. On her petition for review, the court first held that it had jurisdiction in this case where the filing deadline was not jurisdictional but was instead a mandatory claim-processing rule. It held that it had jurisdiction to review under the statutory “safe harbor” provision, and that the BIA had jurisdiction as well because the 30-day time limit in “§ 1003.38(b) did not restrict its jurisdiction.” Turning to the merits of petitioner’s equitable tolling claim, the court applied “Holland’s extraordinary-circumstances and due-diligence elements.” It concluded that it could rely solely on the latter to reject her arguments, so it assumed without deciding that she established the former based on her health struggles. The court found against her on the due-diligence element because Baro had known of the IJ’s decision, the BIA reasonably concluded that she “did not act with diligence after leaving the hospital[,]” she admitted she was aware that she had “missed” the deadline, and “she did not act with any sense of urgency in trying to appeal.” The court concluded that her “failure to meet the deadline even after retaining counsel confirms her lack of diligence.”

Res judicata; Garrett v Washington; Whether the issues in this declaratory-judgment action could have been decided in the prior case

Holding that res judicata did not bar this declaratory-judgment action, the court reversed summary disposition for defendants and remanded. The case arose from “disputes between neighboring homeowners over the maintenance of a shared” private road. The parties entered into a consent judgment in a prior case (the 2017 case), which “dictated how they were to maintain the shared road. But even after” entry of that judgment, they had issues agreeing “on what work needed to be completed. As a result, plaintiff” brought this action, asserting there was a dispute as to the scope of the work the consent judgment required “and defendants’ financial obligations with respect to” it. The trial court agreed with defendants that this action was barred by res judicata. The res judicata element in question was whether the issues in this case could have been resolved in the 2017 case. While “the parties litigated the exact terms of the consent judgment in the 2017 action, plaintiff necessarily could not have brought the current action to clarify and enforce the consent judgment until after it was entered. Thus, the trial court erred by finding that res judicata barred plaintiff’s action.”

Defamation; False light invasion of privacy; First Amendment; Defamation by implication; Smith v Anonymous Joint Enter; Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n; Rhetorical hyperbole; Ireland v Edwards; Qualified privilege; Actual malice; Political campaign speech; Necessarily subjective statements; Edwards v Detroit News, Inc; Social media “like”; Republication

The court held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiff’s defamation and false-light claims arising from statements made during a state senate campaign. Plaintiff had sued her former employer in federal court, the lawsuit settled, and defendant-candidate’s political opponent later used excerpts from the federal summary-judgment opinion in a campaign mailer. The court first held that most challenged statements were not actionable because they were not “about” plaintiff and instead targeted the opposing campaign, while the few statements directly referencing plaintiff were “neither damaging to her reputation nor objectively false.” The court next rejected plaintiff’s defamation-by-implication theory as to most statements because they had “no defamatory implications with regard to” plaintiff, others were “rhetorical hyperbole,” were “plainly true,” or were campaign platitudes. The court also held that defendant did not republish another person’s alleged defamatory statement merely by “like”-ing it on social media because a Facebook “like” is only “a mere sign of approval” and “does not communicate that statement to a new audience.” As to defendant’s statements that the mailer was “an untruth” and “misleading and untrue,” the court held that even assuming a defamatory implication could be drawn, the statements were protected by qualified privilege because the mailer made defendant’s workplace conduct “a matter of public concern,” and there was no evidence he acted in bad faith or with actual malice. The court reasoned that the federal summary-judgment opinion did not establish plaintiff’s claims as facts because a court deciding summary judgment “does not make findings of fact[,]” and the case settled without a liability determination. Finally, the court held that some of the statements were independently protected as “necessarily subjective” because they had several plausible meanings, including criticism of the opponent’s use of the lawsuit rather than an accusation that plaintiff lied. Affirmed.

Quiet title; MCL 600.2932(1); Boundary dispute; Adverse possession; Marlett Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke SC Props, LLC; Acquiescence; Houston v Mint Group, LLC; Statutory period; Aerial photographs; Equitable relief

The court held that the trial court did not err by quieting title to the disputed boundary-line area in plaintiff’s favor under the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession. Plaintiff claimed a four-foot-wide area along the parties’ property line, including land near a privacy fence, driveway, yard, and garden. On appeal, the court first held that acquiescence supported the judgment because plaintiff presented evidence that since 1983 she had treated the disputed area as her own and no owner of the neighboring property challenged that use until 2023. The court reasoned that “plaintiff already had acquired the disputed area by acquiescence” by the time defendant’s predecessor purchased the adjoining property, and plaintiff continued to “possess and exercise dominion over the disputed area.” The court also held that adverse possession supported the judgment because plaintiff presented evidence that her possession was “actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted for the relevant statutory period.” The court rejected defendant’s focus on when the privacy fence was built because “regardless of when the privacy fence was constructed,” plaintiff’s other unchallenged acts of possession and use supported the judgment. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not improperly draw the boundary line because a quiet-title action is equitable, and plaintiff showed she had adhered to the claimed line since 1983 while defendant did not refute that possession. Affirmed.

Stepparent adoption; Termination of parental rights under the Adoption Code; MCL 710.51(6); In re NRC; MCR 2.612’s applicability in adoption proceedings; MCL 710.64(1); MCR 3.806; MCL 710.21a; Distinguishing In re Neagos; Relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a); Fisher v Belcher

In this stepparent adoption case, the court held that the trial court had authority under MCR 2.612 to vacate its prior order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights. Further, it did not abuse its discretion in doing so pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a). Petitioners argued that “(1) the trial court lacked authority to vacate its prior order under MCR 2.612 because that court rule does not apply to adoption proceedings,” and (2) even if it did, the trial court reversibly erred in awarding respondent relief. The court disagreed in both respects. As to their first argument, petitioners relied on MCL 710.64(1) and MCR 3.806, asserting that they “bar trial courts from awarding relief under MCR 2.612 from an order or judgment in an adoption proceeding.” But the court found no “such prohibition in the plain language of those provisions.” As to their citation to MCL 710.21a, it concluded that applying “MCR 2.612, and the discretion it affords trial courts to provide relief from prior judgments and orders in limited circumstances, comports with the full range of the Adoption Code’s stated purposes and the courts’ role in their proper balancing.” Petitioners also heavily relied on Neagos, a 1989 published case. But the court found it “plainly distinguishable.” And to the extent it was inconsistent with the conclusion that “a trial court has the authority to grant relief to a party in an adoption proceeding under MCR 2.612[,]” the court declined to follow it. As to petitioners’ second argument, the court found “no reversible error in the trial court’s decision to vacate its prior termination order on the basis of mistake.” Respondent moved for relief from the order less than a year after it was entered. And the trial court “admitted that it had based its initial termination decision on its mistaken belief that all of the statutory requirements of MCL 710.51(6)(b) had been met, which was a valid basis for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a).” The record showed that respondent “had an existing parent-child relationship with AYS and made repeated efforts to maintain [it] during the relevant time period, with petitioner-mother rebuffing his requests for visitation unless he would agree to relinquish his parental rights.” Further, it was “clear from the record that the trial court was not aware of this information at the time that it rendered its termination decision.” Affirmed.

Assumption of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1); Hearsay; Statements admitted to show the impact they had on the listener; Harmless error

The court held that the statements respondent-father challenged as hearsay were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It further concluded that any error in admitting the testimony would have been harmless because other evidence supported the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). Thus, it affirmed the order assuming jurisdiction. It concluded that the testimony referring to incidents in which a child was hospitalized and tested positive for marijuana in the one instance and had ingested trazodone in the other was “not introduced to establish that respondent’s child had, in fact, ingested these substances.” Rather, it was “introduced to provide a history of the family’s interactions with CPS since [12/23] that ultimately led to the filing of the petition in this case. Because these statements were not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show the impact they had on the listener and the listener’s subsequent actions, they were not hearsay and” thus, were admissible. The court added that, even if the jury had not heard them, testimony about the conditions in the home “would have led the jury to find that remaining in the home posed a substantial risk to the children’s mental wellbeing under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).” Caseworkers testified that during a 5/24 “home visit, they observed clutter and dog feces on the floor, and noted the smell of urine. During the [7/24] home visit, they observed that the home was in a worse condition, with a foul odor, more dog feces, old food, and dirty dishes throughout the home. There was also testimony that there was an unsecured handgun, ammunition, and a vape on a TV stand in the living room.” And respondent admitted that, in 7/24, “he was unable to care for the children due to his medical condition.”

Child protective proceedings; Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Domestic violence; Substantial risk of harm; Unfit home or environment; In re Sluiter; Credibility

The court held that the trial court did not err by exercising jurisdiction over respondent-father’s child under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2). The DHHS petitioned after allegations that respondent had committed domestic violence against the child’s mother, and the trial court found the mother’s allegations credible while finding respondent’s testimony lacked credibility. On appeal, the court rejected respondent’s argument that jurisdiction was improper because his home with his fiancée and other children was stable and free from domestic violence. The court reasoned that evidence showed respondent committed multiple criminal acts inside the mother’s home, including stealing her phone, ransacking her bedroom, and repeatedly assaulting her, with the most recent assault occurring in 1/25. The court noted that in Sluiter, it held that domestic violence in a home “reflects cruelty, criminality, and depravity on the part of [the abuser],” and that “a home where domestic violence repeatedly occurs is not a fit environment in which to raise a child.” The court also rejected any suggestion that jurisdiction required proof the child witnessed every incident because “there is no provision in the statute that requires such behavior be conducted in front of the child.” Although there was evidence respondent’s home was suitable for his other children, the court held the same evidence supported a finding that he failed to maintain a stable environment for this child by engaging in criminality and domestic assaults toward the child’s mother in the child’s home environment. Affirmed.