Unfair labor practice charges; Discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity; National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) §§ 8(a)(3) & (1) (29 USC §§ 158(a)(3) & (1)); Prima facie case; Substantial evidence; An individual complaint under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); The “Interboro doctrine”; NLRB v City Disposal Sys, Inc; Credibility determinations; Substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action; Pretext; Challenge to the National Labor Relations Board’s remedial order at the liability stage; Reinstatement & backpay; § 160(c); Compliance proceedings issue; Sure-Tan, Inc v NLRB

Granting petitioner-NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order, the court held that there was substantial record evidence supporting the Board’s finding that respondent-employer (VNS) violated NLRA §§ 8(a)(3) and (1) by terminating an employee (S) for complaining about an alleged CBA violation. The court first considered whether S engaged in protected concerted activity when he complained to a supervisor during a meeting about a co-worker’s (D) 40-hour guarantee. It evaluates whether an individual complaint under a CBA “amounts to concerted activity under the Interboro doctrine[,]” adopted by the Supreme Court in City Disposal. The parties agreed that the CBA did not prevent the side agreement with D, even if intervenor-Union’s bylaws did. The Board determined that S’s complaint constituted concerted activity under the Interboro doctrine. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s factual finding that S “honestly and reasonably invoked a collectively bargained right.” It was “not persuaded to disturb the Board’s credibility determination that [S] invoked the contract at the meeting.” In addition, substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that S’s invocation of a right under the CBA “was honest and reasonable, even though [D’s] side agreement did not in fact violate the” CBA. The Board credited S’s testimony that he believed that it did because a union representative had previously told him that the CBA did not guarantee 40 hours, and there was no evidence that an alleged “longstanding practice” was so widespread that S must have been aware of it. Next, the court cited seven pieces of evidence in concluding that there was both direct and circumstantial substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding that his “protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in VNS’s termination decision.” It further held that substantial evidence, including documentary evidence, supported the Board’s finding of pretext. While VNS also challenged the Board’s remedial order, which included reinstatement and backpay, as overbroad, the court noted that its “arguments should first be made to the Board in compliance proceedings,” and declined to address them here.

Article III standing; Redressability; First Amendment; 42 USC § 1983; Sign ordinance; Off-premises signs; Prior restraint; Content-based distinctions; Unchallenged alternative restriction on high-rise & pole signs; Midwest Media Prop LLC v Symmes Twp; Severability; Permit-process injury; Application fee; Forfeiture

The court held that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to challenge defendant-township’s off-premises sign ban because unchallenged high-rise and pole-sign restrictions independently barred its proposed billboard. Plaintiff sought to build a 30-foot, two-sided billboard in the township, but the zoning inspector denied the permit application based on the township’s ban on off-premises signs. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s federal First Amendment claim for lack of standing under Midwest Media and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Ohio-law claim. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff’s inability to put up the billboard was not redressable because even if it invalidated the off-premises-sign ban, the unchallenged bans on high-rise and pole signs “still would preclude” the billboard. The court rejected plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish Midwest Media, reasoning that the pleading-stage posture did not matter because plaintiff still had to plausibly allege standing, and the billboard would “flout” the separate high-rise and pole-sign limits. The court also rejected plaintiff’s severability theory because the sign limits could be cleanly separated from any allegedly unconstitutional provisions, and the zoning resolution’s severability clause confirmed that invalidating “any provision” would not affect the continued enforcement of the rest. Finally, the court acknowledged that the permitting process and $100 application fee might have supported a separate standing theory, but held that plaintiff forfeited it because counsel identified the injury as the denial of the billboard, and the fee-based theory came “too little, too late.” Affirmed.

Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Requirement to register under the 2021 SORA; People v Kardasz; Ex post facto punishment; People v Betts

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83334 in the 3/25/25 edition), vacated the trial court’s 8/7/23 order to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s opinion in Kardasz, and remanded to the trial court. The court held that requiring defendant to register under the 2021 SORA was an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment. He committed the crimes at issue in 1995, but he was being required to register under the 2021 SORA. “The statutory requirements enacted after the commission of his crimes – the entirety of the SORA, which did not exist in any form at the time of the offenses – amount to punishment.” For the reasons articulated in Betts as “to the 2011 SORA, the 2021 SORA may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments, and severance or revival of prior versions of the SORA is not appropriate.” The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.

Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Requirement to register under the 2021 SORA; People v Kardasz; Ex post facto punishment; People v Betts

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Part II of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 84158 in the 8/21/25 edition), vacated the trial court’s 2/10/23 order to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s opinion in Kardasz, and remanded to the trial court. It held that requiring defendant to register under the 2021 SORA was an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment. He committed the crimes at issue in 1993 but was being required to register under the 2021 SORA. “The statutory requirements enacted after the commission of his crimes – the entirety of the SORA, which did not exist in any form at the time of the offenses – amount to punishment.” For the reasons articulated in Betts as “to the 2011 SORA, the 2021 SORA may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments, and severance or revival of prior versions of the SORA is not appropriate.” The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented. It also denied the motion for remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Requirement to register under the 2021 SORA; People v Kardasz; Ex post facto punishment; People v Betts

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Part II(B) of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 82575 in the 10/29/24 edition for the published opinion), vacated the trial court’s 10/25/22 order to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s opinion in Kardasz, and remanded to the trial court. The court held that requiring defendant to register under the 2021 SORA was an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment. He committed the crimes at issue in 1980, but he was being required to register under the 2021 SORA. “The statutory requirements enacted after the commission of his crimes – the entirety of the SORA, which did not exist in any form at the time of the offenses – amount to punishment.” For the reasons articulated in Betts as “to the 2011 SORA, the 2021 SORA may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments, and severance or revival of prior versions of the SORA is not appropriate.”

Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Requirement to register under the 2021 SORA; People v Kardasz; Ex post facto punishment; People v Betts

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 82998 in the 1/30/25 edition), vacated the trial court’s 5/10/23 order to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s opinion in Kardasz, and remanded to the trial court. The court held that requiring defendant to register under the 2021 SORA was an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment. He committed the crime at issue in 1990, but he was being required to register under the 2021 SORA. “The statutory requirements enacted after the commission of his crime – the entirety of the SORA, which did not exist in any form at the time of the offenses – amount to punishment.” For the reasons articulated in Betts as “to the 2011 SORA, the 2021 SORA may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments, and severance or revival of prior versions of the SORA is not appropriate.”

Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Requirement to register under the 2021 SORA; People v Kardasz; Ex post facto punishment; People v Betts

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83032 in the 2/6/25 edition), vacated the trial court’s 6/29/23 order to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s opinion in Kardasz, and remanded to the trial court. The court held that requiring defendant to register under the 2021 SORA was an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment. He committed the crimes at issue in 1995 and 2010, but he was being required to register under the 2021 SORA. “The statutory requirements enacted after the commission of his crimes amount to punishment.” For the reasons articulated in Betts as “to the 2011 SORA, the 2021 SORA may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments, and severance or revival of prior versions of the SORA is not appropriate.”

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Right to testify; Factual predicate; Failure to qualify a witness as an expert; Prejudice; Failure to call certain witnesses; Jury instructions; Failure to object; Failure to request a specific unanimity instruction; Double jeopardy; Convictions for violating MCL 750.50(4)(d) & (4)(e); “Unit of prosecution”; People v Wakeford; People v Johnson; Sufficiency of the evidence for a failure to provide adequate care to 25 or more animals conviction; People v Parkinson

While the court rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it held that her convictions for both MCL 750.50(4)(d) and 750.50(4)(e) violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses. It also held that there was sufficient evidence to support her conviction of cruelty to 25 or more animals in violation of (4)(e). Thus, it affirmed that conviction but vacated her conviction of cruelty to 10-24 animals under (4)(d). She asserted that her trial counsel was ineffective in multiple ways, including preventing her from testifying. But the record clearly showed “that defendant knowingly waived her right to testify and decided to instead exercise her right to remain silent.” Thus, she could not establish the factual predicate for this claim. As to failing to qualify a defense witness (a veterinarian, Dr. K) as an expert, even if K “was qualified as an expert, he would not have been permitted to testify about whether defendant complied with the law.” Thus, the alleged failure to qualify K as an expert “did not prevent the jury from” considering his “‘testimony insofar as it suggested legal compliance.’” But the court agreed with defendant’s double jeopardy argument, which required it to determine “what constitutes a single offense under MCL 750.50[.]” It found that it was “clear that the ‘unit of prosecution’ for a charge under MCL 750.50 is a defendant’s conduct that violates MCL 750.50(2)—here, defendant’s failure to provide her animals with adequate care as prohibited by MCL 750.50(2)(a).” The language of MCL 750.50 showed “that the conduct being criminalized is not the number of animals mistreated but the defendant’s conduct that violates MCL 750.50(2).” Only evidence of “one instance in which [she] violated MCL 750.50(2)” was presented here. “The more animals that [she] failed to provide with adequate care, the more she could be punished as provided in MCL 750.50(4). But she could not be subjected to multiple charges for the single instance in which she failed to provide her animals with adequate care.” Thus, because the evidence was sufficient to support her higher conviction (failure to provide such care to more than 25 animals that she owned), the court vacated the lower one, involving 10-24 animals.

Unfair labor practice charges; Discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity; National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) §§ 8(a)(3) & (1) (29 USC §§ 158(a)(3) & (1)); Prima facie case; Substantial evidence; An individual complaint under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); The “Interboro doctrine”; NLRB v City Disposal Sys, Inc; Credibility determinations; Substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action; Pretext; Challenge to the National Labor Relations Board’s remedial order at the liability stage; Reinstatement & backpay; § 160(c); Compliance proceedings issue; Sure-Tan, Inc v NLRB

Granting petitioner-NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order, the court held that there was substantial record evidence supporting the Board’s finding that respondent-employer (VNS) violated NLRA §§ 8(a)(3) and (1) by terminating an employee (S) for complaining about an alleged CBA violation. The court first considered whether S engaged in protected concerted activity when he complained to a supervisor during a meeting about a co-worker’s (D) 40-hour guarantee. It evaluates whether an individual complaint under a CBA “amounts to concerted activity under the Interboro doctrine[,]” adopted by the Supreme Court in City Disposal. The parties agreed that the CBA did not prevent the side agreement with D, even if intervenor-Union’s bylaws did. The Board determined that S’s complaint constituted concerted activity under the Interboro doctrine. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s factual finding that S “honestly and reasonably invoked a collectively bargained right.” It was “not persuaded to disturb the Board’s credibility determination that [S] invoked the contract at the meeting.” In addition, substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that S’s invocation of a right under the CBA “was honest and reasonable, even though [D’s] side agreement did not in fact violate the” CBA. The Board credited S’s testimony that he believed that it did because a union representative had previously told him that the CBA did not guarantee 40 hours, and there was no evidence that an alleged “longstanding practice” was so widespread that S must have been aware of it. Next, the court cited seven pieces of evidence in concluding that there was both direct and circumstantial substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding that his “protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in VNS’s termination decision.” It further held that substantial evidence, including documentary evidence, supported the Board’s finding of pretext. While VNS also challenged the Board’s remedial order, which included reinstatement and backpay, as overbroad, the court noted that its “arguments should first be made to the Board in compliance proceedings,” and declined to address them here.

Article III standing; Redressability; First Amendment; 42 USC § 1983; Sign ordinance; Off-premises signs; Prior restraint; Content-based distinctions; Unchallenged alternative restriction on high-rise & pole signs; Midwest Media Prop LLC v Symmes Twp; Severability; Permit-process injury; Application fee; Forfeiture

The court held that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to challenge defendant-township’s off-premises sign ban because unchallenged high-rise and pole-sign restrictions independently barred its proposed billboard. Plaintiff sought to build a 30-foot, two-sided billboard in the township, but the zoning inspector denied the permit application based on the township’s ban on off-premises signs. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s federal First Amendment claim for lack of standing under Midwest Media and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the Ohio-law claim. On appeal, the court held that plaintiff’s inability to put up the billboard was not redressable because even if it invalidated the off-premises-sign ban, the unchallenged bans on high-rise and pole signs “still would preclude” the billboard. The court rejected plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish Midwest Media, reasoning that the pleading-stage posture did not matter because plaintiff still had to plausibly allege standing, and the billboard would “flout” the separate high-rise and pole-sign limits. The court also rejected plaintiff’s severability theory because the sign limits could be cleanly separated from any allegedly unconstitutional provisions, and the zoning resolution’s severability clause confirmed that invalidating “any provision” would not affect the continued enforcement of the rest. Finally, the court acknowledged that the permitting process and $100 application fee might have supported a separate standing theory, but held that plaintiff forfeited it because counsel identified the injury as the denial of the billboard, and the fee-based theory came “too little, too late.” Affirmed.

Reasonable efforts to reunify; In re Rippy; MCL 712A.19a(2); Initial dispositional hearing; Aggravated circumstances; MCL 722.638; Effect of a guardianship; In re Rozenboom

The court held that the trial court erred by terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing without providing reasonable efforts or identifying a statutory basis for finding that such efforts were not required. The child had been placed in a guardianship with petitioner-grandmother, who later filed a petition seeking jurisdiction and termination under § 19b(3)(f). The trial court found jurisdiction, found the statutory ground proved, and later checked a box stating that reasonable efforts were not required “as determined in a prior court order,” even though no such prior order existed. On appeal, the court reasoned that reasonable efforts “must be made in all cases” except those listed in MCL 712A.19a(2), and the trial court “never made ‘a judicial determination’ that respondent subjected” the child to aggravated circumstances under MCL 722.638. The court also noted that no exception applies merely because the child is in a guardianship and the guardian initiated the petition. Because reasonable efforts were required but not provided, the court vacated the termination order and remanded for further proceedings.