Relationship between the Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA) & the Probation Act; Whether sentencing courts may prohibit MRTMA-compliant marijuana use as a probation condition; Preemption; Ter Beek v City of Wyoming; The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA); The Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA)

The court held that trial courts “may not prohibit MRTMA-compliant marijuana use as a probation condition solely because such use violates federal law.” Thus, it reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider, consistent with the court’s “opinion, defendant’s motion to amend the terms of her probation, to vacate her first violation, and to dismiss her second violation.” The court concluded that the Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled “that prohibiting MRTMA-compliant marijuana use was a mandatory condition of probation.” The court found that its reasoning in Ter Beek as “to the MMMA applies equally to the MRTMA. As a result, the CSA cannot preempt the MRTMA.” It noted that it held in Ter Beek “that the CSA does not preempt § 4(a) of the MMMA.” That case was relevant here because “the MMMA and the MRTMA concern similar subject matter, and because § 5(1) of the MRTMA is very similar to § 4(a) of the MMMA.” Thus, the court applied the Ter Beek preemption test to the CSA and the MRTMA. And it held “that ‘there is no “positive conflict” between the CSA and’ § 5(1) of the MRTMA ‘such that the two “cannot consistently stand together[.]”’” As a result, the CSA “does not preempt § 5(1) of the MRTMA.” The court further held that the Probation Act conflicts with the MRTMA, which “provides that all state laws ‘inconsistent with this act do not apply to conduct that is permitted by this act.’” The court found that the Probation Act “is inconsistent with the MRTMA insofar as it automatically bars probationers from MRTMA-compliant marijuana use based on the CSA.” Thus, the MRTMA controlled. The court noted that whether a trial “court can restrict a probationer’s marijuana use as a discretionary, individually tailored probation condition is a question” it did not decide here because the Court of Appeals never reached that issue.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Search & seizure; Fourth Amendment; Standing; Minnesota v Carter; People v Mahdi; Police-witness impeachment; People v Trakhtenberg; Felon-in-possession; MCL 750.224f; Felony-firearm; MCL 750.227b; Constructive possession; People v Johnson; Speedy trial; Barker v Wingo; Prosecutorial error; Constitutionality of MCL 750.224f; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v Bruen; People v Hughes

The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief from his FIP and felony-firearm convictions based on ineffective assistance, insufficient evidence, speedy-trial delay, prosecutorial error, or his constitutional challenge to MCL 750.224f. He was arrested in a bedroom where officers found a handgun under a mattress, and DNA testing strongly supported him as a contributor to DNA on the gun. The court first held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to relitigate suppression because defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. It reasoned that “nothing in the record establishes that defendant was anything more than a mere visitor” and he failed to show “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom.” The court next held that counsel should have impeached a deputy with prior false-statement evidence because the failure “cannot be considered sound or strategic,” but defendant failed to show prejudice because another officer gave similar testimony and the DNA evidence remained strong. The court also rejected defendant’s incomplete-defense and competency claims because his witness theory was “only speculating,” and counsel testified defendant was “responsive and able to provide input regarding his defense.” The court next held that sufficient evidence supported possession because the DNA evidence made defendant “approximately 6.27 sextillion times more likely” to be a contributor, permitting a jury to infer he placed the gun under the mattress. The court rejected the speedy-trial claim because “most of the delay” arose from defense counsel’s withdrawal and competency proceedings, and defendant was already incarcerated on another case. It also found no prosecutorial error because the prosecutor’s theory was a reasonable inference from proximity and DNA, and rejected the Bruen challenge because Hughes held that MCL 750.224f is “consistent with the Nation’s historical precedent of regulating firearm possession by persons convicted of felonies[.]” Affirmed.

Right of confrontation; Hearsay objection; Testimony about past & future cocaine delivery; Giving a phone number; Plain error review; Whether statements should have been excluded under MRE 403; Distinguishing People v Wilkins

The court held that defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated by a police witness’s testimony because he did not show that hearsay was erroneously admitted. He also failed to establish that statements made by a nontestifying individual should have been excluded under MRE 403. Thus, the court affirmed his drug conspiracy and firearms convictions. While executing a search warrant at another individual’s (S) apartment, police found a kilogram of cocaine, multiple firearms, and $20,000 in cash. S offered to cooperate while he was in jail, and met with a police detective (G). S did not testify at trial, but G testified about what S told him. On appeal, defendant complained about G’s testimony concerning (1) S’s “description of how he obtained cocaine in the past and his subsequent offer to ‘order up’ ‘big amounts’; and (2) the disclosure of” S’s phone number. As to the former, the court concluded it “was not hearsay evidence subject to exclusion under MRE 801(c), and thus its admission did not implicate the Confrontation Clauses. A party may introduce an out-of-court statement not for the truth-of-the-matter asserted but rather ‘to show the effect on the hearer . . . when this effect is relevant.’” The record showed that the prosecution “offered this ‘background information’ to explain why [G] acted in response to it by allowing [S] to place phone calls to defendant using [S’s] cell phone from jail. [S] was not a known informant to law enforcement, and [G] testified that they frequently hear potential informants offer big promises without following through—'we get lied to so much.’ Because ‘a statement offered to show why police officers acted as they did is not hearsay,’” the court found that allowing G “to explain that context to the jury rendered it non-hearsay.” Further, it found no plain error requiring reversal as to the phone number. The “giving of a phone number is not an out-of-court statement that establishes a person’s identity.” The court also rejected defendant’s MRE 403 argument, finding that S’s statements “both served to explain why law-enforcement officials acted as they did and were highly probative in coloring the trafficking conspiracy.” In addition, “defendant admitted to participating in the cocaine’s delivery, the jury heard [his] calls with [S] arranging the deal, and electronic evidence recovered from defendant’s phone . . . confirmed details of the transaction at issue.”

Violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA); Sufficient evidence to support a conviction of distributing a controlled substance without authorization; Ruan v United States; The “nondelegation” doctrine; The “major questions” doctrine; Jury instructions defining “unauthorized” in objective terms & on the “scienter” requirement; Confrontation Clause claim based on the district court’s mask mandate

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Shelton’s unlawful distribution of controlled substances convictions, and rejected his arguments based on the nondelegation and major questions doctrines. It also found that the jury instructions complied with Ruan. Finally, his Confrontation Clause claim failed where there was “no reasonable probability” that but for the district court’s failure to make case-specific findings about the necessity of its mask mandate, his trial would have had a different outcome. Shelton, a physician, was convicted of 21 counts of unlawfully distributing controlled substances to his patients, one of whom died. On appeal, the court first held that there was sufficient evidence that he distributed the substances in question without authorization where there was “abundant circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Shelton knew his prescriptions were unauthorized.” Further, the government established intent where each patient “presented to him with one drug diversion red flag or another.” He was prescribing “to patients who (1) lived far outside the immediate area, (2) he had not physically examined, and (3) were obtaining their medications from other sources.” There was also evidence that he “falsified medical records and then lied about” it to the DEA. Reviewing for plain error, the court rejected his argument that the U.S. Attorney General had not been delegated the power to define the scope of authorization under the CSA, and declined to adopt a rule that “a doctor’s ‘subjective purpose in issuing a given prescription’ controls.” The court also found no error in the district court’s jury instructions allowing the jury to use “objective criteria when considering whether a doctor was authorized to issue a prescription,” and concluded that they adequately explained scienter. As to his Confrontation Clause claim involving the district court’s mask requirement during trial, the court was “unaware of any binding precedent that has addressed whether requiring a witness to wear a mask that partially covers the face offends the ‘face-to-face’ aspect of the right.” Thus, he failed to show “‘an error that was obvious or clear.’” And the court found that even if it assumed the district court abused its discretion, he failed to show prejudice. Affirmed.

Custody; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Sabatine v Sabatine; Distinguishing Kuebler v Kuebler & Bofysil v Bofysil; Time frames; Findings on the statutory best-interest factors; MCL 722.23(b), (c), (f), & (j); Fletcher v Fletcher; Friend of the Court (FOC)

The court held that the trial court considered the correct time frame and its finding that the children’s ECE was only with plaintiff-mother was not against the great weight of the evidence. Further, its finding that defendant-father did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, that changing their ECE was in their best interests was also not against the great weight of the evidence. Thus, the court affirmed the divorce judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody and plaintiff physical custody of their children. Defendant first asserted that if the trial court had considered evidence from between 11/24 and 3/25 in making its initial ECE determination, it would have found “that it was with both parties, which would have changed defendant’s burden of proof at trial.” The court disagreed, noting that at the evidentiary hearing he objected to evidence from after 11/24, including a 2/25 “FOC report, because he believed the evidentiary hearing should have occurred in” 11/24. His counsel conceded this at oral argument. And, per a directive in a 3/25 order from the court that the 11/26/24 “parenting time order controlled, the trial court sustained the objection and excluded the FOC report from its consideration of the” ECE. Even without considering that “report, the trial court still concluded that it was with plaintiff.” The court found that this evidentiary ruling comported with the Supreme Court’s holding in Sabatine. Further, the trial court’s findings as to the ECE were not against the great weight of the evidence. The evidence showed that he “provided care and support for the children—including food, clothing, and health insurance for [them] through his employment—and participated in activities with [them] when they were in his care. But the trial court’s extensive consideration of the testimony (plaintiff, defendant, nanny, and FOC) resulted in a finding that an [ECE] existed with plaintiff only. And defendant” failed to show that the evidence clearly preponderated in the opposite direction. The court also rejected his challenges to the trial court’s findings on best-interest factors (b), (c), (f), and (j). It noted that the trial court found (j) slightly favored defendant, and he did not show how a finding that it “fully favored him” would have changed the trial court’s custody determination.

No-fault insurance; Personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Medical provider claim; MCL 500.3112; Settlement agreement; Release; Future benefits; Michigan Head & Spine Inst, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Consideration; Real party in interest; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Accrual; Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co

The court held that the trial court properly granted defendant-insurer partial summary disposition because the claimant’s settlement agreement and release barred plaintiff-provider’s later claim for PIP benefits incurred after the release. The claimant (J) sued defendant for no-fault benefits, received a zero verdict, and then executed a settlement agreement releasing defendant from past, present, and future PIP-related medical claims except for listed entities that did not include plaintiff. On appeal, the court first held that the release was unambiguous because it waived all J’s “rights to future PIP benefits, which necessarily extinguished plaintiff’s right to those benefits.” The court next held that the agreement did not fail for lack of consideration because an agreement to dismiss “claims ‘furnishes good consideration,’” and defendant’s promise to forgo posttrial and appellate practice supported the release. The court also held that plaintiff lost real-party-in-interest status because defendant was entitled to protection from “different parties asserting the same cause of action,” and the earlier trial had already addressed whether the accident related to the medical services. Finally, the court held that expenses incurred after the release were not payable under MCL 500.3112 because J “released any interest that she had to such benefits before incurring the expense,” meaning she was “no longer insured” for later accident-related expenses under the release’s terms. Affirmed.

No-fault insurance; Personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Medical provider claim; MCL 500.3112; Settlement agreement; Release; Future benefits; Michigan Head & Spine Inst, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Consideration; Real party in interest; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Accrual; Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co

The court held that the trial court properly granted defendant-insurer partial summary disposition because the claimant’s settlement agreement and release barred plaintiff-provider’s later claim for PIP benefits incurred after the release. The claimant (J) sued defendant for no-fault benefits, received a zero verdict, and then executed a settlement agreement releasing defendant from past, present, and future PIP-related medical claims except for listed entities that did not include plaintiff. On appeal, the court first held that the release was unambiguous because it waived all J’s “rights to future PIP benefits, which necessarily extinguished plaintiff’s right to those benefits.” The court next held that the agreement did not fail for lack of consideration because an agreement to dismiss “claims ‘furnishes good consideration,’” and defendant’s promise to forgo posttrial and appellate practice supported the release. The court also held that plaintiff lost real-party-in-interest status because defendant was entitled to protection from “different parties asserting the same cause of action,” and the earlier trial had already addressed whether the accident related to the medical services. Finally, the court held that expenses incurred after the release were not payable under MCL 500.3112 because J “released any interest that she had to such benefits before incurring the expense,” meaning she was “no longer insured” for later accident-related expenses under the release’s terms. Affirmed.

Negligent door installation claim; Factual causation; Skinner v Square D Co; Inadmissibility of subsequent repair evidence; MRE 407

Holding that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish factual causation, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant on plaintiff’s negligent door installation claim. The case arose after defendant installed a front security door on the home of nonparty-D. Days later, plaintiff’s decedent (LaShunte) fell at the threshold of the door. Her brother was nearby “and called an ambulance after LaShunte expressed experiencing hip pain.” He did not see her “fall, but LaShunte told him the door ‘fell on her foot.’” Defendant later “sent an employee to repair the door and instructed [D] how to adjust the door’s closing mechanism.” LaShunte sued, alleging defendant was negligent in installing the door, rendering it defective. On appeal, plaintiff contended that it presented sufficient evidence “to establish a reasonable inference of factual causation.” The court disagreed. While plaintiff presented evidence supporting that the door closed on LaShunte’s foot, critically, it failed “to articulate any defect or malfunction of the door that caused LaShunte’s fall and injury. While evidence was presented to establish that the door began to slam shut shortly after its installation, a jury would be left to speculate whether this was either the factual or legal cause of LaShunte’s fall. When combined with LaShunte’s preexisting conditions and symptoms, including her limp and documented loss of sensation in her feet, attribution of the cause of [her] fall and injuries to a defect of the door would be mere speculation because her other medical conditions were equally possible causes of the injuries.” The court noted that “evidence of defendant’s subsequent repair of the door” was inadmissible under MRE 407.

Personal protection order (PPO); Former spouse; MCL 600.2950; Reasonable cause; MCL 600.2950(4); Reasonable apprehension of violence; MCL 600.2950(1)(l); Stalking; MCL 750.411h; MCL 750.411i; Totality of circumstances; PF v JF; Motion to terminate PPO; Hayford v Hayford

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO entered in petitioner’s favor. The parties were former spouses. Petitioner alleged that respondent produced a firearm while they were alone, entered her home without permission, and later slashed two tires on her boyfriend’s truck while it was parked in her driveway. On appeal, the court held that sufficient evidence supported continuation of the PPO under MCL 600.2950(1)(l) because that provision covers conduct “that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.” The court reasoned that petitioner identified respondent in a video taken shortly after she discovered the slashed tires, was “frightened to learn that respondent was at her home with a weapon at night,” and the trial court believed her allegation. The court also rejected respondent’s argument that petitioner had to show stalking-like repeated conduct because he “erroneously applies these requirements to all conduct under MCL 600.2950(1).” The court explained that “[n]o such requirement exists,” so petitioner did not have to show another instance of harassment or a “continuity of purpose.” Affirmed.