42 USC § 1983 action alleging withholding of evidence & fabrication of evidence; Interlocutory jurisdiction; Qualified immunity; The Heck v Humphrey doctrine; Claims under Brady v Maryland; Waiver of argument that plaintiffs’ rights were not “clearly established”; Malicious prosecution; Collateral estoppel under Michigan law; MCR 6.502; MCL 691.1755(8); Lack of “probable cause” to arrest

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In this § 1983 case arising from wrongful convictions, the court concluded it lacked interlocutory jurisdiction over several aspects of the appeal and dismissed them. It held that collateral estoppel did not bar plaintiffs-Cotton and Legion’s malicious prosecution claim against defendant-Hughes and that the district court properly denied defendant-Bates qualified immunity on their fabrication of evidence claim. Plaintiffs spent nearly 20 years in prison on murder convictions that were vacated after “evidence came to light suggesting that key witness testimony was fabricated, [and] other material evidence” was withheld. Plaintiffs asserted Brady claims, malicious prosecution claims, and fabrication of evidence claims against defendants. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment only in part. They appealed. The court first considered their Heck argument, and held that it has been established that a “Heck claim does not fall under either the collateral order doctrine or pendent appellate jurisdiction.” Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to review this issue and dismissed that part of the appeal. On their qualified immunity claims, the court noted its review is under the collateral order doctrine and its “jurisdiction is limited on interlocutory review” to legal questions, subject to two narrow exceptions. As to defendants’ arguments related to plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the court held that they either were “not properly preserved or outside” its jurisdiction, and thus it did not reach their merits. Turning to the malicious prosecution claims against Hughes under both federal and state law, it first considered whether they were barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs’ convictions were vacated by stipulated orders and under court precedent, stipulated orders have no preclusive effect. Hughes argued that MCR 6.502 barred the claims, but the court held that the Michigan Court Rules “regulate the procedural mechanisms available to litigants, not the court’s authority over its own judgments or its power to vacate a conviction.” Because plaintiffs’ “convictions have been vacated, and the question whether Legion suffered a deprivation of liberty was not ‘actually litigated’ in the state proceedings, collateral estoppel” did not bar their claims. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling to that effect. It also affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the fabrication of evidence claim against Bates, that “a reasonable jury could conclude, based on record evidence, that there was a lack of probable cause for the detention of Cotton and Legion.” It again noted that the determination a triable issue of fact exists “‘cannot be appealed on an interlocutory basis.’”

42 USC § 1983 action alleging withholding of evidence & fabrication of evidence; Interlocutory jurisdiction; Qualified immunity; The Heck v Humphrey doctrine; Claims under Brady v Maryland; Waiver of argument that plaintiffs’ rights were not “clearly established”; Malicious prosecution; Collateral estoppel under Michigan law; MCR 6.502; MCL 691.1755(8); Lack of “probable cause” to arrest

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In this § 1983 case arising from wrongful convictions, the court concluded it lacked interlocutory jurisdiction over several aspects of the appeal and dismissed them. It held that collateral estoppel did not bar plaintiffs-Cotton and Legion’s malicious prosecution claim against defendant-Hughes and that the district court properly denied defendant-Bates qualified immunity on their fabrication of evidence claim. Plaintiffs spent nearly 20 years in prison on murder convictions that were vacated after “evidence came to light suggesting that key witness testimony was fabricated, [and] other material evidence” was withheld. Plaintiffs asserted Brady claims, malicious prosecution claims, and fabrication of evidence claims against defendants. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment only in part. They appealed. The court first considered their Heck argument, and held that it has been established that a “Heck claim does not fall under either the collateral order doctrine or pendent appellate jurisdiction.” Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to review this issue and dismissed that part of the appeal. On their qualified immunity claims, the court noted its review is under the collateral order doctrine and its “jurisdiction is limited on interlocutory review” to legal questions, subject to two narrow exceptions. As to defendants’ arguments related to plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the court held that they either were “not properly preserved or outside” its jurisdiction, and thus it did not reach their merits. Turning to the malicious prosecution claims against Hughes under both federal and state law, it first considered whether they were barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs’ convictions were vacated by stipulated orders and under court precedent, stipulated orders have no preclusive effect. Hughes argued that MCR 6.502 barred the claims, but the court held that the Michigan Court Rules “regulate the procedural mechanisms available to litigants, not the court’s authority over its own judgments or its power to vacate a conviction.” Because plaintiffs’ “convictions have been vacated, and the question whether Legion suffered a deprivation of liberty was not ‘actually litigated’ in the state proceedings, collateral estoppel” did not bar their claims. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling to that effect. It also affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the fabrication of evidence claim against Bates, that “a reasonable jury could conclude, based on record evidence, that there was a lack of probable cause for the detention of Cotton and Legion.” It again noted that the determination a triable issue of fact exists “‘cannot be appealed on an interlocutory basis.’”

Resisting or obstructing; Lawfulness of police conduct; MCL 750.81d(1); People v Quinn; Unlawful arrest; Right to resist; People v Moreno; Warrantless misdemeanor arrest; MCL 764.15; People v Trapp; Disturbing the peace; MCL 750.170; MCL 750.504; Investigatory detention; Terry v Ohio; De facto arrest; Abandoned claims; People v Bowling

The court held that defendant was entitled to dismissal of the resisting-or-obstructing charge arising from his initial seizure because he had a right to resist unlawful police conduct, but he failed to show entitlement to dismissal of charges stemming from his conduct at the jail and during transport to the hospital. Police responded to a report that defendant was yelling and possibly intoxicated, but when they arrived he was lying on the ground with his dog and “not engaging in any unlawful or bothersome activity.” The officers handcuffed him, patted him down, and walked him to a patrol vehicle for possible disturbing the peace, a 90-day misdemeanor. He resisted getting into the police vehicle and later struggled with officers at the jail. And while being transported to the hospital after the cell altercation, he bit a paramedic. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss the charges against him and quash the felony information. On appeal, the court first held that the officers could not lawfully arrest defendant for the disturbing the peace offense because MCL 764.15 permits a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside an officer’s presence only when the misdemeanor is punishable by “more than 92 days,” while disturbing the peace is punishable by “not more than 90 days.” The court also rejected the prosecution’s effort to characterize the seizure as only a detention because the officers’ conduct “went far beyond the permissible limits of a Terry stop,” especially where defendant was handcuffed and forced toward the patrol car when he was not acting disruptively and could not lawfully be arrested for the reported conduct. Relying on Moreno and Trapp, the court held that “‘the seizure, whatever its label, was unreasonable,’” so defendant had a right to resist and the resisting-or-obstructing charge based on that initial encounter had to be quashed. But the court declined to dismiss the remaining charges because he offered only a “sparse and conclusory” argument and failed to provide “meaningful argument or legal authority” showing that the later conduct in the holding cell and ambulance was protected resistance. Reversed in part and remanded.

Sentencing; Departure from the guidelines; Proportionality; People v Walden; Adequate justification; People v Dixon-Bey; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not impose an unreasonable sentence in sentencing defendant, and that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the upward departure. Defendant was convicted of FIP; aggravated domestic violence, second offense; assault with a dangerous weapon; domestic violence or knowing assault on a pregnant individual, third offense; and felony-firearm. The applicable guidelines range was 19 to 38 months. The trial court imposed sentences of 40 to 60 months. The court noted that it “did not explicitly speak in terms of proportionality or expressly state that it was providing an explanation for its departure from the guidelines, and in many cases such an omission would require a remand for a more robust explanation ‘in order to facilitate appellate review.’” But under the circumstances here, it was “confident that the trial court’s comments at sentencing were its explanation, articulated relevant proportionality considerations, and adequately justified its two-month upward departure from the applicable guidelines range.” The court concluded that the trial court’s comments “at the sentencing hearing, although rather sparse,” could be reasonably inferred as its rationale for departing from the guidelines. “As in Walden, [its] comments relate to ‘factors not considered by the guidelines, such as . . . the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation[.]’” It found that defendant’s “lack of remorse and refusal to take accountability were reflected in the [trial] court’s statements that [he] showed a complete disregard for [the victim] and people in general and that defendant’s testimony had been ‘malarkey.’ [It] also questioned [his] rehabilitation potential, stating: ‘I don’t even know if the sentence that I could hand down . . . is going to change’ defendant’s disrespect and lack of self-control.” Given that its “comments, in context, relate specifically to factors used to fashion a proportionate sentence, they provide justification for the” small departure here. The “explanation—though somewhat meager—is adequate for purposes of appellate review.” Affirmed.

Notice of arraignment by mail; Procedural due process; People v McGee; Personal service of citations; Prejudice required to establish a due process violation; People v Darden; Applicability of Jones v Flowers; Right to resist an unlawful arrest; People v Moreno; Sufficiency of the evidence; People v Vandenberg

The court rejected defendant’s procedural due process claim as to notice of the arraignment, held that she had no lawful right to resist the arrest, and concluded there was sufficient evidence to support her assaulting or resisting a police officer conviction. That conviction arose from what occurred when officers arrested her on two outstanding warrants for prior citations. She argued the arrest warrants were issued based on “a violation of her procedural due process rights due to insufficient notice of the arraignment[,]” which was provided by mail. The arraignment summons “was returned as undeliverable due to her homelessness.” The court noted that she “was personally served with two citations, each of which expressly set forth the nature of the charges pending against her and her obligation to appear in court” (although the arraignment date was omitted). “Service of these citations satisfied the requirements of due process by providing notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Further, her “decision to discard [them] in the police department’s trash receptacle upon her departure does not vitiate the sufficiency of service or the adequacy of the notice provided.” The court also found that she failed to identify “any cognizable prejudice arising from the alleged notice deficiency.” And even if prejudice was not a prerequisite, she “was unequivocally informed that a subsequent arraignment date would be provided, yet she failed to undertake any reasonable efforts to ascertain the status of her case, update her address, or otherwise remain apprised of her legal obligations, all while continuing to reside within the court’s jurisdiction. Her contention that the dismissal of” the prior charges had bearing was unconvincing, as this occurred after her arrest on the “outstanding warrants, not due to any procedural deficiencies attributable to the prosecution or the” trial court. Given the evidence presented that the arrest was lawful, and that defendant kicked one of the officers in the groin, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support her conviction. Affirmed.

Sentencing; Whether the trial court relied on inaccurate information; People v Jackson; Proportionality; Effect of a within-guidelines sentence; Unusual circumstances; People v Ventour; Presentencing information report (PSIR)

Rejecting defendant’s claims that he was sentenced based on inaccurate information and that his within-guidelines sentence was disproportionate, the court affirmed. But it remanded “for ministerial correction of the PSIR to reflect the correct guidelines range.” The court previously affirmed his convictions of domestic violence, third offense but remanded for resentencing due to a guidelines scoring error. His corrected range was 22 to 76 months. The trial court resentenced him to 76 months to 20 years. He was correct “that the PSIR was not amended to reflect the corrected guidelines[.]” But the dispositive question was “whether the trial court relied upon inaccurate information in resentencing” him. The court noted that documentation the trial court received, “including the presentencing case report and defendant’s sentencing memorandum, reflects the corrected guideline range. And during the resentencing hearing, defense counsel requested that defendant be sentenced to the bottom of the guidelines range, specifying . . . 22 months, and the prosecutor likewise acknowledged that the guidelines had adjusted downward by two months.” The court concluded that while “the trial court itself did not comment on the guidelines range, [it] was apprised of the correct range from multiple sources and nothing in the record suggests that [it] relied on the wrong” range. Because it “did not rely upon an inaccurate guidelines range, defendant is not entitled to resentencing.” Further, he failed to show unusual circumstances rebutting the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was proportionate. The record showed “the trial court considered ‘punishment, rehabilitation[] prospects, deterrence, and protection of society,’ the traditional objectives of sentencing in Michigan.” In resentencing him, it recognized the work he “had done recently in prison, such as by completing a batterer’s intervention program and maintaining good conduct, but tempered that recognition given defendant’s significant and lengthy criminal record and pattern of committing another offense shortly after release from prison or jail. [It] reasonably determined that a shorter period of incarceration would be ineffective to deter [him] from committing future offenses.”

Child custody; Referee hearing review; MCR 3.215; Docket control; Maldonado v Ford Motor Co; Due process; Notice & opportunity to be heard; Al-Maliki v LaGrant; Children’s best interests; MCL 722.23; Established custodial environment; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Change in custody; Clear & convincing evidence; Sabatine v Sabatine

The court held that the trial court did not violate the referee-review rules or plaintiff-father’s due-process rights and did not abuse its discretion by awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody. Plaintiff had sole legal and physical custody after defendant-mother experienced mental-health issues, but defendant later sought joint custody and equal parenting time. After a referee hearing occurred without a resulting order for nearly two years, the trial court conducted further proceedings, heard evidence from defendant and a reunification therapist, and found by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody with gradually increasing parenting time was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court properly exercised its inherent authority to manage its docket because MCR 3.215 did not bar review where “two years have elapsed since the referee’s hearing on a motion without the issuance of a proposed order.” The court next held that plaintiff received due process because defendant had repeatedly requested joint physical and legal custody, those requests remained pending, and plaintiff had “both notice and an opportunity to be heard.” As to the best-interest findings, the court held that the evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s findings, including its reliance on defendant’s testimony about resolved mental-health issues and her ongoing treatment. The court also upheld the finding that factor (j) strongly favored defendant because plaintiff opposed “almost any relationship” between defendant and the children, while defendant expressed support for the children’s relationship with both parents. Finally, the court held that the custody change was supported by the reunification therapist’s recommendation for unsupervised and gradually increasing parenting time and did not “grossly violate fact or logic.” Affirmed.

Child custody; Remand compliance; Fletcher v Fletcher; Children’s best interests; MCL 722.23; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Joint legal custody; MCL 722.26a(1)(b); Parental cooperation; Bofysil v Bofysil

The court held that the trial court complied with the prior remand order, did not err in its best-interest findings, and did not abuse its discretion by awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody. After the court previously vacated the custody order and remanded for a best-interest hearing, the trial court conducted several days of evidentiary hearings, found that the children had ECEs with both parents, and again ordered joint legal and physical custody. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court complied with the remand because the prior opinion required “a hearing to consider the children’s best interests,” and the trial court did exactly that by holding an evidentiary hearing and resolving defendant-father’s motion. The court next upheld the trial court’s best-interest findings, emphasizing that the trial court was not required to address “every piece of evidence,” was in the best position to assess credibility, and had record support for weighing the challenged factors equally. The court noted evidence that both parents loved the children, provided care, participated in schooling and activities, and had strengths and weaknesses. Although there was concerning evidence, including inappropriate comments by the children, plaintiff-mother’s “No Brad Rule” (referring to defendant), and conflict over appointments and parenting issues, the evidence did not “clearly preponderate” against the trial court’s findings. Finally, the court held that joint legal custody was a closer question, but reversal was unwarranted because the trial court found that the parties generally worked out disputes, the children were older, and the trial court remained available if the parties reached an impasse. Affirmed.

FOIA requests; Final determination; MCL 15.235; Premature summary disposition before discovery is complete; Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club; Law-enforcement exemption; MCL 15.243(1)(b); Evening News Ass’n v City of Troy; Security exemptions; MCL 15.243(1)(u); MCL 15.243(1)(y); Frivolous defense; MCL 600.2591(1); MCR 1.109(E); Grass Lake Improvement Bd v Department of Envtl Quality

The court held that summary disposition for defendant-prosecutor was proper as to plaintiff’s contract-related FOIA claims, but improper as to the threat-records exemption ruling, and that defendant asserted a frivolous ripeness defense. Plaintiff submitted FOIA requests to defendant, seeking contracts with Fortis Group (a security/threat management firm), the Washington Post, other news media outlets, and PR companies, as well as documented threats against defendant, her family, and her office. After defendant issued 10-day extension letters but did not respond further until plaintiff sued, the trial court granted defendant summary disposition. On appeal, the court first held that plaintiff failed to show a fair chance that further discovery would uncover contracts with Fortis Group, or additional media contracts or PR contracts other than those provided by defendant, because her position rested on speculation rather than “specific facts” creating a genuine issue. But the court held that defendant did not justify withholding threat records because her affidavits were “conclusory and generalized” and lacked “particularized facts or reasons” showing how disclosure would interfere with law-enforcement proceedings or endanger personnel. Relying on Evening News, the court remanded for a bill of particulars, detailed affidavit, or in camera review. The court also held that defendant’s ripeness defense was frivolous because MCL 15.235(3)(b) and (2)(d) plainly made her failure to respond within the extension period a “final determination to deny the request.” Defendant’s contrary view would let a public body “perpetually evade” FOIA by issuing one extension, an interpretation with no “colorable legal basis.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The No-Fault Act; Whether plaintiff was barred by MCL 500.3113(a) from recovering no-fault benefits; Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81225 in the 3/27/24 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Swoope.

Tort threshold under the No-Fault Act; Serious impairment of body function; MCL 500.3135; Objectively manifested impairment; McCormick v Carrier; Preexisting condition; Aggravation; Fisher v Blankenship; Record support

The court held that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that she suffered an objectively manifested impairment caused by the motor-vehicle accident. Plaintiff brought a no-fault tort claim for noneconomic damages after a city vehicle backed into her vehicle at an intersection, causing minor vehicle damage. On appeal, the court held that defendants properly supported their summary disposition motion with evidence of plaintiff’s extensive pre-accident history of back and hip problems, including scoliosis surgery, trochanteric bursitis, sacroiliitis, an acetabular labral tear, and hip surgeries. The court noted that plaintiff’s post-accident diagnoses largely mirrored her pre-accident diagnoses. She also had reported many of the same functional difficulties before the accident, including problems with prolonged sitting, standing, walking, transfers, lifting, household chores, and lying down. Although plaintiff argued that the crash caused new injuries or aggravated preexisting conditions, the court held that she cited only generally to medical records and failed to identify “specific objective evidence of an impairment or exacerbation of a preexisting condition directly attributable to the accident.” The court emphasized that “‘mere subjective complaints of pain and suffering are insufficient to show impairment,’” and plaintiff’s deposition testimony about needing help with grooming and having difficulty sitting or standing did not satisfy the objective-manifestation requirement. Because the medical records showed her condition was “largely the same pre- and post-accident,” plaintiff failed to meet the MCL 500.3135 threshold. Affirmed.

Motion for relief from a final order; MCR 2.612(C); Lack of a trial court explanation for its ruling; Woodington v Shokoohi; Moot issue; Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP)

Because the trial court did not “explain its ruling denying plaintiff’s motion for relief from” a final order under MCR 2.612(C), the court vacated the order denying the motion and remanded. The case involved an auto negligence claim against defendant-Hill and a claim for first-party no-fault benefits against defendant-Allstate, an assigned insurer under the MACP. Defaults were entered against Hill. A stipulated order of dismissal was later entered, signed by plaintiff’s counsel and Allstate’s counsel. In her motion for relief from the final order, plaintiff sought to reinstate the case as to Hill only. A motion hearing was held, at the end of which the trial court stated: “So, how about this? Your motion is denied. Have a good day.” The court noted that no “further explanation or legal analysis appears on the record, leaving the basis for the [trial] court’s denial entirely unclear to the parties and to any reviewing court.” Because the court had no “basis for providing meaningful appellate review[,]” it vacated the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions that the trial court “adequately explain the basis of any order it determines is appropriate so the order may be subject to meaningful appellate review.”

Tort threshold under the No-Fault Act; Serious impairment of body function; MCL 500.3135; Objectively manifested impairment; McCormick v Carrier; Preexisting condition; Aggravation; Fisher v Blankenship; Record support

The court held that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that she suffered an objectively manifested impairment caused by the motor-vehicle accident. Plaintiff brought a no-fault tort claim for noneconomic damages after a city vehicle backed into her vehicle at an intersection, causing minor vehicle damage. On appeal, the court held that defendants properly supported their summary disposition motion with evidence of plaintiff’s extensive pre-accident history of back and hip problems, including scoliosis surgery, trochanteric bursitis, sacroiliitis, an acetabular labral tear, and hip surgeries. The court noted that plaintiff’s post-accident diagnoses largely mirrored her pre-accident diagnoses. She also had reported many of the same functional difficulties before the accident, including problems with prolonged sitting, standing, walking, transfers, lifting, household chores, and lying down. Although plaintiff argued that the crash caused new injuries or aggravated preexisting conditions, the court held that she cited only generally to medical records and failed to identify “specific objective evidence of an impairment or exacerbation of a preexisting condition directly attributable to the accident.” The court emphasized that “‘mere subjective complaints of pain and suffering are insufficient to show impairment,’” and plaintiff’s deposition testimony about needing help with grooming and having difficulty sitting or standing did not satisfy the objective-manifestation requirement. Because the medical records showed her condition was “largely the same pre- and post-accident,” plaintiff failed to meet the MCL 500.3135 threshold. Affirmed.

Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); Lack of a finding of aggravated circumstances; Lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL)

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 84396 in the 10/3/25 edition) and remanded the case to that court “to consider whether reasonable reunification services were rendered and, if [they] were not rendered, to determine the appropriate remedy for the lack of a judicial determination of aggravated circumstances.” It noted that the DHHS “must make reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family in all cases unless ‘[t]here is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as provided in [MCL 722.638(1) and (2)].’” Both the DHHS and the children’s LGAL conceded “that no such judicial determination was made.” There was a dispute as to whether reasonable efforts were actually made in the case. “If necessary to the proper resolution of this case, the Court of Appeals may remand to the trial court for additional fact-finding.” The court directed the Court of Appeals to “expedite its consideration of this case.”