Statutory right to a speedy trial; The 180-day rule (MCL 780.131); MCR 6.004(C) & (D); People v Lown

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated Part II(B)(3) of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 85332 in the 3/10/26 edition for the published opinion) and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in analyzing MCL 780.131’s 180-day rule “with reference to MCR 6.004(C) rather than MCR 6.004(D).” In addition, it “overlooked that defendant raised arguments implicating both” court rules. The court directed the Court of Appeals on remand to “reconsider each claim under the appropriate court rule” and then to forward its decision on remand to the court’s Clerk “within 56 days after the date of this order.” The court retained jurisdiction.

Sufficiency of the evidence; Larceny of a firearm; Identity; Circumstantial evidence; FIP firearm & ammunition; CCW; Actual possession; Felony-firearm

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s convictions for larceny of a firearm, FIP of a firearm and ammunition, CCW, and felony-firearm. Officers found him asleep in another person’s vehicle and, after arresting him, discovered a loaded Glock and two rounds of ammunition in his jacket pockets. The gun belonged to defendant’s brother-in-law R, who had not given anyone permission to take it and had not known it was missing. On appeal, defendant first argued that the prosecution did not establish that he was the person who stole the gun because others had access to R’s home. The court noted that “‘[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.’” R testified that the gun was in his home when he left for an extended hospital and rehabilitation stay, that defendant was present in the home while he was away, and that police found defendant with the gun shortly after R returned home. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant took it. His alternative theories did not require a different result because “‘if evidence is relevant and admissible, it does not matter that the evidence gives rise to multiple inferences or further inferences; it is for the jury alone to determine what inferences to draw.’” Defendant’s challenges to the possession offenses also failed. The officers testified that the gun and ammunition were removed directly from defendant’s jacket pockets, and body-camera footage corroborated their testimony. “From this evidence, the jury could find that defendant had actual possession of the firearm and ammunition.” Because sufficient evidence supported the predicate FIP convictions, his derivative challenges to the felony-firearm convictions necessarily failed. Affirmed.

Search & seizure; Motion to suppress evidence; Inventory-search exception to the warrant requirement; Good faith reliance on a search warrant; Probable cause; Mid-trial amendment of the indictment as to one count; Claim preservation; Actual amendment; Applicability of the “matter of form” exception; Co-conspirator statements hearsay exception (FRE 801(d)(2)(E)); Furthered the conspiracy prong; Sufficiency of the evidence for a conspiracy to distribute & possess with intent to distribute drugs conviction; Participation element; Great weight of the evidence

The court upheld the district court’s denial of defendant-Johnson’s three motions to suppress, and found that a challenged hearsay statement was properly admitted under the co-conspirator exception. It also held that there was sufficient evidence to support his conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute drugs conviction. But it vacated his conviction on one count (Count Two) because that count was actually amended mid-trial to refer to cocaine instead of cocaine base. His first motion to suppress concerned a car search. Considering the inventory-search exception to the warrant requirement, the court concluded that the officers’ testimony “showed that their impoundment decision and subsequent inventory search comported with” department policy and the Fourth Amendment. His second motion concerned evidence found at his home during execution of a search warrant. The court determined “that an officer could in good faith rely on the affidavit here” and thus, the officers who conducted the search “relied in good faith on the warrant.” Finally, as to the motion to suppress evidence found in a search of his grandmother’s home pursuant to a warrant, the court concluded that the warrant affidavit established probable cause. Johnson’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge concerned conspiracy’s participation element. The court found “that a rational trier of fact could conclude that Johnson participated in the” conspiracy. The “government showed the jury that Johnson received drug packs from” a co-conspirator approximately 50 “times over the years. That’s a continuing supply from a constant source within the conspiracy.” But as to one of his convictions for individually possessing with intent to distribute (Count Two), the court found that he “did enough to object to the amendment” and that this conviction had to be vacated because “the indictment was actually amended and an actual amendment is a per se violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Presentment Clause.” Affirmed except as to Count Two, which the court reversed, and remanded.

Dismissal with prejudice; Fed R Civ P 41(a)(2) & 41(a)(1)(A)(i); United States v 266 Tonawanda Trail (One Tract); Designation as a vexatious litigator; Due process; Clemons v DeWine (Unpub 6th Cir); Applicability of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to plaintiff’s claim of “protected whistleblower status”; Whether an evidentiary hearing was required; Recusal

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff-Wasserman’s case “with prejudice, designating her as a vexatious litigator, and imposing prefiling restrictions on her.” In her purported capacity as an executor of an Ohio probate estate, plaintiff sued defendants referred to as the Beggs Defendants. After the district court struck her Second Amended Complaint for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 11, it gave her the opportunity to file a Third Amended Complaint. At the deadline for doing so, she instead filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, citing Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), to dismiss the Beggs Defendants. Because they “had already served an answer in the action, the district court determined that Rule 41(a)(2) applied to the Notice, not Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).” In an order, it gave plaintiff three options on how to proceed. When it subsequently determined that she failed to comply with that order, it dismissed the action with prejudice. On appeal, the court concluded that the district court “correctly applied Rule 41(a)(2) to Wasserman’s Notice.” It also did not abuse “its discretion by making the dismissal with prejudice.” The court found that the “district court’s order satisfied the requirements outlined in One Tract. Since those requirements were satisfied, Wasserman’s failure to explain why a dismissal without prejudice would not have legally prejudiced the Beggs Defendants was a sufficient basis for [it] to dismiss the action with prejudice.” As to her due process challenge to the vexatious litigator designation, she did not cite any “authority requiring an evidentiary hearing” and the court found her argument unpersuasive. In a prior case, Clemons, it outlined “four circumstances that, if met, would cover the litigator’s due process concerns” – (1) notice, (2) creation of an adequate record for review, (3) the making of “substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions,” and (4) a narrowly tailored “order to closely fit the specific vice encountered.” Applying these here, the court concluded “that the district court complied with its due process obligations when it designated Wasserman as a vexatious litigator.” Finally, it held that the district court “committed no error, plain or otherwise, in not recusing.” Affirmed.

Tax Tribunal (TT) jurisdiction; MCL 205.731(a); General Property Tax Act (GPTA); Replacement roof as an “addition”; MCL 211.34d(1); Const 1963, art 9, § 3; Taxable value; MCL 211.27a(2); Constitutional challenge to statutory definition; Wikman v Novi; Circuit court jurisdiction

The court held on remand that the TT had jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner’s replacement roof constituted an “addition” under Const 1963, art 9, § 3, but lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the statutory definition of “addition” itself impermissibly conflicts with the Constitution. Respondent-city increased the property’s taxable value beyond the statutory cap after treating petitioner’s replacement roof as new construction and therefore an “addition” under the GPTA. The court’s earlier opinion affirmed that determination, but the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of the TT’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s constitutional arguments. On remand, the court concluded that MCL 205.731(a) gives the TT exclusive and original jurisdiction to directly review the city’s property-tax assessment. Because MCL 211.34d(1) expressly defines “addition” both for the GPTA and as that term is used in Const 1963, art 9, § 3, the TT’s “determination that the replacement roof constitutes an ‘addition’ under MCL 211.34d is necessarily, by legislative mandate, also a determination that the replacement roof constitutes an ‘addition’ as this term is used in Const 1963, art 9, § 3.” The court therefore readopted its earlier conclusion that the roof qualified as new construction and an addition because it was not statutory “replacement construction.” But petitioner’s separate argument that MCL 211.34d’s definition itself violates the Constitution presented a different jurisdictional question. “‘Generally speaking, an agency exercising quasi-judicial power does not undertake the determination of constitutional questions or possess the power to hold statutes unconstitutional.’” Because resolving petitioner’s challenge could invalidate MCL 211.27a or MCL 211.34d, it had to be brought in circuit court, and as the TT lacked jurisdiction to consider this challenge, the Court of Appeals likewise lacked jurisdiction to resolve it in this appeal from the TT. The court vacated the inconsistent portion of its prior opinion and affirmed the TT’s 4/24/23 order.

Tax Tribunal (TT) jurisdiction; MCL 205.731(a); General Property Tax Act (GPTA); Replacement roof as an “addition”; MCL 211.34d(1); Const 1963, art 9, § 3; Taxable value; MCL 211.27a(2); Constitutional challenge to statutory definition; Wikman v Novi; Circuit court jurisdiction

The court held on remand that the TT had jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner’s replacement roof constituted an “addition” under Const 1963, art 9, § 3, but lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the statutory definition of “addition” itself impermissibly conflicts with the Constitution. Respondent-city increased the property’s taxable value beyond the statutory cap after treating petitioner’s replacement roof as new construction and therefore an “addition” under the GPTA. The court’s earlier opinion affirmed that determination, but the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of the TT’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s constitutional arguments. On remand, the court concluded that MCL 205.731(a) gives the TT exclusive and original jurisdiction to directly review the city’s property-tax assessment. Because MCL 211.34d(1) expressly defines “addition” both for the GPTA and as that term is used in Const 1963, art 9, § 3, the TT’s “determination that the replacement roof constitutes an ‘addition’ under MCL 211.34d is necessarily, by legislative mandate, also a determination that the replacement roof constitutes an ‘addition’ as this term is used in Const 1963, art 9, § 3.” The court therefore readopted its earlier conclusion that the roof qualified as new construction and an addition because it was not statutory “replacement construction.” But petitioner’s separate argument that MCL 211.34d’s definition itself violates the Constitution presented a different jurisdictional question. “‘Generally speaking, an agency exercising quasi-judicial power does not undertake the determination of constitutional questions or possess the power to hold statutes unconstitutional.’” Because resolving petitioner’s challenge could invalidate MCL 211.27a or MCL 211.34d, it had to be brought in circuit court, and as the TT lacked jurisdiction to consider this challenge, the Court of Appeals likewise lacked jurisdiction to resolve it in this appeal from the TT. The court vacated the inconsistent portion of its prior opinion and affirmed the TT’s 4/24/23 order.