Attorney fee dispute related to a fee-sharing agreement; Whether the defendant-law firm was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Michigan; Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd.; MCL 600.711; MCL 600.745; Lease Acceptance Corp. v. Adams; Factors in determining whether a corporation carries on “a continuous and systematic part of its general business” in the state; Glenn v. TPI Petroleum, Inc.; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown; Kircos v. Lola Cars Ltd.; Whether the firm was subject to specific personal jurisdiction here; Yoost v; Caspari; MCL 600.715; Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc.; Due process; Starbrite Distrib., Inc. v. Excelda Mfg. Co.; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz; Aaronson v. Lindsay & Hauer Int’l Ltd.

While the court held that the defendant-law firm (Babbitt) was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Michigan, it upheld the trial court’s conclusion that Babbitt was subject to specific personal jurisdiction under MCL 600.715(1). Further, it held that subjecting Babbitt to specific personal jurisdiction here comported “with notions of fair play and substantial justice,” and was permissible under the Due Process Clause. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Babbitt’s summary disposition motion in this attorney fee dispute. Plaintiff-Smith retained the plaintiff-law firm (Goodman) to represent her in pursuing claims related to an auto accident. Goodman entered into a fee-sharing agreement with Babbitt. The court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that Babbitt consented to general personal jurisdiction in Michigan via the Michigan choice-of-law provision in the agreement, noting that “the contract did not contain a Michigan forum selection clause” and thus, “Babbitt did not explicitly agree or consent to the adjudication in a Michigan court of any dispute arising under the contract.” The trial court also erred in finding that “Babbitt carried on a continuous and systematic part of its general business” in Michigan. However, the court concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that Babbitt was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Michigan. “Babbitt entered into the fee-sharing agreement with Goodman, including a Michigan choice-of-law provision. Although the underlying litigation proceeded in Florida, Goodman is a Michigan corporation, and Babbitt communicated with Goodman in Michigan on a consistent basis” during the litigation. “Further, Babbitt’s assent to the fee-sharing agreement meant that it agreed to a continuing contractual relationship with Goodman, a Michigan firm, with a Michigan choice-of-law provision, to litigate against a Michigan company” (defendant-Auto-Owners). The relationship lasted nearly five years. Babbitt’s employees traveled to Michigan to participate in taking depositions. Taken together, the court held that “the contacts were sufficient to constitute the transaction of business by Babbitt within Michigan.” Further, “Babbitt purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities” here, the cause of action arose from its activities here, and relevant “considerations of fairness” showed that Michigan was “a reasonable forum for the adjudication of the dispute between Babbitt and Goodman.”