Claim preclusion; Taylor v Sturgell; Exceptions to the general rule that nonparties to a litigation cannot be bound to a judgment; Pre-existing substantive legal relationships exception; Parent-subsidiary relationship; Nonparty control of the prior litigation exception; The adequate-representation exception; Use of the close & significant-relationship test

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that claim preclusion did not bar plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant-corporate subsidiary (Mastronardi Produce-USA, referred to as USA) based on her prior unsuccessful suit against the parent corporation (nonparty-Mastronardi Produce, Ltd., referred to as Canada). Thus, it reversed the district court’s decision granting USA’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to race and gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while employed at a USA facility. The district court in that suit ruled that Canada was not her employer. In this suit against USA, she asserted “nearly identical factual allegations” and added a hostile work environment claim under Michigan law. On appeal, the court noted the general rule that nonparties to an action cannot be bound to a judgment, and that there are six exceptions. Rather “than look to whether the parties have a close and significant relationship, we instead ask whether [they] fit into one of the traditional exceptions.” Three were at issue. As to the exception for pre-existing substantive legal relationships, the court held that it could not “justify claim preclusion here.” It concluded that “the parent-subsidiary relationship between USA and Canada does not create an identical interest in property such that the property right was already adjudicated in the first” case. It noted that each “owns separate property, claims, liabilities, and contracts[.]” And even if they had “a substantive legal relationship giving them identical interests in some property, that property-based connection was not at issue in” either the prior case or here. Plaintiff alleged that they “were joint tortfeasors who discriminated against her. And at common law, joint tortfeasors were not in privity for res judicata purposes.” Next, the court found that the control exception also did not apply, noting that “the parent-subsidiary relationship cuts against control here, not for it.” Lastly, it held that the adequate-representation exception did not justify preclusion. This was “not a class action and USA, the party seeking preclusion, did not point to any special procedures used by the district court in the first case to protect its interests. It also did not present evidence that Canada was litigating the first case in a representative capacity.”

H-2A visa program; Illegal recruitment fees; 20 CFR § 655.135(j); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA); Forced labor; 18 USC § 1589; Fair Labor Standards Act; Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act; MCL 408.411; Michigan Human Trafficking Victims Compensation Act (MHTVCA); MCL 752.981; Punitive damages; Due process; BMW of N Am, Inc v Gore; State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Campbell; Mistrial; FRE 401; FRE 403; Statute of limitations defense; Waiver; Forum non conveniens; Cumulative error

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that defendants were not entitled to relief from the punitive damages award, the denial of a mistrial, the exclusion of proposed witness testimony, the rejection of statute-of-limitations defenses, or the denial of forum non conveniens dismissal. Plaintiffs were Guatemalan H-2A workers who sued after defendants allegedly charged illegal recruitment fees, subjected them to poor living conditions, underpaid them, restricted their freedom, confiscated documents, and threatened deportation. A jury found defendants liable on almost all claims and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the court first held that the punitive damages award comported with due process. It reasoned that a TVPRA claim “inherently carries with it a degree of reprehensibility,” and the evidence showed repeated, intentional exploitation of financially vulnerable workers, including threats, document confiscation, squalid housing, and delayed medical care. The court also held that the punitive-to-compensatory ratio was “rather modest” and that the TVPRA and H-2A penalties gave defendants “fair notice.” The court next held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial after one plaintiff testified that his ex-partner’s presence in court caused him distress because the comments were “isolated,” the district court gave a “specific and unequivocal” curative instruction, and the verdict did not show incurable prejudice. It also upheld exclusion of proposed worker witnesses who had “no direct or indirect knowledge” of defendants’ treatment of plaintiffs. The court rejected the limitations arguments because some claims were not actually brought and defendants waived the MHTVCA limitations defense. Finally, it held that defendants did not show Guatemala was an adequate alternative forum because “unsupported, conclusory statements” were insufficient. Affirmed.

Brady v Maryland; Impeachment evidence; MRE 608; MRE 609; MRE 613; Judicial impartiality; People v Stevens; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to suppress; Fourth Amendment; Terry v Ohio; Reasonable suspicion; Concealed pistol license (CPL); MCL 28.425f; People v Williams; Second Amendment; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen; Probation term; MCL 771.2(1); Great weight of the evidence

The court held that defendant failed to establish a Brady violation, judicial partiality, ineffective assistance, or a great-weight basis for relief, but that his probation term had to be reduced to three years. He was convicted of felony-firearm, FIP, and CCW after officers testified that he possessed and discarded a firearm. The trial court denied his posttrial motions alleging undisclosed impeachment evidence about one officer (A), ineffective assistance for failing to seek suppression, and a verdict against the great weight of the evidence. On appeal, the court first rejected defendant’s Brady claim because the undisclosed evidence about A’s employment history and unrelated misconduct was not favorable. It reasoned he failed to show the evidence involved “lying or a character for untruthfulness,” and he did not show the officer “lied under oath” rather than made honest mistakes in an unrelated deposition. The court also concluded the evidence was not material because another officer’s testimony “corroborated that of” A in most relevant respects. The court next held that the judge did not pierce the veil of impartiality because the challenged comments reflected trial management, were directed at repetitive questioning, and did not show “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” The court rejected defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim because a suppression motion would have failed. Under Williams, officers had reasonable suspicion after seeing an extended magazine and a black object at defendant’s waistband, and counsel was not deficient for failing to advance a “novel legal argument” under Bruen. But the court held that the four-year probationary term exceeded the statutory three-year maximum, requiring an amended probation order. It finally rejected the great-weight challenge because the prosecution’s case did not depend solely on one officer, and the other officer corroborated the key testimony. Affirmed in part and remanded for entry of an amended probation order.

H-2A visa program; Illegal recruitment fees; 20 CFR § 655.135(j); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA); Forced labor; 18 USC § 1589; Fair Labor Standards Act; Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act; MCL 408.411; Michigan Human Trafficking Victims Compensation Act (MHTVCA); MCL 752.981; Punitive damages; Due process; BMW of N Am, Inc v Gore; State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Campbell; Mistrial; FRE 401; FRE 403; Statute of limitations defense; Waiver; Forum non conveniens; Cumulative error

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that defendants were not entitled to relief from the punitive damages award, the denial of a mistrial, the exclusion of proposed witness testimony, the rejection of statute-of-limitations defenses, or the denial of forum non conveniens dismissal. Plaintiffs were Guatemalan H-2A workers who sued after defendants allegedly charged illegal recruitment fees, subjected them to poor living conditions, underpaid them, restricted their freedom, confiscated documents, and threatened deportation. A jury found defendants liable on almost all claims and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the court first held that the punitive damages award comported with due process. It reasoned that a TVPRA claim “inherently carries with it a degree of reprehensibility,” and the evidence showed repeated, intentional exploitation of financially vulnerable workers, including threats, document confiscation, squalid housing, and delayed medical care. The court also held that the punitive-to-compensatory ratio was “rather modest” and that the TVPRA and H-2A penalties gave defendants “fair notice.” The court next held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial after one plaintiff testified that his ex-partner’s presence in court caused him distress because the comments were “isolated,” the district court gave a “specific and unequivocal” curative instruction, and the verdict did not show incurable prejudice. It also upheld exclusion of proposed worker witnesses who had “no direct or indirect knowledge” of defendants’ treatment of plaintiffs. The court rejected the limitations arguments because some claims were not actually brought and defendants waived the MHTVCA limitations defense. Finally, it held that defendants did not show Guatemala was an adequate alternative forum because “unsupported, conclusory statements” were insufficient. Affirmed.

No-fault insurance; Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Allowable expenses; MCL 500.3107(1)(a); Reasonably necessary products, services, & accommodations; Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n; Objective standard; Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co; Care, recovery, or rehabilitation; Admire v Auto-Owners Ins Co; Experimental treatment for a traumatic brain injury (TBI); Hyperbaric oxygen therapy (HBOT); Genuine issue of material fact

The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether HBOT was an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Plaintiff-hospital sought nearly $900,000 from defendant no-fault insurer for HBOT provided to a minor (DK) who suffered a TBI in a motor-vehicle accident. The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant, reasoning that the treatment was experimental for a TBI and not FDA-approved. On appeal, the court held that “[n]either factor is dispositive in and of itself.” Relying on Krohn, it explained that MCL 500.3107(1)(a) does not require treatment to have “gained general acceptance within the medical community,” but requires “objective and verifiable evidence that an experimental procedure is efficacious.” Viewing the evidence in plaintiff’s favor, the court concluded there were fact questions because Drs. P and H testified about studies and data supporting HBOT for TBIs, progress notes connected DK’s anxiety, sleep, attention, and behavioral issues to his TBI, and MRI reports arguably showed improvement after HBOT. But the court also noted summary disposition for plaintiff was not warranted because one treating doctor declined to order HBOT, Dr. P questioned whether the 2021 and 2022 treatment was necessary, and the treatment remained “‘off-label’ and perhaps ‘experimental.’” Reversed and remanded.

Involuntary mental-health treatment; Person requiring treatment; MCL 330.1401; Clear & convincing evidence; MCL 330.1465; Great weight of the evidence; Request for remand; MCR 7.211(C)(1); Untimely motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict & new trial; MCR 7.216(B); MCR 2.610(A)(1); MCR 2.611(B)

The court held that the jury’s verdict finding respondent was a person requiring involuntary mental-health treatment was not against the great weight of the evidence. The petition was filed after respondent sent several emails to the sheriff’s office containing allegations about his father, conspiracy theories, Morgellons-related symptoms, and excerpts of ChatGPT conversations. Two doctors concluded respondent had a delusional or mood and thought disorder, and a jury found he was mentally ill and a person requiring treatment. On appeal, the court held that the evidence “clearly supported the jury verdict.” It noted the psychiatrist testified respondent had a mood disorder, a thought disorder, paranoia, and a “delusional thought process,” and that he was verbally aggressive, insulted staff, and prompted complaints from other patients. The court also relied on the deputy’s testimony that respondent could become “very aggressive” about refusing treatment and that officers approached him in groups because of his aggression. Although the psychiatrist and deputy testified respondent did not express homicidal or suicidal thoughts, the court concluded the evidence did not “preponderate against the jury’s verdict.” It also denied remand because respondent did not show what factual record needed development, and it denied permission to file late posttrial motions because he failed to show “good cause for his delay” or entitlement to relief. Affirmed.

No-fault insurance; Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Allowable expenses; MCL 500.3107(1)(a); Reasonably necessary products, services, & accommodations; Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n; Objective standard; Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co; Care, recovery, or rehabilitation; Admire v Auto-Owners Ins Co; Experimental treatment for a traumatic brain injury (TBI); Hyperbaric oxygen therapy (HBOT); Genuine issue of material fact

The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether HBOT was an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Plaintiff-hospital sought nearly $900,000 from defendant no-fault insurer for HBOT provided to a minor (DK) who suffered a TBI in a motor-vehicle accident. The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant, reasoning that the treatment was experimental for a TBI and not FDA-approved. On appeal, the court held that “[n]either factor is dispositive in and of itself.” Relying on Krohn, it explained that MCL 500.3107(1)(a) does not require treatment to have “gained general acceptance within the medical community,” but requires “objective and verifiable evidence that an experimental procedure is efficacious.” Viewing the evidence in plaintiff’s favor, the court concluded there were fact questions because Drs. P and H testified about studies and data supporting HBOT for TBIs, progress notes connected DK’s anxiety, sleep, attention, and behavioral issues to his TBI, and MRI reports arguably showed improvement after HBOT. But the court also noted summary disposition for plaintiff was not warranted because one treating doctor declined to order HBOT, Dr. P questioned whether the 2021 and 2022 treatment was necessary, and the treatment remained “‘off-label’ and perhaps ‘experimental.’” Reversed and remanded.

The court’s jurisdiction; Final judgments or orders; MCR 7.203(A)(1); Discretion to treat a claim as if on leave granted under MCR 7.203(B)(1)

The court held that appellants had no right to appeal under MCR 7.203(A)(1) because the order they appealed from was not final, and it was not persuaded that it should exercise its discretion to treat their claim of appeal as a granted application for leave to appeal. Thus, it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The case arose from a business dispute. In 2024, appellants “moved to ‘quash and/or set aside’” an order the trial court entered in 9/23 authorizing a chief restructuring officer to seize their assets. On 5/22/24, the trial court held a hearing on the motions to quash and, treating them as motions for reconsideration, denied them. In its 6/24 written order, it “stated that the order ‘does not resolve the last pending claim nor close the case.’ Appellants moved for reconsideration and the trial court denied that as well in a” 7/24 order. On appeal, after the court ordered supplemental briefing, the parties unanimously agreed “that, contrary to their initial claim, appellants had no right to appeal under MCR 7.203(A)(1), and the” 6/24 written order confirmed they were right. They should have instead filed an application for leave to appeal, but did not do so.

Claim preclusion; Taylor v Sturgell; Exceptions to the general rule that nonparties to a litigation cannot be bound to a judgment; Pre-existing substantive legal relationships exception; Parent-subsidiary relationship; Nonparty control of the prior litigation exception; The adequate-representation exception; Use of the close & significant-relationship test

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that claim preclusion did not bar plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant-corporate subsidiary (Mastronardi Produce-USA, referred to as USA) based on her prior unsuccessful suit against the parent corporation (nonparty-Mastronardi Produce, Ltd., referred to as Canada). Thus, it reversed the district court’s decision granting USA’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to race and gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while employed at a USA facility. The district court in that suit ruled that Canada was not her employer. In this suit against USA, she asserted “nearly identical factual allegations” and added a hostile work environment claim under Michigan law. On appeal, the court noted the general rule that nonparties to an action cannot be bound to a judgment, and that there are six exceptions. Rather “than look to whether the parties have a close and significant relationship, we instead ask whether [they] fit into one of the traditional exceptions.” Three were at issue. As to the exception for pre-existing substantive legal relationships, the court held that it could not “justify claim preclusion here.” It concluded that “the parent-subsidiary relationship between USA and Canada does not create an identical interest in property such that the property right was already adjudicated in the first” case. It noted that each “owns separate property, claims, liabilities, and contracts[.]” And even if they had “a substantive legal relationship giving them identical interests in some property, that property-based connection was not at issue in” either the prior case or here. Plaintiff alleged that they “were joint tortfeasors who discriminated against her. And at common law, joint tortfeasors were not in privity for res judicata purposes.” Next, the court found that the control exception also did not apply, noting that “the parent-subsidiary relationship cuts against control here, not for it.” Lastly, it held that the adequate-representation exception did not justify preclusion. This was “not a class action and USA, the party seeking preclusion, did not point to any special procedures used by the district court in the first case to protect its interests. It also did not present evidence that Canada was litigating the first case in a representative capacity.”

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); The Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA); Removal of an Indian child; Active efforts; MCR 3.967(D); MCL 712B.15(2)-(4); Appellate-rights advice after removal; MCR 3.965(B)(15); In re Barber/Espinoza; No-contest plea; Appellate-rights advice after adjudication; MCR 3.971(B)(6)-(8); Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b); In re Jacobs

The court held that the trial court erred by failing to advise respondent of her appellate rights at the removal and adjudication stages, but the errors did not affect her substantial rights. The child (UC) was removed after DHHS raised concerns about housing instability, possible transfer of the child to an unverified person in Canada, and respondent’s conduct at a shelter. She later pled no contest to the jurisdictional allegations, and the trial court eventually terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the court first held that the failure to advise respondent of her appeal rights was “clear or obvious error” because MCR 3.965(B)(15) provides that the court “shall advise” a parent of the right to appeal removal, and MCR 3.971(B)(6)-(8) similarly required advice of appellate rights after her no-contest plea. But the court concluded she did not show prejudice. As to removal, the “most critical fact” was that UC faced an “imminent and substantial risk of harm” because respondent repeatedly expressed an intent to send the child to live with a person in a foreign country whose identity and claimed credentials DHHS could not confirm. The court also rejected respondent’s active-efforts challenge under the ICWA and MIFPA, reasoning that MCR 3.967(D) required findings but “does not require the trial court to state its findings in a particular way or sequence.” Finally, the court concluded any challenge to jurisdiction would not have changed the result because allegations of abuse, instability, and lack of parenting skills “would be substantial and sufficient” to support jurisdiction. Affirmed.

Negligence claim related to bank loans; Duty; Disclosures; Hord v Environmental Research Inst of MI; Principle that there is no legal duty to exercise reasonable care in determining loan eligibility; Ulrich v Federal Land Bank of St Paul; Silent fraud; Roberts v Saffell

The court held that plaintiff’s negligence claim against defendant-bank failed because no legal duty existed between them on the basis of the complaint’s allegations, which also fell short of providing the necessary elements for a silent fraud claim. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. Plaintiff operates a farming business, and defendant has served as its agricultural lender. He sued defendant “for the alleged actions or inactions of its agricultural specialist,” nonparty-B. Plaintiff’s negligence claim alleged “that defendant owed him a duty to respond fully, fairly, accurately, and timely to his requests for lending; to use due care not to cause harm in the performance of an undertaking, and to act in a nonnegligent manner.” As to the silent fraud claim, he alleged that B never intended to loan requested additional funds, “was ‘duty-bound’ to timely disclose whether” they would be made, and B’s “failure to respond created an assumption that [they] would be available.” The court first noted that plaintiff did not identify any “regulation, statute, provision in a contract, or other basis for finding a fiduciary relationship between himself and defendant.” He cited two recognized legal duties, but the court found neither of them were “triggered by the facts in the complaint. Specifically, while Michigan law recognizes a legal duty to act with due care when one assumes to act on another’s behalf,” there was no allegation that B “or any other representative did this.” The absence of any alleged action or statement “evidencing a commitment on defendant’s part to renew the loans at the existing rates or to issue additional financing” was fatal to plaintiff’s second asserted legal duty, based on Hord. Plaintiff did not allege that B “made any disclosure of any information that was truthful and incomplete.” The court found that, at best, plaintiff alleged “that defendant unduly delayed in notifying him of a decision as to his eligibility for a loan.” And in Ulrich, it “determined that no legal duty exists to exercise reasonable care in determining eligibility for a loan.” That analysis applied here.

Involuntary mental-health treatment; Person requiring treatment; MCL 330.1401; Clear & convincing evidence; MCL 330.1465; Great weight of the evidence; Request for remand; MCR 7.211(C)(1); Untimely motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict & new trial; MCR 7.216(B); MCR 2.610(A)(1); MCR 2.611(B)

The court held that the jury’s verdict finding respondent was a person requiring involuntary mental-health treatment was not against the great weight of the evidence. The petition was filed after respondent sent several emails to the sheriff’s office containing allegations about his father, conspiracy theories, Morgellons-related symptoms, and excerpts of ChatGPT conversations. Two doctors concluded respondent had a delusional or mood and thought disorder, and a jury found he was mentally ill and a person requiring treatment. On appeal, the court held that the evidence “clearly supported the jury verdict.” It noted the psychiatrist testified respondent had a mood disorder, a thought disorder, paranoia, and a “delusional thought process,” and that he was verbally aggressive, insulted staff, and prompted complaints from other patients. The court also relied on the deputy’s testimony that respondent could become “very aggressive” about refusing treatment and that officers approached him in groups because of his aggression. Although the psychiatrist and deputy testified respondent did not express homicidal or suicidal thoughts, the court concluded the evidence did not “preponderate against the jury’s verdict.” It also denied remand because respondent did not show what factual record needed development, and it denied permission to file late posttrial motions because he failed to show “good cause for his delay” or entitlement to relief. Affirmed.

Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; In re Simpson

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that terminating both respondents-parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination orders. The trial court considered each child individually. As to respondent-mother, it found that terminating her rights was in their best interests because the bonds with her “were unhealthy and minimal, the children were not physically or emotionally safe in [her] care, [they] were doing much better in the care of their foster parents, and the children required permanence, stability, and guidance” that she was unable to provide. The trial court acknowledged that she “had housing and usually had employment,” but emphasized that she did not “benefit from the case service plan during the lengthy proceedings, and she refused to accept feedback or responsibility for her role in the children’s trauma.” In addition, it explained that she “tested positive for alcohol and cocaine in the weeks leading up to termination, failed to address her issues with domestic violence and poor parenting ability, and lied about her continued relationship with respondent-father.” Further, the children were doing well in their placements. Five of them had healthy “bonds with their foster parents, who wanted to provide” them with permanency, and the sixth child had a grandparent who might be interested in adopting him. As to the father, the trial court found that the children’s bond with him “was weak or nonexistent, [he] ‘showed no inclination to do anything as a parent,’ the children were doing much better with their foster parents, and [they] needed stability, safety, and permanency” that he was unable to provide. He never showed that “he had stable housing or employment, and he did not address his issues with domestic violence, substance abuse, and poor parenting skills—the same issues that initially led to the children’s removal.”

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; Incarcerated respondent; In re Mason; Waiver of an argument; Child’s best interests; In re White

The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, that § (c)(i) was proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. It acknowledged that neither the DHHS “nor the county jail offered respondent any services or even visitation opportunities when she was incarcerated” for about eight months. But the record indicated the case worker met with her monthly “while she was in jail to review her case-service plan and discuss her goals after release.” And after her release, the DHHS tried to assist her with “classes and programs to address the issues that led to adjudication, such as mental-health concerns, domestic violence, parenting skills, and housing. Further, [it] acknowledged that because respondent was unable to receive services while incarcerated, it was essentially required to treat the reunification process as starting from the beginning upon her release.” While she contended that it “did not adequately help her address her housing situation, it” appeared that she received the help that the DHHS was able to provide to those in her circumstances. As to § (c)(i), it was “undisputed that the 182-day period was satisfied, even after respondent was released from jail[,]” and more importantly, the record showed “most of the conditions that led to the adjudication—housing, domestic violence, substance abuse, and parenting skills—continued to exist at the time of the termination trial and were unlikely to be rectified within a reasonable time.” Finally, as to the child’s best interests, while respondent showed some progress during the case by “completing some recommended classes and not testing positive for alcohol[,]” the focus was on the child. Respondent’s home with a boyfriend with whom she “had an extended history of domestic disputes and violence” was inappropriate for the child, “particularly when compared with his foster home,” where testimony indicated that he was “thriving” and his foster parent was interested in adopting him.

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); The Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA); Removal of an Indian child; Active efforts; MCR 3.967(D); MCL 712B.15(2)-(4); Appellate-rights advice after removal; MCR 3.965(B)(15); In re Barber/Espinoza; No-contest plea; Appellate-rights advice after adjudication; MCR 3.971(B)(6)-(8); Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b); In re Jacobs

The court held that the trial court erred by failing to advise respondent of her appellate rights at the removal and adjudication stages, but the errors did not affect her substantial rights. The child (UC) was removed after DHHS raised concerns about housing instability, possible transfer of the child to an unverified person in Canada, and respondent’s conduct at a shelter. She later pled no contest to the jurisdictional allegations, and the trial court eventually terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the court first held that the failure to advise respondent of her appeal rights was “clear or obvious error” because MCR 3.965(B)(15) provides that the court “shall advise” a parent of the right to appeal removal, and MCR 3.971(B)(6)-(8) similarly required advice of appellate rights after her no-contest plea. But the court concluded she did not show prejudice. As to removal, the “most critical fact” was that UC faced an “imminent and substantial risk of harm” because respondent repeatedly expressed an intent to send the child to live with a person in a foreign country whose identity and claimed credentials DHHS could not confirm. The court also rejected respondent’s active-efforts challenge under the ICWA and MIFPA, reasoning that MCR 3.967(D) required findings but “does not require the trial court to state its findings in a particular way or sequence.” Finally, the court concluded any challenge to jurisdiction would not have changed the result because allegations of abuse, instability, and lack of parenting skills “would be substantial and sufficient” to support jurisdiction. Affirmed.