Foreclosure on a commercial real estate broker’s lien; The Commercial Real Estate Broker’s Lien Act (CREBLA); MCL 570.584(9)(b); Name of the “record owner”; Attorney disqualification; Settlement agreement (SA)

The court concluded that the “trial court properly denied plaintiff’s request to enforce a nonexistent [SA] and to disqualify” defendant-ASJJ Management’s counsel. But it erred “by dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on grounds that the lien on which plaintiff was seeking to foreclose was void because it did not name the record owner of the hotel property.” Thus, the court affirmed in part but vacated “the trial court’s order to the extent that it struck plaintiff’s lien and dismissed plaintiff’s claims premised on that lien. On remand, the parties are free to litigate whether ASJJ Management was an owner of the hotel property despite there being no genuine issue of material fact that [it] was not the record owner.” The court rejected “plaintiff’s wholly meritless argument that the parties had a binding [SA] that the trial court should have enforced.” However, it held that the trial court erred in concluding the lien plaintiff filed “was invalid and unenforceable because it did not name the record owner of the hotel property.” The court did not have to “define the precise contours of what the term ‘owner of commercial real estate’ as used in MCL 570.584(9)(b) means.” It held “only that MCL 570.584(9)(b) requires what it says—that a commercial real estate broker’s lien contain ‘[t]he name of the owner of the commercial real estate,’ which does not necessarily require that the lien contain the name of the ‘record owner’ or ‘the owner of record’ as that term is used elsewhere in the CREBLA.” The court found that the trial court correctly determined there was no genuine issue of material fact that ASJJ Management was not the record owner of the hotel property. But “it erred by concluding that this meant that plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law. MCL 570.584(9)(b) requires only that a commercial real estate broker’s lien identify ‘[t]he name of the owner of the commercial real estate,’ and the trial court never addressed plaintiff’s argument that there was sufficient evidence to create a question of fact that ASJJ Management—which plaintiff’s lien named as the owner of the hotel property—was an owner of the” property. Finally, plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing that ASJJ Management’s counsel “should be disqualified on grounds that she was a necessary witness.”

Sanctions for misconduct; “Frivolous” appeal; FedRAppP 38; Frivolous as filed; Frivolous as argued; Misrepresentation of law; The court’s inherent authority; Bad faith or conduct tantamount to it; BDT Prods, Inc v Lexmark Int’l, Inc; First Bank of Marietta v Hartford Underwriters Ins Co; Objections to the show cause order; Sixth Circuit Local Rule 46; The attorney-client & work-product privilege; Whether the order was invalid because it allegedly came from ex parte communications; Whether the order was void because the clerk signed it

Holding that sanctions on plaintiff’s attorneys were appropriate under Rule 38 and its inherent authority, the court concluded “that appellees should be fully compensated for being forced to litigate this appeal.” It further awarded them double costs, and it imposed a $15,000 fine on each attorney “because (1) the misconduct was spread across three cases instead of just one and (2) smaller fines have plainly been inadequate[.]” The decision concerned the misconduct of plaintiff’s attorneys, appellant-Irion and Egli, in their briefing before the court, which “repeatedly misrepresented the record, cited non-existent cases, and cited cases for propositions of law that they did not even discuss, much less support.” Discussing Rule 38, the court noted an “appeal can be frivolous as filed, frivolous as argued, or both.” It rejected “any suggestion that Rule 38 does not recognize frivolous-as-argued appeals.” And it determined that plaintiff’s appeal was “frivolous as argued because Irion and Egli submitted fake cases, and inventing case law is a misrepresentation of law.” It noted that citing “even a single fake case can be sanctionable because ‘no brief, pleading, motion, or any other paper filed in any court should contain any citations—whether provided by generative AI or any other source—that’ a lawyer has not personally ‘read and verified.’” The court also imposed sanctions under its inherent authority, which “are appropriate only when the litigant has acted in bad faith or ‘willfully abuse[d] judicial processes.’” Applying the three-prong BDT test, the court found that inherent authority sanctions were appropriate here. It had concluded that plaintiff’s appeal was “meritless, and any reasonable attorney should know that a case is meritless if the only authority on which he can rely is a figment of imagination.” The court further concluded “that Irion and Egli have acted with an improper purpose because they have ‘used the court system to try to force a result that [they] could not obtain under the applicable law.’” In addition, “when given an opportunity to explain how such citations appeared in their briefing, [they] failed to provide an explanation and instead argued that the court’s show cause order was void and invalid.” It rejected those objections to the show cause order, holding among other things that the order did not violate Local Rule 46 or the work-product or attorney-client-privilege doctrines, and that its “orders are not invalid simply because the clerk signed them.”

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to advise of the deadline to accept a favorable plea offer; Other acts evidence of prior sexual assault; MCL 768.27a; People v Watkins; MRE 403; MRE 611(c); Cruel & unusual punishment; MCL 750.520b(2)(c); Increased penalty on the basis of facts not found by a jury; Life without parole (LWOP)

The court concluded that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of CSC I and II. The record established that he “was aware of the consequences of his choice to reject the plea, as explained by defense counsel (and the prosecutor), so as to enable him to make an informed choice, despite his claimed confusion regarding the date that the plea offer expired.” Defendant had “not established that defense counsel’s actions related to the plea negotiations were objectively unreasonable or prejudicial.” The court found that his “dissatisfaction with his ultimate mandatory LWOP sentences does not establish that defense counsel was ineffective, and defendant is not entitled to resentencing on this basis.” It found that the probative value of the other acts “evidence was high. However, evidence offered under MCL 768.27a is still subject to MRE 403[.]” The court concluded that given “the absence of corroborating physical evidence, the lengthy delay in the girls’ disclosures, and the unusual manner in which their allegations came to light, the other-acts evidence was not wholly unnecessary, meaning this last factor also favors a finding that the evidence did not violate MRE 403.” It also held that given “the high probative value of the other-acts evidence, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Also, balancing the considerations, defendant had “not demonstrated MCL 750.520b(2)(c) requires imposition of an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual punishment.” Finally, his LWOP sentences were not “impermissible under the federal Constitution because they were required on the basis of facts not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Affirmed.

Prosecutorial error; Closing argument; People v Unger; The rape shield statute; People v Sharpe; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Statements of medical opinion by a witness not qualified as an expert; Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701; Jury instructions on witness testimony

Rejecting defendant’s prosecutorial error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed his CSC I convictions. During “closing argument the prosecutor commented that the victim testified regarding the texture and taste of semen. The prosecutor argued that this testimony supported the victim’s claims because the only way she would know the taste of semen was if she experienced it. Given the victim’s young age and the specificity of her knowledge, this was a reasonable” permissible inference to make. Because the “comment was formed on the basis of the victim’s testimony and was a reasonable inference, there was no error.” Further, the trial court “instructed the jury that the lawyers’ arguments were not evidence, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” As to defendant’s claim that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, “the prosecutor was allowed to argue that the victim’s uncontested statements regarding her sexual knowledge suggested that the sexual assaults had occurred.” The court next disagreed with defendant’s assertion that the rape shield statute precluded him “from introducing evidence to explain that the victim’s testimony of specific sexual knowledge arose from her use of the internet.” He failed to show that questioning her “about her internet usage would have been tantamount to introducing evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct.” In addition, he addressed the issue of her internet usage during cross-examination of a police witness. As to defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to (1) the prosecutor’s closing argument statements, or (2) testimony from a doctor (S) who was not qualified as an expert witness. As to S’s “opinions resting on his own rational perceptions and which are helpful to explain his own testimony,” as they were admissible under MRE 701, the court found no error. And because the record suggested that S “could have been qualified as an expert in sexual assault examinations, any error in the admission of his medical opinions in the form of lay witness testimony was harmless.” Thus, the court could not “conclude that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” on the basis of failing to object.

Search & seizure; Terry stop scope; Terry v Ohio; Search & seizure; Reasonable suspicion; People v Prude; Duration of stop; Rodriquez v United States; Review of video evidence; People v Trapp

The court held that the officers unlawfully extended the Terry stop after facts known to them dispelled reasonable suspicion, so the evidence discovered during the stop had to be suppressed. Officers stopped defendant while responding to a 911 report that a black man named Orlando Robertson, wearing a red jersey, driving a grey or silver Jeep, and accompanied by a woman, had assaulted a caller and chased her with a gun. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, and a jury later convicted him of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of controlled substances. On appeal, the court assumed the officers could initially stop defendant, but held that Terry did not allow them to continue the seizure once available facts undermined suspicion because Terry stops are limited in “scope and duration” and may last “no longer than is necessary” to confirm or dispel suspicion. The court found the trial court erred in concluding the officers learned the exculpatory details only after the stop began because dispatch audio showed that information was given before defendant was seized. It next held that the trial court erred in finding defendant failed to provide identification, because dashcam audio captured defendant saying, “I got my ID right here, man,” and officers later found his license in the driver’s side door pocket. Because those erroneous factual findings had justified escalating the encounter, and no other valid basis supported prolonging the stop, suppression was required. Reversed, convictions vacated, and remanded.

Sentencing after revocation of supervised release; Whether the district court considered the conduct underlying defendant’s violation; 18 USC §§ 3583(e) & 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C); Sanctioning a defendant for breach of trust associated with the violation; United States v Morris; United States v Patterson; Substantive reasonableness; Supervised release condition prohibiting defendant from communicating with his longtime girlfriend

The court held that the district court did not “err by considering the seriousness of” defendant-Williams’s violation conduct in sentencing him after revoking his supervised release. It also rejected his substantive reasonableness challenge and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing s “supervised-release condition that prohibits him from communicating with his longtime girlfriend” (S.H.). While on supervised release for drug crimes, Williams committed multiple offenses, including defrauding a woman (R.A.) out of $300,000. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 30 months in prison and 5 more years of supervised release, with the new condition. The court found that the record showed that while “the district court referenced the seriousness of Williams’s fraud scheme, it wasn’t seeking to punish him for that conduct.” Instead, it was discussed to “illustrate[] the need for ‘deterrence and protecting the public.’” Additionally, a district court “can sanction the defendant’s breach of trust associated with the violation.” Although a court cannot “consider retribution when revoking supervised release[,] . . . breach of trust isn’t about retribution or punishment. Instead, it concerns the ‘forward-looking relationship’ between the defendant and district court ‘that’s focused on helping him reintegrate into society.’” In violating supervised-release conditions, a defendant “breaches that trust.” The court added that “a defendant’s breach of trust directly relates to several factors that the supervised-release statute permits a district court to weigh when imposing a revocation sentence.” It also found that “Williams’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court carefully weighed the sentencing factors and concluded that a 30-month sentence was necessary ‘to deter’ Williams and ‘protect society from further crimes’ he might commit.” Further, it did not “put too much weight on the seriousness of his violation conduct” because his conduct showed “the pressing need to protect the public from similar scams.” Finally, the condition of supervised release as to S.H. was “directly related to protecting the public from Williams. First, S.H. was a ‘coequal’ in Williams’s efforts to defraud R.A.” In addition, he sent S.H. threatening text messages. Affirmed.

Jurisdiction over collection of winnings from the casino; Michigan Gaming Control Revenue Act (MGCRA); Davis v BetMGM, LLC; Kraft v Detroit Entm't, LLC; Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA)

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its “reversal of this Court’s decision in Davis and its clarification of this Court’s decision in Kraft,” the court concluded “that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate the common-law claims of plaintiff in this case, which are not inconsistent with the MGCRA.” Thus, it affirmed “the judgment of the circuit court, which denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal the order of the district court that denied defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims.” The case involved the claim of plaintiff-Jewell, alleging unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation against defendant-MGM. It contended “that the circuit court erred by denying its application for leave to appeal the order of the district court, arguing that the district court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(4).” Defendant argued “that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s claim, which [it asserted] falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan Gaming Control Board (the Board).” The court concluded “that plaintiff’s pursuit of her common-law claims in the district court was not ‘inconsistent’ with the comprehensive statutory scheme of the MGCRA.” This was “particularly true because, as in Davis, the Board in this case ‘expressly disclaimed any role in resolving the merits of disputes’ between patrons and casinos.” The court found as “with the Supreme Court’s review of the LIGA in Davis, [its] review of the MGCRA does not reveal a grant to the Board of either the authority or the obligation to resolve individual patron disputes such as the one plaintiff presented in this case.” The court did “not perceive an intention by the Legislature to abrogate a patron’s common-law claims that are not inconsistent with the MGCRA.” In addition, having held “that the Board lacked the authority to resolve plaintiff’s common-law claims and that plaintiff’s common-law claims in this case were not abrogated by nor inconsistent with the MGCRA,” the court rejected “defendant’s argument that plaintiff in this case was obligated to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing her common-law claims in the district court.”

PIP opt out; Effective election under § 3107d; MCL 500.3107d; Love v Rudolph; No-fault coverage; Unlimited PIP medical benefits; MCL 500.3107c(1)(d); Statutory interpretation; Plain language; Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP v City of Detroit

The court held that the insured (Springer) did not make an effective election to opt out of PIP medical coverage under MCL 500.3107d because all statutory criteria were not met, so absent any other valid defenses the defendant-Allstate policy must be treated as providing unlimited PIP medical coverage. Springer’s son (Turner) was injured in an automobile accident while living with Springer, who had renewed her Allstate no-fault policy after 7/1/20 and selected “Option 6” to opt out of PIP medical coverage in exchange for a 100% premium reduction. Although Springer had Medicare Parts A and B and thus qualified personally to elect the opt out, her resident relative Turner did not have “qualified health coverage” because his purported coverage was Medicaid, which the statute and Allstate’s form expressly excluded. The court held that the plain language of MCL 500.3107d requires that all statutory conditions be satisfied for an effective opt out, including that resident relatives have the required coverage and that documentation be provided for all covered persons. The court rejected arguments that Turner himself had to be a “qualified person” or separately execute the opt-out form, but it concluded that the election still failed because Turner lacked the required other coverage and Springer did not provide proof of qualifying coverage for him. The court further held that under MCL 500.3107d(4), when an effective opt out is not made, the policy is considered to provide unlimited PIP medical benefits under MCL 500.3107c(1)(d), and that result applies to the policy as a whole, not just to selected individuals. Reversed and remanded.

The No-Fault Act (NFA); Personal protection insurance (PIP) medical benefit policy limits; Priority for payment of no-fault benefits to an injured motorcyclist; MCL 500.3114(5); Claim for additional benefits from a lower-priority insurer that provides unlimited coverage; MCL 500.3107c(1)(b); Mary Free Bed Rehab Hosp v Esurance Prop & Cas Co

In this consolidated appeal, the court held that, under Mary Free Bed, MCL 500.3114(5) allowed plaintiffs to recover PIP medical benefits from plaintiff-Maher’s “lower-priority Farm Bureau motor vehicle policy after PIP medical-benefits coverage was exhausted under” defendant-Allstate’s higher-priority policy. Thus, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Farm Bureau and Allstate. Maher was riding his motorcycle when he was struck by Allstate’s insured’s vehicle. The Allstate policy “carried a coverage limit of $250,000 for PIP medical benefits.” Maher’s no-fault policy with Farm Bureau “carried unlimited coverage for PIP medical benefits.” Allstate made PIP benefit payments until its policy limit was exhausted. Farm Bureau denied Maher’s claim for PIP benefits “on the ground that Allstate was solely responsible for paying Maher’s PIP benefits because Allstate was higher in priority under MCL 500.3114(5).” Maher sued Farm Bureau, and two of his medical providers sued Farm Bureau and Allstate. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition because the NFA “does not preclude plaintiffs from claiming PIP medical benefits from Maher’s lower-priority Farm Bureau policy, which carried unlimited coverage, after PIP medical coverage from the capped higher-priority Allstate policy was exhausted.” The court agreed. It recently held in Mary Free Bed that “when the policy coverage limit of a higher-priority insurer under MCL 500.3114(5) is exhausted, an injured person or their treatment provider may claim additional benefits from a lower-priority insurer that provides unlimited coverage.” Mary Free Bed governed the outcome here. Reversed and remanded.

Jurisdiction over collection of winnings from the casino; Michigan Gaming Control Revenue Act (MGCRA); Davis v BetMGM, LLC; Kraft v Detroit Entm't, LLC; Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA)

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its “reversal of this Court’s decision in Davis and its clarification of this Court’s decision in Kraft,” the court concluded “that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate the common-law claims of plaintiff in this case, which are not inconsistent with the MGCRA.” Thus, it affirmed “the judgment of the circuit court, which denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal the order of the district court that denied defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims.” The case involved the claim of plaintiff-Jewell, alleging unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation against defendant-MGM. It contended “that the circuit court erred by denying its application for leave to appeal the order of the district court, arguing that the district court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(4).” Defendant argued “that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s claim, which [it asserted] falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan Gaming Control Board (the Board).” The court concluded “that plaintiff’s pursuit of her common-law claims in the district court was not ‘inconsistent’ with the comprehensive statutory scheme of the MGCRA.” This was “particularly true because, as in Davis, the Board in this case ‘expressly disclaimed any role in resolving the merits of disputes’ between patrons and casinos.” The court found as “with the Supreme Court’s review of the LIGA in Davis, [its] review of the MGCRA does not reveal a grant to the Board of either the authority or the obligation to resolve individual patron disputes such as the one plaintiff presented in this case.” The court did “not perceive an intention by the Legislature to abrogate a patron’s common-law claims that are not inconsistent with the MGCRA.” In addition, having held “that the Board lacked the authority to resolve plaintiff’s common-law claims and that plaintiff’s common-law claims in this case were not abrogated by nor inconsistent with the MGCRA,” the court rejected “defendant’s argument that plaintiff in this case was obligated to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing her common-law claims in the district court.”

Court of Claims Act (COCA) notice requirement; MCL 600.6431; Christie v Wayne State Univ; Retroactivity; Flamont v Department of Corrs; Governmental immunity waiver; Mead v State; Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA)

The court held that plaintiff’s PWDCRA claims against defendant-DOC were barred because he failed to comply with the COCA notice requirement, and Christie applied retroactively. Plaintiff worked for defendant for many years. He later experienced multiple medical issues and work restrictions, and eventually was placed on a Waived Rights Leave of Absence before being told in 2/20 that he was no longer a state employee. He filed an EEOC charge in 10/20, received a right-to-sue notice in 2/22, and then filed this circuit-court action in 8/22 alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the PWDCRA. The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant on immunity grounds. On appeal, the court held that strict compliance with MCL 600.6431 was required for claims against the state or its agencies, even when filed in circuit court. Christie made clear that the statute applies to all such claims and that compliance is a prerequisite to liability. The court next held that plaintiff’s argument for prospective-only application failed because Flamont had already determined that Christie did not announce a new rule, but instead “corrected a relatively short-lived misinterpretation of the law,” so full retroactive application applied. The court also held that defendant did not waive governmental immunity by its pleadings or litigation conduct because immunity is “not an affirmative defense but is instead a characteristic of government,” and only the Legislature may waive it. Affirmed.

Sanctions for misconduct; “Frivolous” appeal; FedRAppP 38; Frivolous as filed; Frivolous as argued; Misrepresentation of law; The court’s inherent authority; Bad faith or conduct tantamount to it; BDT Prods, Inc v Lexmark Int’l, Inc; First Bank of Marietta v Hartford Underwriters Ins Co; Objections to the show cause order; Sixth Circuit Local Rule 46; The attorney-client & work-product privilege; Whether the order was invalid because it allegedly came from ex parte communications; Whether the order was void because the clerk signed it

Holding that sanctions on plaintiff’s attorneys were appropriate under Rule 38 and its inherent authority, the court concluded “that appellees should be fully compensated for being forced to litigate this appeal.” It further awarded them double costs, and it imposed a $15,000 fine on each attorney “because (1) the misconduct was spread across three cases instead of just one and (2) smaller fines have plainly been inadequate[.]” The decision concerned the misconduct of plaintiff’s attorneys, appellant-Irion and Egli, in their briefing before the court, which “repeatedly misrepresented the record, cited non-existent cases, and cited cases for propositions of law that they did not even discuss, much less support.” Discussing Rule 38, the court noted an “appeal can be frivolous as filed, frivolous as argued, or both.” It rejected “any suggestion that Rule 38 does not recognize frivolous-as-argued appeals.” And it determined that plaintiff’s appeal was “frivolous as argued because Irion and Egli submitted fake cases, and inventing case law is a misrepresentation of law.” It noted that citing “even a single fake case can be sanctionable because ‘no brief, pleading, motion, or any other paper filed in any court should contain any citations—whether provided by generative AI or any other source—that’ a lawyer has not personally ‘read and verified.’” The court also imposed sanctions under its inherent authority, which “are appropriate only when the litigant has acted in bad faith or ‘willfully abuse[d] judicial processes.’” Applying the three-prong BDT test, the court found that inherent authority sanctions were appropriate here. It had concluded that plaintiff’s appeal was “meritless, and any reasonable attorney should know that a case is meritless if the only authority on which he can rely is a figment of imagination.” The court further concluded “that Irion and Egli have acted with an improper purpose because they have ‘used the court system to try to force a result that [they] could not obtain under the applicable law.’” In addition, “when given an opportunity to explain how such citations appeared in their briefing, [they] failed to provide an explanation and instead argued that the court’s show cause order was void and invalid.” It rejected those objections to the show cause order, holding among other things that the order did not violate Local Rule 46 or the work-product or attorney-client-privilege doctrines, and that its “orders are not invalid simply because the clerk signed them.”

Foreclosure on a commercial real estate broker’s lien; The Commercial Real Estate Broker’s Lien Act (CREBLA); MCL 570.584(9)(b); Name of the “record owner”; Attorney disqualification; Settlement agreement (SA)

The court concluded that the “trial court properly denied plaintiff’s request to enforce a nonexistent [SA] and to disqualify” defendant-ASJJ Management’s counsel. But it erred “by dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on grounds that the lien on which plaintiff was seeking to foreclose was void because it did not name the record owner of the hotel property.” Thus, the court affirmed in part but vacated “the trial court’s order to the extent that it struck plaintiff’s lien and dismissed plaintiff’s claims premised on that lien. On remand, the parties are free to litigate whether ASJJ Management was an owner of the hotel property despite there being no genuine issue of material fact that [it] was not the record owner.” The court rejected “plaintiff’s wholly meritless argument that the parties had a binding [SA] that the trial court should have enforced.” However, it held that the trial court erred in concluding the lien plaintiff filed “was invalid and unenforceable because it did not name the record owner of the hotel property.” The court did not have to “define the precise contours of what the term ‘owner of commercial real estate’ as used in MCL 570.584(9)(b) means.” It held “only that MCL 570.584(9)(b) requires what it says—that a commercial real estate broker’s lien contain ‘[t]he name of the owner of the commercial real estate,’ which does not necessarily require that the lien contain the name of the ‘record owner’ or ‘the owner of record’ as that term is used elsewhere in the CREBLA.” The court found that the trial court correctly determined there was no genuine issue of material fact that ASJJ Management was not the record owner of the hotel property. But “it erred by concluding that this meant that plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law. MCL 570.584(9)(b) requires only that a commercial real estate broker’s lien identify ‘[t]he name of the owner of the commercial real estate,’ and the trial court never addressed plaintiff’s argument that there was sufficient evidence to create a question of fact that ASJJ Management—which plaintiff’s lien named as the owner of the hotel property—was an owner of the” property. Finally, plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing that ASJJ Management’s counsel “should be disqualified on grounds that she was a necessary witness.”