“Class of one” equal-protection claim related to postal delivery service; Subject-matter jurisdiction; 28 USC § 1331; Effect of an administrative review scheme; Elgin v Department of Treasury; Thunder Basin Coal Co v Reich; Free Enter Fund v Public Co Accounting Oversight Bd; Axon Enter, Inc v Federal Trade Comm’n; The Postal Accountability & Enhancement Act (PAEA); 39 USC § 3662

The court held that plaintiffs’ “class of one” equal-protection claim concerning defendant-USPS’s failure to deliver mail to their property had to be filed before the Postal Regulatory Commission. Thus, it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their first amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The USPS stopped delivering to the mailbox at the end of plaintiffs’ driveway on a single lane road after a confrontation between one of their neighbors and a mail carrier. They have to “travel to a mailbox about half a mile down the road to retrieve letters and five miles into” a town for parcels. The court applies a two-step process to “determine whether an administrative review scheme divests a district court of jurisdiction over a constitutional claim[.]” At step one, it considered “whether the PAEA, ‘by specifying a different method to resolve claims about agency action,’ implicitly supplants § 1331’s grant of jurisdiction.” It concluded, after reviewing “the PAEA’s text, structure, context, and purpose, Congress’s intent to supplant federal district court jurisdiction over those matters expressly placed within the Commission’s purview is fairly discernible.” The court determined that Congress intended “that the Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over service- and rate-related complaints.” It next found that plaintiffs fared “no better at step two, because each of the three Thunder Basin factors indicates that this particular case belongs before the Postal Regulatory Commission.” The court noted that the fact all three of those factors indicated that their “‘claim is “of the type” Congress thought belonged within [the] statutory scheme’” helped explain why courts, including this one, “have all held that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims like Plaintiffs’, even when they are framed as constitutional issues.”

42 USC § 1983 action; Qualified immunity; Fourth Amendment claims; Probable cause for a traffic stop; Heien v North Carolina; Inventory search exception to the warrant requirement; United States v Hockenberry; United States v Snoddy; Scope of a policy requiring search of a vehicle’s contents; Opening closed containers

Holding that defendant-Officer Lawless was entitled to qualified immunity in this § 1983 action asserting Fourth Amendment violations, the court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment for him on that ground. Lawless and another officer (P) stopped plaintiff-Henderson’s car and issued citations for, among other things, speeding and driving with an expired vehicle registration (the 9/13 stop). Days later, they stopped him again (the 9/22 stop) after seeing him driving the same car with the same expired tags. They told him “that they would have to impound his car until he renewed its registration, and” began an inventory search of the car. He objected, yelled at them, and walked toward them. They then arrested him. “The inventory search revealed a large black tote locked with a padlock[,]” which they forced open. On appeal, the court first held that they had probable cause for the 9/13 stop. “Based on his own visual observations and [P’s] radar-gun confirmation, Officer Lawless reasonably found that Henderson violated the town’s speed limit. Even if . . . an error occurred in measuring the speed of Henderson’s decelerating vehicle, that mistake does not fall on the unreasonable side of the line. That means that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred either way.” The court next held that the 9/22 “inventory search satisfied the Fourth Amendment.” The car was lawfully impounded under an ordinance permitting “officers to impound ‘[a]ny vehicle . . . connected with[] the commission of a crime.’” Driving with an expired registration is a misdemeanor under Ohio law. Further, the Police Department’s inventory policy provides that officers are to conduct an inventory search when they impound a vehicle, and are to “always do a COMPLETE physical inventory of its contents.” They followed those requirements. The court rejected Henderson’s argument that “the policy gave insufficient direction over how to conduct an inventory search.” It noted it has interpreted “a policy requiring officers to inventory all ‘articles and property’ contained in a car . . . to ‘include closed containers’ and their contents.” This is in line with the other circuits, which “interpret policies that require a comprehensive inventory of all property to apply to the opening of closed containers.” The court found that the officers “fairly construed the policy to require them to open the black tote and inventory its contents.”

Title VII retaliation; 42 USC § 2000e-3(a); McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green; Prima facie causation; Temporal proximity; Pretext; Reduction in force; Failure to follow internal procedures; Title VII hostile work environment; § 2000e-2(a)(1); Same-sex harassment; Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Servs, Inc; Faragher Ellerth affirmative defense; Faragher v City of Boca Raton; Burlington Indus, Inc v Ellerth; Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); 29 USC § 623(a)(1); Replacement; Reduction-in-force evidence; Grosjean v First Energy Corp; Geiger v Tower Auto

The court held that factual disputes precluded summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Title VII retaliation claims, but that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on their hostile-work-environment claims and one plaintiff’s ADEA claim. Plaintiffs sued their former employer after one plaintiff filed an ethics complaint about their supervisor and both were later terminated. The district court granted defendant summary judgment on all claims. On appeal, the court first held that plaintiffs met their “minimal” prima facie burden on causation because evidence showed the decisionmaker did not make his final termination decisions until after the ethics complaint and may have decided to terminate the second plaintiff after he participated in the investigation. The court also held that a reasonable jury could find pretext. Evidence showed the decisionmaker “question[ed] the timing” of the ethics complaint, and stated in the same email that he planned to terminate plaintiffs. Further, he terminated them even though his supervisor had “[n]o expectations” that the reorganization would lead to terminations, and seemingly failed to follow defendant’s reduction-in-force process. Because the parties offered “two reasonable interpretations of the evidence,” the retaliation claims had to go to a jury. But the hostile-work-environment claims failed under the Faragher/Ellerth defense. The court held that defendant had a reasonable harassment policy, promptly investigated the complaint, substantiated the allegations, disciplined the supervisor, and thereby “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly” the harassment. It also held that plaintiffs unreasonably failed to use defendant’s corrective measures because one waited about four months to report and largely provided only vague allegations, while the other never reported the conduct. Finally, the court held that the ADEA claim failed because the plaintiff’s duties were redistributed among existing employees, and “‘[s]preading the former duties of a terminated employee among the remaining employees does not constitute replacement.’” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

42 USC § 1983 action; Qualified immunity; Fourth Amendment claims; Probable cause for a traffic stop; Heien v North Carolina; Inventory search exception to the warrant requirement; United States v Hockenberry; United States v Snoddy; Scope of a policy requiring search of a vehicle’s contents; Opening closed containers

Holding that defendant-Officer Lawless was entitled to qualified immunity in this § 1983 action asserting Fourth Amendment violations, the court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment for him on that ground. Lawless and another officer (P) stopped plaintiff-Henderson’s car and issued citations for, among other things, speeding and driving with an expired vehicle registration (the 9/13 stop). Days later, they stopped him again (the 9/22 stop) after seeing him driving the same car with the same expired tags. They told him “that they would have to impound his car until he renewed its registration, and” began an inventory search of the car. He objected, yelled at them, and walked toward them. They then arrested him. “The inventory search revealed a large black tote locked with a padlock[,]” which they forced open. On appeal, the court first held that they had probable cause for the 9/13 stop. “Based on his own visual observations and [P’s] radar-gun confirmation, Officer Lawless reasonably found that Henderson violated the town’s speed limit. Even if . . . an error occurred in measuring the speed of Henderson’s decelerating vehicle, that mistake does not fall on the unreasonable side of the line. That means that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred either way.” The court next held that the 9/22 “inventory search satisfied the Fourth Amendment.” The car was lawfully impounded under an ordinance permitting “officers to impound ‘[a]ny vehicle . . . connected with[] the commission of a crime.’” Driving with an expired registration is a misdemeanor under Ohio law. Further, the Police Department’s inventory policy provides that officers are to conduct an inventory search when they impound a vehicle, and are to “always do a COMPLETE physical inventory of its contents.” They followed those requirements. The court rejected Henderson’s argument that “the policy gave insufficient direction over how to conduct an inventory search.” It noted it has interpreted “a policy requiring officers to inventory all ‘articles and property’ contained in a car . . . to ‘include closed containers’ and their contents.” This is in line with the other circuits, which “interpret policies that require a comprehensive inventory of all property to apply to the opening of closed containers.” The court found that the officers “fairly construed the policy to require them to open the black tote and inventory its contents.”

Motion for relief from judgment; FedRCivP 60(b)(6); Buck v Davis; 28 USC § 2255(f) limitations period; Apprendi v New Jersey violation; “Death results” sentencing enhancement for a conviction of using interstate channels to commission a murder-for-hire; Procedurally defaulted claim; Cause; “Actual innocence”; Whether the government waived or forfeited the limitations argument; Whether a compassionate release order created a new final judgment; 18 USC § 3582(b); An order not authorized by § 3582(c)(1); Relation back; Mayle v Felix; Equitable tolling; Equitable estoppel; Fraud on the court; Fraudulent concealment

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court did not err in understanding § 2255(f) to foreclose petitioner-West’s entitlement to Rule 60(b) relief. Further, even putting aside the statute of limitations, “Rule 60(b)(6) relief would be ‘inappropriate.’” West was convicted of using interstate channels to commission a murder-for-hire. If “death results” in such cases, there is a mandatory minimum life sentence. “West’s indictment did not explicitly charge the” enhancement, and the jury was not instructed on it. But he was sentenced to life. “No one noticed the Apprendi violation at the time, and West did not raise the issue in his direct appeal or in his” § 2255 motion. Nearly a decade later, he raised it in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from his § 2255 judgment. The court noted that “the merit or futility of that hypothetical Apprendi-based § 2255 claim is relevant to the resolution of the Rule 60(b) motion. As the district court correctly recognized, if the § 2255 claim would inevitably fail, then reopening the judgment would be nothing more than ‘an empty exercise.’” The court further noted that procedural “barriers to relief count in this analysis.” Pursuant to Buck, “it would be ‘inappropriate’ to balance the equities in favor of granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion when an insuperable procedural barrier would render the underlying claim ‘unreviewable’ in the reopened § 2255 motion.” The court additionally concluded it was not clear that the equities ran in West’s favor. Because he did not “raise the Apprendi claim in the trial court or on direct appeal, the claim is procedurally defaulted—indeed, doubly so.” And it determined that he “could not cure the appellate default by claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” He also could not show “actual innocence.” Further, the court rejected his claims that (1) the government waived or forfeited the statute of limitations defense; (2) that his claim related back to his § 2255 motion; (3) that equitable estoppel, fraud on the court, or fraudulent concealment barred the defense; and (4) that equitable tolling applied. His claim that his new § 2255 motion would not be untimely due to a compassionate release order also failed because that “order did not create a new final judgment and, in any case, [it] was reversed.” Affirmed.

Title VII retaliation; 42 USC § 2000e-3(a); McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green; Prima facie causation; Temporal proximity; Pretext; Reduction in force; Failure to follow internal procedures; Title VII hostile work environment; § 2000e-2(a)(1); Same-sex harassment; Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Servs, Inc; Faragher Ellerth affirmative defense; Faragher v City of Boca Raton; Burlington Indus, Inc v Ellerth; Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); 29 USC § 623(a)(1); Replacement; Reduction-in-force evidence; Grosjean v First Energy Corp; Geiger v Tower Auto

The court held that factual disputes precluded summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Title VII retaliation claims, but that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on their hostile-work-environment claims and one plaintiff’s ADEA claim. Plaintiffs sued their former employer after one plaintiff filed an ethics complaint about their supervisor and both were later terminated. The district court granted defendant summary judgment on all claims. On appeal, the court first held that plaintiffs met their “minimal” prima facie burden on causation because evidence showed the decisionmaker did not make his final termination decisions until after the ethics complaint and may have decided to terminate the second plaintiff after he participated in the investigation. The court also held that a reasonable jury could find pretext. Evidence showed the decisionmaker “question[ed] the timing” of the ethics complaint, and stated in the same email that he planned to terminate plaintiffs. Further, he terminated them even though his supervisor had “[n]o expectations” that the reorganization would lead to terminations, and seemingly failed to follow defendant’s reduction-in-force process. Because the parties offered “two reasonable interpretations of the evidence,” the retaliation claims had to go to a jury. But the hostile-work-environment claims failed under the Faragher/Ellerth defense. The court held that defendant had a reasonable harassment policy, promptly investigated the complaint, substantiated the allegations, disciplined the supervisor, and thereby “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly” the harassment. It also held that plaintiffs unreasonably failed to use defendant’s corrective measures because one waited about four months to report and largely provided only vague allegations, while the other never reported the conduct. Finally, the court held that the ADEA claim failed because the plaintiff’s duties were redistributed among existing employees, and “‘[s]preading the former duties of a terminated employee among the remaining employees does not constitute replacement.’” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Asylum & withholding of removal; Serious nonpolitical crime bar; 8 USC §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) & 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii); “Serious reasons to believe”; Probable cause standard; Maryland v Pringle; Burden shifting; 8 CFR §§ 1208.16(d)(2)(i) & 1240.8(d); Attempted murder charge; Intent; Defense of others; Convention Against Torture (CAT); 8 CFR § 1208.16(c)(2); Official consent or acquiescence; § 1208.18(a)(7); Substantial evidence

In an issue of first impression, the court interpreted the phrase “serious reasons to believe” in the statutory serious-nonpolitical-crime bar, and held that the bar requires only probable cause. It further held that substantial evidence supported the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Petitioner, a Brazilian citizen, conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding, and CAT relief after DHS initiated removal proceedings. The IJ denied relief, and the BIA affirmed. On his petition for review, the court first adopted the probable-cause standard for the statutory phrase “serious reasons for believing,” holding that it “requires no more than a finding of probable cause.” Applying that standard, the court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that the bar applied where petitioner was charged with attempted murder in Brazil after shooting at his nephew’s vehicle, chasing him for about two kilometers, and seriously injuring him. The court rejected petitioner’s intent argument, reasoning that intent could be inferred from the facts and that the IJ and BIA were not required to “hyper-scrutinize” his admitted actions or credit his after-the-fact claim that he lacked intent to kill. It also rejected his defense-of-others argument because the record supported the conclusion that he “took the law into his own hands” after he knew his son was not with the nephew, and deadly force was not reasonably necessary. The court further held that substantial evidence supported denial of CAT relief. Police responded to prior harm, the nephew was prosecuted and imprisoned, and the record showed the government did not “turn a willfully blind eye” to petitioner. His prison-torture theory also failed because the BIA reasonably found the nephew’s alleged criminal-gang connections “limited” and “speculative.” The court denied his petition.

“Class of one” equal-protection claim related to postal delivery service; Subject-matter jurisdiction; 28 USC § 1331; Effect of an administrative review scheme; Elgin v Department of Treasury; Thunder Basin Coal Co v Reich; Free Enter Fund v Public Co Accounting Oversight Bd; Axon Enter, Inc v Federal Trade Comm’n; The Postal Accountability & Enhancement Act (PAEA); 39 USC § 3662

The court held that plaintiffs’ “class of one” equal-protection claim concerning defendant-USPS’s failure to deliver mail to their property had to be filed before the Postal Regulatory Commission. Thus, it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their first amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The USPS stopped delivering to the mailbox at the end of plaintiffs’ driveway on a single lane road after a confrontation between one of their neighbors and a mail carrier. They have to “travel to a mailbox about half a mile down the road to retrieve letters and five miles into” a town for parcels. The court applies a two-step process to “determine whether an administrative review scheme divests a district court of jurisdiction over a constitutional claim[.]” At step one, it considered “whether the PAEA, ‘by specifying a different method to resolve claims about agency action,’ implicitly supplants § 1331’s grant of jurisdiction.” It concluded, after reviewing “the PAEA’s text, structure, context, and purpose, Congress’s intent to supplant federal district court jurisdiction over those matters expressly placed within the Commission’s purview is fairly discernible.” The court determined that Congress intended “that the Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over service- and rate-related complaints.” It next found that plaintiffs fared “no better at step two, because each of the three Thunder Basin factors indicates that this particular case belongs before the Postal Regulatory Commission.” The court noted that the fact all three of those factors indicated that their “‘claim is “of the type” Congress thought belonged within [the] statutory scheme’” helped explain why courts, including this one, “have all held that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims like Plaintiffs’, even when they are framed as constitutional issues.”

Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; Relative placement; In re Gonzales/Martinez; Guardianship; In re Lombard

The court held that the trial court did not err in finding termination was in the child’s best interests despite his relative placement. The child was born testing positive for multiple substances, including cocaine, meth, methadone, and opioids, and he remained hospitalized for more than six weeks with withdrawal symptoms. Respondent-mother admitted longstanding drug addiction, lack of prenatal care, no housing or employment plan, and a prior termination. On appeal, she only challenged the trial court’s best interests finding. The court held that the best-interest finding was supported by the lack of bond, the mother’s failure to provide for the child or be “part of the child’s life,” and her failure to address drug addiction. The court noted she had not visited the child while he was in the grandmother’s custody, was still using heroin and crack cocaine at the time of trial, and showed no signs of improvement. It rejected her reliance on relative placement because the trial court specifically considered that factor and still found termination appropriate. The child was thriving with his grandparents, bonded with his grandmother and half sibling, and the grandmother was willing to adopt. The court also found guardianship unnecessary because the child was too young for guardianship, adoption would provide permanency, and without termination “the child could be returned to [respondent], which would put the child at risk.” Affirmed.

Assumption of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1); “Neglect” (MCL 722.602(1)(d)); “Negligent”; In re Lange; Due process

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in exercising jurisdiction over the child (BGS) under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and rejecting respondent-mother’s due process claims, the court affirmed the order assuming jurisdiction. The trial court heard evidence that, despite hospital staff “repeatedly informing respondent that the hospital was not equipped to provide neonatal or obstetrics care and that respondent and BGS would need to be transferred after BGS was born to ensure that BGS was properly cared for, respondent initially refused all attempts to transfer BGS to a suitable hospital. This was despite not only the risks that this refusal posed to BGS but the actual issues that BGS was experiencing with her health in the hours” after her birth. The court concluded that the evidence supported the trial “court’s finding that, despite being able to do so, respondent refused to provide proper medical care that was necessary for BGS’s health.” It also supported the “finding that BGS was harmed by respondent’s negligent refusal to allow BGS to receive proper medical care—a reasonably prudent person in respondent’s position would not have waited to address BGS’s medical issues and would have immediately permitted BGS to be transferred to a hospital that could provide the” needed care. The court also found that the record did not support her due process claims. While she asserted that the trial court heavily relied on her prior cases involving other children, it “did not even mention” them in finding that exercising jurisdiction here was proper. As to her challenge to its factual findings, they were supported by hospital staff “testimony about the actual harm that respondent’s actions and decisions caused BGS and the medical records reflecting the same.” Finally, the trial court’s finding of jurisdiction was supported by sufficient evidence.