Second-degree arson; Sufficiency of the evidence; MCL 750.73(1); Circumstantial evidence; People v Walker; Evidentiary error; Relevance; MRE 401; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Harmless error; People v Phillips; Sentencing; OV 1; Incendiary device; MCL 777.31(1)(b) & (3)(b); OV 2; MCL 777.32(1)(b) & (3)(d); People v Naccarato

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s second-degree arson conviction, any error in admitting certain police testimony was harmless, and OVs 1 and 2 were properly scored based on use of an incendiary device. Defendant lived in his father and uncle’s home, slept in the basement, and was facing eviction when a fire began in the basement. On appeal, the court first held that the evidence was sufficient to prove the fire was intentionally set because the fire investigator eliminated other possible causes and concluded that the fire was started “by a human hand using an ‘open flame device’” and combustible fuel. It also held that sufficient circumstantial evidence identified defendant as the culprit because he had a lighter, was the first to know about the fire, slept in the basement where it started, had a motive from the eviction, and made “unprovoked and agitated assertions” that his father and uncle thought he was responsible. The court next found that defendant’s statements “about Rittenhouse and Kenosha” were admissible as evidence of violent state of mind, but agreed that testimony about racist statements and prior police contact did not fit the trial court’s stated rationale. Still, any error was harmless because the testimony was brief, was barely referenced, and “there was ample unobjectionable and untainted evidence of defendant’s guilt.” Finally, the court held that OVs 1 and 2 were properly scored at 20 points and 15 points, respectively, because the combustible fuel qualified as an incendiary device, and under Naccarato, victims sleeping in a house set on fire were “subjected or exposed to” that device. Affirmed.

Bindover; First-degree murder; Premeditation & deliberation; People v Oros; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Plea bargaining; Lafler v Cooper; Self-defense; MCL 780.972; Sufficiency of the evidence; Prosecutorial error; Sentencing; Felony-firearm; MCL 750.227b; Consecutive sentencing; People v Clark; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

The court held that defendant was properly bound over on first-degree murder, was not denied the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, and was not entitled to relief on his self-defense challenge, but that his JOS required ministerial correction. Defendant shot the decedent inside a liquor store after an altercation. The security footage showed defendant approach the decedent, draw his firearm, hold him at gunpoint, and shoot him as he fell. On appeal, the court first held that the bindover was proper because the video evidence supported premeditation and deliberation, including that defendant drew his gun, held the decedent at gunpoint despite another person’s (B) efforts to intervene, and had enough time “to take a second look.” The court next rejected defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim arising from plea negotiations because defendant twice “unequivocal[ly]” rejected plea offers on the record and failed to show that viewing B’s interrogation video would have changed his decision. The court noted that the interrogation statements were “quite similar” to B’s trial testimony and other evidence, and the security footage was “arguably more damaging.” As to self-defense, the court held that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to disprove the defense because witnesses heard no threats, the decedent was unarmed, and the video “clearly depict[ed]” defendant approaching the decedent and holding him at gunpoint. The court also held that the prosecutor’s characterization of defendant as the aggressor was consistent with the proofs and was not misconduct. Finally, the court held that the JOS had to be corrected because a CCW sentence cannot run consecutively to a felony-firearm sentence where MCL 750.227b expressly excludes MCL 750.227 as a predicate felony, and “‘no language in the statute permits consecutive sentencing with convictions other than the predicate offense.’” Affirmed but remanded for ministerial correction of the JOS.

Sufficiency of the evidence for an accosting a child for an immoral purpose conviction; MCL 750.145a; People v Darga; Vagueness challenge to the statute; People v Gaines; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a futile constitutional challenge; Failure to seek a stipulation as to prior convictions; Applicability of Old Chief v United States & People v Swint

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of accosting a child for an immoral purpose, and that the statute (MCL 750.145a) is not unconstitutionally vague. It also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He contended “the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he ‘accosted’ [victim-]XW because, unlike in Darga, there was no evidence that he spoke to XW in an ‘aggressive, challenging, or threatening way.’” The court found this argument was “misplaced. First, defendant ignores that ‘enticing’ or ‘soliciting’ are alternative bases to convict him, and that ‘accosting’ is not required.” It noted that he did “not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of enticement or solicitation. Second, while true that, unlike in Darga, there was no evidence here that defendant yelled at XW, threatened him, or commanded him to engage in a sex act, this fact does not mean the evidence was insufficient to convict. Regardless of his tone, defendant approached XW, an unaccompanied 14-year-old, inside a gas station and said, ‘You look like you could use a blowjob,’ and that XW ‘needed a blowjob.’ After XW went outside the gas station, defendant circled the gas station multiple times and waved at XW at least once. At minimum, a rational juror could conclude that defendant made the comments to ‘entice’ or ‘solicit’ or ‘accost’ XW to engage in the sexual acts that he described as those terms are defined.” As to his vagueness argument, the court held in Gaines that MCL 750.145a is not unconstitutionally vague. And the court concluded that no reasonable person would have to guess whether his statements to XW sought “to induce an ‘immoral act’ under the statute.” He also could not show “prejudice because the use of the word ‘immoral’ within the context of MCL 750.145a specifically describes his conduct toward XW that resulted in a guilty conviction.” Finally, his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring a meritless constitutional challenge to the statute or for not seeking a stipulation to conceal “the number and nature of his prior convictions.” Affirmed.

Divorce; Asset distribution; Marital home sale proceeds; Personal property; One party’s IRA; Spousal support; MCL 552.23(1); Woodington v Shokoohi

The court vacated the trial court’s ruling as to the distribution of defendant-ex-husband’s IRA and remanded for further proceedings as to that issue but otherwise affirmed its asset distribution and the decision not to award him spousal support. He challenged various aspects of the asset distribution, including the award, through “setoffs,” to plaintiff of approximately $28,000 of the $266,000 obtained in the sale of the marital home before the remaining proceeds were divided evenly. It awarded her “6,924.50 out of the proceeds as reimbursement for sale-preparation activities” and the court concluded that the record provided support for that decision. It also provided support for the decision to award her “$15,000 to equalize a withdrawal made by defendant from an E*TRADE account, and $3,293 to equalize an income-tax payment plaintiff had made.” Further, the court upheld the ruling “that each party would retain the personal property currently in his or her possession.” As to defendant’s IRA, the trial court awarded him, “as his separate premarital property, the value of the IRA on the date of the parties’ marriage, and then split the remaining balance of the account equally between the parties.” He asserted it erred in including in that “balance (1) the amount in the IRA attributable to [his] pension buyout, which he received during the marriage but which consisted entirely of money earned and accrued prior to the marriage; and (2) the amount in the IRA attributable to the appreciation of his premarital property[.]” Based on the record, the court saw “some conceivable merit in these arguments, but the trial court’s findings are insufficient to permit due appellate review of them.” It noted that “the trial court did not address the pension buyout or explain why it may be properly subject to division between the parties.” Given the circumstances, it concluded that a remand for the trial court to specifically address the matter was appropriate. It also remanded as to “how to characterize and distribute the appreciation of defendant’s IRA that occurred during the parties’ marriage.” As to spousal support, the trial court recognized the governing standards, and the court saw no reversible error in its “application of them to defendant’s request[.]”

Petition for instruction from the probate court as to the sale of decedent’s property; Personal representative (PR)

The court held that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in allowing petitioner-PR to amend the purchase agreement for the decedent’s farm. Respondent-Mietalka was one of the decedent’s children. She sought to purchase the farm for $650,000 in cash. A group of the decedent’s other children also sought to purchase it. They eventually formed an LLC (Mata Farm) to do so. The PR petitioned for instruction from the probate court as to the competing offers and a related request to amend the purchase agreement on the Mata Farm offer. The probate court entered an order permitting the PR to amend the purchase agreement and add one of the decedent’s children (C) “as an individual party, with the condition that the closing date be no later than 30 days from the date of the order.” Mietalka appealed. The court found no error in the probate court’s decision. It noted that “both parties were ultimately able to purchase the property for $650,000 in cash, that petitioner and Mata Farm addressed the necessary repairs to the property, that Mietalka’s offer required payment of the realtor’s commission by the estate, and that several of decedent’s children were involved with Mata Farm.” It concluded that Mietalka “failed to show any abuse of discretion in the probate court’s decision to allow petitioner to amend the purchase agreement to add [C] as an individual party and to afford Mata Farm and [C] a 30-day window to purchase the property. Both Mietalka and Mata Farm made reasonable offers, which were for more than the appraised value of the property and were from members of decedent’s family. In light of the large number of decedent’s living children that would have access to the property and the overall amount the estate would receive from the purchase, the probate court’s decision in favor of Mata Farm did not fall outside the range of principled outcomes; that does not change simply because an outcome in favor of Mietalka might also have been reasonable.”

Reasonable reunification efforts; Incarcerated parent; In re Dixon (On Reconsideration); Case service plan; In re Matamoros; Meaningful opportunity to comply; In re Mason; Plain error; In re Berryman/Hurd/Morgan/Morgan-Hurd

The court held that respondent-father failed to show error in the trial court’s determination that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts before termination of his parental rights. The trial court took jurisdiction after respondent’s whereabouts were unknown, he had no significant contact with the child, and the DHHS could not locate him despite following its “absent parent protocol.” Respondent was later arrested, jailed, and then imprisoned. His only appellate challenge concerned reasonable efforts while incarcerated. On appeal, the court first noted that imprisonment alone does not eliminate the DHHS’s duty to make reasonable efforts because “[t]he mere fact of imprisonment is not one of” the statutory exceptions. But the court held that the record “belies” respondent’s claim that little was done because of his incarceration. While he was jailed, the caseworker mailed him case documents, discussed the case with him in person and by phone, contacted the jail about available services, enrolled him in parenting classes, provided a parenting workbook that he “never completed and returned,” and arranged video parenting-time visits. After respondent was transferred to prison, the caseworker mailed additional documents, contacted the prison about services, and recommended substance-abuse treatment, therapy, and cognitive intervention. She also spoke with his therapist, communicated with respondent by phone, video, and in person, and arranged weekly phone calls with the child when prison video visits were not approved. The court concluded that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to give respondent “a meaningful opportunity to participate in the services available to him,” and he did not identify additional services the DHHS could reasonably have provided. Affirmed.

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Suspension of parenting time; MCL 712A.13a(13); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Mason; Children’s best interests; Relative placement; In re CJM; Guardianship alternative; In re Lombard; Guardian ad litem (GAL)

The court held that: 1) the trial court did not reversibly err by suspending respondents’ parenting time, 2) the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, 3) § (c)(i) supported termination, and 4) termination was in the children’s best interests. The case arose after respondent-father chased a child through a field with his truck and tackled him, while respondent-mother allegedly supported the conduct and helped restrain the child in the truck. On appeal, the court first held that the ex parte suspension of parenting time was not reversible error because the GAL’s allegations, taken at face value, were sufficient to show that “‘parenting time, even if supervised, may be harmful to the [children’s] life, physical health, or mental well-being.’” Further, the later termination petition supplied an independent basis for suspension. The court next held that the DHHS made reasonable efforts, including psychological evaluations, individual counseling, couples counseling, parenting classes, supportive visitation, and efforts to arrange family therapy, but respondents failed to show “meaningful progress.” As to statutory grounds, the court held that § (c)(i) was established because, after more than 182 days, the barriers involving mental health, domestic relations, and parenting skills remained unresolved. The court emphasized that “‘mere participation is not the same as overcoming the barriers in place,’” and respondents’ conduct during parenting time showed only minimal change. The court also held that termination was in the children’s best interests because the parent-child bond was “‘definitely broken,’” the children improved after parenting time was suspended, several children feared returning home, and respondents had no meaningful safety plan. Finally, the court rejected the guardianship argument as to one child (K) because the DHHS considered guardianship, but K did not want continued contact with respondents and adoption better served her interests. Affirmed.

Ex parte removal order; MCR 3.963(B)(1) & (4); Absence of a petition or affidavit of facts; Harmless error; In re Miller; Sufficiency of the factual findings in the order; MCL 712A.14(1)

The court held that while the trial court erred in issuing the ex parte removal order without a petition or an affidavit, the error was harmless as “the result was consistent with substantial justice, and it did not affect the” outcome of the case. Further, the factual findings in the order “satisfied MCR 3.963(B)(1) and MCL 712A.14(1).” Respondent-mother appealed the order, which removed her three children from her care. She first asserted that the trial court erred in issuing the ex parte order without receiving a petition or affidavit of facts. The court agreed an error occurred. “MCR 3.963(B)(4) requires that a ‘petition or affidavit of facts’ be submitted before an ex parte order can be issued.” Respondent brought two of the children to the hospital on 10/23/25 with severe burns. Authorities learned about their circumstances the next day. “Neither an affidavit nor a formal petition was submitted before the” trial court issued the order. Although the “DHHS did not submit it in affidavit form, on the basis of the record, the trial court was provided with the information it relied on to enter the ex parte order, as contemplated by the court rule. At the initial preliminary hearing, [it] heard from respondent and her counsel. [It] ultimately adjourned the preliminary hearing for good cause shown and, later that day, DHHS signed and submitted a petition, which was docketed the next business day [10/27/25], before the preliminary hearing resumed. And two days later respondent waived her right to a probable cause determination, the trial court heard testimony, and it then issued an order authorizing the filing of the petition and placing the children with DHHS pending a later hearing.” If the trial court had not issued the ex parte order on 10/24, and instead required a petition or affidavit, it was unclear “what would have happened, though it is possible the children would have been ordered removed three days later[.]” But the ultimate result “would have been the same.” As to the adequacy of the order, its “factual findings detailed the incident which led DHHS to seek the ex parte order: the injuries to the children, the services that had been provided to the family to prevent removal, and the fact that the children’s father was in jail at the time.” Affirmed.