The eJournal provides summaries of the latest opinions from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court. The summaries also include a PDF of the opinion and identifies the judges, key issues, and relevant practice area(s). Subscribe here.

Includes a summary of one Michigan Supreme Court order under Real Property.

RECENT SUMMARIES

    • Criminal Law (2)

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      e-Journal #: 86779
      Case: People v. Lawrence
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Patel, M.J. Kelly, and Garrett
      Issues:

      Expert testimony; MRE 702; PTSD, anxiety, & depression; Self-defense; People v Orlewicz; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Alleged juror misconduct; OV 7; MCL 777.37(1)(a); Excessive brutality

      Summary:

      The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding defendant’s proposed psychological expert testimony, defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and 50 points were properly scored for OV 7 based on excessive brutality. He was convicted of second-degree murder after repeatedly striking the victim in the head and face until she died. Defendant claimed self-defense, testifying that the victim pointed a gun at him and maintained her grip on it while he struck her. He sought expert testimony that his PTSD, anxiety, depression, and trauma history affected how he perceived and responded to the alleged threat. On appeal, the court concluded that the testimony would not have assisted the jury. As in Orlewicz, the prosecution and defense presented “two competing and largely incompatible theories of what factually occurred.” Under the prosecution’s theory, defendant disarmed the victim and then beat her to death. Under his theory, she continued holding the gun while he defended himself. Thus, the expert’s proposed testimony “would have had no bearing on which scenario actually occurred.” The court explained that when there are two competing theories, testimony concerning a defendant’s psychological characteristics is not relevant unless it makes one version more or less probable. Defendant’s related ineffective assistance claims also failed because counsel made the substance of the expert argument clear, was not deficient for failing to cite every potentially applicable case, and any asserted failure to establish the expert’s qualifications caused no prejudice because the trial court did not exclude him on qualification grounds. Counsel likewise was not ineffective for failing to seek a mistrial based on alleged juror research where the juror testified under oath that she had not looked anything up. Finally, the evidence supported 50 points for OV 7. Defendant repeatedly struck the smaller victim in the face while she was pinned beneath him and crying, inflicting extensive head injuries. His conduct “involved excessive violence beyond the minimum required to commit the offense of second-degree murder.” Affirmed.

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      e-Journal #: 86778
      Case: People v. Papp
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to call a specific witness; Trial strategy; Denial of request for an evidentiary hearing; Failure to move to suppress evidence; Fourth Amendment; Tenants who have been ordered evicted; “Search”; Futile motion; Admission of defendant’s criminal record; Old Chief v United States; People v Swint; Harmless error; People v Lukity; Second Amendment as-applied challenge to the FIP statute (MCL 750.224f); People v Hughes; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen

      Summary:

      The court held that defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective and that Michigan’s FIP statute did not violate the Second Amendment as applied to him. While the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction in spite of his stipulation, the court found that he was not entitled to relief under the harmless-error rule. Thus, it affirmed his FIP and felony-firearm convictions. He and his girlfriend were evicted from a rental home that they shared. The sheriff’s department carried out a district court’s eviction order. During that process, a “handgun was located just inside the door to the master bedroom that defendant shared with his girlfriend.” Police testimony indicated that it “was sitting out in the open on top of a shelf.” On appeal, he claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling the girlfriend as a witness and for not moving to suppress the gun. As to the former, the court found that the “prosecution’s evidence of possession was wholly circumstantial, so a reasonable trial strategy was simply to argue to the jury that the prosecution had not met its burden of proof, without the possible distraction of presenting the testimony of a defense witness with credibility problems—particularly when she would be the only defense witness and the last witness the jury would hear from.” As to the latter, the court concluded “that the deputies’ seizure of the weapon in this case was not the product of a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the home because he had been lawfully evicted by court order and the officers’ entry was reasonably necessary to carry out” that order. They also “were not physically trespassing on a constitutionally protected area because they were acting pursuant to a lawful order that allowed them to enter the premises for purposes of carrying out the eviction.” Thus, a motion to suppress would have been futile. The court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in admitting his criminal record but determined that he was not entitled to a new trial because he failed to show “that the error affected the verdict.” The evidence of his “constructive possession was circumstantial, but it was strong,” and the trial court gave a limiting jury instruction when the record was admitted. Finally, applying Bruen and Hughes, the court rejected defendant’s Second Amendment claim.

    • Insurance (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86780
      Case: Bronson Methodist Hosp. v. Michigan Auto. Ins. Placement Facility
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Young, Redford, and Feeney; Concurrence – Redford
      Issues:

      Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Effectiveness of an opt out of PIP benefits under MCL 500.3107d; Northland Radiology v Allstate Fire & Cas Ins Co; Award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148; Reasonableness of an insurer’s refusal to pay; Qualified health coverage (QHC)

      Summary:

      Concluding that the facts here were indistinguishable from Northland, the court held that the insured’s election to opt out of PIP benefits was ineffective and defendant-Pioneer was liable to pay plaintiff-hospital (Bronson) allowable medical expenses and interest. But attorney fees should not have been awarded “under MCL 500.3148 because Pioneer’s refusal to pay the claim was not unreasonable as a matter of law.” Bronson provided treatment to the adult son of Pioneer’s insured (B) after he was injured in a pedestrian/motor vehicle accident. He had no QHC or auto “insurance policy providing PIP benefits of his own.” He regularly slept on B’s couch, but she did not mention him when she renewed her policy before the accident. “She elected to opt out of PIP medical expense benefits by utilizing the ‘Medicare Opt Out’ option.” The court noted that here, as in Northland, “the named insured was a qualified person, meaning that she had health coverage under parts A and B of Medicare; however, her election to opt out was not effective because her resident relative was neither a qualified person, nor did he have QHC or an alternative auto insurance policy that provided PIP medical coverage. Because her opt-out option was not effective, the policy was ‘considered to provide [PIP] benefits under section 3107c(1)(d).’” The court noted it was bound by Northland as a prior, published opinion. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order granting Bronson’s summary disposition motion and denying Pioneer’s motion as to liability for the son’s medical expenses. But it reversed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Bronson. When it “sent its letter demanding payment and filed its complaint, Pioneer’s refusal to pay Bronson’s claim was the product of either a legitimate question of statutory construction and/or factual uncertainty. There was factual uncertainty as to whether” the son was B’s resident relative. He was 49 years old, and during “the six years this policy had been in place, he was never mentioned to Pioneer; in fact, [B] testified that she intentionally did not discuss him with either Pioneer or her insurance agent.” Further, Pioneer denied the claim because of B’s election based on its “interpretation of MCL 500.3107d—albeit an interpretation” the court now had to conclude was incorrect based on binding precedent. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

    • Litigation (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86775
      Case: In re: E. Palestine Train Derailment
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Thapar, Readler, and Hermandorfer
      Issues:

      Class-action settlement; Relief from judgment; FedRCivP 60(d)(3); Fraud on the court; Class counsel’s fiduciary duties; FedRCivP 23(g)(4); FedRCivP 60(b)(3); Fraud by an opposing party; Environmental testing; Confidential settlement terms; FedRCivP 60(b)(6); Extraordinary circumstances; Evidentiary hearing

      Summary:

      The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying movants relief from the judgment approving the East Palestine train-derailment class settlement or in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing on their Rule 60 motion. Norfolk Southern agreed to create a $600 million settlement fund after the derailment released hazardous chemicals into the environment. Class members could receive direct payments and could waive personal-injury claims for additional compensation. After the settlement took effect, 196 residents who signed personal-injury releases sought relief from the judgment, asserting that class counsel and Norfolk Southern concealed or misrepresented information concerning long-term exposure risks and environmental testing. On appeal, the court first rejected their fraud-on-the-court theory involving class counsel. As to counsel’s characterization of an expert video, the court concluded that “class counsel accurately represented the Carson video and didn’t need to say anything more. And without misrepresentations or duty-breaching omissions, there’s no fraud.” Claims involving another expert’s contrary opinions also failed because the district court knew of those opinions and counsel had no duty to disclose all underlying information. Further, “new post-settlement evidence, standing alone, doesn’t suggest class counsel lied to the court pre-settlement.” The Rule 60(b)(3) claims against Norfolk Southern fared no better. Its participation in environmental-testing decisions did not establish concealment, its decision to settle before completion of expert discovery was not misconduct, and the settlement openly disclosed the existence of a confidential supplemental agreement governing opt-out thresholds. The court noted that such confidentiality is common in class settlements and Norfolk Southern “had no duty to diverge from that well-trodden path.” Repackaging the same allegations under Rule 60(b)(6) did not establish extraordinary circumstances. Finally, because movants “made no evidentiary showing of fraud by class counsel or Norfolk Southern,” the district court acted within its broad discretion in deciding the motion without another hearing. Affirmed.

    • Real Property (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86824
      Case: Cissell Trust v. Bennett
      Court: Michigan Supreme Court ( Order )
      Judges: Cavanagh, Zahra, Bernstein, Welch, Bolden, Thomas, and Hood
      Issues:

      Acquiescence for the statutory period; Tacit agreement; Daley v Gruber

      Summary:

      In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 85602 in the 4/30/26 edition) that ruled defendants’ acquiescence claim failed entirely. The court agreed with concurring Judge Trebilcock that a preponderance of the evidence showed that the parties’ immediate predecessors (S and B) “mutually understood, for more than 15 years, that an old ash tree served as the properties’ boundary line, such that the alleged encroachments fell entirely on [B’s] property. This tacit agreement for the statutory period means, by operation of the doctrine of acquiescence, that [B] acquired title to that portion of the disputed property to the old ash tree, which he then conveyed as part of his sale to defendants.” The court remanded the case to the trial court “for a determination of the exact acquiesced-to boundary line based on the location of the old ash tree and to reinstate judgment in favor of defendants based on that determination.”

    • Termination of Parental Rights (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86781
      Case: In re Williams
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Reasonable reunification efforts; Accommodation of a parent’s disabilities; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); In re Hicks/Brown; Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Marijuana use; Suitable housing; Child’s best interests; Relative placement; Guardianship; In re Lombard

      Summary:

      The court held that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights under § (c)(i), and that the trial court did not err in finding that terminating both respondents’ parental rights, rather than guardianship, was in the child’s best interests. The child was removed shortly after birth, and mother’s primary barriers included unsuitable housing and substance-abuse concerns. Both respondents participated in services but never obtained suitable housing. On appeal, mother argued that the DHHS failed to reasonably accommodate her ADHD and depression. The court rejected the claim because she did not make “‘any substantive argument on how [the] [provided] services were deficient or how they were not reasonable or appropriate’” in light of her disabilities and did not identify additional accommodations she needed. Thus, it was “‘left to speculate what other services [petitioner] could have offered.’” As to § (c)(i), the conditions leading to adjudication continued nearly two years after the initial disposition. The court recognized that marijuana is legal in Michigan and that mother’s use, standing alone, could not justify termination without evidence that it harmed her parenting or endangered the child. But her use prevented approval of her public-housing application. Thus, although her “marijuana use did not independently support the trial court’s finding of statutory grounds for termination,” the trial court could consider its effect on her continuing failure to obtain suitable housing. As to best interests, the trial court permissibly considered respondents’ limited progress, lack of housing, parenting abilities, their bonds with the child, the child’s need for permanency and stability, and the advantages of the relative placement. It expressly recognized that relative placement weighed against termination but found the other considerations outweighed it. Finally, the relative caregiver preferred adoption, and the child’s young age and need for permanency supported termination rather than guardianship. Affirmed.

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